Creating a Favorable International Public Opinion Environment: External Propaganda (Duiwai Xuanchuan) as a Global Concept with Chinese Characteristics by Ohlberg, Mareike Svea
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“CREATING A FAVORABLE INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC OPINION ENVIRONMENT: 
EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA (DUIWAI XUANCHUAN) 
AS A GLOBAL CONCEPT WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS” 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation 
zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde 
der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Heidelberg 
 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
Mareike Svea Ohlberg, M.A. 
 
Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Rudolf G. Wagner 
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Andrew J. Nathan 
 
6. März 2013 
Abstract 
 
This thesis offers a political history of PRC propaganda targeted at 
foreigners in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 century. It seeks to give an answer to the seeming 
contradiction that particularly over the last decade, China has repeatedly pledged 
to invest more resources into improving its image and influencing international 
public opinion, yet at the same time, there continue to be blunders of the most 
basic type, particularly in areas where China wants to influence foreigners’ 
opinions most. The thesis examines how and to what extent China has been able 
to adapt its external propaganda apparatus, initially set up on the basis of the 
Soviet propaganda model that depended on the ability of the Party to regulate the 
flow of information into and out of China, to the current global media 
environment marked by porous national borders and fast-paced flows of 
information across the globe. Drawing on internal publications, archival 
documents, openly available materials, and interviews, it combines a bird’s-eye 
perspective on the development of external propaganda in China over the course 
of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 century with in-depth reading and analysis of key texts.  
Two propositions are tested: First, that external factors, including foreign 
models that China learns from, have had significant impact on how Chinese 
external propaganda policy has developed and second, that previous choices the 
PRC has made for its external propaganda sector substantially restrict the options 
available to the CPC today. Arguing that external propaganda has been path 
dependent at various levels, this study explains the difficulties China’s external 
propaganda apparatus continues to face as well as what strategies people pushing 
for reforms have used to overcome historical, ideological, and bureaucratic 
baggage. 
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1 Introduction  
In December 2003, propaganda targeting foreigners received a major 
upgrade in status: In a little-publicized speech, China’s President Hu Jintao 胡锦
涛 declared that “creating a favorable international public opinion environment” 
and “establishing a good image of China” abroad were “of importance for China’s 
national security and social stability.”1 This, for the first time in the history of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), turned propaganda targeting foreign publics 
formally into a matter of national security as well as internal stability. A few 
months later, in April 2004, China created the External Propaganda Work Leading 
Small Group in order to better coordinate policy making and implementation in 
this field.
2
 Simultaneously, the CPC introduced a Three Step Plan (san bu zou 三
步走) for the development of its external propaganda sector until 2020.3 Since 
then, officials have reiterated the need to give external propaganda (duiwai 
xuanchuan 对外宣传), the term China uses to refer to what would be called 
“public diplomacy” in most other countries, a stronger role in the realization of its 
long-term strategic objectives.
4
 
Although neither Hu Jintao’s speech nor the creation of the Leading Small 
Group were picked up by the Western press or in academic studies on the topic, 
the manifold consequences of linking propaganda targeted at foreigners to China’s 
                                                          
1
 Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju 中共中央宣传部干部局 [Cadre Bureau of the 
Central Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China], 
ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo 新时期宣传思想工作 [Propaganda and thought 
work in the new period] (Beijing: Xuexi, 2006), 188.  
2
 Cf. Zhu Muzhi 朱穆之, Fengyun jidang qishi nian 风云激荡七十年 [Seven turbulent decades], 
vol. 2 (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2007), 248; Zhou Zongmin 周宗敏, “Yong 
‘shijie yuyan’ tong haiwai shouzhong ‘zhijie duihua’ – yu guonei fenshe jizhe Yingwen baodao 
peixunban xueyuan zuotan” 用‘世界语言’同海外受众‘直接对华’——与国内分社记者英文
报道培训班学员座谈 , Duiwai xuanchuan cankao 对外宣传参考  [External propaganda 
reference], no. 10 (2004): 10.  
3
 “Quansheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi tichu: jianli da waixuan geju kaichuang waixuan 
gongzuo xin jumian” 全省对外宣传工作会议提出:建立大外宣格局开创外宣工作新局面 
[The province's foreign propaganda work meeting suggests: establish a big external 
propaganda pattern to create a new situation of external propaganda work], Jinri Hainan 今日
海南 [Hainan today], no. 7 (2004): 7. 
4
 Cf. “Wang Chen: Kaichuang dang he guojia duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo xin jumian” 王晨：开
创党和国家对外宣传工作新局面 [Wang Chen: Create a new situation for the Party’s and 
China’s external propaganda work], Zhongzhi dangjian 中直党建  [Party building (in 
institutions directly) under the Central Committee], no. 9, 2012, put online August 29, 2012, 
http://www.zzdjw.com/n/2012/0829/c348481-18868083.html, accessed November 14, 2012.  
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national security, domestic stability, and its long-term goals were soon noticed. 
Journalists as well as scholars have commented on the well-financed push of 
China’s media for a global presence in the midst of a global recession and at a 
time when most Western media were experiencing crises,
5
 on the mushrooming of 
Confucius Institutes,
6
 and on the marked improvement in the way China’s 
diplomats presented themselves abroad.
7
 China has made headlines for its 
orchestration of the 2008 Olympic opening ceremonies,
8
 for its campaign to 
improve the image of products “made in China,”9 for renting a huge billboard at 
the very heart of world news Times Square in New York City,
10
 and for the 
expansion of Chinese media into Africa,
11
 to list just a few examples. These 
efforts are usually associated with the by now well-known concept of “soft power,” 
introduced by Joseph Nye as a form of power that does not rely on military or 
economic might, but on attraction and thus “co-opts people rather than coerces 
them.”12 Particularly earlier articles and studies argued that although China had 
only recently discovered “soft power,” it was good at what it was doing and was 
improving its image in leaps and bounds, quite possibly at the expense of the 
United States’ (U.S.) international popularity.13  
                                                          
5
 E.g. Nicholas Bequelin, “China’s New Propaganda Machine: Going Global,” website of the Wall 
Street Journal, January 30, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123326012456829891.html, 
accessed September 14, 2012; Liang Fook Lye and Siew Keng Catherine Chong, China’s 
Media Initiatives and Its International Image Building, EAI Background Brief no. 555 (2010), 
available online at http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB555.pdf, accessed September 15, 2012. 
6
 E.g. James Paradise, “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in 
Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power,” Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (July/August 2009): 647-665. 
7
 E.g. Joshua Kurlantzik, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World 
(Yale University Press, 2007). 
8
 E.g. Richard Williams, “Patriot Games: China Makes its Point with Greatest Show,” website of 
the Guardian, August 9, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2008/aug/09/olympics2008.openingceremony, accessed 
December 17, 2012; “Olympic Show Opens with a Bang,” CNN website, August 8, 2008, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/08/olympics.opening.us/index.html, accessed 
December 17, 2012. 
9
 E.g. Calum MacLeod, “New Ad Campaign Touts ‘Made in China,’” website of USA Today, 
August 1, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-07-made-in-china-
products_N.htm, accessed August 30, 2012.  
10
 E.g. Stuart Elliott, “Sign of Arrival, for Xinhua, Is 60 Feet Tall,” New York Times Online, July 
25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/business/media/xinhuas-giant-sign-to-blink-on-
in-times-square.html?_r=0, accessed December 17, 2012.  
11
 E.g. David McKenzie, “Chinese Media Make Inroads into Africa,” CNN website,  September 25, 
2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/05/business/china-africa-cctv-media/index.html, accessed 
December 17, 2012.  
12
 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Public Affairs, 2004), 5.  
13
 E.g. Joshua Kurlantzik, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 47 (June 2006), accessed through CIAO 
(Columbia International Affairs Online); Kurlantzik, Charm Offensive.  
11 
 
Even after several years of investments and hard work, however, the fact 
that Chinese media and politicians operate in an environment that they are not 
fully familiar and comfortable with becomes evident on a regular basis. One 
scholar has noted that “in many contentious areas, including Taiwan, Tibet, […] 
the Falun Gong organization and so on, China’s performance has been dismal.”14 
In fact, ironically, the fields in which China wants to influence foreigners’ 
perceptions most strongly are also the fields in which the country’s attempts to 
sway global public opinion seem most heavy-handed and clumsy. For instance, in 
2010, after Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, China’s shrill 
reaction was met with a mixture of bewilderment and ridicule.
15
 In September 
2012, some Western media complained about the refusal of Chinese 
spokespersons to comment on the reasons why Xi Jinping 习近平, who is slated 
for the highest office in the Party and government, had cancelled important 
meetings and was not seen for two weeks.
16
 This was perceived as a form of 
secrecy that was outdated and incompatible with how a major power should 
behave. Chinese journalists and academics that I spoke to were generally aware of 
similar problems and somewhat frustrated about their inability to effect permanent 
change in how Chinese authorities approach communicating with foreign 
publics.
17
  
                                                          
14
 Paradise, “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering 
Beijing’s Soft Power,” 664. 
15
 As Kalathil has pointed out, the “petulant and stilted language” of China’s official rebuttal to 
Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize “[made] China seem amateurish.” Shathi Kalathil, “China’s 
Soft Power in the Information Age: Think Again,” ISD Working Papers in New Diplomacy, 
2011, 9. Available online at http://isd.georgetown.edu/files/Kalathil_Chinas_Soft_Power.pdf, 
accessed March 1, 2013. 
16
 E.g. Ian Johnson, “Communist Leader’s Absence Sets Off Rumor Mills in China,” New York 
Times Online, September 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/world/asia/xi-jinping-
chinas-presumptive-new-leader-mysteriously-absent.html?pagewanted=all, accessed 
September 13, 2012; Mark Jia, “Guest Post: The Many (Imagined) Lives of Xi Jinping,” 
Foreign Policy Online, 
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/12/guest_post_the_many_imagined_lives_of_xi_ji
nping, accessed September 13, 2012; Steffen Richter, “Pekings Schweigen ist gestrig” 
[Beijing’s Silence is Outdated], Website of Die Zeit, September 11, 2012, 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2012-09/xi-jinping-modernes-china, accessed September 13, 
2012. In December 2012, the disappearance of the new head of the Central Propaganda 
Department (CPD) was shrouded in similar silence. Cf. David Bandurski, “Where is Liu 
Qibao,” December 3, 2012, website of the China Media Project, 
http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/12/03/29628/, accessed December 9, 2012. 
17
 Interview with Communications Studies professor I, Beijing, April 2011; Interview with 
Communications Studies professor II, Beijing, April 2011; Interview with Journalist I, Beijing, 
April 2011. 
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In sum, on the one hand, China has linked a positive image abroad to the 
security and stability of the nation, and actual initiatives confirm that external 
propaganda ranks high on the list of priorities. The country has signaled its 
willingness to invest money and other resources into this endeavor, and there is 
visible apprehension in the United States and other countries about its possible 
impact. On the other hand, China’s rapidly expanding external propaganda 
continues to face difficulties because of content and journalistic practices that 
contain blunders, often seem to disregard the foreign audiences and lead to low 
impact if not disbelief and ridicule. My thesis takes up these contradictions and 
asks under what institutional, ideological and historical constraints Chinese 
propaganda targeted at foreigners has been operating and what the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) does (or does not do) to solve these problems. In so doing, 
this thesis tackles an issue that is relevant for all fields of contemporary China 
studies because it analyses the policies behind media content and official 
government statements that scholars working on almost any aspect of 
contemporary China use as their sources.  
While external propaganda as the effort of trying to establish a better 
image for oneself and gaining understanding for one’s policies among foreign 
publics is ubiquitous among nation-states in modern times, China provides a 
particularly fascinating case study. First, the CPC tries to adapt to a globalizing 
world as a Party originally organized according to Leninist principles and with a 
propaganda apparatus that was constructed for a global environment vastly 
different from today’s. Before the founding of the PRC and in the early 1950s, the 
PRC adopted a lot of its propaganda practices from the Soviet Union, whereas 
since the beginning of the post-Mao period, it has looked to the West as an 
important model how to make propaganda more effective.
18
 Thus, over the course 
of its history, the CPC has adapted ideas and propaganda practices both from the 
Soviet Union and from the West, particularly the Anglophone world, and is 
currently trying to consolidate the two.  
Second, one major difference between Chinese external propaganda and 
external propaganda as organized by states with multi-party democracies is its 
dual function: to propagate both the CPC and the Chinese nation-state. When the 
                                                          
18
 See Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in 
Contemporary China (Lanham MD et al.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 72-73. 
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CPC propagates China to the world, it does not want to omit itself from the 
picture but wants to convince foreigners that China’s development is the result of 
the Party’s policies rather than having been achieved despite the Party’s rule.19 
Thus, a Communist party claiming Marxism as its guiding ideology and ruling the 
second largest economy in the world is trying to establish itself and its point of 
view in front of the international public. It needs to do so in the post-Cold War era 
in which few other Communist parties remain in power and in which much of the 
practices and rhetoric of the former Socialist bloc have been discredited.  
While the CPC has arguably adapted its Leninist domestic propaganda 
apparatus with relative success to the changed political, economic and technical 
environment,
20
 its redefined external propaganda faces additional problems: It has 
to operate in an environment that the CPC does not control, and worse, that is 
dominated by Western news agencies and media which are considered as 
relatively hostile to both the form and the content of China’s attempts to influence 
foreign publics. This makes the development of an effective Chinese external 
propaganda strategy that at the same time does not conflict with Party-internal 
sensitivities all the more challenging. Thus, the PRC offers a uniquely interesting 
and timely case study on the perceived importance of an effective external 
propaganda strategy for a rising economic giant ruled by a Communist Party that 
is ideologically and structurally deeply anchored in propaganda practices of a 
world that largely collapsed with the end of the Cold War. 
 
1.1 State of the Art and Remaining Questions 
 Chinese external propaganda is a highly contested and rapidly developing 
field. The increasing number of reports, studies, hearings and briefs demonstrate 
the attention China’s efforts have received among media, scholars, and foreign 
governments. The U.S. Congress has held several sessions discussing Chinese 
“soft power”21 and has received multiple briefings on the topic.22 Over the last 
                                                          
19
 For example, in 2011, an edited volume on the CPC was published in English as part of a 
government-funded publications plan: Xie Chuntao, ed.,Why and How the CPC Works in 
China: A Look at What's Behind the Achievements of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: 
New World Press, 2011). 
20
 Cf. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 201. 
21
 Most importantly “China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations, its Intelligence Activities that 
Target the United States and its Resulting Impacts on US National Security,” Hearing before 
14 
 
three years, both edited volumes and individual articles on various aspects of 
China’s soft power project have surged in number. Despite this increase, there are 
four problems in existing secondary literature that I will use as a starting point to 
develop my own explorative approach for this thesis: first, the field of research is 
fragmented, second, the link between Chinese external propaganda and similar 
practices in other countries has been neglected, third, current initiatives are not 
connected with past practices, and fourth, there is a large amount of Chinese 
source material that has not been studied.   
 
A Fragmented Field 
Research on what broadly falls under the scope of “external propaganda” 
is scattered across different disciplines and theoretical frameworks, each of which 
approaches the subject matter from a different angle. Studies on or touching on 
Chinese external propaganda, past and present, come from a broad variety of 
disciplinary backgrounds, most importantly communication studies, international 
relations (IR), political science, and history. The manifold approaches to studying 
Chinese external propaganda defy easy classification; however, in order to present 
them more systematically, it makes sense to roughly divide them into two large 
categories. First, over the last decade, a debate on Chinese soft power has 
developed that tries to assess Chinese resources of soft power as well as the role 
soft power plays in China’s rise from an IR perspective. Second, external 
propaganda has been examined from an institutional-historical perspective by 
historians, political scientists as well as by scholars in the field of journalism and 
communications studies. These studies examine the structural transformations of 
Chinese politics and society and, as such, can be considered part of a larger body 
of literature focused on the question of how the CPC has adapted to the current 
times and how it is trying to secure its ruling position in China.
23
 
                                                                                                                                                               
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 20, 2009, available online 
at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/china/09_04_30_infl_ops.pdf, accessed March 1, 2013. 
22
 E.g. Another U.S. Deficit - China and America - Public Diplomacy in the Age of the Internet: A 
Minority Staff Report Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations , United 
States Senate, One HundredTwelfth Congress, First Session, February 15, 2011 (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), available online at 
http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/diplomacy/ChinaInternet.pdf, accessed November 1, 
2012.  
23
 E.g. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center and Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California 
15 
 
 In the last decade, the number of studies examining Chinese external 
propaganda initiatives and potential resources of soft power in IR studies has 
grown. The first few studies largely consisted of outlines and assessments of 
Chinese soft power resources and public diplomacy tools and have thus provided 
useful overviews of simultaneous developments as much as attested to the fact 
that the CPC has taken a close interest in the soft side of power, drawing on 
resources such as culture, history, and its media.
24
 Later, researchers increasingly 
also relied on individual case studies either to examine a specific field in its own 
right or in order to arrive at larger conclusions about Chinese soft power as a 
whole. Areas relatively well-covered include cultural diplomacy in general
25
 and 
Confucius Institutes in particular,
26
 the Olympics,
27
 the discourse of China’s 
                                                                                                                                                               
Press, 2008); Heike Holbig and Bruce Gilley, “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China,” Politics and 
Policy 38, no. 3 (2010): 395-422; Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship. 
24
 E.g. Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of China’s Soft Power,” Survival: 
Global Politics and Strategy 48, no. 2 (2006): 17-36; Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, “The 
Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s Soft Power,” EAST ASIA 23, no. 4 (2006): 22-44; 
Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and 
Prospects,” Asian Survey 48, no. 3 (2008): 453-472; Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the 
Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” ANNALS, AAPSS, no. 616 (2008): 257-273. 
25
 E.g. Xiaogang Deng and Lening Zhang, “China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural 
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has a research project with Jian Wang as principal investigator, titled “Reshaping Cultural 
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http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/research/project_detail/confucius_institutes/, accessed 
October 7, 2012. The project includes the Confucius Institutes Media Monitor (July 2009 to 
date) that keeps track of Confucius Institutes all over the world. Other studies include Paradise, 
“China and International Harmony”; Don Starr, “Chinese Language Education in Europe: the 
Confucius Institutes,” European Journal of Education 44, no. 1 (2009): 65-82; Hsi Chang Li, 
Sam Mirmirani, and Joseph A. Ilacqua, “Confucius Institutes: Distributed Leadership and 
Knowledge Sharing in a Worldwide Network,” The Learning Organization 16, no. 6 (2009): 
469-482.  
27
 E.g. Kevin Latham, “Media, the Olympics and the Search for the ‘Real China,’” The China 
Quarterly 197 (2009): 25-43; Hui Li, “Imagining China through the Olympics: Government 
Publicity and Journalism” (PhD dissertation, Queensland University of Technology, 2005); 
Nicholas Cull, “The Public Diplomacy of the Modern Olympic Games and China’s Soft Power 
Strategy,” in Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China, eds. Monroe E. Prise and 
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“peaceful rise,”28 the transformation of China Central Television (CCTV),29 and 
China’s “soft power” initiatives in the developing world.30 China’s relatively new 
policy to create global media players has also attracted some attention.
31
 More 
recently, relatively broad overviews in the IR approach have been supplemented 
by a number of edited volumes, most importantly Soft Power: China’s Emerging 
Strategy in International Politics (2009),
32
 Soft Power in China: Public 
Diplomacy through Communication (2011),
33
 which focuses on media-based 
initiatives, and China’s Soft Power and International Relations (2012).34 While 
these have contributed to a more nuanced study of Chinese external propaganda 
by offering case studies from different perspectives, the framework holding them 
together is still largely missing.  
In the IR field, scholarship produced out of analytical interest and studies 
written to give policy advice to governments cannot always be neatly separated. 
Aside from briefings directly produced for different governments, there are, for 
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instance, studies produced at various government-affiliated think tanks
35
 or 
sponsored by government agencies.
36
 This has led to government concerns 
dominating the focus and questions asked in this field. As others have pointed out 
before,
37
 Chinese “soft power” is implicitly or explicitly largely analyzed from the 
perspective whether and to what extent it might challenge the position of the U.S. 
or the West in general, and to what extent it poses a threat to the national security 
of a particular country. Kurlantzik, whose most important work focuses on South 
East Asia, answers in the affirmative,
38
 whereas Rawnsley,
39
 Kalathil,
40
 and Lye
41
 
find that China still has a long way to go. Some authors invert the perspective, and 
instead of looking at Chinese external propaganda from a U.S. security angle ask 
how China can overcome foreigners’ suspicions and raise its soft power.42 Of 
course, most individual author’s arguments are more complex than a simply yes 
or no reply to the question whether Chinese soft power might pose a threat to the 
U.S. or any other country, and some of these arguments will be addressed again 
below in the individual chapters. However, overall, the national security 
perspective has framed –and limited– the IR analysis.  
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The institutional-historical perspective can be subdivided into two approaches. 
First, there is the top-down perspective, which is an outgrowth of a debate on the 
role of propaganda in Chinese politics and governance, focusing on bureaucratic 
structures and official policy. It includes the works of Anne-Marie Brady, who has 
primarily focused on China’s domestic propaganda and thought work but also 
devoted a chapter in Marketing Dictatorship (2008) to external propaganda work, 
in particular to the differences in external propaganda before and after the 
crackdown on Tiananmen in 1989.
43
 David Shambaugh also comments on 
external propaganda in a 2007 article on China’s overall propaganda system.44 
The top-down institutional-historical approach, which stays relatively close to 
Chinese terminology and categories of organization, provides a potentially 
interesting angle, but has thus far treated external propaganda as an aside rather 
than as a topic in its own right.  
 Second, the institutional-historical perspective also includes a few studies 
analyzing the role and agency of Chinese journalists. These are part of a larger 
field concerned with transformation and negotiation processes in the media sector 
from a bottom-up perspective. One study assesses the function of foreign 
language media in China’s overall media landscape,45 and, like other accounts,46 
concludes that foreign language media are more advanced and thus have a 
pioneering role vis-à-vis domestic media. In another case study on the 
transformation of CCTV-9, John Jirik demonstrates, among other things, the 
influence of CCTV’s employees and existing structures and hierarchies on 
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planned changes to the channel.
47
 This approach from journalism and 
communication studies adds an important dimension to the study of Chinese 
external propaganda, namely how the agenda and agency of journalists and other 
people involved in the implementation of external propaganda policies may differ 
from the interests of the Party Center and affect the implementation of central 
policies on the ground. Like the top-down approach, however, the study of 
bottom-up transformations or resistance to reforms of the Chinese media is 
predominantly focused on the domestic.
48
 Thus, while the bottom-up and top-
down perspectives are both useful, the questions how external propaganda has 
been transformed to adapt to changing international circumstances and what 
difficulties are encountered in the process have only been treated marginally.  
 
Methodological Nationalism 
As implied above, China has selectively copied from other countries, most 
importantly the Soviet Union and the United States. Today, the CPC has an 
official policy of emulation, or rather, selective appropriation of foreign 
knowledge and expertise that has well-known predecessors going back to the 19
th
 
century when China was first confronted with the Western world order.49  
  While few people would claim that attempts to influence foreign publics 
are an exclusively Chinese practice, it is often presented and examined as such. 
Aside from academic convention (“methodological nationalism”) this most likely 
also has to do with the fact that the study of other countries’ foreign propaganda 
apparatuses has grown out of and feeds back into intelligence work. Even 
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explicitly comparative studies are rare; comparison, if it does take place, is usually 
implicit and comes in the form of edited volumes with different authors covering 
separate areas.
50
 A number of studies have mentioned that the Chinese 
development is part of a transnational trend.
51
 A recent dissertation on Chinese 
soft power, moreover, includes a chapter that introduces other countries’ 
initiatives, although again the comparison takes place largely through 
juxtaposition, not analysis.
52
 Thus, what has been left out of the equation is the 
massive amount of flows regarding the concept of propaganda as well as specific 
institutions and practices.  
  
“Soft Power” versus “External Propaganda” 
Studies that analyze the reception of the concepts of soft power or public 
diplomacy in China usually do not take earlier concepts into account –concepts 
that actually remain dominant in official circles and attached to which is a 
package of discourses, institutions and practices that the current soft power and 
public diplomacy discourses draw on or at least have to interact with in some form. 
Because China’s recent expansion of its external propaganda apparatus since 2004 
has been so striking, the majority of studies on current developments implicitly or 
explicitly treat the country’s interest in shaping international public opinion as a 
relatively new phenomenon.
53
 A notable exception is Edney Kingsley’s “Soft 
Power and the Chinese Propaganda System.”54 A few other studies make a note 
that before China became interested in soft power or public diplomacy in the 21st 
century, it subsumed and practiced activities associated with these concepts under 
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the term external propaganda.
55
 Others give a cursory overview of past 
developments on a few pages.
56
 Xiaoling Zhang and Rumi Aoyama have briefly 
addressed the differences between external propaganda before and after 1978. 
These two authors have proposed to use different terminology to address the 
rupture between the Mao and post-Mao periods: Zhang has proposed to read the 
transformation of propaganda in China today as a transformation from 
“propaganda to hegemony” in the domestic realm57 and from “foreign propaganda 
to international communication” for messages targeting foreigners. 58  Aoyama 
speaks of a transformation from “propaganda to public diplomacy.”59 What is 
missing, however, is a detailed analysis of both continuities and changes in 
China’s external propaganda between today and the founding of the PRC or even 
before. Thus, the questions how previous conventions affect current practice and 
how previous choices restrict current options remain largely unexplored. 
Particularly in recent years, a number of studies on Chinese external 
propaganda both during the Republican period and during the Mao period have 
emerged. The emphasis in secondary literature has primarily been on concrete 
initiatives and content. Chinese wartime propaganda during the Sino-Japanese 
War from 1937 to 1945 is fairly well researched compared to earlier initiatives.
60
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The most recent and comprehensive study is a dissertation on the development of 
Chinese propaganda targeted at foreigners between 1928 and 1941.
61
 For external 
propaganda in the Mao period, the most detailed studies are a dissertation from 
2009, which argues that external propaganda during the Mao period was difficult 
and costly for the Chinese state
62
 and another study published in Chinese in 2010 
that primarily seeks to show that many of the current innovations in external 
propaganda work already existed in some form before 1966.
63
 In addition to these 
works, there are some studies in Chinese that cover the time frame from the late 
19
th
 century until today, though these are forced into a relatively strictly defined 
historical narrative informed by the CPC’s teleological understanding of history 
that steadily progresses from lower to higher stages of development.
64
 One of the 
most glaring gaps in the current literature is the development of external 
propaganda during the 1980s and 1990s, which could give valuable insight into 
the reasons for the problems China has encountered thus far. Brady, who gives the 
most detailed account of this period, differentiates between external propaganda 
before and after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, but does not make any other 
distinctions and still considers “talking up the economy, rather than improving 
China’s political image”65  as the main aim of China’s external propaganda,66 
which is clearly no longer true. Thus, a large number of both small and large 
changes have been disregarded.  
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Chinese Sources 
Existing studies on Chinese soft power initiatives or public diplomacy 
proceed from a number of different approaches. This includes case studies on 
concrete initiatives which analyze visible output or use interviews, participant 
observation, and theoretical assessment of potential soft power resources. Except 
in cases where authors have analyzed the emergence of a debate surrounding the 
new concept of soft power in China,
67
 studies make relatively little use of Chinese 
source material. Works that fall into the historical-institutional approach, such as 
Brady, have widely consulted policy documents and speeches, but do not offer a 
detailed analysis of how the understanding and debate surrounding external 
propaganda has changed. Thus, there is a large amount of Chinese source material 
on external propaganda, including speeches, policy documents, handbooks, 
academic works, etc. that has thus far not been examined in an effort to 
understand both current and past changes in the sector.  
 
In conclusion, the current literature on various aspects of Chinese external 
propaganda is spread out across several disciplines and theoretical frameworks, 
and while each makes important points, these are only rarely linked up. More 
importantly, a large number of works are driven by government concerns, whereas 
analyses of institutional changes have only addressed external propaganda as an 
aside. Second, Chinese external propaganda is examined in isolation from similar 
developments and phenomena in other countries, and while studies might 
acknowledge the existence of similar practices outside of the Chinese context, the 
impact of flows between different countries has been neglected. Third, most 
studies on Chinese external propaganda or public diplomacy focus on the last 
decade, and almost no attempts have been made to analyze how the external 
propaganda concept and associated practices have changed and how previous 
practices constitute constraints for current initiatives. Finally, a close examination 
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of Chinese source material is missing. Thus, the Chinese perspective and the inner 
logic of the external propaganda apparatus and its expansion are actually not well 
understood.  
Based on the gaps in existing studies, this thesis is primarily driven by two 
connected sets of research questions: 
 
1. How have the CPC’s concept and practice of external propaganda changed, and 
what domestic as well as international or “external” factors have played a role in 
this change? 
2. How do past practices and institutions restrict China’s current options as well as 
how and to what extent is the CPC or groups within the Party addressing these 
issues and trying to solve them in the ongoing reform of its external propaganda 
apparatus? 
 
In answering these questions, this study tries to address each of the four 
issues in current studies on external propaganda explained above. First, by using 
and adapting methods as required by the material at hand rather than by the canon 
approved for a particular discipline, my dissertation serves as a first exploration 
on how to combine various methods in the study of a topic defined by subject 
matter rather than discipline, language, medium or country. It primarily seeks to 
make a contribution to the research on the transformation of the CPC and the PRC 
in order to adapt to the new international environment; however, while I do not 
assess or measure China’s soft power, this thesis also provides a basis and 
background for future studies on Chinese soft power. Second, this dissertation 
includes a detailed analysis of the development of external propaganda in China, 
particularly since the beginning of the post-Mao period and examines how the 
past influences and restricts current choices. Third, it explicitly aims to analyze 
Chinese external propaganda not in isolation but as part of a global trend or 
phenomenon, beginning with the concept itself and extending to the appropriation 
of concrete arguments and practices. At the same time, it takes account of the fact 
that concepts, institutions, and practices adapted in China enter a new, though 
constantly changing structural context. My dissertation is thus located in a field of 
tension between a global, or near global, notion in the contemporary world, 
namely that a nation-state needs to advertize itself in order to be successful in 
25 
 
international politics, and a concrete Chinese realization of this idea, complete 
with a set of assumptions, practices, and institutions that is distinct from yet at the 
same time continues to interact with and feed off the implementation of the same 
notion in other countries. Finally, the analysis is predominantly based on Chinese 
sources, taking its point of departure from material that is openly available or at 
the lowest levels of China’s internal classification system and employing various 
reading strategies outlined below to generate information about core directives 
and documents that are not necessarily publicly available. 
Below, I will briefly introduce the two main approaches – the past as 
potential burden as well as external propaganda as a global concept – before 
explaining my working definition of propaganda as well as addressing sources, 
research strategies, and structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Research Perspectives 
Proceeding from the gaps in the current literature, I make two propositions 
to be tested: First, the development of the external propaganda concept and 
associated practices in China has been impacted significantly by the development 
of propaganda in other countries. Throughout the 20th century and until today, 
ideas about propaganda as much as actual institutions and practices have tended to 
spread fast from one country, ideological camp or interest group to another. In the 
“battle over the hearts and minds” of the people of the world, learning from one’s 
enemy or competitor is considered legitimate.
68
 China is no exception. Over the 
course of the 20th century and into the 21st century, it appropriated several 
different propaganda discourses as well as concepts of propaganda that are part of 
different ideologies or ways of ordering and explaining the world. The CPC has 
adjusted its external propaganda apparatus and practices to better adapt it to the 
changing international environment in a continuous interaction with other 
countries’ propaganda concepts and strategies as well as a global media landscape 
with its own routines and values. 
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 See for instance Liu Yaming 刘雅鸣 and Li Pei 李珮, “Quanqiu chuanbo shidai woguo duiwai 
xuanchuan xin chulu (san) – Di yi shijian fachu shengyin waixuan bixu xian fa zhi ren” 全球传
播时代我国对外宣传新出路（三）——第一次发出声音外宣必须先发制人 [A new way 
out for China’s external propaganda in the era of global communication (three) – Starting with 
the first sound external propaganda needs to gain the upper hand by releasing news first], 
Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 1 (2004): 19.  
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Second, previous choices and previous institutional arrangements have 
exerted an influence on what reforms can and cannot be achieved and can explain 
difficulties encountered. Although the CPC has proven extremely flexible and 
pragmatic in its overall propaganda reform efforts,
69
 it appears to have difficulties 
improving some aspects of its external propaganda apparatus, despite substantial 
political will and financial commitment. In order to solve this puzzle, I propose to 
investigate the history of Chinese external propaganda from a perspective of path 
dependence, used loosely. Originally developed to explain inefficient yet 
persistent modes of operation or technology such as the survival of the QWERTY 
key board,
70
 path dependence has been used extensively in economics and has 
also been adopted in other branches of the social sciences, including political 
science.
71
 The basic idea behind arguments of path dependence is that earlier 
choices tend to have immense consequences in the future because it is difficult to 
reverse them without paying a price. Margaret Levi has offered an apt metaphor: 
 
“[…] once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very 
high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional 
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better 
metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different 
branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber 
from one to the other - and essential if the chosen branch dies - the branch on which a 
climber begins is the one she tends to follow.”
72
 
 
Here, the appropriation of different propaganda concepts over the course of 
the history of the PRC becomes relevant again. What makes the Chinese case a 
particularly interesting object for the study how a previous path affects current 
options and how subsequent constraints can be overcome is the fact that China has 
adopted aspects from radically different models of organizing society in general 
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 Cf. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 65-87.  
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 The QWERTY key board was originally created for type writers. Letters were arranged to 
intentionally slow people typing down in order to prevent bars from jamming. The QWERTY 
key board is maintained in the English-speaking world despite the fact that computer keys 
cannot jam because people had become used to the order of the keys. 
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 Cf. Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American 
Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 251-267. 
72
 Margaret Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis,” In Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: 
Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 28.  
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and the media and propaganda in particular, namely the Soviet model and the 
“Western” model. China has worked with and combined different concepts of 
propaganda stemming from what could be called different versions of modernity 
or ways of organizing modern society. Although one of them is considered a 
“failed modernity,” 73  vital aspects of the Soviet or Soviet-inspired way of 
organizing modern mass society survive in the CPC’s concept of propaganda and 
its vision of the role of the media until today.
74
 How and to what extent has the 
CPC been able to reverse its course? Is it trying to climb up a dead branch; has it 
climbed back down; has it leapt to another branch; or is the Soviet-inspired branch 
perhaps not dead at all?  
In the case of Chinese external propaganda, path dependence can potentially 
be applied to several different levels: As implied above, there is the question how 
the choice of copying the Soviet model in the 1950s has affected any later reforms. 
This includes the concept of propaganda in general and its place in the overall 
ideological universe as much as concrete institutions and practices. At the most 
basic level, it is costly to change certain external propaganda practices because 
personnel need to be retrained. At higher levels, this may entail clashes between 
new practices and old values. There is also the issue of bureaucratic resistance: It 
is difficult both to reorganize a sector and to change existing practices because 
different groups and people at higher and lower levels in the Chinese bureaucracy 
have a stake in the status quo. In this last area, a certain degree of path 
dependence in the external propaganda sector has been demonstrated in existing 
secondary literature. John Jirik’s study on the transformation of CCTV-
International has shown that it is difficult to change both existing practices and 
existing hierarchies in the Chinese bureaucracy.
75
 While the concrete information 
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 Stephen R. Graubard, “Preface,” in Multiple Modernities, ed. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (New 
Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2000), ix. The article in the volume that 
Graubard sums up with this remark is Johann P. Arnason, “Communism and Modernity,” 61-
90. 
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 Cf. Nicolai Volland, The Control of the Media in the People’s Republic of China (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Heidelberg, 2003).  
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 John Jirik has documented the failures of an attempt to turn CCTV into a 24 hour news channel 
in 2004 in his PhD dissertation. The first obstacles to reforming the channel as planned came 
from within the unit itself, as the production teams affected opposed the changes that the 
reform plan mandated. The producers of the feature programs began to negotiate their position 
and ultimately succeeded in framing their existing programs as necessary to CCTV’s continued 
function as a “window on China.” The second obstacle was the fact that CCTV-9 had just 
undergone a make-over shortly before, in 2003 and simply did not have the capacities to 
organize another revamp, particularly without sufficient staff. Third, the plan involved 
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Jirik could draw on as an advisor to CCTV is hard to come by for outsiders, path 
dependence, in the sense that initial choices tend to be difficult to reverse, still 
provides a promising approach to explain the development of Chinese external 
propaganda as well as the remaining problems in the sector.    
 
1.3 Definition of Propaganda 
As briefly indicated above, some authors have suggested to analyze the 
transformation of Chinese influence operations at home and abroad as a move 
away from propaganda and towards a different mode of communication, whereas 
Brady, for example, analyzes the changes as a way to adapt the Chinese 
understanding and practices of propaganda to the new environment. In this thesis, 
I adopt a broader definition of propaganda that subsumes both techniques and 
practices as practiced in relatively closed off totalitarian or authoritarian societies 
and those developed for democratic settings.  
The term propaganda is a pejorative word in English today and has largely 
been turned into a political instrument to delegitimize the activities of opponents. 
Because of this, a number of alternative terms have been coined to describe 
activities related to propaganda: political communication, publicity, perception 
management, public relations, outreach, public diplomacy, etc. Initially, many of 
these were explicitly coined as euphemisms,
76
 but since then, much energy has 
been spent to distinguish them from propaganda.
77
 The Socialist camp on the 
other hand, retained the term propaganda in an act of defiance: As Marxists, they 
                                                                                                                                                               
cooperation between CCTV, Xinhua, and CRI as well as with Shanghai TV, none of which 
manifested despite calls from high ranking cadres to join forces. As these alternative sources of 
programs failed and CCTV was forced to produce almost all of the content on its own, the 
leadership began to fall back on the rhetoric originally developed by the Feature production 
team to defend their programs when revising the plans for reform. During the relaunch, the 
planned establishment of an assignment desk also failed because it did not align with existing 
authority structures in the news production process and thus evoked strong opposition from 
those defending the status quo. Cf. Jirik, “Making News in the People’s Republic of China: 
The Case of CCTV-9,” 215-237.  
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 For instance, Edward Guillon, who is credited with inventing the modern usage of the term 
public diplomacy, preferred propaganda, but felt the term could no longer be used because of 
its negative connotations and therefore used public diplomacy as an alternative. See Nicholas J. 
Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase,” in Routledge Handbook 
of Public Diplomacy, eds.Snow and Taylor, 19. 
77
 Cf. Thymian Bussemer, Propaganda: Konzepte und Theorien (Wiesbaden: Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 382-385. See for example John Brown, “Public Diplomacy & 
Propaganda,” American Diplomacy, September 2008. 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/0709/comm/brown_pudiplprop.html, accessed 
November 19, 2012. 
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argued, they were proud to spread the truth to gain the support of the people and 
thus propel history in the right direction. Unlike the bourgeoisie, which denied 
engaging in reactionary propaganda to slow down the progress of history and their 
own demise, Marxists were on the right side of history and could be honest and 
proud about their actions.
78
  
While using different terms, such as political communication or publicity, 
to refer to various activities carried out by different actors has some merit, the 
activities they refer to have a common purpose: They all constitute attempts to 
influence the perception of publics through selective presentation of information 
and argument, either in order to get others to act in a certain manner or to diminish 
objection to one’s own actions. Thus, the use of different terms is veiling 
connections between related activities with common roots and further contributes 
to the fragmentation of the field of propaganda studies.  
In setting a working definition of propaganda for this thesis, I return to the 
first theoretical explorations of the topic during the first half of the 20th century, 
when terms such as propaganda and publicity were still used interchangeably. In 
an article from 1927, Harold Lasswell defined propaganda as “the management of 
collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols.” 79  The word 
“attitude” was used by Lasswell to refer to “a tendency to act according to certain 
patterns of valuation.”80 This definition –one of the earliest– already contains 
most of the core ingredients: Propaganda consists of a range of techniques that are 
intended to manipulate symbols of communication, with the aim of shaping 
human perception and consequently influence both short-term and long-term 
behavior of the target group. Another core ingredient, which Lasswell’s definition 
does not state explicitly but rather presumes is the notion of the public: The idea 
that the opinion of large sections of or of the entire population of a political unit 
matters because it can facilitate, restrict, or otherwise influence the exercise of 
power. This new concept of the “public” is what distinguishes propaganda as a 
broad cross-temporal practice from propaganda as a specific phenomenon that 
spread around the world in the 20th century and that I examine in this thesis.  
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 Harold Lasswell, “The Theory of Political Propaganda,” The American Political Science Review 
21, no. 3 (1927): 627.  
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This definition of propaganda as first laid down by Lasswell, however, is 
still very broad. For a narrower definition, there is an additional ingredient that 
was routinely used in the first half of the 20
th
 century to distinguish between 
propaganda in the broad and in the narrow sense:
81
 An organizational structure to 
plan propaganda activities (usually with a budget to fund it). An institutional 
structure with a budget can refer to state or party institutions, but also the public 
relations (PR) departments of corporations, Non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) or other types of organizations. Propaganda thus is a particular mode of 
communication before the public that is organized and funded. Propaganda as a 
mode of communication goes beyond verbal communication through the mass 
media. It can include other symbolic acts, although doing so before the eyes of the 
public usually means transmission through the mass media.  
Propaganda does not take place in a vacuum in which one group simply 
spreads its message. Either directly or indirectly it always replies to a particular 
countertext. Thus, propaganda is not only concerned with proactively getting a 
particular message out, but also with reactive measures to deal with propaganda 
spread by one’s opponents, including direct replies, indirect replies, discrediting 
the source of a message, or censorship of the message. Usually, even the proactive 
propaganda agenda devised by governments reacts to outside concerns or 
propaganda spread by other groups. Although measures such as censorship and 
the blocking of information flows will play a role time and again in this thesis, 
they are more relevant for domestic propaganda, and even there, the CPC 
increasingly focuses on proactive measures. Thus, while this thesis will include 
more detailed analyses of direct and indirect replies to “attacks” from foreigners, 
it only addresses censorship where this is directly relevant to the mode in which 
propaganda targeted at foreigners can be conducted. By contrast, for each period, I 
will include domestic propaganda in order to examine how the concept and 
practice of domestic propaganda impacted on external propaganda work. 
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 See for example Wu Yuzhen 吴榆珍, “Xuanchuan ji qi yingxiang yu Zhongguo shehui bianhua 
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1.4 Sources and Strategies 
 While I have also conducted a small number of interviews and analyzed 
some of the output of China’s media targeted at foreigners, my main basis for this 
thesis are different sets of Chinese language source material. The sources 
available for each decade naturally differ both in type and in number for each 
period. During the Republican period, there was a very vivid and open debate on 
propaganda, which was initially stifled after the PRC was established. In the Mao 
period, the topic was rarely discussed in open or semi-open publications. Instead, 
more detailed discussions largely took place in administrative documents with a 
very limited circulation range. Those involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA, Waijiaobu 外交部) are available at the MFA’s archive. 82  In addition, 
internal journals primarily concerned with domestic propaganda work, such as 
Propaganda Newsletter (Xuanchuan tongxun 宣传通讯) and Propaganda and 
Education Dynamics (Xuanjiao dongtai 宣教动态 ), also occasionally carried 
articles on external propaganda. Over the course of the last 40 years, the external 
propaganda debate has again gradually moved into the public realm as a result of 
both intensified debates, more people interested in the topic, and a lifting of 
restrictions on discussing external propaganda openly: In the 1970s and 1980s, for 
which archival records have not yet been declassified, more widespread 
discussion in internal journals was added, and a number of policy documents have 
been made available in document collections. Starting in the mid-1990s, in the 
wake of the policy to involve more bureaucratic organizations within the Party-
state, public journals began to carry articles on external propaganda. Then, in the 
21st century, articles on the topic cropped up everywhere, resulting in an 
explosion of material available for analysis. Given this development as well as the 
difference in approaches, the main sources used for each chapter also differ, in 
some cases significantly. However, the most important material and approaches 
used for this thesis shall be introduced here briefly.   
 My first type of sources consists of relatively authoritative documents, 
including government circulars issued within the propaganda and the external 
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 The MFA Archive was opened in 2004 and offers access to declassified diplomatic documents. 
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propaganda sector. A number of these documents have been made available in the 
form of document collections.
83
 Another important collection of authoritative 
sources has been handbooks, most importantly Propaganda and Thought Work in 
the New Period (Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo 新时期宣传思想工作), 
first issued on a trial basis in 2001
84
 and then republished in 2006 in a second 
revised version that included a section on external propaganda.
85
 Articles on 
external propaganda work published in the People's Daily (Renmin ribao 人民日
报 ), the mouthpiece of the CPC, also fall into the category of authoritative 
documents. Finally, I will use speeches of former leading cadres in the external 
propaganda sector, which have been preserved in a series of collections.
86
 
 Second, I will draw on twenty-five years (1981 to 2005) of issues of the 
journal External Propaganda Reference (Duiwai xuanchuan cankao 对外宣传参
考) edited by Xinhua News Agency. External Propaganda Reference was initially 
launched under the name External Reporting (Duiwai baodao 对外报道 ) in 
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 Most importantly Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu bangongting zhongyang dang’anguan 
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1973
87
 and was intended for internal circulation within Xinhua News Agency only. 
In June 1981, it was renamed External Reporting Reference (Duiwai baodao 
cankao 对外报道参考) and began to be distributed more widely, i.e. also to 
recipients in the external propaganda system not working for Xinhua 新华.88 In 
1984, the journal was again renamed, this time External Propaganda Reference.
89
 
Since issue ten (October) 1989, the journal has been supervised by the highest 
external propaganda organization in the Party.
90
 As the title already implies, it is 
only intended for “reference” purposes, meaning that the journal does not include 
direct orders to external propaganda workers and work units. The journal’s 
purpose is to provide reports of local and sectoral external propaganda to other 
units, to publish external propaganda policies and slogans devised by the Center, 
publish analyses of failed or successful external propaganda initiatives, both past 
and present, Chinese and foreign, and to brief readers on other countries and their 
take on China.
91
 Issues of the journal from 1981 to 2005 are available at the 
National Library (Guojia tushuguan 国家图书馆) in Beijing 北京. This already 
shows that although it used to be intended for “internal distribution” (neibu faxing 
内部发行 ) only, External Propaganda Reference is not a strictly controlled 
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journal.
92
 Over the course of its existence, the target audience was continuously 
broadened and requirements to subscribe lowered. Nonetheless, it contains 
material not published in openly available journals as well as vital clues as to what 
the CPC wants its external propaganda workers to know and take into 
consideration.  
 Third, the most important source to analyze the organizational and 
hierarchical set up of the CPC and Chinese government agencies is Materials on 
the History of Organization of the Communist Party of China (Zhonggong 
zuzhishi ziliao 中共组织史资料), which covers institutional changes up to the 
year 1997/1998.
93
 For more up-to-date versions, I will use official Chinese 
government and party websites, which usually provide an overview of their 
internal structure (jigou shezhi 机构设置), as well as reports on institutional 
structures or activities in the media. 
 Fourth, I will draw on a number of fulltext databases. For the period before 
1949, the most important databases were the Early Chinese Periodical Database 
Dacheng Data (Dacheng laojiu kan quanwen shujuku 大成老旧刊全文数据库),94 
and the Shanghai-based National Index of Papers and Journals (Quanguo baokan 
suoyin 全国报刊索引).95 The most important resources that I used for the time 
after 1949 are Duxiu 读秀 , the databases of the China National Knowledge 
Infrastructure (CNKI, Guojia zhishi jichu sheshi 国家知识基础设施), and the 
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December 14, 2012. 
35 
 
database of the journal Reference News (Cankao Xiaoxi 参考消息). Duxiu is a 
massive database run by a Beijing-based company that allows for full-text search 
of a large number of monographs, journals, newspapers as well as other 
information resources mostly from the PRC but also including some earlier 
materials and material published outside of the mainland.
96
 Through Duxiu, I have 
had full text access to several dozens of monographs on propaganda and external 
propaganda, including handbooks, translated works, and scholarly works 
produced in the PRC. CNKI, associated with Qinghua University, is a platform 
integrating several research resources from the PRC.
97
 It offers access, among 
others, to China Academic Journals (CAJ), which contains several thousands of 
journals published in the PRC in fulltext, and a database of doctoral and M.A. 
theses from PRC universities. 
 
The material at hand is marked by a contradiction that needs to be 
addressed in order to make the analysis feasible and generate meaningful findings. 
On the one hand, the volume of sources available is massive. On the other hand, 
as China’s external propaganda work is among the policy fields in which much 
background information and documents about the decision making process are 
simply not available. Thus, the challenge is to extract as much information from 
the large quantity of Chinese language source material that is out in the open 
without getting lost. I will adopt a number of reading strategies both to navigate 
the large volume of texts and to generate information that remains classified. In 
each chapter, the strategies adopted differ slightly, but the most important can be 
summed up as follows:  
First, I will use a combination of inductive and deductive reading of my 
source material. For each period in the post-Mao period, I will locate the most 
important policy document or speech which sets the agenda for that particular 
period as well as identify the most important decisions about external propaganda 
policy taken at the highest level. Major changes in focus in large numbers of texts 
at the lower level give clues as to the timing and content of a new policy 
                                                          
96
 A lot of the material indexed is available in full text or in excerpts. The publisher is Beijing 
Superstar Information Technology Co. Ltd. 
97
Cf. “Zhongguo zhishi jichu sheshi gongcheng”中国知识基础设施工程  [China Knowledge 
Infrastructure], http://cnki.net/gycnki/gycnki.htm, accessed December 14, 2012.  
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document, speech, or decision, which then makes it possible to search for it in a 
more focused manner. While more recent policy documents are not available in 
full text, it is often possible to find excerpts in academic articles or to reconstruct 
them on the basis of particular wordings that appear verbatim in large numbers of 
articles. Once the existence and in many cases the content of a particular 
document is known, it then becomes possible to read the debate in academic and 
professional journals in a more structured manner. 
Second, I will use examples of local external propaganda structures to 
better understand how external propaganda at the central level functions. Likewise, 
local external propaganda organizations often provide more concrete information 
about specific policies they pursue. Thus, reading local documents allows some 
(though limited) inferences about central policies.  
Third, most formal writing, such as speeches, circulars, and scholarly 
works are written in the language of the Marxist-derived “theory system with 
Chinese characteristics.” While such statements are often dismissed, I argue that 
much can be gained by understanding what they actually mean. Knowledge of the 
ideological universe and the terminology in which it is presented makes it possible 
to pick up certain nuances and changes that are otherwise overlooked. I argue in 
this thesis that rhetorical upgrades matter, and that, in order to spot them, it is 
necessary to understand the language in which the conversation on external 
propaganda takes place. More importantly, in order to understand certain 
constraints on policy options in the external propaganda sector exist, it is 
important to understand how the CPC frames reality as much as to know the 
purpose of propaganda and external propaganda as they are seen within this 
ideological universe.  
Fourth, a key feature of communication in China is the use of slogans (tifa 
提法). Often, summaries of speeches by high-level leaders consist of little but lists 
of the most recent slogans. With regard to interpreting texts in general and slogans 
in particular, it is important to be aware that things that are said or written have a 
context-specific meaning. In reverse, this means that use of the same slogan, 
either in different fields or across time, should never be assumed to mean that the 
content behind the slogan is the same, although use of a slogan in other fields can 
sometimes provide important clues as to its meaning in external propaganda work. 
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Therefore, I have used a number of approaches how to understand slogans in their 
specific context that will be introduced in the main body of the dissertation. 
 
1.5 Structure 
I have chosen the form of a political history in order to be able to analyze 
how earlier choices limit later choices and how the path Chinese external 
propaganda currently finds itself on emerged and was consolidated through a 
series of events and decisions taken. The main body is divided into three parts that 
will proceed largely chronologically, with occasional in-depth excursions on 
specific topics as well as necessary background information.  
Part I, consisting of chapters two and three, examines the development of 
Chinese external propaganda before the official beginning of economic reforms in 
1978. This part’s purpose is to demonstrate different ways of understanding 
propaganda in China’s past and to understand the historical trajectory of external 
propaganda that influenced China’s options later. It analyzes the legacy from the 
Republican period (1911-1949), in which different models and understandings of 
propaganda coexisted and what happened to them after the founding of the PRC, 
when the CPC systematically emulated the Soviet model. In order to understand 
the CPC’s take on external propaganda as well as many of the current debates 
taking place, the second chapter illustratively dissects different understandings 
and genealogies of the concept of propaganda in China since the beginning of the 
20
th
 century and thus traces how key beliefs and ideas related to propaganda came 
about, changed, and continued to develop. I will show that propaganda came to 
China as part of different modernization packages via different groups of 
intermediaries and that rivaling concepts clashed, and merged within the Chinese 
context. With the founding of the PRC, the environment in which external 
propaganda was discussed and implemented changed entirely. The third chapter 
therefore analyzes the new institutional environment that China’s external 
propaganda apparatus became a part of as well as the dispute between different 
factions over whether external propaganda should serve revolutionary goals or 
state-to-state diplomacy. Although the Communist Party of China (CPC, 
Gongchandang 共产党) had been exposed to very different ways of understanding 
propaganda, it chose a particular path after the founding of the People’s Republic 
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of China (PRC), taking the first step towards the institutional dilemma it currently 
finds itself in now that other approaches the CPC rejected temporarily have 
regained in importance. 
The choices of the Mao period did not irreversibly define the path China 
was bound to take. In the 1980s, there was a serious possibility that the overall 
domestic propaganda apparatus might be reformed before the CPC decided to 
fortify it after 1989. Part II, consisting of chapters four, five, and six, covering 
the period 1977 to 2002, tries to answer how the changes in the CPC’s general 
line and in the importance attached to domestic propaganda work affected external 
propaganda. It examines how external propaganda cadres and other actors within 
the CPC repeatedly tried to change external propaganda policy and concrete 
conventions in order to make it serve the new Party line against the backdrop of 
institutional and ideological constraints and changes in the political climate. By 
looking at the many subtle and major changes Chinese external propaganda has 
undergone since the late 1970s, it is possible to better understand the problems 
China current faces and moreover to gain insight into the dynamics of policy 
processes in the PRC. Chapter four takes a systematic approach and provides the 
background on the institutional and ideological environment of the PRC in the 
post-Mao period that anyone joining the policy debate has to operate within. 
Chapter five examines the development of external propaganda in the 1980s as the 
CPC’s overall propaganda and media policy came under attack. Chapter six 
analyzes how China’s external propaganda changed against the backdrop of tense 
international relations as well as a reinforced domestic propaganda apparatus 
during the era of Jiang Zemin 江泽民.  
Part III addresses the current round of external propaganda after the field 
was formally defined as a matter of national security and social stability by the 
CPC in 2003/2004. It asks why external propaganda was upgraded in importance 
at this particular point in time, how this upgrade has been translated into reforms 
and new initiatives, and how proponents of external propaganda have tried to 
overcome and circumvent institutional obstacles that cannot be removed 
completely. This part is not an assessment of China’s soft power or its ability to 
communicate successfully with foreign publics, but rather asks to what extent the 
added urgency after 2003 has led to conceptual and institutional reforms. In 
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chapter seven, I will explain why external propaganda became so important to the 
CPC at this particular juncture in time and illustrate the changes that followed the 
upgrade. Chapter eight examines the bureaucratic structures behind China's 
external propaganda efforts, how they coordinate their work and what conflicts 
exist between different players within the bureaucracy. Chapter nine analyzes the 
problems faced in one of the key areas of external propaganda, namely China’s 
media, as they try to establish a name and credibility for themselves in the 
international arena.  
Finally, on the basis of the findings of the three parts, the conclusion will 
explain how and under the influence of which types of factors the Chinese 
understanding and practice of external propaganda has changed and to what extent 
path dependence has played a role in the development of Chinese external 
propaganda.  While it is not the goal of this book to assess to what extent Chinese 
external propaganda has been “successful” in improving China’s image and 
influencing international public opinion –an issue that hinges on a lot of factors, 
many of which are outside of the control of the CPC– I will point out basic 
problems standing in the way of realizing reforms, such as conflicts between 
different bureaucracies, conflicts between different policies that are supposed to 
be implemented simultaneously, as well as incentive structures that prevent the 
implementation of certain policies. 
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Part I 
 
Choosing a Path for China? 
 
Chinese External Propaganda between Different Social and 
Political Imaginaries before 1976 
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2 Between the Western and the Soviet Model: Propaganda in 
China before 1949 
 
“The initiative in introducing propaganda as a regular instrument of international 
relations must be credited to the Soviet Government. The causes of this were partly 
accidental. The Bolsheviks, when they seized power in Russia, found themselves 
desperately weak in the ordinary military and economic weapons of international 
conflict. The principal element of strength in their position was their influence over 
opinion in other countries; and it was therefore natural and necessary that they should 
exploit this weapon to the utmost.”
1
  
  --- E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1939 
 
In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, in the midst of several crises after 
having been defeated first by the Western powers in the two opium wars and by 
Japan in 1895, China underwent a major reconfiguration of world order from an 
empire with China at the center of civilization to a nation-state based world order, 
in which all “civilized” nations interacted with one another on equal terms, but in 
which China painfully found itself at the bottom of the hierarchy, not recognized 
as an equal by the Western powers and forced to cede parts of its territory. In the 
conceptual and institutional rearrangements that China underwent in search for 
renewed strength to overcome this power asymmetry both before and after the fall 
of the Qing 清 dynasty, different foreign models played key roles at different 
though often overlapping times. One core idea that reached Chinese elites as early 
as in the 19th century was the need to manage public opinion through instruments 
such as the press.  
In 1939, when Edward Carr published what is today considered one of the 
earliest works of International Relations (IR) theory, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, he 
included a distinction between military power, economic power, and “power over 
opinion.” Exercising “power over opinion,” according to Carr, was initially the 
weapon of choice of the militarily and economically weak Soviet Union and 
spread from there to become a regular instrument of diplomacy in times of peace 
in the inter-war years. China, however, saw itself not only in a weak position 
                                                          
1
 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1954, second 
edition), 137.  
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militarily and economically, but also in terms of “power over opinion.” The 
crucial media links between China and the world and between different parts of 
the country were in the hands of foreigners with extraterritorial privileges located 
in foreign settlements. Thus, during the late Qing period, there was already a 
sentiment that the key media represented foreign interests, and in order to reassert 
itself, China needed to control press instruments of its own.
2
 Later, as the 
distinction between military power, economic power, and power over public 
opinion, or “propaganda power,” began to establish itself in China as part of a 
massive appropriation of ideas from abroad, Chinese elites recognized this area as 
a chance for China to catch up more easily than in terms of military and economic 
power. As China’s conflict with Japan gradually escalated over the course of the 
1920s and 1930s, propaganda began to be increasingly seen as a crucial 
instrument both to rally domestic resistance and to gain the support of foreign 
publics.
3
 
Most Chinese authors tend to point out that there is a radical disconnect 
between the English word propaganda and the Chinese term xuanchuan 宣传.4 
They are right, of course, that propaganda is largely derogative in the English 
language today, whereas xuanchuan is predominantly used either in a positive or 
in a neutral sense in mainland China. However, this was not always the case. The 
notion of “power over opinion,” and its weapon of choice, propaganda, can be 
considered key concepts that shaped how people analyzed and debated various 
aspects of politics and society in the 20
th
 century. Propaganda was practiced by 
and in different countries, under different political systems, became part of 
different ideologies and social and political imaginaries
5
 and was known under 
many different names. It dominated theories of politics and government, the 
                                                          
2
 Cf. Natascha Vittinghoff, Die Anfänge des Journalismus in China [The origins of journalism in 
China] (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002). 
3
 Cf. Shuge Wei, “To Win the West: China’s Propaganda in the English-Language Press, 1928-
1941” (PhD diss. Australian National University, 2012). 
4
 E.g. Hou Yingzhong 侯迎忠 and Guo Guanghua 郭光华, Duiwai baodao  celüe yu jiqiao对外报
道策略与技巧 [Strategies and techniques for external reporting] (Beijing: Zhongguo chuanmei 
daxue chubanshe, 2008), 2-3; Gan Xianfeng甘险峰, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi 中
国对外新闻传播史  [A history of Chinas external news communication] (Fuzhou: Fujian 
renmin chubanshe, 2004), 11.  
5
 The concept of the social imaginary was introduced by Cornelius Castoriadis to refer to the 
mental constructs underlying and thus also creating a particular social or political order. Cf. 
Cornelius Castoriadis, World in Fragments: Writing on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and 
the Imagination, translated by David Ames Curtis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 
84-85. 
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organization of mass and social movements, as much as practices and assumptions 
in the world of corporations and businesses. In the first half of the 20
th
 century, as 
China looked for ways to strengthen itself, it simultaneously absorbed several of 
these propaganda discourses. 
Although there is more than enough source material, no study to date has 
dealt with the colorful history of how and under what circumstances the concept 
of propaganda was appropriated in China through different routes and became 
accepted – though amidst some controversy – as a tool for realizing one’s policy 
objectives among different groups and factions. Today, full text databases have 
made it possible to search for different uses of the term xuanchuan across a broad 
range of sources and identify the most important issues in the debate while at the 
same time challenging the standard narrative of the history of propaganda in 
China, illustrating the breadth of what was discussed, the variety of propaganda 
concepts adapted, of how this happened, and of which common themes can be 
discerned across different interest groups as well as across time. Chinese domestic 
and international propaganda are not unexplored topics per se, but the focus of 
attention thus far has been external propaganda practice, not the underlying ideas 
about propaganda. More importantly, secondary literature addresses specific 
aspects and is thus spread out across different areas.
6
 As mentioned in the 
Introduction, there are some overviews of the history of propaganda and external 
propaganda published in China, but those tend to follow a very strict political 
                                                          
6
 For example, a number of works on Chinese wartime international propaganda exist: The earliest 
work was published in 1938: Bruno Lasker and Agnes Roman, Propaganda from China and 
Japan: A Case Study in Propaganda Analysis (American Council Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1938). More recent studies include Yong Z. Volz, “China’s Image Management Abroad, 
1920s-1940s: Origin, Justification, and Institutionalization, in Soft Power in China: Public 
Diplomacy through Communication, ed. Jian Wang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
157-179; Tsuchida Akio, “China’s ‘Public Diplomacy’ toward the United States before Pearl 
Harbor,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 17 (2010): 35-55. For domestic 
propaganda, there are a number of works on Chinese effors as part of the resistance against 
Japan, e.g. Chapter 9 in Michael Sullivan, Art and Artists of Twentieth-Century China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). GMD rituals in citizen-making, which could 
also be categorized as part of the overall propaganda enterprise, have been analyzed: Henrietta 
Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 
1911-1929 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Moreover, various works on the role of 
foreigners and foreign journalists in China also touch on the topic of propaganda: E.g. Stephen 
R. MacKinnon, China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the1930s and 
1940s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Paul French, Through the Looking 
Glass: China’s Foreign Journalists from Opium Wars to Mao (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2009).  
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narrative:
7
 In line with Chinese Marxist conventions of historiography, the history 
of Chinese external propaganda is divided into successive and overall progressing 
periods.
8
  
The most basic aim of this chapter is to analyze how the term xuanchuan 
宣传 was understood in China before 1949 in an environment that was marked by 
a sense of crisis as much as by a plurality of interest groups and lack of a single 
authority controlling the Chinese territory. Although the Communist Party of 
China (CPC, Gongchandang 共产党) had been exposed to very different ways of 
understanding propaganda, it chose a particular path after the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), taking the first step towards the institutional 
dilemma it currently finds itself in now that other approaches the CPC rejected 
temporarily have regained in importance. To understand the complex history of 
how different propaganda concepts were translated into the Chinese context helps 
to understand the dilemmas PRC external propaganda has been facing since the 
early 1950s. It also forms the first step in elucidating the dilemma Chinese foreign 
language media have found themselves in since the 1990s, trying to switch from 
one propaganda model and set of practices to another.  
Analytically, this chapter has three dimensions: First, it examines Chinese 
propaganda concepts and practices as part of larger global trends. Second, it traces 
the merging and clashing of different discourses, and third, it identifies themes 
and practices that persist until today or reappeared again at a later point in time.  
In the analysis, I will use approaches that can broadly be associated with 
conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte).
9
 Conceptual history analyzes the 
                                                          
7
 For propaganda and journalism in general, see for instance Fang Hanqi 方汉奇, Zhongguo jindai 
baokan shi 中国近代报刊史  [A history of the modern press in China] (Shanxi renmin 
chubanshe, 1981). For external propaganda, see for example Gan Xianfeng  甘险峰 , 
Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi 中国对外新闻传播史 [A history of China’s external 
news communication] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004). 
8
 For instance, according to Gan Xianfeng, the first period, the “incubation period” or “preparation 
period” (yunniang shiqi 酝酿时期), took place between the late 19th century and 1937. The 
second period, the “initial period” (qibuqi 起步期), lasted from the beginning of the full-scale 
war of resistance against Japan in 1937 until the proclamation of the PRC on October 1, 1949. 
The third period, which began with the founding of the PRC and ended with the outbreak of the 
Cultural Revolution is called the “fully operating period” (quanmian kaizhan qi 全面开展期) 
by Gan Xianfeng. The fourth period, the “wavering period” (paihuaiqi 徘徊期) during which 
China’s external propaganda suffered serious setbacks, encompasses the ten years of the 
Cultural Revolution. The fifth and final period, the “period of rapid development” (xunsu 
fazhan qi 迅速发展期), which Gan does not formally subdivide into stages, began in 1976 and 
continues until this day. Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai chuanbo shi, 12, 51,136, 196, 208.  
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changing meanings of concepts, but because its main unit of analysis has been a 
lexeme in a single language and its changing underlying meanings, it has mainly 
been applied within artificial national contexts and disregarded the fact that major 
concepts and ideas cross borders through transnational networks, translations of 
texts, loan translations of individual terms, and continued conversations about the 
same idea that transcend national languages and national borders. I therefore seek 
to make a contribution to the sub-discipline of conceptual history by applying it to 
a transnational and translingual context.  
The analysis includes concepts of propaganda in the domestic and 
international realm that share some common roots, but developed in different 
directions before being appropriated in China. In the analysis, I will refer to 
different discourses on propaganda. Discourses can be compared to foreign 
languages that need to be learned and that can provide the speakers with a unique 
perspective on a particular topic.
10
 Discourses, understood as ways of framing and 
discussing a particular topic or phenomenon, provide a certain perspective; they 
come with a specific vocabulary, shared assumptions and usually a limited range 
of positions that can be articulated without being dismissed by the discourse 
community.
11
 To help discern different intellectual and political trends and 
schools of thought with regard to the concept of propaganda I will use the concept 
of man (Menschenbild) and concept of world order underlying a particular 
propaganda discourse.
12
 The concept of man and ideas about the relationship 
between masses and elites are important primarily for domestic propaganda, 
whereas the concept of the nation and ideas about how the world is structured 
influences external propaganda. While the overall focus of this dissertation is on 
propaganda targeted at foreigners, including propaganda discourses primarily 
                                                                                                                                                               
9
 The most famous work of the approach of conceptual history is Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: 
Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland [Basic concepts in history: 
A historical encyclopedia of political and social language in Germany], ed. Reinhardt 
Koselleck, published in eight volumes (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972-1997). 
10
 Cf. Frank Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 42. 
11
 For instance, two different ways of speaking about and conceptualizing external propaganda are 
the ‘mutual understanding’ discourse and the ‘national interest’ discourse. The first sees 
external propaganda as a way of furthering understanding between different peoples, whereas 
the second insists that external propaganda needs to serve the national interest.  
12
 I take the approach to focus on the concept of man from Thymian Bussemer’s Propaganda. 
Konzepte und Theorien (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008). The focus on 
different ways of ordering the world was inspired by Rebecca Karl, Staging the World: 
Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Century (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2002).  
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centered on the domestic realm is vital first, in order to illustrate the differences in 
development and origin between domestic and external propaganda in China and, 
second, in order to understand the origins of concepts of domestic propaganda in 
China, which have interfered with China’s propaganda targeted at foreigners both 
in the past and today.  
In order to make this chapter feasible in light of the massive amount of 
data, I have approached the source material from three different directions. First, I 
have taken the ideas behind the concept of propaganda in the narrow, modern 
sense as defined in the introduction and analyzed briefly how propaganda-related 
ideas were discussed in China before the term xuanchuan became commonplace 
in the 1920s on the basis of hints available in Chinese secondary literature, 
searching for key terms related to the press and public opinion. Second, I have 
taken the term xuanchuan as the unit of analysis in a corpus-based approach by 
analyzing monographs and a sample of journal articles, largely obtained through 
the Early Chinese Periodical Database Dacheng Data (Dacheng laojiu kan 
quanwen shujuku 大成老旧刊全文数据库), and the Shanghai-based National 
Index to Chinese Newspapers and Periodical (Quanguo baokan suoyin 全国报刊
索引) introduced above. Third, I have paid attention to references to foreign key 
texts on propaganda, full or partial translations from other languages, as well as 
examples from foreign contexts.
13
  
                                                          
13
 Translations can be divided into acknowledged and unacknowledged as well as full and partial. 
Acknowledged full translations published in book form are generally speaking the easiest to 
locate, but this was not how the bulk of material was published. Finding unacknowledged 
translations on the other hand, is largely a matter of luck or coincidence. Aside from full 
monographs, articles and book excerpts were often published in several parts of a series in 
Chinese journals. One example is the partial translation of Lasker and Roman, Propaganda 
from China and Japan: A Case Study in Propaganda Analysis: “Zhong Ri zai Mei zhi 
xuanchuanzhan” 中日在美之宣传战 [The propaganda war between China and Japan in the 
United States], Gonglun congshu 公论丛书 [Public opinion series], no. 6, 1939. It is possible 
that many expositions on propaganda that are not directly concerned with China but instead use 
other parts of the world were originally, at some point in time, translated from a foreign 
language and not attributed. These unacknowledged translations were then often supplemented 
with original writing. Two examples I came across where this strategy was obvious are Zhang 
Jiuru, Qunzhong xinli [Crowd psychology] (Zhongyang Junxiao, 1929), a de facto plagiarism 
of Le Bon’s Psychologie des foules (Paris: Alcan, 1895), and Xuanchuanxi 宣传熹, “Jinhou de 
guoji xuanchuan luxian” 今后的国际宣传路线 [Direction for international propaganda in the 
future], Duzhe 读者  [Reader] 1, nos. 2-3 (1946): 18-19, which sometimes sums up and 
sometimes directly translates passages from the sub-chapter “Power over Opinion” in Edward 
Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 132-145. Although translations were often unattributed, 
Chinese authors usually did not attempt to hide the Western (or in some cases Soviet) origin of 
the concept and set of practices of propaganda. As was common with other concepts, practices, 
and institutions as well, a number of texts pointed to ancient Chinese propaganda practices as a 
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Below, I will first give an overview of the concept of propaganda as it 
developed outside of China, most importantly in the West and in the Soviet Union. 
In the second step, I will look at the wide and the narrow concept of propaganda 
in China before the term xuanchuan was used to denote political propaganda. 
Finally, I will analyze several propaganda discourses and institutions that 
developed after the 1920s, when the topic had become popular across different 
political factions and interest groups. This includes the Guomindang’s (GMD, 国
民党) and the CPC’s understanding of propaganda and external propaganda in 
between the Soviet model and the Western model to lay the basis for subsequent 
development after the founding of the PRC. I will show that the idea of 
propaganda made its way to China through various different routes and channels 
and became part of several different transnational and translingual debates, which 
stayed in contact either implicitly or explicitly and thus shared some common 
ground but also developed distinctly with regard to other aspects. 
 
2.1 Emergence and Development of Propaganda in the West and the 
Soviet Union 
Propaganda in its broad definition is a ubiquitous phenomenon not bound 
to a particular moment in history. However, propaganda in the narrow sense as 
explained in the Introduction is closely tied to the notion that the opinion of broad 
sections of the population –whether they are referred to as the masses, as the 
people or as the public– matters. As such, the emergence of propaganda in this 
sense is linked to a number of ideas that first surfaced in the 19th century and 
were translated into the political process in the 20th century. Propaganda as a 
subject of interest, as a research object, and as a profession was intimately tied to 
the nascent concepts of the masses, the public, and public opinion in the 19
th
 
century accompanying a rise in literacy, media proliferation, and elections.  
During the Enlightenment movement the idea of collective rationality, 
achieved through debate between rational individuals resulting in a consensus that 
embodied a higher level of rationality than that of the individual, became 
                                                                                                                                                               
means to legitimize the practice. See for example Wu Yuzhen 吴榆珍, “Xuanchuan ji qi 
yingxiang yu Zhongguo shehui bianhua de taolun” 宣传及其影响于中国社会变化的讨论 [A 
discussion of propaganda and its impacts on the transformations in Chinese society], Shehui 
xuejie 社会学界 [World/Circles of sociology], no. 4 (1930): 199.  
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dominant.
14
 It was against the backdrop of the growing Socialist movement in 19
th
 
century Europe and increasing fear of the masses that a strong polemic against this 
enlightenment ideal emerged, namely the idea that individuals lose their ability to 
think once they become part of a crowd, subsequently necessitating select elites to 
operate from behind the scenes to maintain order.  
Fear of the mob was already prevalent as a theme in much of literature and 
art of the 19
th
 century,
15
 but was first systematically spelled out during the last 
decades of the century in the guise of the study of “crowd psychology.” Crowd 
psychology is considered one of the most important intellectual preconditions for 
the development of professional propaganda in the 20
th
 century.
16
 One of the 
intellectual predecessors of the concept of systematic propaganda was Gustave Le 
Bon’s (1841-1931) La psychologie des foules,17 translated into English as The 
Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind,
18
 which presented itself as a practical guide 
to statesmen on how to manage crowds and minimize their inevitably increasing 
grip on power in the present “age of crowds” (l’ère des foules). The key to 
managing crowds, according to Le Bon, lay in understanding their character 
(l’âme) and knowing how to appeal to them. Though intellectually clearly inferior 
to the individual, the crowd’s actions were determined by the external stimuli it 
received; depending on the nature of those stimuli, the crowd could be better or 
worse than its constituent individuals.
19
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Le Bon’s writings influenced people such as Walter Lippmann,20 whose 
work Public Opinion (1922) introduced the concept of public opinion as a factor 
in the political process into political theory
21
 as well as Edward Bernays
22
 and Ivy 
Lee,
23
 both famous for their pioneering role in public relations. Gustave Le Bon’s 
work, likewise, influenced Lenin and the Bolsheviks in general.
24
 The 
differentiation between propaganda (explaining a complex idea to an individual so 
that he can rationally grasp it) and agitation (getting the masses to act on a single 
issue through appealing to their emotions) in the Soviet Union is one indicator for 
such influence or at least a shared substratum of ideas between crowd 
psychologists and “elitists” within the Marxist and Socialist movement.25 Thus, 
although propaganda developed differently in the Soviet Union and in Western 
countries later during the 20
th
 century, the underlying assumptions about masses 
and elites were rather similar. 
 
The term propaganda is derived from the Sacra congregatio de 
propaganda fide (Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith),
26
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founded in Rome in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV to counter the influences of the 
Reformation and help spread Catholicism.
27
 Initial use of the term was in the form 
of a proper noun, “the Propaganda,” to refer to this particular Catholic institution. 
The often-told story that the term propaganda had a positive connotation until the 
word was tarnished by its association with the First World War is not entirely 
accurate. The idea that propaganda was practiced by a minority of “bad elites” in 
secrecy could already be found in the Enlightenment movement, which viewed 
propaganda as an activity steered by a secret society within the Catholic Church 
(i.e. “the Propaganda”) that intentionally tried to keep people uninformed. 28 
Consequently, propaganda had a positive connotation in Catholic regions and a 
negative connotation in Protestant areas.
29
 During the French Revolution, the verb 
propager was used by Jacobins to refer to their right to export the revolution to 
other countries.
30
 The proper noun la propagande denoted a fictive Jacobin 
institution modeled on the Catholic Sacra Congregatio, but with the opposite goal, 
namely to destroy Christianity.
31
 Propaganda was also taken up by the 19
th
 
century Labor Movement as a means to mobilize workers, or “the laboring 
masses.”32 
The First World War was a key event for the theory and practice of 
propaganda. Before the outbreak of the war, propaganda-related activities 
included advertisement, press-agentry, and agitation as part of various social 
movements. Likewise, governments and other political actors increasingly utilized 
control over information to disseminate their point of view, particularly as the 
telegraph and, subsequently, news agencies became more widely spread.
33
 With 
the beginning of the war, however, the activity of propaganda first became 
institutionalized through actual organizations at the governmental level both on 
the side of the Axis and the Allies. Great Britain established a War Propaganda 
Bureau as early as in October 1914, later renamed Department of Information in 
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1917 and Ministry of Information in early 1918.
34
 Although Germany later 
attributed the loss of the war to a “propaganda deficit,” 35  it also established 
governmental structures, such as the Center for Foreign Service (Zentralstelle für 
Auslandsdienst).
36
 After the United States joined the war, Wilson established the 
Committee on Public Information (CPI), also named the Creel Committee after its 
chairman George Creel. Despite the dominant view in U.S. society at the time that 
rejected manipulation of the people by select elites, the CPI’s way of operating 
was very much based on the premises of mass theory.
37
 The CPI initially focused 
on the American public, but later established branches abroad to promote U.S.-
style democracy, including in China.
38
 The CPI’s staff included people that were 
later to make important contributions to the conceptualization of propaganda and 
public opinion in the U.S., most importantly Walter Lippmann and Edward 
Bernays. 
At the same time, the First World War also had an impact on the concept 
of propaganda itself, contributing to its politicization and militarization.
39
 The 
“propaganda war” (alternatively called “psychological war” or “war over opinion”) 
became an established category alongside the “military war” and the “economic 
war.” Germany was particularly active in researching propaganda to 
professionalize it after the end of the war due to the perceived propaganda deficit: 
In the early 1920s, while the U.S. still predominantly discussed propaganda as a 
social pathology and abuse of government powers,
40
 Germany established 
research institutes and German academics published extensively on propaganda.
41
  
In the second half of the 1920s, Americans began to develop a more active interest 
in propaganda theory. One of the earliest works systematically analyzing the role 
of propaganda in English that drew on previous research done in Germany was 
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Harold Lasswell’s Propaganda Technique in the World War,42  which gave a 
systematic overview of different propaganda methods, techniques and target 
audiences and became a classic work of reference, including in China, where 
Lasswell taught at Yenching University (Yanjing daxue 燕京大学) in 1937.43 
In the 1930s, propaganda research continued to develop under different 
political systems, including democracies as much as the Bolshevik and the Fascist 
totalitarian states. Beliefs quickly spread across different countries and systems. 
Edward Carr, for instance, drew on German concepts of propaganda; citing Hitler, 
he explained that propaganda was the weapon of choice to deal with these masses 
that had become influential without being intellectually qualified to make any 
decisions. Propaganda, Carr continued, was important in democratic and 
totalitarian states alike.
44
 The Soviet Union was quite active in international 
propaganda as well. According to Carr, the Comintern was the first “large-scale 
permanent international propaganda organization” established by a state, 
intricately tied to the new Soviet state and necessitated by the latter’s military and 
economic weakness.
45
 Although the Bolsheviks certainly used international 
propaganda as a means to protect and further the interests of the Soviet Union 
within the state-based world order at a time when it had few alternatives, their 
definition of propaganda was similar to that of the Jacobins: They considered 
themselves to have both the right and the duty to export the revolution to other 
countries.
46
  
In the area of cultural relations, the Soviet Union was, indeed, a pioneer, 
not in terms of the idea itself (which had been practiced by France and Germany 
for several decades
47
), but in terms of scope and organization. In 1925, it founded 
the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, also known 
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under its Russian acronym VOKS (ВОКС).
48
 VOKS organized all kinds of 
cultural and scholarly exchanges, including sending art troupes abroad, organizing 
art exhibitions, organizing the visits of academics and professionals, etc.
49
 In 
addition, the Soviet Union set up international organizations for leftist artists and 
intellectuals such as the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, the 
International Union of Revolutionary Theater, etc.
50
 By the 1930s, cultural 
propaganda had become a more widely recognized important instrument of 
diplomacy, so that in 1934, both Britain and Japan set up organizations to 
coordinate cultural propaganda.
51
 
 
In North America, the period between the mid-1920s and the 1940s was 
marked by a paradoxical, bifurcated attitude of society towards the concept and 
practice of propaganda: On the one hand, propaganda had been discovered as a 
new “secret weapon” and a large number of academic and professional treatises 
on the topic began to be published (though not all of them chose the word 
propaganda). On the other hand, contempt and wariness of propaganda and the 
“abuse of words” had already emerged as a result of the First World War on both 
sides of the Atlantic.
52
 An indirect exchange between John Dewey and Walter 
Lippmann, which later became known as the Dewey-Lippmann debate,
53
 shows 
                                                          
48
 Cf. Katerina Clark, Moscow, the Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution 
of Soviet Culture, 1931-1941 (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2011), 
38. VOKS stands for Vsesoyuznoye obshchestvo kulturnoy svyazi s zagranitsey Всесоюзное 
общество культурной связи с заграницей.  
49
 Clark, Moscow, the Fourth Rome, 39.  
50
 Clark, Moscow, the Fourth Rome, 38. 
51
 Britain set up the British Council, and Japan founded the Society for International Cultural 
Relations (Kokusai bunka shinkōkai 国際文化振興会 ). Akami, “The Emergence of 
International Public Opinion and the Origins of Public Diplomacy in Japan in the Inter-War 
Period,” 119-120. 
52
 There was an overall opposition to any practices associated with propaganda, regardless under 
which term, as an attempt to manipulate and corrupt public opinion, what Bussemer referred to 
as the humanist paradigm. This paradigm remained dominant in the U.S. during most of the 
1920s. Cf. Bussemer, Propaganda, 81.  
53
 Lippmann has been introduced above. John Dewey (1859-1952) was a philosopher and educator 
teaching at Columbia University, famous among other things for his democratic and practice-
oriented teaching philosophy. For the Dewey-Lippmann debate, which only took place in the 
form of an indirect exchange through a number of successive publications, see for example 
Mark Whipple, “The Dewey-Lippmann Debate Today: Communication Distortions, Reflective 
Agency, and Participatory Democracy,” Sociological Theory 23, no. 2 (June 2005): 156-178. 
The idea of a “Dewey-Lippmann debate” was first introduced by James Carey, a teacher at the 
University of Illinois and at Columbia University, in the early 1980s. While it is agreed that 
Dewey was replying to Lippmann, Lippmann may not have been aware that a “debate” was 
ongoing.  
54 
 
the two main positions American elites took on the role of propaganda and public 
opinion in a democracy over the course of the 1920s.  
Both Dewey and Lippmann agreed that the basis for public opinion and 
participation in politics had been broadened in the 20
th
 century. Lippmann saw 
public opinion as irrational, unreliable, and easily manipulated. It was therefore up 
to a class of elite men with both expertise in a particular field and an 
understanding of how to steer public opinion to guide it in the correct direction. 
Dewey, on the other hand, while conceding that public opinion did not necessarily 
always make the wisest choices, maintained that it remained powerful moral force 
that exerted a positive influence on politics. The Dewey-Lippmann debate 
exemplifies two very different political imaginaries, namely the public holding 
politicians and other elites accountable versus the public having to be guided by 
elites. Both Dewey and Lippmann were very influential in China,
54
 and both 
points of view also showed up in the Chinese propaganda debate, as will be 
shown below.  
The attitude towards the notion of propaganda continues to a large extent 
to be determined by a society’s or other group’s concept of man, of collectives, 
and of the relationship between masses and “elites.” The concept of man in a 
given society consists of several different aspects or subordinate ‘building blocks’ 
regarding specific traits of man, such as the popular question whether man is good 
or bad by nature.
55
 In the interaction between man and society, this assessment has 
implications for the question whether contact with the collective corrupts or 
improves a person. In cases where man is considered inherently good, 
governmental or any other form of interference of society in the development of 
the individual is often considered undesirable and as detracting from man’s 
“purity,” “authenticity,” “individuality,” or “innocence.” If one assumes that a 
person on his or her own is bad by nature or incapable of recognizing his or her 
own interests, on the other hand, society and/or the government are suddenly 
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tasked with turning every individual into a morally upright human being. Of 
course, there can be other reasons for society or the government to have to 
interfere in the development of an individual.  
In Marxism, man has no inherent nature that is shared by all of humanity. 
Just as society evolves, so does the consciousness and nature of the people 
inhabiting it, hence man’s “class nature.” However, in the Leninist version of 
Marxism that was adapted by the Chinese Communists, some people are ahead of 
others, forming a revolutionary vanguard, and it is their role to educate and 
enlighten the rest of society. The role of domestic propaganda in Lenin’s view of 
how to engineer a revolution becomes apparent in his early writings on the press: 
Consciousness had to be brought to the laboring masses from without.
56
 This task 
was the responsibility of the Communist Party, which had a higher level of 
consciousness than the rest of the population. This leads to another “building 
block” in the concept of man, the question whether a person can be changed or not, 
as well as when and how such change can be brought about. Whether or not a 
person or an unenlightened population or mass of people can be changed 
determines the responsibilities of the elites towards the rest of the population, for 
example whether they are to educate them, to guide them or to keep them in check 
and minimize their influence on political decisions.  
The similarities between Lippmann’s take on public opinion and that of the 
Bolsheviks
57
 can be explained, at least in part, by a shared sub-stratum of ideas 
circulating widely at the time about the psychology of crowds and the differences 
between enlightened elites and the overwhelming mass of ordinary, unenlightened 
people.
58
 However, whereas the Bolsheviks believed in the malleability of the 
masses and in the possibility of raising their consciousness, Lippmann did not. 
Likewise, while propaganda had begun to acquire a negative connotation in the 
English-speaking world starting in the First World War, Communists continued to 
use the term with pride. As Marxists and as an enlightened vanguard of the people, 
they argued, they needed to spread the truth in order to help propel history in the 
right direction. There was no shame in this kind of work, neither domestically nor 
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internationally. In the Communist world, including in China after 1949, as the 
term propaganda had been appropriated by the Party-state and continued to 
describe the Party-state’s rather than the “enemy’s” activities, it was shielded 
from the bulk of the massively negative connotations that began to be attached to 
the word propaganda in Western languages after the First World War and that 
became dominant after the end of the Second World War.  
 
While in the Soviet Union, just like in China during the 1950s, the focus 
was on trying to penetrate and thus reach all of society through establishing a 
propaganda network, propaganda research and practice in the West focused on 
techniques how to convince people psychologically. To a large degree, this was 
the result of working in a democratic setting in which many different interest 
groups operated and tried to gain the attention and the favor of the public for their 
purposes. Thus, the core challenges were to establish credibility in a setting with 
many different competing actors and to catch people’s attention in an information-
rich society.  
Although censorship did exist,
59
 it was relatively limited, and interest 
groups trained how to present themselves as better or more trustworthy than their 
opponents, whose voices could also be heard. This entailed conducting research to 
test the effectiveness of techniques. In the 1920s and 1930s, propaganda was 
professionalized in politics as much as in business. Large companies had already 
begun to employ press agents in the late 19th and early 20th century in order to 
combat the muckraking press and negative publicity in cases of major work 
accidents, labor protests, etc.
60
 The two most famous figures in the emerging 
public relations industry were Ivy Lee and former CPI staffer Edward Bernays.  
After the First World War, Bernays began to write down the experience he 
had accumulated earlier. Bernays had been strongly influenced by the theories of 
“crowd psychology,” which to him justified the need for a few select elites to 
manipulate the rest of the population for its own good. Thus, although “crowd 
psychology” has long been rejected in the discipline of psychology, it retained 
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considerable influence on large parts of Western society well into the 1930s and 
1940s.
61
 In Crystallizing Public Opinion,
62
 he introduced a range of new, 
proactive techniques that went beyond simply distributing positive news stories 
and managing bad press for a client. These new strategies included widely 
publicized charitable acts, commissioning scientific studies,
63
 conducting public 
opinion polls in order to influence the public with the results,
64
 or countering 
rumors through the release of only indirectly related news stories rather than 
issuing direct rebuttals.
65
  
By the early 1930s, commercial enterprises were searching for better ways 
to predict consumer behavior.
66
 This was the beginning of quantitative marketing 
research as well as public opinion research. In 1935, George Gallup founded the 
American Institute of Public Opinion.
67
 In 1937, the journal Public Opinion 
Quarterly was launched.
68
 In the 1930s, empirical propaganda studies became a 
sub-branch of the emerging discipline of communications studies.
69
 The two most 
important people in the field were Harold Lasswell and Paul Lazarsfeld.
70
 Thus, 
the collecting of quantitative data on people’s opinions and choices as a basis for 
decision making was introduced into the political process.
71
  
While opposition to propaganda was weaker in the 1930s than it had been 
in the 1920s, it continued to exist. In 1937, largely in reaction to empirical 
propaganda studies, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) was founded, 
whose goal was to train citizens to recognize propaganda and thus make them 
immune to attempts to manipulate them that were by then lurking almost 
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everywhere.
72
 The IPA published a journal called Propaganda Analysis, in which 
it explained propaganda techniques and dissected concrete examples.
73
 After 
facing increasing criticism,
74
 the Institute, which had opposed American 
intervention in the Second World War, was closed in October 1941, shortly before 
the United States joined the war.
75
  
In 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) was established, which ran 
the newly founded radio station Voice of America and worked together with 
Hollywood to organize both domestic and international propaganda campaigns.
76
 
Like the CPI earlier, the OWI’s international arm, the U.S. Information Service 
(USIS) was quite active in China, having dispatched people who were later to 
become renowned China scholars, such as John Fairbank.
77
 The Second World 
War provided an opportunity to test propaganda techniques that had been 
developed over the course of the 1930s.  
However, it was also the last time that the U.S. government could openly 
organize propaganda targeted at domestic audiences. In Western countries, 
particularly the United States but also countries in Western Europe, since the end 
of the Second World War, there has been a strong –though recently challenged–78 
taboo against domestic propaganda and attempts to manipulate public opinion at 
home organized by the government
79
 and a less pronounced aversion against 
propaganda targeting foreigners. As demonstrated above, its intellectual roots 
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preceded the Second World War, but the taboo only became properly 
institutionalized after end of the war, for example in the United States with the 
passing of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which barred content produced for 
external propaganda purposes to be made accessible to U.S. audiences.
80
  
By contrast, for propaganda targeted at foreigners was much more 
accepted. In 1953, the U.S. instituted a strong international propaganda agency, 
the United States Information Agency (USIA).
81
 There were two different 
discourses framing the need for propaganda targeted at foreigners, one “Realist” 
discourse that highlighted national interest and the role of propaganda to defeat 
the enemy and one “Idealist” discourse related to the humanist critique of 
propaganda
82
 as disinformation which stressed cultural exchange and the 
distribution of correct information as a channel to further mutual understanding. 
However, critiques of international propaganda to support national interests were 
focused on policy goals and means used rather than questioning the legitimacy of 
propaganda per se, as was the case in the domestic realm.
83
  
While in practice, various U.S. administrations made use of domestic 
propaganda campaigns,
84
 the conceptual distinction between propaganda targeted 
at foreign publics serving the national interest and domestic propaganda, which 
was officially shunned, had important consequences for how the concept of 
propaganda developed in the West and how it developed in the Socialist bloc after 
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the end of the Second World War. This difference in attitude towards domestic 
propaganda further reinforced two rather different sets of methods and 
mechanisms as well as underlying institutional structures through which 
governments in both blocs sought to manipulate the news at home, which then, in 
turn, also impacted how propaganda targeted at foreigners was conducted.  
This, of course, did not mean that there were no flows between the two 
camps; on the contrary, the Soviet Union and the United States closely watched 
each others’ propaganda activities as well as China’s. Likewise, it does not mean 
that each side did not integrate aspects of the non-dominant imaginary. However, 
the difference in political system, overall institutional contexts and legitimacy of 
propaganda itself as much as different underlying conceptions of the public/the 
masses led to the development of rather different techniques and mechanisms of 
controlling information on the two sides of the Iron Curtain.  
As (domestic) propaganda acquired a bad name in the West, the term 
became a politicized instrument used primarily to delegitimize opponents. 
Consequently, propaganda was replaced by a number of terms with less negative 
baggage attached to them: Publicity, public relations, persuasion, perception 
management, etc.
85
 This already indicates that it would be wrong to assume that 
propaganda strategies did not continue to develop in the West after the end of the 
Second World War. On the contrary, the propaganda-aversion of the population of 
North America and Western Europe resulted in the continued perfection of 
strategies that were either less objectionable than the more crude techniques 
employed during the war or covert and thus deniable. The first category included 
practices such as press conferences and access journalism. Well-known covert or 
grey operations included media such as Radio Free Europe
86
 or and various ways 
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of co-opting or planting journalists.
87
 Governments could also draw on new 
methods and research produced in the marketing and public relations industries. 
All in all, while domestic propaganda remained important, the United States 
invested much more resources in its international propaganda war against the 
Soviet Union. In the Communist world, including in China after 1949, as the term 
propaganda had been appropriated by the Party-state and continued to describe the 
Party-state’s rather than the enemy’s activities, it was shielded from the bulk of 
the massively negative connotations that began to be attached to the word 
propaganda in Western languages after the First World War and that became 
dominant after the end of the Second World War. 
 
In sum, propaganda became part of several movements, institutions, 
disciplines, and ways of organizing the world, all of which tried to come to terms 
with the question how to deal with a new influential force of the 20
th
 century, 
namely the public or the “masses.” The concept of propaganda as it developed in 
the West and the Soviet Union shared some common roots in its assumptions 
about the relationship between “the masses” or the overwhelming majority of 
society and elites, but later relied on rather different institutions and techniques. 
The international socialist movement which received much impetus from the 
Soviet Union through the Comintern focused on how to organize and mobilize the 
laboring masses. While the Bolsheviks were concerned with penetrating Soviet 
society and spreading the revolution to as many other countries as possible, 
researchers in the U.S. focused on the question how to predict or measure 
reactions of the public. In the interwar period in the U.S., propaganda was 
discussed as part of two different imaginaries of how politics and mass-elite 
relations should function, both of which survive not only in different models of 
democracy but also in media discourses in China today. In the first imaginary, it is 
the role of the public to hold politicians accountable. This imaginary established 
itself in most Western countries, which is why propaganda became an unusable 
term, research and debates were conducted around a large variety of old and new 
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terms referring to different aspects and types of propaganda. In the other 
imaginary, the public is guided by politicians and other elites. This imaginary 
determined the actions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and, 
later, the CPC. As will be seen below, these various strains of propaganda debates 
were picked up in China at some point in time and reused for different purposes. 
 
2.2 From Incorporating the World into China to Incorporating China 
into the World 
One problem in tracing the history of the concept of propaganda in China 
(as with any concept anywhere) is distinguishing between terminological and 
conceptual history. While the term for propaganda, xuanchuan, in its current 
usage, entered the Chinese lexicon at a fairly late point in time (around 1920) 
related ideas circulated in China long before that and even had some pre-modern 
Chinese framings of mass-elite relations to draw on and engage with. These 
practices were not always referred to as propaganda at the time, but were 
definitely part of the genealogy of various propaganda packages in late 19
th
 and 
20
th
 century Europe. I argue here that the earliest discussions in China that 
touched on issues that were related to political propaganda (including national 
image management in the eyes of foreigners, the spreading of revolutionary ideas, 
or the unifying of national public opinion for short term or long term purposes) 
were discussed largely (though certainly not exclusively) as part of the role of the 
new institution of the newspaper. These discourses preceding the term xuanchuan 
in its modern sense are addressed here primarily because they included key ideas 
that still inform the CPC’s conception of the world and its understanding of 
domestic and external propaganda. While it makes little sense to want to answer 
essentialist questions such as “What is truly ‘Chinese’ about Chinese 
propaganda?”, this section introduces ways of framing the world and mass-elite 
relations dominant in pre-modern Chinese politics (at least during the Qing 
dynasty) that recur in contemporary propaganda discourses.  
As several studies point out, neither the idea of trying to influence 
behavior and thought of Chinese subjects (today called ‘internal propaganda’) nor 
the idea to project a particular image of China abroad (today called ‘external 
propaganda’) were entirely alien to imperial China. Tsang, in his dissertation from 
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1980 on Chinese propaganda in the U.S. during WWII, sums up an excerpt from 
Sunzi’s The Art of War (Sunzi bingfa 孙子兵法) describing how propaganda 
leaflets were dropped over the enemy in battle, terming this the first use of war 
propaganda in world history.
88
 Some texts on propaganda from the Republican 
period also linked the concept to Chinese classics.
89
 Of course, linking 
propaganda to older Chinese texts or concepts the way that Tsang does here has 
mainly served and continues to serve as a tool to legitimize the appropriation of 
Western ideas. Nonetheless, ideas about the role and responsibility of elites 
towards the rest of the population, as well as parts of the pre-modern Chinese way 
of framing the world still underlie current conceptions of propaganda. Thus, it 
makes sense to consider pre-modern ideas that could be termed propaganda in the 
broader sense and analyze how they began to intermingle with news ways of 
ordering the world.  
In the context of international propaganda, the concept of man is often 
secondary to how a particular group conducting propaganda understands and 
analyses the world order and the world’s main units of interest. The three main 
ways of distinguishing different interest groups in the world that were common in 
China since the late 19
th
 century were, first, dividing the world according to race, 
culture, or civilization, second, dividing the world according to nation-states, and 
third, dividing the world according to class. This is important because all three 
conceptualizations show up in the discourse surrounding propaganda targeting 
non-Chinese.  
In the pre-modern Chinese political imaginary, China was the center of 
civilization in a system best imagined as “concentric squares” around a central 
source of civilization.
90
 China’s “foreign relations” or inter-state relations, if one 
can speak of such a thing, during the imperial period were considered an 
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extension of this “domestic” system. 91  The world as a whole was thus an 
extension of the Chinese empire itself, in the center of which sat the emperor,
92
 
who bore the ultimate responsibility for emanating morality and civilization into 
the world uni-directionally. China’s role and position as center of civilization was 
communicated to other “countries” through rituals and other actions associated 
with the tributary system. In fact, the ancient Chinese model is contrasted with the 
current situation in the contemporary soft power debate.
93
 Although the notion of 
soft power in its contemporary sense is a clear product of the 20
th
 century, similar 
ideas structured China’s self-perception during the imperial period.94 
Voices that suggested propagating China to the world, of course without 
using the tern xuanchuan, were first raised after China was confronted with and 
felt challenged by the West in the mid-19
th
 century. The fact that China saw itself 
as the moral center of the world was also reflected in these writings of Chinese 
officials and reformers in the second half of the 19
th
 who suggested “establishing 
newspapers in Western languages”95 because China’s moral superiority was not 
only not recognized by the foreign powers, but China was also misrepresented in 
the Western press. These early texts advocating the establishment of foreign 
language media were located in between the traditional Chinese world order with 
China as the center of civilization, and the new nation-state based world order 
structured by racial hierarchies, leaning towards one or the other to different 
degrees.  
In the late 19
th
 century, China was gripped by a sense of crisis after having 
been defeated in the Opium Wars twice, having been subjected to a number of 
unequal treaties and facing additional domestic problems and instability. The 
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absorption of evolutionary theories, racial theories, and Social Darwinism
96
 
convinced many concerned intellectuals that the Chinese nation was facing 
extinction. This was not some abstract idea in the eyes of Chinese intellectuals, 
but a concrete danger that had already afflicted India and China’s former tributary 
states in South East Asia. The only nation-state in Asia that had successfully 
managed to protect itself in the race war was Japan, which is why Japan, after 
having defeated the Qing Empire in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, advanced to 
the position of primary model for China in almost all aspects of governance, 
including how to present the country to the outside world.
97
 There were quite a 
few similarities between what was suggested and what was done or at least 
financed by political actors during the late Qing period, suggesting that the debate 
did lead to actual initiatives in the late Qing period. While it is not possible to 
establish whether any of the authors briefly discussed below concretely stipulated 
the launching of external propaganda publications, the idea was clearly floating 
around right before actual initiatives were first put into practice in the early 20
th
 
century.  
 
The first known suggestions for China to establish foreign language papers, 
which were still very much informed by the traditional Chinese conception of the 
world, are from 1874 and reacted to what was seen as unfair coverage of China in 
the foreign press whenever Chinese and foreign interests clashed. This was two 
years after Ernest Major founded the Shenbao (申报) in Shanghai 上海,98 at a 
time when the idea and institution of the newspaper was beginning to take hold 
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among Chinese elites in China’s treaty ports. 99  “Unfair coverage” probably 
generally referred to articles on the quite frequent conflicts between Chinese and 
foreigners in the treaty ports. In 1874, there was a relatively big concrete event 
when Japan sent a “punitive expedition” to Taiwan in retaliation for the death of 
Okinawan fishermen, after the Qing authorities had first presented the conflict as 
an internal Chinese affair and later renounced judicial responsibility.
100
 At the 
time, Japan was already actively involved in distributing its own version of events 
to the foreign press.
101
  
Wang Tao 王韬 (1828-1897), a close associate of the Shenbao, argued that 
the papers established in China’s coastal cities were all financed by foreign capital 
and that although the foreign editors had usually stayed in China for some time, 
they rarely knew anything about the China outside the coastal concessions. What 
these papers published was often distorted. The formulation Wang Tao used here, 
“confusing black and white and turning right and wrong upside down” (hei bai 
hun xiao, shi fei dao zhi 黑白混淆, 是非倒置), is still often used to describe 
Western media today.
102
 Westerners –who only spoke foreign languages and 
therefore had no chance to read Chinese opinions– would then readily believe 
these lies.
103
 Thus, when any incident touching both on foreign and Chinese 
interests happened, foreigners would trust what they had read in their papers and 
would be hard to convince of anything else later (xian ru zhi yan wei zhu 先入之
言为主).104 In the current times, Wang argued, it was therefore more important for 
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China to run papers in foreign languages than in Chinese; after all, the latter were 
only read and understood by Chinese people.
105
 
In the General newspaper (Huibao 汇报), a paper launched in 1874 by 
local officials in Shanghai that soon engaged in polemics with the British press 
about Britain’s role in China,106 reformer Zheng Guanying郑观应 (1842-1923)107 
announced his plans to establish a Western (presumably English) language paper 
to be called Jiaoshebao 交 涉 报  [“Interaction (between different 
“countries”/peoples) paper”]. In the charter for the paper, Zheng explained that 
because Western papers’ coverage of events was motivated by partisan interests 
(si xin 私心, as opposed to by concern for the public good, gong 公), the righteous 
people in each country did not know of all the injustices that China suffered.
108
 
This framing has, in fact, persisted throughout the propaganda discourse, both in 
the 20
th
 century and today, because it fits in the master narratives of China as a 
victim and China as a country without adequate external propaganda capacities. 
The planned paper would report whenever anything happened that involved China 
and foreign countries. If there was any unfair coverage in foreign papers, the 
Jiaoshebao would do a special report with the original biased text attached, so that 
everyone realized both the true situation and the unfair coverage in the foreign 
paper.
109
  
The two underlying assumptions of voices calling for foreign language 
media run by Chinese were first, the problem China was faced with was not one 
of bias, but of availability of information. The Qing court’s regulations, argued 
early proponents of Chinese-run papers, prevented Chinese people from speaking 
up for themselves. If this was changed and Westerners enabled to obtain correct 
information about China, it was argued, they would believe it. The reasons why 
misinformation about China was spread differed. Some of Wang Tao’s comments 
imply that he assumed lack of knowledge as the reason. On the other hand, the 
fact that foreign papers did not have the greater good in mind (gong) was taken for 
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granted, just like the fact that Chinese papers would automatically express the 
public interest. Second, what Westerners knew and thought about China was 
important. The reason was that the current hard power world order was opposite 
to what it should be if ethics were the decisive criterion; if Westerners realized 
China’s moral and cultural superiority, they would adjust its place in their mental 
and consequently their physical universe. This theme is important because it 
continued to show up in China’s external propaganda discourse long after Chinese 
elites had largely transitioned from ‘all under heaven’ (tianxia 天下) to the basic 
premises of a new world order based on nation-states competing against one 
another.  
This already shows that there were larger concerns than balancing 
incorrect reporting at work, related to the changing world order: How should 
China conduct its ‘foreign relations’ in the new situation and thus assure the 
continued recognition of China as a great civilization by other countries. 
According to Zheng Guanying, the purpose behind setting up papers in Western 
languages was to “maintain [the stability of] the overall situation and stay true to 
relations with other ‘states’” (yi wei daju er du bangjiao 以维大局而笃邦交).110 
In “On the advantages of China setting up papers in Western languages itself,” 
Wang Tao also argued that what defined success in relations between China and 
other countries had changed and that now, in order to maintain good relations 
(xiuhao mulin zhi dao 修好睦邻之道111), it was necessary to run a newspaper in a 
foreign language.
112
  
The debate intensified towards the turn of the century. In 1894, Zheng 
Guanying again expressed his anger over China-related coverage in Western 
papers on Chinese soil and the lack of a platform for Chinese to contest foreign 
media’s version of events and called on the Qing government to allow Chinese to 
run papers as well.
113
 In 1897, after China had been defeated in the Sino-Japanese 
war and Japan had become the most important model, poet Chen Yan 陈衍 (1856-
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1937) advised the Chinese government to learn from Japan in this regard.
114
 The 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been funding Chinese and Japanese 
language publications in China since the beginning of the short war in 1894.
115
 
The purpose behind running a foreign language paper was to counter China’s 
image as the “Sick man of Asia” and to demonstrate that the country was serious 
about its self-strengthening movement.
116
 
The time after the defeat against Japan is considered the period when 
China began to internalize the concept of the nation-state,
117
 and the logic behind 
proposals to establish papers in foreign languages did reflect this shift. After 1901, 
China launched the “Renewing of Government” (Xinzheng 新政 ) reforms to 
modernize the government apparatus on the basis of the Japanese model.
118
 The 
idea to establish papers in foreign languages to represent China abroad in the 
system of nation-states came up again during this period. For example, in 1906, 
Xiong Xiling熊希龄 (1870-1937), who was in Fengtian 奉天 (today’s Liaoning 
辽宁) to help implement the Xinzheng reforms in the three northern provinces, 
suggested to establish a global news agency (huanqiu tongbaoshe 环球通报社) in 
Shanghai and to publish monthly journals in the local languages in Japan, Britain, 
the US, Germany, France, Russia, Austria,
119
 and Italy. These should be 
distributed for free to foreign papers and officials. Thus, by the early 20th century, 
in the midst of the Xinzheng reforms and attempts to modernize the Chinese state 
to better fit the new nation-state based world order, more concrete strategies how 
to distribute China’s point of view, such as liaising with foreign papers and 
foreign embassies in China, had emerged.  
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Two Chinese authors note that these plans were not realized, explaining that 
the circumstances simply did not allow for that.
120
 This is not entirely true. 
Through their foreign networks, individual politicians and cliques engaged both in 
foreign language publishing on Chinese soil and in other activities that can be 
classified as external propaganda for China and as attempts to improve their own 
image in the eyes of foreign publics. In the late Qing and early Republican period, 
these publications joined a multilingual vivid publishing industry consisting of 
periodicals representing different national interests run both by foreigners of 
various nationalities and by Chinese who successfully circumvented the ban on 
media ownership by presenting a foreigner as the public face of the periodical or 
registering abroad.
121
 At the same time, publishing was a popular means used by 
Chinese reformers and revolutionaries in exile used to gain support. This was a 
very “messy” media environment, in which the nationality of the owner was rarely 
indicative of the interests a particular publication represented, and alliances of a 
paper could change quickly.
122
 In order to stand out internationally, a new paper 
had to draw attention to itself in this fiercely competitive environment. Therefore, 
it is no surprise that papers directly presented themselves as the official 
mouthpiece of the Chinese court or high-ranking politicians.  
In 1908, both the New York Times and the Washington Post reported that a 
national paper called Chinese Public Opinion had begun to be published thrice 
weekly in Beijing 北京  by general Yuan Shikai 袁世凯  (1859-1916). 123 
According to the U.S. press, the Chinese Public Opinion was “part of a general 
movement to express in the press the feeling of China with regard to her 
international situation.”124 At the time, there was, in fact, a paper called Chinese 
Public Opinion published in Beijing with the parallel Chinese title Beijing ribao 
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北京日报 [Beijing daily];125 however, it is also possible that the U.S. press was 
referring to a different paper, the National Review, which had a parallel Chinese 
title that translated to Chinese Public Opinion (Zhongguo gonglun xibao 中国公
论西报). In 1910, the New York Times unequivocally reported about the National 
Review, stating that it had been founded with the aim of “[giving] the English-
speaking world a correct understanding of the Chinese opinion on international 
questions.”126 According to the article, the paper received backing from the Qing 
court, which had it distributed to all Ministries, Consulates, and educational 
establishments in China. Furthermore, the State Department in Washington also 
received two copies.
127
 The paper was first published in January 1907 and, 
according to Chinese sources, was “subsidized” (jintie 津贴) by Yuan Shikai.128  
During the Republican period, the journal was controlled by the Northern 
government and thus, just like in the late Qing period the journal supported Yuan 
Shikai. Yuan used the paper as a platform to shape his own image and manage 
image crises. For instance, when a scandal erupted in 1913 that relatives of 
Yuan’s were growing opium in Henan 河南, the National Review published a 
statement from a credible third party that Yuan Shikai had ordered an 
investigation of the issue. This statement was then reprinted in the New York 
Times.
129
 The National Review translated articles from the Chinese press and often 
also reprinted articles published in other English language papers (such as the 
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Peking Gazette). In addition to introductions about the paper, U.S. media 
occasionally republished or summarized articles from the National Review.
130
  
In the American press, the National Review was presented as a sign that 
China was a progressive and reforming nation-state that fulfilled its duty to keep 
other nations informed of “Chinese public opinion.” The presentation of the paper 
to American audiences (it is unclear how much of a role Chinese players had in 
choosing this representation) was in line with the paradigm that saw public 
opinion as a force of reason and publicizing it as an obligation imposed on each 
nation in an internationalizing world. By publishing the paper, China was 
fulfilling part of its obligation necessary to be admitted as an equal into the family 
of nations. Whether or not and to what degree Yuan Shikai’s financing of the 
paper was officially backed by and done in the name of the Qing court is unclear. 
In the climate of the Xinzheng reforms, with an increasing number of official 
papers at national and provincial level,
131
 and with Japan as the primary model 
doing the same, an official mandate (rather than an individual decision by Yuan 
Shikai) is certainly within the realm of the plausible, despite the fact that Yuan 
primarily used the paper to promote himself and his own interests.  
The National Review was not Yuan’s only initiative to publicize himself in 
the West. He was also honorary Vice-president of the China Society of America 
(Zhong Mei xiejinhui 中美协进会 ), 132  an organization founded in winter 
1911/1912, among others by V. K. Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun 顾维钧),133 who 
was an exchange student studying in the United States (U.S.) at the time. The 
China Society’s headquarters were located in New York, and its self-declared 
purpose was to further cultural exchange between China and the U.S. and to 
“[educate] Americans to know China and things Chinese.” 134  Its scope of 
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activities was very broad, ranging from publishing or recommending China-
related publications, trying to influence parts of the U.S. school curriculum and 
lobbying the U.S. government in favor of affiliated interest groups in China to 
sponsoring various cultural events, providing a network for Chinese students in 
the U.S. and practicing film diplomacy.
135
 There are some instances in which 
influential members of the China Society propagated Yuan Shikai’s stance in the 
US media. For example, when Yuan declared himself emperor, citing “historical 
reasons and public opinion” as a justification for this move, he was defended by 
Andrew B. Humphrey, then president of the China Society of America, in an 
article in the New York Times as a democratic move because it had been decided 
by referendum.
136
 
One of Yuan’s main adversaries, Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan 孙中山), is 
of course also well known for his connections both with fellow overseas Chinese 
and with white “mainstream” society in North America and Western Europe. Sun 
Yat-sen had several Western friends who advised him on how to propagate China 
and his own cause in the West and who also helped him with concrete texts in 
English.
137
 In China, Sun financed The China Press (Dalu bao 大陆报), which 
operated in the International Settlement and was registered in Delaware to avoid 
being censored by the Qing Court.
138
 In addition, Sun Yat-sen also subsidized The 
Republican Advocate (Minguo Xibao 民国西报), which was launched in Shanghai 
in April 1912. Hollington Tong (Dong Xianguang 董显光), a Missouri-trained 
journalist who was later to play an important role in the GMD’s international 
propaganda apparatus, acted as Beijing correspondent of the paper.
139
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These examples are only illustrative, but they do give some insight into the 
use of the subsidized English language press in China in the rivalry between 
different politicians and factions in China during the 1910s. This shows that 
rivaling factions were engaged in a propaganda war over international public 
opinion before the term xuanchuan was used to designate political propaganda 
and before fully and openly government-run papers (or other media) became a 
more acceptable transnational practice, but after the idea that the press was an 
ideal tool to consolidate one’s power and to defend one’s “national interest” had 
already gained currency. At least in the case of the National Review, attempts 
were made to present the periodical as the official voice of the Chinese people 
(through the government legitimately representing them) and to distribute it to 
embassies.   
 
2.3 The Chinese Term for Propaganda: Xuanchuan  
The First World War and the interest it triggered in the phenomenon of 
propaganda as part of the regular functions of government of any successful state 
contributed significantly to the introduction and subsequent wide use of the term 
propaganda in Japan and China. Propaganda had suddenly become the weapon of 
choice in the 20
th
 century in various different domestic and international contexts. 
Propaganda-related notions and activities had been present in both countries 
before, just like the manipulation of news had already been part of the standard 
repertoire of international relations in Europe for decades, but after the war, 
discussions began to intensify in Europe and this resulted, among others, in a 
narrowing down on the term senden/xuanchuan in Japan and China.  
The Japanese-Chinese word for propaganda consists of two characters, 
xuan 宣 and chuan 传. The word xuan, by itself or in various combinations, has a 
connotation of something rightful and honest being announced officially and 
solemnly. In ancient China it was also associated, during certain periods and 
among other meanings, with “making visible the ‘mandate of heaven’” (xianshi 
tianming 显示天命 ). 140  It hence signified something righteous, i.e. the 
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proclamation of truth. Words containing chuan have historically been used in the 
sense of transmission in all sorts of fields, e.g. physics, mechanics, medicine, 
missionary work, heritage, lingual translation, and, finally, speech acts.
141
 
Most people believe that the lexeme xuanchuan 宣传 in its modern sense 
was coined in Japan (宣伝, Japanese pronunciation: senden) and transmitted to 
China from there.
142
 In the earliest reference found in the Modern Chinese 
Scientific Terminologies database (MCST),
143
 namely as an entry in the Chinese 
English Dictionary (Hua Ying zidian jicheng华英字典集成), published in Hong 
Kong since 1868, the term xuanchuan is used in a Christian context: xuanchuan 
fuyin 宣传福音, which is translated as “to proclaim the gospel.”144 This means 
that the lexeme may actually have functioned as a loan translation to render the 
new concept of propaganda in China earlier than in Japan, but for propaganda in a 
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religious context only. In 1914, the term was still used in official paper Internal 
Affairs (Neiwu gongbao内务公报) to refer to the propagation of Christianity.145  
There is some evidence that, as in many other cases, xuanchuan is, in fact, 
a graphic loan from Japanese, where it had been appropriated from a different 
context (either a pre-modern Chinese text or a more recent Chinese text on 
religious propaganda) to translate the English term propaganda. Akami writes 
that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs underwent a relatively sudden 
change in terminology in the period 1919 to 1920. Earlier, activities related to 
news propaganda had been termed news manipulation. Suddenly, the new terms 
of choice were “propaganda” (senden 宣伝) and “enlightenment” (keihatsu 啓
発).146 In China, the first instances of use of the term xuanchuan are from 1918147 
and 1919.
148
 After these first few mentions, the number of articles in the two main 
databases I searched then starts to increase significantly after 1920.
149
   
Different understandings of propaganda and the types of activities it 
encompassed reached China through different routes at the same time. Japan, 
which increasingly emerged as China’s main enemy, served as an important 
model. In addition, there were exchange students and networks of Chinese 
students in Europe. Although after the war, many Chinese were convinced that 
Europe was doomed and worse off than China,
150
 this did not stop them from 
trying to extract from the European tradition anything they thought might be 
                                                          
145“Pi Zheng Wenxin bing xuanchuan yejiao suo qingyou bu zixing gaisheng fagei shiyu zhichu 
ainanzhaozhun wen” 批郑维新禀宣传耶教所请由部咨行该省发给示谕之处碍难照准文,九
月二十一日 [Official document rejecting Zheng Weixin’s request for a ministerial order to that 
province, for facilitating the propaganda of Chriantianity, September 21], Neiwu gongbao内务
公报 [Inner affairs gazette], no. 13 (1914): 49-50.  
146
 Cf. Akami, “The Emergence of International Public Opinion,” 111.  
147
 The first use from 1918 is still in the sense of proclamation, but has points in common with the 
phenomenon of political propaganda popular at the time. “Geming jinian ri shilue ji xuanchuan 
yaodian” 革命纪念日史略及宣传要点  [Brief history and propaganda points for the 
commemoration day of the revolution], Hebei jiaoyu gongbao 河北教育公报 [Hebei education 
bulletin], nos. 35-36 (1918). 
148
The second article speaks about the propaganda of “Russian extremists.” “Eguo guojipai zhi 
xuanchuan yundong” 俄国过激派之宣传运动 [The propaganda campaigns of the Russian 
extremists], Shishi xunkan 时事旬刊 [Current events biweekly] 1, no. 9 (1919): 20-21.  
149
 Particularly in the second half of the 1920s, the term xuanchuan became increasingly popular 
and widely used. There is a marked increase of articles with the term xuanchuan in the title in 
Dacheng data in the year 1925: There were 3 in 1924, and 14 in 1925. In Quanguo baokan 
suoyin, there is also an increase from 33 to 44. However, the number of articles is too small to 
make this a decisive indicator.  
150
 Cf. Robert A. Scalapino, “The Evolution of a Young Revolutionary – Mao Zedong in 1919-
1920,” The Journal of Asian Studies 42, no. 1 (November 1982): 35.  
77 
 
useful to save China. With the Boxer Indemnity Scholarships, an increasing 
number of Chinese were introduced to U.S. discourses. The first journalists in 
China were mostly U.S.-educated (at Columbia and Missouri) and maintained 
networks with their colleagues abroad. China also found the United States to be an 
ally in its struggle against British and Japanese colonialism, as the United States 
had an interest in an independent China free from the control of other nations.
151
 
According to Manela, many Chinese perceived the U.S. as “the first nation to 
[have emerged] from a successful revolt against empire, and one that, although 
born of the West, represented a more benign version of Western modernity when 
compared with the habits of imperial aggression and exploitation associated with 
the European powers.”152  Finally, the Comintern directed the CPC as one its 
subordinate branches and also exerted a strong influence on the GMD until 1927. 
Thus, during the May Fourth Movement and in the 1920s, different ideas from a 
large variety of different movements, political interest groups, and movements 
were absorbed in China.  
This resulted in the coexistence of several different propaganda discourses, 
most of which used the term xuanchuan, including propaganda in times of war, 
propaganda as a part of diplomacy, or propaganda for one’s national interest, 
propaganda as a means to create national unity, propaganda as education of the 
citizenry, propaganda in the international labor movement, propaganda as a way 
to spread the revolution, etc. The articles using xuanchuan that I have found 
suggest that the term was applied to domestic and international propaganda 
roughly around the same time in the late 1910s and early 1920s, although with 
international propaganda a bit earlier. This makes sense, as the initial discussions 
were derived from the European war experience, whereas domestic propaganda 
only became a major issue after the GMD turned towards the Soviet Union for 
help. First voices openly critical of the concept of propaganda or alluding to the 
fact that propaganda had a negative connotation among some people were present 
in China both in the 1920s and 1930s. However, the role the Soviet Union played 
in organizing both the GMD and the CPC and the Soviet concept of propaganda 
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as a legitimate activity contributed to the stability of the term xuanchuan, even as 
euphemisms for the term propaganda multiplied in the West.  
Below, I will introduce these different discourses, beginning with the 
earliest discussions and practices of international propaganda, continuing with the 
introduction of the idea of domestic propaganda, and finishing with the concept of 
propaganda in times of war and crisis as discussed both by the GMD and the CPC. 
 
2.4 Participating in the International Public: Chinese Public Opinion 
Matters 
One common strategy in the overall repertoire of techniques to influence 
international public opinion used by China and others today is launching 
complaints about the representation of one’s own country in the foreign media. 
This strategy was used as early as in the 1920s, primarily by people who had 
networks abroad and saw China as a junior member of the world community.  
After the turn of the century, especially starting in the 1920s, despite the 
fact that the GMD had turned towards the Soviet Union, the United States became 
more influential in shaping China’s reforms in a number of realms including 
education and journalism because of the Boxer Indemnity Scholarships, the first 
round of which was distributed in 1909.
153
 In the 1920s, U.S.-educated Chinese 
journalists maintained ties to U.S. journalists and institutions.
154
 As opposed to 
most European scholars, Americans at the time still viewed “public opinion” as a 
benign, positive force that had developed legitimately and that needed to be 
respected by governments that wanted to claim any form of 
legitimacy/representation.
155
  
As demonstrated above, early efforts on the part of Chinese political 
factions were presented in the United States as an attempt on China’s part to 
publicize its stance and the opinion of the Chinese public because the world had 
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an interest and a right to know about it. The idea of international public opinion as 
a moral force had been implied in Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which were wildly 
popular in China at the time of the May Fourth Movement,
156
 and was fully 
spelled out in Wilson’s speech at the League of Nations in February 1919.157 This 
was a time when the idea of “public diplomacy” became popular in China, not in 
the sense that the term is used today but as a synonym of “open diplomacy” and 
the opposite of examples such as the Versailles conference, which was seen by 
Chinese American-educated journalists as the classic example of “secret 
diplomacy,” i.e. diplomacy behind closed doors, which led to unjust outcomes.158 
While in the early 20
th
 century, journals such as the National Review were only 
presented in the terminology of the “rational public opinion” discourse in the U.S. 
press (but not necessarily in China), by the early 1920s, Chinese journalists, at 
least when speaking in English, had adapted the same vocabulary and line of 
argument in addition to new arguments about the need for open diplomacy and 
journalism standards that had become popular in the United States by that time.  
One common strategy that Chinese organizations pursued during the early 
1920s, not called xuanchuan, but taking place at a time when the term xuanchuan 
was already in use in China, was cautioning foreign governments and foreign 
organizations that their image in the eyes of the Chinese public deteriorated 
because of their negative portrayal of China and the Chinese people in the 
country’s mass media. Thus, as early as in the 1920s, Chinese used appeals to 
shared values in order to try to change how China was portrayed in foreign media, 
including the press and film.  
Such activities were not labelled propaganda. In fact, at the first Pan-
Pacific journalism conference organized by the Press Congress of the World in 
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Hawaii in October 1921,
159
 at which China was represented by four delegates,
160
 
one of the Chinese delegates, Xu Jianping 许建屏 (Jabin Hsu),161 called for a 
Western “press devoid of propaganda and colored news.”162 Propaganda in his 
eyes, as in the eyes of the other participants, was a bad word, the opposite of 
‘white publicity,’ 163  which was intended to counter the problem of secret 
diplomacy behind closed doors and create transparency for the public. The crucial 
function of the press was to hold politicians auntable to their promises of open 
diplomacy. The argument that ‘public diplomacy’ was needed in order to serve the 
public interest certainly appealed to Chinese journalists, particularly when made 
in connection with the Treaty of Versailles. It also resonated with the traditional 
Chinese distinction between private interest (si), as displayed by the Western 
press at the time, and public interest (gong), which could only be achieved 
through open diplomacy.  
The press congress was used by Chinese delegates to criticize the Western 
press’s China coverage and to appeal to the (perceived) wish of the Western press 
to be well-respected in China. Delegate Xu Jianping emphasized that Chinese 
journalists had already lost their respect for the Western press, as they felt that 
news organs were controlled and steered by their national governments.
164
 The 
speech Xu gave was very much in line with the rhetoric of the American members 
of the World Press Congress at the time, but also expressed the disappointment of 
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the Chinese people in the American press which had been accepted as “big 
brothers” in teaching China the code of journalism and as a force “helping to 
guide the public opinion of China’s vast populace.”165 The belief underpinning 
this line of argumentation was that public opinion was a moral force and that 
foreigners cared about how Chinese public opinion viewed them.  
In addition, China also tried to engage in “film diplomacy,” which refers the 
efforts of a nation-state (both through popular and government initiatives) to exert 
influence on how one’s country is portrayed in film productions abroad. This was 
a very common practice for governments all over the world in the first part of the 
20
th
 century.
166
 Films that portrayed China and the Chinese people negatively 
prompted both protest letters to influential people in the film industry and foreign 
governments, as well as caused heated discussions at home. In protesting movies 
to foreign governments, Chinese often appealed to the interests of the other parties 
to maintain their own image in China. Protesting the 1921 movie Dinty
167
 to the 
U.S. Secretary of State, for instance, Chinese students implied that films 
portraying a negative view of the Chinese could hurt America’s image in China if 
the government allowed these movies to be distributed unchecked.
168
  
The central idea behind such appeals was, again, that China was an equal or 
a potential equal in the international system, once it had caught up with the 
Western countries by learning from them. Those who believed that China was 
already accepted as a junior member of the international community and would be 
increasingly integrated over the coming years as the country continued to 
modernize itself tried to engage and reason with their foreign peers by appealing 
to shared ideals.  
This shows that the notion of the rationality and importance of public 
opinion was also used to try to improve China’s image abroad (by appealing to 
foreign journalists, film studios, etc). Such activities later became part of the 
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overall package of activities subsumed under the term xuanchuan.
169
 The 
discourse universe centred on the notion of imperialists who would never treat 
China as an equal was soon to emerge, among others, as a polemic against this 
ideal.   
 
2.5 Establishing China in the Forest of Nations 
International respect became one of many issues addressed during the May 
Fourth Movement. The fact that Japan had been given German rights in Shandong 
山东, rather than fully returning the province to China was a painful reminder to 
May Fourth students and intellectuals that China was not seen as a full member of 
the international community en par with Europe, North America, and Japan, 
despite the promises made in Wilson’s Fourteen Points.170 Just like in the late 19th 
and at the turn of the 20
th
 century, recognition of China by the international 
community, its “international status,” was important in the early 1920s. The idea 
of international status and of being accepted as a great civilization that is at least 
on equal footing with the Western countries are central to understanding China’s 
early conception of external propaganda that also persisted after the end of the 
First World War and subsequently became one of the many discussions 
surrounding the term xuanchuan. 
An article from 1922 on the propagation of Chinese history written by Miao 
Fenglin 缪凤林 (1899-1959), who was later to become a renowned historian, 
posited that having a reputation as a great ancient civilization was a precondition 
for being respected today, at least for China, arguing that because there were no 
systematic introductions of Chinese history in Western textbooks on world history, 
it should not come as a surprise that the West did not respect China.
171
 It was not 
that there were no texts on China’s history in the West at all, but the existing 
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studies, first, did not grasp the true value of Chinese civilization (wei neng 
mingliao wuguo wenming zhi zhenjia 未能明了吾国文明之真价) and, second, 
they contained grave mistakes.
172
 This was particularly bitter for China because 
histories of Ancient Egypt and Ancient Babylon were, as Miao pointed out, much 
more detailed. While Westerners were interested in understanding Chinese history, 
their language abilities and other limitations prevented them from doing so 
properly.
173
 Therefore, the Chinese people needed to speak up for themselves, 
propagate Chinese history and, in so doing, answer to the demands from other 
countries to learn about China and to prevent all sorts of misunderstandings.
174
 
This type of rhetoric places the appeal somewhat within the discourse centred on 
rational public opinion and interaction between China and foreigners on equal 
footing.  
At the same time, the author highlighted the superiority of Chinese 
civilization compared to the West. For North Americans and Europeans, whose 
own countries were too young to even remotely compare to China, argued Miao, it 
was difficult to imagine the glories of a country that had thousands of years of 
civilization. Currently, they therefore viewed China as a semi-carved up, semi-
opened up country.
175
 Propagating the achievements of China’s civilization, for 
instance its contributions to governance and law,
176
 would help eliminate this lie 
and show people the contributions China had made as well as its potential for 
future contributions to world civilization.
177
 Propagating China’s history, Miao 
stated, was also important to let the world see the wrongs Europeans had 
committed on the Asian continent. All countries that the West has forced open and 
thus destroyed used to be part of the Chinese tributary system, with India as the 
only exception. They were part of Chinese history and hence it was China’s 
responsibility to let the world know of their fate at the hands of Western 
countries.
178
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However, relatively abstract recognition of China’s greatness as well as 
demonstrating the West’s immoral behavior were not the only reason why China 
needed to propagate its history abroad; rather, history was also to serve present 
political needs: An incorrect understanding of Chinese history would cause other 
countries to take the wrong stance on current political issues. For instance, 
Westerners believed that Manchuria only became a part of China during the Qing 
Dynasty. If China let them know that it had been a part of China for thousands of 
years, they would not dare to openly support Japan’s bids to control the land.179 
Moreover, China needed to eliminate the misperception that the North and South 
of the country had been ruled by different governments for significant parts of 
Chinese history. If Westerners understood that the North and the South had 
always been unified, that would influence them psychologically and make them 
support a unified China.
180
  
The article contained themes that had been present in earlier debates why it 
was necessary to establish media in foreign languages and that were to remain 
important in the coming decades. It is representative of later (to some extent 
including today’s) discussions in its ambivalence towards the role of the Western 
countries, expressing disdain on the one hand and a desire of being recognized as 
a great civilization by the West on the other. Likewise, it shows that culture and 
history, which are considered important carriers for communicating China’s 
message today, have had a place in the Chinese discussion on external propaganda 
since the earliest days. The theme of a rival faction doing its own international 
propaganda, by contrast, was only implicit in this early article. It was spelled out 
more explicitly later, after the conflict with Japan worsened over the course of the 
1920s: Foreigners (or, alternatively, illegitimate Chinese governments) kept 
getting away with misrepresenting events because China did not have any 
international propaganda.
181
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2.6  Domestic Propaganda: Making and Governing Citizens 
Although the first longer discussions on xuanchuan in its modern meaning 
described the practice of international or transnational propaganda, the term was 
soon also used to refer to domestic propaganda. After Sun Yat-sen had propagated 
his agenda in the West,
182
 but had failed to gain recognition or support from 
Western governments for the GMD that had set up a separate government in the 
South, he turned towards the Soviet Union. As the GMD rebuilt itself as a 
Leninist party under Soviet tutelage, it established domestic propaganda structures. 
In 1922, two years prior to the official restructuring of the GMD along the lines of 
a Leninist party, but at a time when the term xuanchuan for the modern 
phenomenon of political propaganda was already well-established in China, Sun 
Yat-sen first instituted a Propaganda Bureau (Xuanchuanju 宣传局 ), thus 
establishing the first structure to manage propaganda in GMD history.
183
 At this 
time, Sun was, of course, already working with the Comintern. In 1923, he 
established the GMD Central Propaganda Department (Guomindang zhongyang 
xuanchuanbu 国民党中央宣传部) in Shanghai.184  
The CPC had also established a Propaganda Department in the year of its 
foundation in 1921, as such a structure was a requirement for joining the 
Comintern.
185
 Thus began the importation of domestic propaganda structures and 
techniques from the Soviet Union. Volland has argued that the current domestic 
propaganda concept of the CPC has its roots not only in practices absorbed from 
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the Soviet Union through the Comintern, but also in pre-modern ideas about the 
relations between the people (min 民) on the one hand and the emperor and his 
officials (guan 官) on the other.186 The pre-modern Chinese concept of min had 
been marked by a distinct lack of trust in intellectual capacities and conscious 
agency of the people. In what would today be considered the domestic realm, 
namely the territory controlled by the court through the dispatching of officials 
(guan), the emperor as the Center of the world was responsible for the moral 
education of the population, which depended on him like children.
187
 Likewise, 
there was a general idea that competing individuals or groups (“ringleaders”) 
could mislead and corrupt the people if they were not dealt with swiftly and 
harshly. The emperor mainly fulfilled his duty through living as a moral example. 
In addition, there were a number of practices and routines that ensured that the 
population did not miss the message, such as the regular reading of the Sacred 
Edict (Shengyu 圣谕) by officials to villagers all over the Chinese empire.188  
Reformers and revolutionaries at the turn of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries 
likewise assumed the population’s need for guidance in order to turn China’s 
useless masses into proper, awake patriotic citizens.
189
 Chinese intellectuals’ 
conceptions about the population they had to deal with in order to build a strong 
nation that would be able to survive in the social Darwinist struggle were further 
fuelled by Western theories that reached China usually through the mediation of 
Japan. For example, in China, as in other parts of the world, ideas about “national 
psychology” and “crowd psychology,” one of the foundations for propaganda 
studies later, became very popular among intellectuals starting in the early 20
th
 
century.
190
  
Le Bon’s Les lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples, which intended 
to analyze the “psychology” and consequently the political behavior of different 
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“nations” or “races,” had been a popular book during the last years of the Qing 
dynasty, when intellectuals in exile in Japan argued over the ideal form of 
government for China. Liang Qichao 梁启超  used Le Bon’s Psychology of 
Peoples as early as 1904 to argue against the introduction of too much liberty into 
the Chinese political system. He commented on the chaos that he found in San 
Francisco’s Chinatown due to the lack of governmental power that usually kept 
the Chinese in check and suggested that Chinese were incapable of living under 
any other system than despotic rule.
191
  
Certain notions, such as “crowd psychology” or, later, the need for a 
revolutionary vanguard leading the people, were thus well-received in China in 
the early 20
th
 century because they were considered a modern scientific 
explanation for traditional paternalistic conceptions of the people from the 
imperial period. The belief in the lack of intellectual capacities and conscious 
agency of the people as well as the role of masses and elites vis-à-vis each other 
did not need to be significantly changed in order to accommodate new ideas 
imported from the West arguing for the need of an elite in guiding the rest of the 
population. Instead, an existing belief was bolstered with additional details and 
came to be “scientifically proven” by Western psychology or Bolshevik ideology.  
However, Chinese intellectuals, with a few exceptions, largely believed in 
the malleability of crowds through education and advocated cultivating their good 
sides while eliminating their shortcomings.
192
 By creating a large number of good 
citizens, China would be able to strengthen itself and thus its overall position in 
the Social Darwinist struggle for national existence. Chinese elites distinguished 
between themselves and the overwhelming majority of the population, but as 
opposed to European crowd psychologists who were looking for ways to 
manipulate the masses to maintain order, Chinese elites saw it as their 
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responsibility and genuinely wanted to change people in order to create a stronger 
China. Similar ideas can be found today for example when the CPC talks of the 
need to raise the “quality” (suzhi 素质) of the Chinese people, which will be 
addressed again below in chapter 8.4. 
In the political imaginaries of both reformers and revolutionaries –reality 
was of course a different matter– the purpose of such “propaganda” was not to 
push through certain policies, but to change the population for the greater good. 
As opposed to previous conceptualizations centered on the emperor’s role in 
maintaining morality and order, the underlying rationale of intellectuals at the turn 
of the century was that China needed an enlightened, patriotic citizenry in order to 
strengthen itself and be able to survive in the competition between nations. This 
has been covered extensively in secondary literature
193
 and will therefore only be 
revisited here to make brief points about the role of the press, conceptions of 
mass-elite relations, and the link to later ideas about propaganda.   
Again, some of the earliest ideas of what was later to become one of the 
debates around the term xuanchuan were initially expressed in the form of 
discussing the role of the press, which was an adept instrument to turn useless 
Chinese peasants into proper citizens by reformers at the turn of the century. Sun 
Yat-sen, too, shared the belief in the press as a powerful force to unify national 
public opinion. In 1912, on several occasions, he stressed that one of the most 
important functions of the press during the revolutionary struggle had been to 
unify public opinion and guide it towards the one correct truth.
194
 After the term 
xuanchuan became commonly used in China, statements such as these were 
considered part of the history of the idea of propaganda in China.
195
 Indeed, the 
                                                          
193
 E.g. Fogel and Zarrow, eds., Imagining the People.  
194
 Chinese quote: “其初虽有不正当之舆论……而报馆记者卒抱定真理，一往不渝，并牺牲
一切精神、地位、财产、名誉，使吾所抱真理屹不为动，作中流之砥柱。久而久之，人
人之心均倾向于此正确之真理，虽有其它言论，亦与之同化” “Zai Shanghai Minlibao zhi 
dayan” 在上海《民立报》之答言 [Answering questions at the Shanghai People’s Paper 
(literally: paper set up by the people)], April 17, 1912, in Sun Yixian孙逸仙 [Sun Yat-sen], 
Sun Zhongshan quanji 孙中山全集 [Complete works of Sun Yat-sen] (Beijing: Zhonghua 
shuju, 1981), vol. 2, 337. For another speech, see for example “The Press Should Be United” 
(Speech given on April 27, 1912 to reporters of Canton newspapers). In Sun Yat-sen, 
Prescriptions for Saving China: Selected Writings of Sun Yat-Sen (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1994), 73 
195
 For instance, writing in 1928, one Chinese author opined that before the 1911/1912 revolution, 
the members of Sun’s Revolutionary League (Tongmenghui 同盟会) focused on propaganda, a 
focus that was unfortunately lost and replaced by an emphasis on military achievements after 
1912. Long Sheng龙生, “Guoji xuanchuan yu Shanghai guoji dianxunshe” 国际宣传与上海
89 
 
belief in the press’s ability to shape opinions and transform people is another 
important precursor of the concept of propaganda before the term xuanchuan was 
introduced into China and discussed on a large scale in the aftermath of the First 
World War. It was in the 1920s, mostly under the influence of the Cominterm, 
that Sun Yat-sen began using the term xuanchuan to when speaking of the need to 
unify people and make them accept the GMD’s correct ideas. In 1923, he 
proclaimed that for the revolution to succeed, the GMD needed to rely to 90 per 
cent on propaganda and only 10 per cent on military force because reforming 
people’s thought could not be achieved through military might.196  
After the GMD had brought larger sections of Chinese territory under its 
control through the Northern Expedition of 1927-1928 and had established itself 
in Nanjing 南京, it had more capacities for large scale propaganda movements 
that were theoretically intended to target and shape all of the Chinese population 
within the GMD’s reach. Starting in the second half of the 1920s and continuing 
throughout the 1930s, the GMD Central Propaganda Department as well as its 
provincial equivalents began to devise “propaganda programs” or outlines 
(xuanchuan dagang 宣传大纲 ) for a number of different occasions and 
campaigns,
197
 a format that was later also used to list the points to highlight in 
international propaganda work.
198
 In this context, any sinister context of the term 
xuanchuan was not even debatable. Importantly, like later CPC outlines, this 
included the proper slogans to write and shout.
199
 Despite the break with the 
Comintern after 1927, the GMD had clearly internalized organizational principles 
and practices established under Soviet influence, such as the mass campaign 
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(yundong 运动), i.e. the mobilization of the population under the leadership of the 
Party in order to achieve a particular goal.
200
 
Looking at the CPC’s understanding of propaganda work, it becomes 
apparent that it was an outgrowth of or converged with earlier citizen-building 
campaigns that had been ongoing since the turn of the century, at least in part. The 
CPC considered domestic propaganda a necessary activity in order to raise the 
consciousness of the Chinese people and develop (fayang 发扬) their conscious 
agency (zijue nengdongxing 自觉能动性) to enable them to stand up to their 
domestic and international oppressors.
201
 Like in the GMD, the CPC discussed 
propaganda as a necessary activity to “awaken” the Chinese people so that they 
could struggle against and liberate themselves from the enemy du jour – whether 
that was the “imperialists,” the Japanese or the capitalists. Former concrete values 
and their abstract categories that the “new Chinese” was to be inculcated with 
were simply replaced with new ones. However, the reach of the CPC was 
obviously limited, and initially, its propaganda activities were relatively 
uncoordinated and waxed and waned.
202
 It was only in 1942 that the CPC 
established a strong domestic propaganda apparatus to inculcate Party members 
with “correct thought” and unify their thinking.203 
Aside from use of the term xuanchuan in the GMD (and starting in the 
1930s increasingly the CPC) bureaucracy to denote a certain type of activity that 
had already been accepted as a normal part of the political process in order to 
shape proper citizens and no longer needed any debate, there was a parallel 
movement among intellectuals to write at length about propaganda and 
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propaganda strategies. While propaganda as a strategy of governance had been 
adopted from the Soviet Union, the actual propaganda debate at the time mostly 
drew on the North American and Western European discussions, which focused 
on qualitative strategy and research to buttress actual propaganda work. At the 
time, the GMD could also learn from Fascist countries in Europe that perfected 
propaganda techniques on their own populations and with which the GMD had 
good ties in the 1930s.
204
As opposed to the early Republican period (until the 
early 1920s), when the focus was on what elites wanted China’s population to 
become and to believe (modern citizens who had been ideologically freed of 
China’s “feudal” legacy), the focus in the late 1920s and 1930s shifted to the 
question how elites could successfully mold, steer, and control the people.  
An excerpt in a book on crowd psychology, whose tenets were also used in 
China to derive propaganda methods, stated: “Propaganda is the most important 
strategy to gain the trust of crowds. Without propaganda, even if you argue well, 
you cannot gain the trust of the majority.”205 In other words, merely being right 
and being able to articulate one’s beliefs in the form of cold, rational arguments 
did not suffice; one needed to employ a set of particular propaganda techniques to 
succeed.
206
 This reflects an idea that was becoming widespread at the time, 
namely that any political authority that wanted to prevail needed to be well-versed 
in the art of propaganda, which consisted both of certain verbal and rhetorical 
skills (qualitative aspect) and of the omnipresence and constant repetition of one’s 
arguments (quantitative aspects).  
While initially, propaganda strategies discussed were linked to crowd 
psychology and assumptions about the “crowd mind,” they were later mixed with 
more up-to-date qualitative and quantitative research that emerged in the United 
States in the 1930s. Applied Propaganda Studies (Shiyong xuanchuanxue 实用宣
传学 ), written by Missouri-trained journalist Liang Shichun 梁士纯  (1902-
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1984)
207
 and published in 1936, explored various different propaganda strategies 
that were first invented, or at least systematically spelled out, in U.S. research on 
public relations. These included how to grab the attention of the audience,
208
 how 
to maintain the target’s interest,209 and how to elicit a particular reaction from the 
audience. Concrete examples included putting notices up in places where people 
are bored, such as on the train or in the waiting room at the doctor’s office. The 
color red, wrote Liang, was best to grab people’s attention,210 but it was also 
important to combine colors that made for a good contrast.
211
 In talks and articles, 
it was always good to use concrete examples to illustrate a theoretical point.
212
 
Changing strategies was, moreover, a good means to maintain interest.
213
 Liang 
also explained what emotions or perceptions to evoke, from the perspective of 
psychology, to get a group of people to act. The section used both ideas still 
largely based on Le Bon’s crowd psychology, such as that people (or, in Le Bon’s 
work: crowds) were conservative and would cling to old ideas and newer findings 
from marketing research, such as that a product or idea one wanted to sell needed 
to be associated with positive sentiments.
214
 Thus, while both the GMD and the 
CPC were influenced by the Soviet concept of propaganda, the results of U.S. 
(marketing) research conducted in the 1930s also made their way to China.  
Despite the largely positive or neutral connotation that the term xuanchuan 
had, there were quite a few voices that presented propaganda as a social pathology 
and questioned its underlying notions of mass-elite relations. The relatively 
widespread negative connotation of propaganda in China does not only become 
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visible in texts directly condemning or talking negatively about propaganda,
215
 but 
also in texts supporting propaganda which explain that the term has a bad 
reputation.
216
 As early as in 1930s, one article called “Discussion of propaganda 
and its influence on changes in Chinese society” explained that what people 
associated with the term xuanchuan differed vastly: Some people thought of secret 
societies, others equated propaganda with advertisement, and some went even so 
far as to believe that propaganda was deceptive in nature (dai qipian xingzhi de 带
欺骗性质的).217  
Different assumptions about whether propaganda was good or bad, honest 
or dishonest could also be mixed. For example, a text otherwise very affirmative 
of international propaganda published in the journal Sino-Soviet Culture (Zhong 
Su wenhua 中苏文化), the mouthpiece of the GMD-affiliated Sino-Soviet Culture 
Association, which had many members from the CPC, who controlled the 
journal,
218
 implicitly accepted the negative association. It argued that “exactly 
because we rely on iron-clad facts, one could even say that we are not engaging in 
propaganda, but are only stating what is true and righteous.”219 Through such 
statements, propaganda was overall portrayed as legitimate, but the fact that some 
people saw it as dishonest was also acknowledged. 
On the one hand, the negative connotation may have originally slipped into 
the Chinese debate through the unattributed translation of Western texts. On the 
other hand, the issue was genuinely taken up and discussed later in a larger debate 
over the difference between propaganda and education in which the different 
underlying concepts of man of different factions clashed. Several well-known 
texts stated that propaganda was the same as education. Liang Shichun explained 
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that propaganda, “in other words, is educating the masses,” 220  reflecting the 
standard definition of propaganda promoted through the practice of the GMD. 
 In the early 1940s, sociologist Pan Guangdan 潘光旦 (1899-1967), best 
known for his role in the Eugenicist movement in China, by contrast, made a 
strong polemic against statements like this that shows that relatively thorough 
criticism of propaganda as an activity per se from a humanist point of view were 
also transmitted to China.
221
 Pan explained that propaganda first came to be 
viewed as a social pathology in Europe after the First World War, and that he 
based the details of his argument largely on the work of Western philosophers, 
educators, and psychologists.
222
 According to Pan, the beliefs underlying 
propaganda and education respectively were diametrically opposed. Education 
proceeded from the assumption that man had some inner wisdom and that he 
would use it to solve problems in his environment. Therefore, education did not 
seek to solve problems but instead sought to enable individuals to use their 
knowledge to solve problems.
223
 At the same time, people were different, and no 
one-size-fits-all model applied. Education theory held that, therefore, the best 
form of education was to “enlighten” (qifa 启发), not to “pour” (guanshu 灌输).  
Propaganda, on the other hand, made use of “pouring,” not of 
“enlightening.” 224  Propaganda reduced the theories the propagandist deemed 
important to very simple dictums and hoped that the target audience would accept 
them as a whole and without any doubts.
225
 Propaganda only offered a one-size-
fits-all explanation ill-suited to the actual differences that existed.
226
 The 
assumption behind propaganda was that only a small portion of humanity could 
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attain wisdom, that only this small minority could develop a proper ideology and 
rescue society. All other people had to listen, accept, and follow orders.
227
 In the 
case of education, the receiver was the main beneficiary; in the case of 
propaganda, the sender benefited the most.
228
 Pan’s text shows that the position 
that people like Dewey had taken in the U.S. in the 1920s showed up in China in 
the 1940s and that people not only attacked certain understandings of propaganda, 
but also addressed underlying concepts of man. 
In conclusion, as the GMD and the CPC copied the Soviet domestic 
propaganda apparatus and the corresponding ideology, the new beliefs mixed well 
with earlier conceptualizations of mass-elite relations. Although the institutional 
set-up and practices such as mass campaigns were largely learned from the Soviet 
Union, the debate on domestic propaganda was also transfused with and further 
developed by drawing on the findings of new research from the U.S. Moreover, 
while the “mainstream” connotation of the term propaganda was positive owing to 
the perceived usefulness of propaganda in mobilizing the Chinese populace for 
various purposes, there were voices of opposion that drew their ammunition 
largely from the U.S. debate on the role of propaganda and education in a 
democracy. Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that xuanchuan has always had a 
positive connotation in China. 229  However, the GMD contributed to the 
establishment of a Soviet-inspired model of propaganda which defined 
propaganda as a legitimate activity and focused on penetration of society. Later, 
after the CPC had founded the PRC in 1949, this understanding of propaganda 
dominated in China for several decades before being temporarily challenged 
during the 1980s.  
 
2.7 International Propaganda and Socialist Internationalism 
The earliest structures for international propaganda in China were most 
likely also set up under Soviet influence. While the GMD was still working 
closely with the Comintern, besides its domestic propaganda apparatus, it also 
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tried to institute separate structures for international propaganda work. In 
August/September 1924, the suggestion was made to establish a Committee on 
International Propaganda (Guoji xuanchuan weiyuanhui 国际宣传委员会) in the 
GMD headquarters that would serve as a liaising knot between China and the 
world to propagate the Three People’s Principles230 abroad, to spread international 
ideas in China, and to handle any contact between the GMD and the Comintern in 
a systematic manner.
231
 It appears this structure was not solely intended to import 
information, but also to export it. Nonetheless, this effort should be viewed 
somewhat separately from later initiatives, as it was clearly first and foremost part 
of trying to integrate China into the international network of Socialist movements 
rather than to appeal to foreigners for help in a specific conflict situation.  
In the case of the CPC, the initial focus on internationalism and class 
solidarity was naturally even more pronounced. When the CPC was founded in 
Shanghai in 1921, the Bolsheviks and their international representative organ, the 
Comintern, were already quite conscious of the usefulness of propaganda both 
domestically and internationally. In order to facilitate communication with the 
Comintern and thus other socialist movements around the world, the China-Russia 
News Agency (Zhong E tongxunshe 中俄通讯社) was set up in Shanghai as early 
as July 1920, before the CPC had even been founded.
232
 By September 1920, 
dispatched Comintern agent Voitinsky (Войтинский; 维经斯基) reported that the 
Secretary’s Office of the Comintern in East Asia233 had opened publishing centers 
in Harbin, Beijing, and Shanghai which distributed works originally printed in 
Moscow in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.
234
 The Far Eastern Department of the 
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Comintern, established in December 1922, published the Far Eastern Newsletter 
(Yuandong tongxun 远东通讯) distributed to leaders of each of the member 
parties of the Comintern, and also established a Foreign Books Press, an editorial 
office, and a book room for Marxist works.
235
 In October 1923, the CPC 
established the Committee for Education and Propaganda (Jiaoyu xuanchuan 
weiyuanhui 教育宣传委员会) to fulfill Comintern requirements. The internal 
structure of the Committee shows that one important purpose of the committee 
was actually to transmit information about the Communist movement to China.
236
  
Initially, the CPC was very weak. Founded by a dozen Communists at a 
time when the two most powerful factions were the GMD in the South and the 
Northern government in Beijing, the young CPC entered an alliance with the 
GMD in 1922 at the behest of the Comintern in what later became known as the 
First United Front.
237
 The alliance broke apart after Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi 
蒋介石) cut ties with the Comintern and purged members of the Communist Party 
from his ranks in the midst of the Northern Expedition, so that the CPC had to go 
underground before establishing a permanent base, the “Chinese Soviet Republic” 
in Jiangxi in late 1931.  
Propaganda targeted at foreigners was one task of nearly all of the CPC’s 
newly founded media in the 1930s, although these initiatives cannot be called very 
successful. Red China News Agency, the predecessor organization of Xinhua 
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established in 1931 directly after the Temporary Central Soviet Government in 
Ruijin was officially established, engaged in some –though extremely limited– 
external propaganda work. In spring 1931, the Chinese Workers and Peasant’s 
Correspondence (CWPC) was formed under head of the CPC’s Central 
Propaganda Department Zhang Wentian张闻天 (1900-1976).238 CWPC released 
news once a week or about every ten days, each consisting of ca. 3000 to 4000 
characters. News was released both in Chinese and in English. For Chinese news, 
seven or 8 copies were made by hand and distributed secretly to Party papers and 
other “progressive papers.” As for English language releases, usually around 80 
copies were printed and distributed mainly abroad.
239
 With regard to content, 
these releases mainly covered CCP policies, activities and developments at the 
Communist basis, workers’ and students’ movements, anti-Japanese activities, 
and anti-GMD releases.
240
 
As will be seen below, starting in the mid-1920s when the conflict with 
Japan continued to escalate, Chinese authors already wrote impassioned articles 
urging their fellow Chinese to pay more attention to international propaganda. The 
CPC, too, addressed the issue of international propaganda, but before allying with 
the GMD against the Japanese for a second time, it used the term in quite a 
different meaning: To refer to linking the Chinese Communist movement more 
closely to other Communist movements around the world. 
An article published in the official paper of the CPC Red Flag (Hongqi 红
旗)241 in 1930 focused on transnational solidarity between the working class and 
the oppressed peoples of the world. The article explained that Communists were 
“internationalists,” not only in their beliefs, but also in their actions. The 
responsibilities of Communists in each country were not only determined by the 
circumstances in their country: Just like other countries’ struggles mattered for 
China, China’s struggle was watched by the masses in other countries. The only 
way that the CPC could be successful in China was to let the working masses 
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(laoku qunzhong 劳苦群众) know that they were part of the world revolution and 
connect them with the Chinese revolution. For this, the CPC had two important 
tasks that were equally important: First, it needed to conduct international 
education (guoji jiaoyu 国际教育), which meant bringing news about the world 
revolution to the Chinese masses and to politically educate them about the 
ideology of internationalism. Second, the Party needed to engage in international 
propaganda (guoji xuanchuan 国际宣传 ), which meant widely propagating 
(guangda xuanchuan 广大宣传) the current state of the Chinese revolution to the 
international proletariat and agitating them into helping the Chinese revolution.
242
 
The article criticized the CPC’s lack of attention to international 
propaganda and noted that this was the reason why China had received so little 
international support for its revolution thus far.
243
 Just like around the turn of the 
19
th
 and 20
th
 century it had been presented as the duty of the Chinese state to 
inform the people of the world of “Chinese public opinion,” it was the duty of the 
CPC to inform other communist parties of the development and progress of the 
movement on the Chinese front.  
The article acknowledged the existing “Capitalist” world order, in which 
(working) people were divided and conquered by the erection of national borders 
held against it the ideal of solidarity determined by class, not by nation-state. 
“International propaganda” had to operate in an environment fractured by national 
borders, but was intended to produce and nurture feelings of solidarity between 
working people all over the globe by reporting on and thus linking the 
development of socialist movements in different countries. As will be seen below, 
while similar themes also showed up in later texts on international propaganda by 
authors doubting that appealing to imperialist Western countries could help China, 
this distinct discourse on class solidarity faded into the background after Japan 
was identified as the greatest threat to China.  
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2.8 The Third Front: The War over Public Opinion, 1925-1931 
As the tension between China and Japan rose over the course of the 1920s 
and 1930s and China looked for ways to gain the sympathy of the international 
community, international propaganda became increasingly important. The 
experiences of the First World War had led to a systematic study of the function 
of propaganda and an institutionalization of propaganda as part of international 
relations. As indicated above, China adapted the debate on propaganda almost 
from the very moment that propaganda became a subject of systematic study in 
Europe, and the term xuanchuan entered the Chinese vocabulary around the same 
time or soon after senden became a central concept in the Japanese government. 
The division into military wars, economic wars, and propaganda wars was quickly 
adapted in China
244
 and soon became a form of common knowledge among 
people writing on propaganda.  
After the end of the First World War, a large body of literature on 
propaganda emerged in all major Western countries involved in the war. In 
Germany, it became commonplace, especially among military elites, to blame the 
loss of the war on a “propaganda deficit” 245  both at the domestic and the 
international propaganda front.
246
 The role of propaganda in Germany’s loss of 
the war was also highlighted in China.
247
 One author noted that the First World 
War was not decided on the military front, but mainly on the economic front and 
the propaganda front.
248
 Prominent statements made by German military generals 
and in the German press in this context were often picked up to bolster the 
importance of propaganda well into the 1930s, although it is doubtful that they 
were taken directly from the German context and incorporated into Chinese 
articles on international propaganda. It is more likely that these quotations already 
circulated in English-language treatises on propaganda and found their way into 
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the Chinese debate from there.
249
 An article in the journal Journalism Quarterly 
(Baoxue jikan 报学季刊)250 from 1934 quoted Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hindenburg 
to emphasize the importance of propaganda.
251
 Another article quoted a “German 
general” and a “German paper.” 252  As China got much of its literature on 
propaganda from the United States, however, Germany was not portrayed as 
entirely unskilled in the art of propaganda in every Chinese text on the topic. 
Instead, many texts introduced several different propaganda strategies used during 
the war and then explained which country had excelled at which strategy.
253
 For 
the balance in the propaganda war, Chinese authors not only wrote about 
propaganda skills, but also took hard aspects, such as control over means of 
communication into account. Thus, it was noted that Germany was in a weaker 
position in the propaganda war because Britain controlled the telegraph system 
and wireless telecommunication technology was not yet developed enough that it 
could be employed by Germany on a wide scale.
254
  
In the 1930s, journals published overviews of international propaganda 
initiatives organized by different countries.
255
 The purpose was quite similar to 
later overviews: To try to stay up to date with developments in the field and at the 
same time to demonstrate the importance of propaganda by arguing that all 
countries in the world paid attention to it. Propaganda measures were regularly 
divided into “proactive” (jiji 积极) and “reactive” (xiaoji 消极).256 This could 
refer to the distinction between propaganda and censorship measures and other 
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restrictive means.
257
 However, reactive could also mean to be forced to have to 
react to accusations made by the enemy rather than being able to determine 
oneself what was discussed by the international community.
258
   
The debate in Europe and the U.S. (and presumably Japan as well) had the 
outcome that propaganda came to be viewed as a form of “magical weapon” in 
China as well. International propaganda was described as “a powerful weapon” 
(liqi 利器)259 that helped the citizens of a country to prosper and progress and that 
thus constituted “the most indispensable instrument in the competition over 
national existence” (minzu shengcun jingzheng zui bu ke queshao de gongju 民
族生存竞争最不可缺少的工具).260  One argument made frequently was that 
China, which had just awoken, was not yet ready to fight a military or an 
economic battle and therefore needed to try even harder to excel in the 
propaganda war.
261
 This is reminiscent of the argument that Edward Carr made 
about the Soviet Union later and was also invoked by Chinese authors when 
speaking in more general terms of the “oppressed peoples” (bei yapo minzu 被
压迫民族).262 Another article argued that the 20th century was a “century of open 
public opinion” (yulun gongkai zhi shiji 舆论公开之世纪). All who could make 
their voice heard had an advantage, regardless of their military strength.
263
 
One argument often used by students and intellectuals to stress the urgency 
of better international propaganda was the fact that even in this “soft” area, China 
was significantly behind Japan, with disastrous consequences. Thus, Japan served 
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both as primary competitor and as primary reference model. Starting in the mid-
1920s, Japan’s international propaganda was frequently portrayed as being ahead 
of China in all possible ways – their news releases were faster, their equipment 
was more modern, and their methods were more innovative.
264
 Japan’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs had established a Department of Information (Jōhōbu 情報部) 
by 1921 to adapt to the new post-war diplomatic environment in which 
propaganda would play a more and more important role.
265
 Its main responsibility 
was news-related propaganda, including supervising “independent” Japanese 
media and liaising with foreign media organizations.
266
 With the creation of the 
Department, Japanese news propaganda was expanded from countering anti-
Japanese protests in the U.S. and China (reactive) to a more proactive program.
267
 
In 1923, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs added the Department of 
Cultural Affairs for China.
268
 In 1924, Japan set up the supra-ministerial Research 
Committee for International Information Telecommunication, which was 
primarily created to research wireless news transmission.
269
  
 
Calls for better international propaganda usually came in the wake of 
conflicts with foreign powers in China, although aside from these relatively 
immediate concerns, the idea of being perceived by foreigners as uncivilized also 
continued to be a motivation.
270
 In fact, as the section on the propagation of 
Chinese history has shown, lack of recognition as a worthy civilization and lack of 
political support were linked in the heads of some Chinese participants in the 
debate. The first widespread calls for better international propaganda driven by a 
sense of crisis came together with the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925. The 
event that led to the movement is known in China as the May Thirtieth Massacre 
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(Wu Sa Can’an 五卅惨案). On May 30, 1925, Shanghai students had gathered to 
protest the shooting of a Chinese worker in a Japanese-owned cotton mill. In the 
course of the demonstration, British police opened fire on the protestors, killing 
thirteen students on Nanjing Road in the International Settlement.
271
  
The incident led both to a discussion of the usefulness of international 
propaganda
272
 and to some short-lived non-governmental attempts at international 
propaganda, such as the Shanghai Student Union publishing nine issues of a 
journal named the English Weekly (Yingwen zhoubao 英文周报) in 1925.273 One 
paper called for people to mobilize their Chinese friends studying or working 
abroad and sending them copies of newspaper articles so that they had enough 
information to spread.
274
 According to their own account, members of China’s 
Esperanto movement also sent letters to Esperanto societies around the globe that 
were then translated into local languages to publicize the events in China.
275
 Over 
the course of the next few years, the GMD added a number of foreign propaganda 
channels. The GMD launched its “Chinese News Service” that issued English 
language publications in Canton.
276
 The official party paper Central Daily 
(Zhongyang ribao 中央日报) published in Hankou 汉口 in 1927 also had an 
English language edition, which relied on translations from the Chinese version 
and was edited, among others, by Lin Yutang 林语堂.277 
The next incident that spurred widespread calls for better international 
propaganda was the Jinan Incident, known as the May Third Massacre (Wu San 
Can’an 五三惨案) in Chinese, when GMD and Japanese troops clashed in 1927 
in Shandong. Japanese troops ultimately purged GMD troops from the area, 
killing many of the soldiers. Although not all foreign papers took a decidedly anti-
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Chinese stance, the Jinan Incident was considered a clear propaganda defeat.
278
 
The number of articles calling for international propaganda was larger than in 
1925,
279
 and the topic was treated like a well-established problem.
280
 One author 
commented after the incident that China was already well aware of the need to 
conduct international propaganda, but had difficulties putting this realization into 
practice.
281
  
Another author suggested that the GMD should establish English language 
papers under direct control of the Central Propaganda Department. In addition, 
China should run papers and periodicals in the “world’s important capitals,” 
whose dual responsibility would be to “introduce Chinese culture and transmit 
Chinese news.”282 The GMD should also establish a proper news agency that 
would release news in both English and Chinese and subsidize private initiatives 
in return for pro-GMD propaganda.
283
 China also needed a decent newspaper that 
employed well-educated journalists. In order to ensure that there was enough 
personnel, Chinese universities had to add journalism departments.
284
 While the 
author argued that Chinese officials and politicians needed to learn to respect 
journalists, he also encouraged censorship of any items that were untrue or 
smeared China. Foreign journalists who were ill-intentioned (xin huai eyi 心怀恶
意 ) and permanently wrote against China should be deported. 285  Individual 
journalists that were known to report favorably should be contacted. By 
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establishing contacts with well-established Western news agencies, China could 
ensure that pro-China messages were transmitted to Western papers in their home 
countries.
286
  
In 1928, the GMD set up the Central Broadcast Station (Zhongyang 
guangbo diantai 中央广播电台), which broadcasted news provided by the 
Central News Agency, but did not have a very strong signal.
287
 In the same year, 
the GMD established an International Division (Guojike 国际科 ) within its 
Central Propaganda Department. This was both the result of the Jinan Incident and 
of the GMD’s desire to strengthen its own position after having established itself 
in Nanjing.
288
 As the division lacked organization and its work was directed by 
the same people that were also in charge of domestic propaganda, however, it was 
not very successful. Many texts were translated directly from Chinese, focused on 
Party doctrines and praised the GMD. In sum, these propagandists paid no 
attention to the question how to appeal to foreign target audiences and how to 
reduce the “propaganda flavor” of their publications.289 Thus, the GMD faced a 
similar dilemma in the 1930s as the CPC would face later starting in the post-Mao 
period, namely trying to conduct propaganda targeted at Western audiences 
through structures set up with the help of the Soviet Union, based on the Soviet 
model and intended primarily for domestic propaganda. 
Just like in 1925, the episode also triggered a number of popular initiatives. 
In July 1928, the Shanghai International News Agency (Shanghai guoji 
tongxunshe 上海国际通讯社 ) was founded. 290  Also in reaction to China’s 
treatment by Japan in 1928 and the international take on the events, returned 
overseas exchange students launched the China Critic (Zhongguo pinglun 
zhoubao 中国评论周报), dubbed “the only Chinese owned and edited English 
weekly,” in Shanghai in May 1928.291  
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Ill. 2.I: “A comparison 
of international 
propaganda.”
292
 A 
cartoon from 1931 after 
Japan had invaded 
Manchuria shows the 
imbalance between 
Japanese and Chinese 
international propaganda 
as it was seen in China at 
the time. On the left side 
of the stage, the cartoon 
shows a Japanese man 
with a sword hidden 
behind his back, though the attempt to conceal it is not very pronounced. He holds a black 
megaphone to amplify his “black propaganda” message. The Japanese is small, has 
“traditional” Japanese hairstyle, a shirt resembling a kimono, no pants, and Japanese sandals. 
On the right side of the stage is a Chinese, who is notably taller than his Japanese counterpart 
and resembles Sun Yat-sen in terms of his hairstyle, moustache, and clothing and is clearly a 
“modern” man. He is holding his white megaphone in the wrong direction, so that the 
message is diminished rather than amplified. His other hand is clearly visible. Both the 
Japanese and the Chinese are performing in front of a Western audience (as shown by their 
clothes and especially their top-hats) of five people who are facing the Japanese propagandist 
and listening to him.  
 
In 1931, with the occupation of Manchuria and the impending hearing 
before the League of Nations, concerns about international propaganda again 
surged. The League of Nations dispatched the Lytton Commission in spring 
1932.
293
 Japan set up an informal coordination committee in May and an 
information committee at the Cabinet Office in September 1932 to present Japan’s 
position to the Commission and member countries of the League of Nations 
(including all countries the General Assembly).
294
 The GMD sent Columbia-
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educated diplomat Wellington Koo to provide background material to the 
Commission and to accompany its members on their visit to Manchuria.
295
 
Likewise, in 1932, the previously very weak Central Radio Station, which had 
broadcasted in Japanese since 1931, was replaced by a 75 Kilowatt station.
296
 The 
GMD also set up an English newspaper in Beiping 北平  shortly before the 
Commission arrived to write its report.
 297
 In addition, the GMD attempted to set 
up a supra-ministerial board in charge of international propaganda, which, 
however, lacked mechanisms for coordination between different ministries and 
was therefore ineffective.
298
 The decision of the League of Nations has been 
described as a tremendous propaganda loss for Japan.
299
 Nonetheless, the outcome 
was viewed as anything but victory on the Chinese side. The theme “We are right, 
but we are not heard because China does not conduct (enough) international 
propaganda” remained dominant.  
In addition to GMD activities, non-governmental institutions continued to 
launch initiatives. In 1932, the Chinese Catholic Action (officially founded in 
Beijing in 1928) decided to establish an international propaganda organization 
(guoji xuanchuan jiguan 国际宣传机关) in order to target their fellow-Catholics 
abroad and counter Japanese propaganda.
300
 The distribution of material was to be 
funded by the headquarters of the Catholic Action. This again highlights the use 
of net-works that were not state-based, transnational rather than international. 
Esperanto also continued to be propagated as a good tool for international 
propaganda as late as in 1939.
301
  
Over the next few years, as the GMD began to pursue a policy of 
appeasement towards Japan and subsequently toned down its international 
propaganda,
302
 calls for better external propaganda continued. An article from 
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1934 insisted that “because we do not have international propaganda, foreigners 
do not understand that the three Northern provinces have [always] been a part of 
China.”303 Like others before, the author came up with an ambitious proposal that 
suggested running one English language paper in London and Washington DC 
each, running a French language paper in Paris, a German language paper in 
Berlin, an Italian language paper in Rome, and a Japanese language paper in 
Tokyo. In addition, China should establish a Bureau for International Propaganda 
or a similar institution in Shanghai in order to be able to liaise with foreign 
journalists.
304
  
GMD initiatives could not live up to the suggestions made in Chinese 
journals, but a number of new institutions were set up. In 1934, the Central News 
Agency (Zhongyang she 中央社 ) established an English department, which 
provided papers all over the country with English language news releases.
305
 This 
meant that people did not need local staff with English language editing skills, but 
could rely on a central agency to provide them with the necessary material. Some 
of the domestic news consisted of translations from Chinese language news 
releases as well as selected articles from local Chinese language papers picked by 
local branches of the Central News Agency.
306
  
The press environment in the 1930s in which multiple interest groups were 
active and in which Chinese could either employ a nominal foreign editor or 
register their papers abroad or in the international concessions allowed for a 
relatively vivid privately organized press to begin with. While the GMD did not 
have the reach to shut a paper down, it could extend its support to and subsidize 
papers that were partial to the Party’s cause. T’ien Hsia Monthly, which focused 
on literature and the arts, was launched in Shanghai in August 1935, funded by the 
Sun Yat-sen Institute for the Advancement of Culture and Education after the 
editors enlisted Sun Fo’s 孙科307 support.308 Altogether, more than fifty editions 
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were published. The majority of editors and contributors had studied abroad. 
Originally, T’ien Hsia Monthly was supposed to be a political journal, but 
ultimately its main aim was defined as introducing Chinese culture to the West.
309
 
In 1935, American writer Emily Hahn (1905-1997) and Chinese poet Shao 
Xunmei 邵洵美 (1906-1968) also tried to launch the English language periodical 
Vox, which did not succeed in establishing itself.
310
 Again, these examples are 
only illustrative; there were many private and semi-private initiatives, although 
not all of them were effective.  
However, the use of international propaganda did not remain unchallenged 
in China in the 1930s. Two problems came together: First, the failure to get the 
international community to intervene militarily and the subsequent loss of 
Manchuria had created doubt whether propaganda was really as powerful a 
weapon as it had been made out to be. One article argued against this new mindset 
and criticized the Chinese people for going from one extreme (trust in the 
international community and propaganda) to the other (rejection of propaganda 
and loss of trust in the international community) and for expecting support simply 
for being right without even trying to be competitive in the international 
propaganda battle.
311
 Second, one of the dominant world views at the time, 
namely that China was not and would never be considered an equal by Western 
powers, got in the way. The argument was made that appealing to Western powers, 
the oppressors and imperialists, was both morally wrong and futile because the 
imperialists would never side with oppressed China. This, according to one author, 
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was confirmed by the 1935 decisions in the League of Nations on Abyssinia that 
failed to restrict Italian aggression.
312
  
Thus, on the one hand, Chinese authors writing from an anti-imperialist 
point of view had to condemn the international community for being unfair and 
led by imperialist governments. On the other hand, the purpose of international 
propaganda was for this unfairly organized international community to intervene 
on China’s behalf. A theme that had dominated the anti-imperialist protests of the 
1920s re-entered the debate on international propaganda, namely “The present 
world order is unfair and determined by particular interests (si) rather than the 
public interest (gong).” However, even those most vocally condemning the 
contemporary world order did not necessarily reject international propaganda 
entirely.  
The solution, as would be the case later during parts of the Mao and post-
Mao periods, was to distinguish between unethical political and military elites and 
the overwhelming majority of the people. For instance, as early as in 1928, one 
article addressing those opposing international propaganda argued that in the past, 
uncivilized behavior had always been the fault of individual politicians and 
warlords and “did not come from the public [= in the sense of ‘in the public 
interest,’ i.e. just or unselfish] will of the people” (er fei you mingzhong zhi 
gongyi ye 而非由民众之公意也).313 Several articles stressed the need to address 
the Japanese people and ask them to oppose the policies of their government more 
vigorously.
314
 Often, the crisis discourse of having to appeal to other nations for 
help and the discourse on class solidarity as exemplified in the Red Flag text from 
1930 were blended within single articles. For instance, an article in the journal of 
the GMD’s Whampoa Military Academy, Hwang Poo Monthly (Huangpu yuekan 
黄埔月刊 ), entitled “The oppressed peoples and the propaganda war” first 
described the use of propaganda in the First World War and noted that each 
country had recognized the importance of propaganda in winning a fight. The 
article then explained that conducting propaganda was particularly important for 
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the oppressed peoples of the world who lacked the material resources of the 
imperialist countries.
315
 
Thus, a number of texts drew on two different ways of conceptualizing 
international propaganda, one drawing on the discourse of propaganda as a tool of 
diplomacy and the other based on a mixture of the discourse of class solidarity 
across national boundaries and a framing of the popular will as inherently good 
and just. Although the basic units of interest (dividing the world according to class, 
race, or nation-state) have changed a number of times since then, these two basic 
positions have persisted: One the hand, some people argue that external 
propaganda is pointless because the target audience is biased against China, on the 
other hand are those who maintain that this is only a small minority and that the 
overwhelming majority of foreigners are good and therefore must have good will 
towards China (which stands for righteousness and the public interest, gong).
316
 
 
2.9 1937: The Breakthrough? 
In September 1937, with pressure added by the outbreak of the war against 
Japan in July, the GMD finally managed to solve some of its institutional 
problems regarding international propaganda.
317
 The Office for International 
Propaganda was taken out of the Central Propaganda Department and transformed 
into the Fifth Board of the Military Affairs Commission, thus putting it under the 
direct control of Chiang Kai-shek. Hollington Tong was appointed head of the 
new office after being recommended by Chiang’s wife, American-educated Song 
Meiling 宋美龄.318 For Tong, a Missouri-trained journalist, the GMD’s previous 
international propaganda work as well as its defensive counterpart, the Party’s 
censorship policy, came as a shock.
319
 Tong established a number of significant 
qualitative changes in the GMD’s external propaganda apparatus. He requested 
anything that could make information from China look like propaganda in the 
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eyes of Westerners be removed and suggested employing foreigners to conduct 
propaganda on China’s behalf. 320  Moreover, he succeeded in relaxing the 
censorship policy. Not everyone approved of the changes Tong implemented. In 
order to solve internal power struggles between Tong and his superior, Chiang 
abolished the Fifth Board and turned it into the International Department of the 
Central Propaganda Department. Importantly, however, the new department 
continued to be funded by the military and was thus directly under Chiang’s 
control.
321
  
Aside from the main international propaganda organization under Tong, 
the GMD used a number of additional channels to spread its message. In 1938, the 
GMD established the Central Overseas Department (Zhongyang Haiwaibu 中央
海外部), which was assessed as relatively successful before Japan occupied the 
South Pacific and cut off China’s access to the rest of the world through 
occupation of China’s harbors.322 Appeals to overseas Chinese were very common, 
and the GMD, CPC, and the Wang Jingwei 汪精卫  regimes all had special 
government or party structures and journals to liaise with Chinese abroad.
323
 
While initially, overseas Chinese had been primarily a propaganda target, they 
also came to be considered a propaganda resource in the conflict with Japan. 
Likewise, in the 1930s, as cultural activities came to be increasingly viewed as a 
channel for propaganda in Europe, Chinese also displayed interest in the topic. 
For instance, the World Exposition held in Paris in 1937 was used as an 
opportunity by Chinese overseas to discuss how China could improve its own 
cultural propaganda.
324
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Although Chinese propaganda arguably improved under Tong, Chinese 
authors continued to find problems. The sentiment that Japanese international 
propaganda was far ahead of China’s continued after 1937.325 Naturally, China 
also kept a close eye on any developments in Japan’s propaganda apparatus, and 
any changes in its international propaganda institutions and organizations were 
reported in China.
326
 China’s own international propaganda institutions, by 
contrast, were seen as insufficient and riddled with problems. For instance, an 
article published in the Shenbao in April 1938 complained about the state of 
China’s foreign propaganda initiatives as contrasted with Japan’s: China was 
lacking an “organization directly engaged in foreign propaganda” (zhijie duiwai 
xuanchuan de jiguan 直接对外宣传的机关), such as a large international news 
agency. The Central News Agency did not match Japanese activities. Second, 
China’s official news releases were always behind Japan’s by one to two days, an 
advantage Japan uses to influence readers in its favor. Third, the most effective 
tools of propaganda were news, images, and movies. So far China had not only 
fallen short in the realm of daily news, but almost completely ignored images and 
movies, instead only publishing a few pamphlets. Finally, the country did not 
distinguish between different target audiences sufficiently.
327
 One author also 
complained about the habit to create posts for individuals (yin ren she shi 因人
设事), who would then squander the money intended for international propaganda 
for their own pleasure.
328
 While this alarmism about China’s “propaganda deficit” 
should be taken with a grain of salt, the article does illustrate a common problem, 
namely the fact that China, which was already struggling to catch up with Japan, 
had to constantly consider new developments in the fast developing field of 
international propaganda. Even if China did manage to surpass Japan at some 
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point in time, that moment of triumph was unlikely to last for long. This was a 
problem that the CPC would also have to grapple with in the post-Mao period. 
 
2.10 CPC International Propaganda after 1936 
The CPC came into being and grew stronger during this time of crisis and 
of course did not exist in a completely parallel universe. In 1935, after the CPC 
had settled down in Yan’an 延安,329 the Seventh (and last) World Congress of the 
Comintern directed its branches to enter alliances with non-Communists again and 
thus form a United Front against Fascism. Chiang Kai-shek had no interest in 
allying with the CPC, but other members of his Party thought otherwise. In 1936, 
he was kidnapped and coerced into entering the Second United Front with the 
CPC, which formally lasted until 1946, although GMD and CPC already fought 
one another before the end of the Second World War.  
In order to justify the alliance with the GMD, most likely in hindsight, 
Mao Zedong famously redefined what he termed the principal contradiction 
(zhuyao maodun 主要矛盾). Contradictions in Marxist ideology are different 
from contradictions in formal logic (xingshi luoji 形式逻辑) in that they do not 
refer to a relationship of mutual exclusion between two things or aspects, but to 
the “reciprocal struggle and reciprocal relation” between two aspects within a 
thing.
330
 Complex things, such as “human society” have many different 
contradictions between different pairs of aspects, and therefore, one of the main 
functions of Communist parties is to make sense of this complex mix and assess 
what is important at a particular point in time and what the Party has to do to 
make history progress. This episode of how Mao redefined the principal 
contradiction in line with the Comintern directive is well-known, but as it 
exemplifies some of the flexibility of the ideological system that will become 
relevant again below, this will be briefly explained in more detail.  
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Basic contradictions of a global scale had been declared by Lenin and 
Stalin in 1920 and 1925 respectively.
331
 The Comintern’s declaration that Fascism 
posed a more dangerous enemy than the capitalist class provided the framework 
within which the CPC had to justify its alliance with the GMD. Mao did this by 
famously inventing a second type of contradiction aside from the basic 
contradictions (jiben maodun 基本矛盾), namely the principal contradiction 
(zhuyao maodun). A thing can (and usually does) have several basic 
contradictions. They are present throughout the entire development process of the 
thing (shiwu fazhan de guocheng 事物发展的过程), and are the fundamental 
driving force (genben dongli 根本动力) of its development. Basic contradictions 
manifest themselves differently in different periods of history owing to the 
different characteristics (tedian 特点) of the international situation (guoji jushi 国
际局势) and different factors influencing it at different times.332 Once the basic 
contradictions have been resolved, the nature of the thing (shiwu 事物) changes 
and a new thing/ development process begins. The principal contradiction, 
according to Mao Zedong 毛泽东, on the other hand, usually does not run through 
an entire development process. To solve the principal contradiction of a certain 
period is the prerequisite to being able to advance to a higher stage of 
development. Hence, the identification of the principal contradiction of a certain 
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period also defines the principal task (zhuyao renwu 主要任务) and the core work 
(zhongxin gongzuo 中心工作 ) of this period for the Party. While the basic 
contradictions as defined by Stalin remained valid, a new stage in the 
development of Chinese history had begun that. The new principal contradiction 
was now that between fascism and the forces against fascism. This principal 
contradiction dictated what China needed to do, and because the GMD was an ally 
in the fight against Japanese fascism, the CPC had to work with it instead of 
continuing to focus its energies on class struggle.
 333
 
 
The CPC’s understanding of international propaganda was adapted to this 
new evaluation of reality. With the beginning of the Second United Front, the 
CPC naturally de-emphasized the class-based framework of international 
propaganda. There were obviously different stances on asking the “imperialist” 
countries for help both within the GMD and the CPC, but as the crisis that China 
experienced worsened and public opinion in Western countries was increasingly 
on China’s side, this concern lost in importance. As the CPC readjusted its core 
responsibility, international propaganda naturally followed suit. 
During the Second United Front, the CPC cooperated with the GMD on 
external propaganda matters. For most of this time, the CPC did not have the 
resources or the capacities to organize any media-based international propaganda 
comparable to the activities of the GMD, but it did have the advantage of being 
able to draw on the international network of the Comintern. Moreover, the CPC 
proved extremely adept at accommodating foreign journalists who then wrote 
favorably about the Party, most famously Missouri-educated journalist Edgar 
Snow, who had lived in China since 1928 and who recounted his experiences 
living with the Communist Party in the 1938 bestseller Red Star Over China.
334
 
Although Snow maintained that the book was not political, he made a number of 
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changes to the manuscript at the request of CPC leaders to reflect new policies of 
the Party after the forming of the Second United Front.
335
 
In September 1938, the International News Agency (Guoji xinwenshe 国际
新闻社) was established in Wuhan, following a directive by Zhou Enlai 周恩来, 
who was responsible for the Southern Office of the CPC, with the aim of better 
coordinating news work in the entire area.
336
 It was headed by publicist and 
activist Hu Yuzhi 胡愈之 (1896-1986) and journalist Fan Changjiang 范长江 
(1909-1970). After obtaining permission from the International Department of the 
GMD Central Propaganda Department, the International News Agency starting 
November 1939 also began to release news to the outside world. In late 1939, due 
to the shifting war front, the International News Agency was first relocated to 
Changsha 长沙 and then to Guilin 桂林. In Guilin, the News Agency began 
issuing various print publications, one of them in English (the Far Eastern 
Bulletin, also called Yuandong tongxun 远东通讯 in Chinese). In May 1941, the 
offices in Guilin and Chongqing 重庆 were closed, and the main office moved to 
Hong Kong 香港 , where it was, however, also closed down following the 
Japanese invasion in December 1941.
337
 Starting in March 1941, the CPC 
published ten issues of a print publication called Zhongguo tongxun in English, 
Russian, and French, edited by Zhang Wentian.
338
  
In 1941, the CPC launched its first foreign language broadcasts in 
Japanese, but these were very weak and their significance was most likely 
exaggerated in the historiographies of the CPC’s external propaganda activities.339 
In 1944, Xinhua News Agency began sending irregular English language 
broadcasts.
340
 Transmitters only reached Beijing and Nanjing, and therefore, the 
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CPC was dependent on reporters picking up stories and forwarding them. Through 
Morse code, however, China could both send and receive messages to and from 
all over the world.
341
  
After the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Civil War, 
CPC members and sympathizers launched a number of English language media 
largely based in Hong Kong to avoid being shut down by the GMD, for example 
the China Digest, edited by then-journalist Qiao Guanhua 乔冠华 (1913-1983)342 
and his wife Gong Peng 龚澎 (1914-1970),343 and an English newsletter published 
by journalist Jin Zhonghua 金仲华 (1907-1968) on behalf of Xinhua’s Hong 
Kong branch.
344
 Jin was quite familiar with the reading habits of Westerners; he 
had previously worked for the USIS, first in Chongqing and later, after Japan had 
surrendered, in Shanghai. As the CPC continued to be on the move, its 
international propaganda activities largely lacked central coordination and instead 
relied on individual initiatives roughly coordinated with individual Party leaders 
such as Zhou Enlai. Thus, even after the CPC had consolidated its Party-internal 
propaganda apparatus in 1942, for its external propaganda it drew on a network of 
people who were acquainted with Western journalistic norms that were not 
subjected to very rigid control. 
 
2.11 Conclusions  
This chapter has analyzed how the concept of propaganda came to China 
via different routes and as part of different modernization packages as the country 
tried to adapt to the new world order in order to gain both strength and status. It 
has shown that in the first half of the 20th century, in a climate of near constant 
crisis, different groups within the country simultaneously appropriated ideas from 
different countries, including Japan, Western Europe, the United States, and the 
Soviet Union, resulting in the co-existence of understandings of propaganda that 
differed in terms of the underlying concept of man, and the imaginary of the ideal 
political order both at the national and at the international level.  
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The appropriation of different concepts of propaganda happened against 
the backdrop of several shifts in how China imagined world order and the 
“structural basis of world relations,” 345  which also had an impact on how 
international propaganda was understood. Initially, under the influence of the 
traditional Chinese world order, Chinese journalists and academics looked for 
ways to get the West to acknowledge China’s cultural achievements and thus 
regain its status as a great civilization recognized by others. With the Xinzheng 
reforms after 1901 and the founding of the Republic in 1912, the nation-state 
emerged as the most important unit of interest which structured how different 
groups of people interacted with each other. The nation-state based world order 
came in both a benign and a hostile version. In the benign imagination, China’s 
goal became to be accepted among the “family of (civilized) nations.” The 
underlying assumption of this aim was that China would eventually be welcomed 
in this “family,” as, for instance, the rhetoric of Wilson’s Fourteen Points 
suggested. By contrast, the rhetoric of anti-imperialism that became increasingly 
popular in the 1920s and 1930s suggested that the industrialized countries would 
never accept China as an equal. This hostile imaginary of the nation-state based 
world order was mixed with the rhetoric of the class-based world order. Here, the 
category of the West began to merge with the category of the imperialist, and the 
exploiter. The category of China, on the other hand, was equated with the 
exploited, the colonized, and the “people.” These two images of the West –benign 
versus irredeemably imperialist– as well as the distinction between “the people,” 
who were basically good and on China’s side, and the “enemies of the people” 
that could not be won over would show up again as important themes in the 
debate on external propaganda in the decades to come.  
Thus, for international propaganda, several different discourses can be 
identified. First, there was propaganda as a way to rectify China’s image and show 
foreigners the greatness of Chinese civilization, an idea that had circulated among 
Chinese reformers before the term xuanchuan became commonly used. This 
theme of making the international public realize the greatness of Chinese 
civilization was to be pushed into the background for several decades after the 
founding of the PRC owing to new way of ordering the world as well as to more 
                                                          
345
 The term is from Rebecca Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the 
Century (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002), 43. 
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concrete external propaganda concerns, but it has become a relevant motivation 
again since the end of the 20
th
 century.  
Second, there was the humanist tradition focused on mutual understanding 
that viewed China as a junior member of international society and in which China 
had the responsibility to inform foreigners about developments in China. While 
the word propaganda had a negative connotation in this context, Chinese 
participation in international networks was used to improve foreigners’ image of 
China and to eliminate biased or stereotypical portrayals of the Chinese people in 
foreign media.  
Third, two additional ways of understanding international propaganda 
existed that were to clash in the Mao period. On the one hand, there was 
propaganda as a tool of diplomacy in times of peace accompanying concrete 
policy aims, a concept and practice that emerged in the inter-war years. This 
understanding of propaganda naturally focused on propaganda within the nation-
state-based world order. On the other hand, there was propaganda as a means to 
spread the world revolution and trying to reinforce alternative units of interest 
outside of the nation-state system, namely class solidarity and linking up with the 
“oppressed people of the world.” 
Different ways of ordering the world led to different explanations why 
propaganda was unsuccessful. For propaganda in times of war and crisis, there 
were two basic ways of framing why foreigners did not help China, tied to the two 
different evaluations of the West as either benign or imperialist. The first was that 
China’s international propaganda initiatives were insufficient; foreigners would 
help China if the country did a better job at letting others know of its problems. 
The second framing was that Westerners viewed Chinese people as inferior and 
had no interest in helping them. These two frames could be combined by arguing 
that arrogant Westerners with an imperialist mindset did not represent the majority 
of the population and that therefore, it made sense to appeal to “the people” (min 
民, minzhong 民众, later: renmin 人民). The two different ways of making sense 
of China’s failure to persuade Westerners were to resurface again in the post-Mao 
period.  
Finally, there was propaganda as a weapon in times of war, which 
combined domestic and international propaganda. The constant crises that China 
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experienced during the 1920s and 1930s led intellectuals to push for better 
institutions to conduct international propaganda, including both proactive and 
reactive means. Although many of the plans suggested were overly ambitious, the 
GMD took massive steps to improve its propaganda work. Neither domestic nor 
international propaganda was entirely undisputed in China. As the conflict 
intensified, critical voices subsided, first, because the crisis helped in shape a 
consensus but also because more foreigners came to be sympathetic of China. 
After 1937, international propaganda as an instrument of war was rarely 
questioned.  
Although domestic propaganda and propaganda targeted at foreign 
nationals were connected during the war, they had very different origins and 
routes of transmission to China. For international propaganda in the state-based 
world order, despite Carr’s assessment that the Soviet Union must be understood 
as a pioneer, the West was the most important source of new ideas, practices, and 
institutions. The dominant institutions associated with domestic propaganda were 
largely based on the Soviet model, both for the GMD and for the CPC that mixed 
with existing ideas from earlier nation-building projects and was challenged 
occasionally from a humanist perspective.  
There were three main ways of viewing domestic propaganda. First, there 
was propaganda as a means to strengthen and unify the nation, an idea that already 
existed at the turn of the century, that drew on pre-modern frames of mass-elite 
relations and that was reinforced after the GMD began building a domestic 
propaganda apparatus under Soviet tutelage. Second, there was propaganda as a 
way to propel history by elevating the consciousness of the masses and allowing 
them to liberate themselves from their oppressors. Interaction included both 
convergence and polemic. In both discourses, propaganda was equated with 
tutelage of the people by more enlightened elites for a noble purpose. Finally, the 
humanist discourse, which rejected domestic propaganda as illegitimate 
manipulation and as the opposite of education was also appropriated in China. 
Thus, although domestic propaganda had a predominantly positive connotation in 
Republican China, the clash between two different political imaginaries also 
manifested itself in the Chinese debate. Those who believed that elites needed to 
guide the masses clashed with others that maintained that such manipulation was 
harmful and misguided.  
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A first clash of concepts between domestic and international propaganda 
could be observed when the GMD first tried to organize external propaganda 
aimed primarily at Western countries through its domestic Propaganda 
Department based on the Soviet model. In a way, this anticipated the problems 
faced later by the CPC in the post-Mao period. Ultimately, Chiang Kai-shek 
succeeded by fiscally separating the GMD’s external propaganda structure from 
the Central Propaganda Department and putting in charge U.S.-educated 
Hollington Tong, who was familiar with the likes and dislikes of China’s most 
important target audience. This did not solve all problems, but allowed for 
propaganda that used the language of the Western target audience and catered to 
its concerns and interests. 
During the Republican Period, activities, instruments, and channels for 
international propaganda considered and in many cases also realized were very 
broad, including both official and private initiatives. Although the GMD had 
adopted the Soviet domestic propaganda apparatus, it did not exist in an 
environment in which such a system could be enforced. In the realm of the media, 
all parties were faced with fierce competition from other groups. While censorship 
had been a popular means of establishing at least a little bit of control over foreign 
media, both the GMD and the CPC had also practiced “soft” means of co-opting 
rather than coercing actors outside the two parties. After the CPC gained control 
over most of China’s territory and established the PRC, it took the Soviet Union 
as its main teacher during the first few years. The new environment marked by 
much tighter control as well as the erection of effective barriers blocking flows of 
information allowed for a very different mode of conducting propaganda than the 
more open environment of the first half of the 20
th
 century. The focus of the next 
chapter will be the fate of external propaganda under these new circumstances. 
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3 External Propaganda during the Mao Period: For the State 
or for the Revolution? 
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) no longer propagated itself solely as a political 
party and as a faction in war, but as the legitimate government of China, both to 
those that recognized the PRC and to those that did not. Relatively little written 
evidence about the external propaganda concept during the Mao period is 
available, particularly if compared to the large amount of writing produced during 
the Republican period with its flourishing media landscape. However, the study of 
the few documents that are available combined with an analysis of activities does 
provide an insight into the different framings and purposes of propaganda during 
this time as well as its interaction and conflict with the domestic propaganda 
apparatus. Several indicators show that the question what external propaganda 
should be was one aspect of a larger power struggle between the “left” and the 
“moderates” pushing for economic reform and state-to-state diplomacy. Both the 
purpose and the methods of external propaganda became an issue of dispute.  
Basically, after 1949, two different propaganda concepts clashed. On the 
one hand were people like former United States Information Service (USIS) 
employee Jin Zhonghua 金 仲 华 , who were familiar with the Western 
understanding of and attitude towards propaganda and who, like Hollington Tong 
(Dong Xianguang 董显光), maintained that the best type of propaganda was that 
which was not recognized as such.
1
 This point of view had its origin in the 
experience of international wartime propaganda, of studying at U.S. universities, 
and of being in contact with Western journalists and audiences. As will be seen 
below, many of these people joined the young PRC’s external propaganda 
apparatus. At the other end of the spectrum was the notion that propaganda meant 
education of the backward masses organized by an enlightened elite and was an 
                                                          
1
 Jin Zhonghua is credited with stating that “the best propaganda is that which does not let people 
recognize it as propaganda; propaganda that can be recognized as such is the worst [kind of] 
propaganda” (最好的宣传，是使人看不出是在宣传；看得出的宣传，是最不好的宣传). 
Cited in Zhai Shuyao 翟树耀, “Waiguoren bu yuanyi jieshou bieren de ‘xuanchuan’ – Tan ‘nei 
wai you bie’” 外国人不愿意接受别人的“宣传”——谈“内外有别” [Foreigners are unwilling 
to accept someone’s ‘propaganda’ – On the difference between internal and external 
(propaganda)], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao 对外宣传参考 [External propaganda reference], no. 
10 (1998): 4. 
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activity that could and should be conducted openly. Affirmation of propaganda 
meant the proud affirmation of the idea that everybody was capable of 
understanding and eventually getting involved in politics so long as the Party 
fulfilled its duty of educating the masses. Similarly, the two different 
understandings of external propaganda in particular that existed within the CPC 
during the Republican era were also frequently blurred and became the object of 
factional struggles: On the one hand, China’s external propaganda had a 
diplomatic mission; on the other hand, it had a revolutionary mission. This 
dilemma was similar to the quandaries of Soviet international propaganda during 
the 1920s, which was affected by the well-known conflict between Soviet 
diplomats interested in European diplomatic recognition and Comintern agents 
interested in spreading the revolution.
2
  
China’s initial external propaganda initiatives drew heavily on networks 
from the war against Japan and the Civil War. These people were very much 
aware that one of the functions of external propaganda was to support or at least 
not significantly interfere with China’s diplomacy on the state-to-state level. In 
order to get out China’s message without offending particular governments, China 
had to compromise. This was also necessary in order to be able to distribute the 
material abroad in the first place. Another discourse that grew stronger as leftist 
influences increased was that of class solidarity and of bringing the good news of 
China’s revolutionary transformation to the laboring masses of other countries as 
well as to anybody else struggling against the oppression of their capitalist rulers.  
In addition, there was a dispute over how much external propaganda was 
allowed to deviate from domestic content for strategic purposes. In the early 
1950s, external propaganda media were allowed to implement the principle of 
“largely the same with small differences” (datong xiaoyi 大同小异) in order to 
adapt to different target audiences.
3
 During the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1958 
and over the course of the 1960s, as China redefined itself as the new center of the 
world revolution and became increasingly evangelical, those arguing in favor of 
more distinction lost ground. This was also a battle over who the target audience 
                                                          
2
 Cf. Alastair Kocho-Williams, “Engaging the World: Soviet Diplomacy and Foreign Propaganda 
in the 1920s,” December 2007, available online at 
http://www.uwe.ac.uk/hlss/history/sovietdiplomats1920s.pdf, accessed December 11, 2012.  
3
 Cf. Cagdas Ungor, Reaching the Distant Comrade: Chinese Communist Propaganda Abroad 
(1949-1976) (PhD diss. Binghamton University, 2009), 110.  
126 
 
should be, which in certain respects resembled the debate of the 1920s and 1930s 
whether it made sense to appeal to “imperialist” countries or not. After 1970, on 
the other hand, the idea that external propaganda needed to serve China’s state-to-
state diplomacy rather than further the world revolution regained ground, laying 
the basis for the policies that were to be established after 1978.  
Although the CPC again used various different models for its external 
propaganda between 1949 and 1976, the founding of a domestic propaganda 
apparatus according to Soviet standards during the first few years had a lasting 
impact. The existence of a strong domestic propaganda apparatus in Communist 
countries has, time and again, been presented as an asset in the international 
propaganda war against the West.
4
 However, I argue that, in fact, the most 
disruptive factor for external propaganda work in the PRC was the integration into 
a relatively powerful domestic propaganda apparatus (established right after the 
CPC gained control of most of China’s territory), coupled with the ideological 
argument that adapting too much to target audiences in non-socialist countries 
equaled “catering to the capitalists.” 5  More importantly, perhaps, with the 
existence of a strong domestic propaganda bureaucracy, China did not establish 
any powerful, independent external propaganda agency comparable to the United 
States Information Agency (USIA) founded in 1953 (cf. chapter 2.1). 
After a brief introduction to the new domestic propaganda apparatus and 
the control of information in and out of the PRC that the CPC relied on, I will 
analyze the external propaganda organs set up in the PRC and discuss how 
external propaganda developed over the course of the Mao period under the 
                                                          
4
 One former USIA official writes “Soviet leaders were very good at distorting reality, for every 
single day they needed to convince their own people that they lived in a land of freedom and 
plenty.” Alvin A. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation: American Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and 
the Winning of the Cold War (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 96. 
5
 The first full policy document on external propaganda in the post-Mao period stated that trying to 
adapt to foreign target audiences had been condemned as “catering to the capitalists” under the 
“Gang of Four.” See “Duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu guanyu gaijin he jiaqiang duiwai xuanchuan 
gongzuo de yijian” 对外宣传小组关于改进和加强对外宣传工作的意见  [The External 
Propaganda Small Group’s opinion on improving and strengthening external propaganda 
work”], June 30, 1980, in Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he wenxian (1951-1992) 
党的宣传工作会议概况和文献 (1951-1992) [Overview and documents from the Party’s 
propaganda work conferences], ed. Zhongyang xuanchuanbu bangongting 中央宣传部办公厅 
[General Office of the Central Propaganda Department] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang 
dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), 391. While post-Mao documents would naturally condemn the 
external propaganda practices of the Cultural Revolution, this was an actual problem. 
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influence of factional struggles, different political agendas, as well as domestic 
propaganda practices.  
 
3.1 The Domestic Propaganda Apparatus 
In the early 1950s, as the CPC sought to tighten its grip on Chinese society, 
it set up a nationwide “propaganda net” (xuanchuanwang 宣传网) that could 
penetrate all sectors and aspects of society. At the top of this “net” was the Central 
Propaganda Department, which was moved to Zhongnanhai in late 1949.
6
 The 
“net” itself was built by setting up propaganda departments within party 
committees (dangwei  党委 ) at all levels, including in factories and other 
production sites.
7
 It came together with a system of conducting “study sessions” 
on the basis of the journal Study (Xuexi 学习) edited by the Central Propaganda 
Department (CPD), launched in 1950.
8
 As part of this effort, the CPC published 
handbooks for cadres on how to set up this net and conduct propaganda work in 
the early 1950s.
9
 Some of these were directly translated from Russian,
10
 while 
others combined information from various sources or circulated the experience of 
Chinese propaganda cadres for reference purposes at other propaganda 
departments.
11
  
                                                          
6
 Cf. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in 
Contemporary China (Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 36.  
7
 In 1951, it was decided that every party branch must have a full time propaganda cadre in charge 
of propaganda work and reporting back to CPD about local conditions. Cf. Brady, Marketing 
Dictatorship, 37.  
8
 Cf. ibid., 37.  
9
 E.g. Renmin chubanshe bianjibu 人民出版社编辑部 [Editorial department of People’s Press], 
ed., Zenyang jianli xuanchuanwang 怎样建立宣传网  [How to build a propaganda net] 
(Beijing: Gaishe, 1951); Xinhua shishi congkan she 新华时事丛刊社 [Xinhua current events 
series press], ed., Zenyang gao hao qiye xuanchuan gudong gongzuo 怎样搞好企业宣传鼓励
工作 [How to do propaganda and agitation work in companies well] (Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 
1950).  
10
 E.g. M. Vodolagin М.Водолагин, author and  Ze Xiang 泽湘 , trans., Sidalingele sheng 
xuanchuanyuan gongzuo de jingyan 斯大林格勒省宣传员工作的经验   [Experience of 
propaganda workers in  Stalingrad province] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1954). Original: M. 
Vodolagin М.Водолагин, Opyt raboty Stalingradskikh agitatorov Опыт работы 
Сталинградских агитаторов [Work experience of agitators in Stalingrad] (Moscow: 1949). 
Note that agitators is translated as xuanchuanyuan.  
11
 E.g. Fu Zhensheng 富振声, Dongbeiqu jianli xuanchuanwang jingyan 东北区建立宣传网的经
验 [Experiences from the Northeastern zone in establishing a propaganda net] (Shenyang: 
Dongbei renmin chubanshe, 1951); “Yi zhi” 一知, Xuanchuanbu zenyang jinxing gongzuo 宣
传部怎样进行工作  [How a propaganda department works] (Jinan: Shandong renmin 
chubanshe, 1955). 
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After the founding of the PRC, the main declared goals of propaganda 
work were, first, to explain core tasks to the masses so that they could be 
implemented properly,
12
 i.e. a practical and often short term use, second, to 
increase the masses’ trust,13 which could potentially have both short term and long 
term uses, and, third, to raise the political level (zhengzhi shuiping 政治水平) and 
political awareness (zhengzhi juewu 政治觉悟) of the masses,14 a long term task. 
Concretely, propaganda after 1949 had two main goals, both tied to the aim of 
eradicating the Capitalist class in China: explaining the CPC’s policies and 
inculcating socialist ideology on the one hand, and eradicating the legacies of 
GMD propaganda on the other.  
In many ways, the concept of propaganda during the Mao period must be 
seen as a polemic against the framing already present in pre-modern conceptions 
of mass-elite relations and given “scientific” backing by “crowd psychology” that 
considered the masses incapable of understanding higher truths and therefore to be 
kept out of politics. Chinese propaganda and thought work had no lesser goal than 
to involve the entire population in political matters and ensure correct thinking in 
every single member of Chinese society so as to make full use of every Chinese 
person’s conscious agency in transforming China and propelling it towards a 
higher and more advanced stage of history.  
The Soviet model of domestic propaganda that was appropriated in China 
relied on a relatively closed environment in which the party-state had an almost 
exclusive monopoly on information. First, as early as in January 1949, the CPC 
issued instructions that no foreign news agencies would be allowed to send news 
or use radio transmitters on Chinese soil. Foreign-owned papers and journals were 
initially allowed to continue their operations after registering with the authorities 
for a limited time after which all except a few select publications would be shut 
                                                          
12
 Liu Shaoqi刘少奇, “Xuanchuan gongzuo buneng likai dangqian de zhongxin gongzuo” 宣传工
作不能离开当前的中心工作 [Propaganda work cannot be removed from the current core 
work], in Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De lun dang de xuanchuan gongzuo 毛泽
东、 周恩来、 刘少奇、朱德论党的宣传工作 [Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and 
Zhu De on the Party’s propaganda work], ed. Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu中共中央组织部 
[Organization department of the CPC Central Committee] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang 
dangxiao chubanshe, 1989), 37. 
13
 Ibid., 39. 
14
 Ibid., 37. 
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down.
15
 After the founding of the General Press Administration, the Center set up 
a journalism school to retrain journalists according to the new standards as part of 
the overall re-education campaigns targeting Chinese intellectuals.
16
 By 1953, the 
CPC had either brought previously independent media under its control or had 
closed them down.
17
  
While there are different means of creating monopolies on information and 
maintaining barriers between different populations, only entities that are backed 
up by a military, such as national governments, or groups that are able to keep 
populations in and out of a certain territory through other means (such as 
geographic barriers, control over food, etc.), can create these most radically 
sealed-off environments. During the Mao period, China had established this type 
of environment for large parts of its population through restrictions on movement, 
not only at the national level by restricting the travel abroad of Chinese people 
and closely coordinating the visits of foreigners, but also at the local level through 
the hukou 户口  system. Today, the most prominent and arguably the most 
effective of the few remaining examples of propaganda in totalitarian states is 
North Korea. This control over which information enters or leaves a certain 
territory makes some otherwise very costly or complicated propaganda maneuvers 
possible. However, it is difficult to maintain once borders are eroded and has a 
number of other drawbacks, such as lack of credibility in the international 
environment. 
 
3.2 1949 to 1954: Setting up the PRC’s External Propaganda 
Apparatus 
While after the founding of the PRC the CPC instituted a strong domestic 
propaganda apparatus in order to be able to ideologically penetrate all of society it 
                                                          
15
 Cf. Neil O’Brien, “John William Powell and the China Weekly/Monthly Review, An American 
Editor in Early Revolutionary China” (PhD diss, Washington State University, 2001), 204-205.  
16
 Ibid., 332-333. This re-education campaign also affected Liang Shichun (cf. chapter 2.6), who 
was teaching classes on international propaganda at Shanghai’s St. John’s University when the 
PRC was founded. Cf. Liang Shiwei 梁世伟, “Fuqin Liang Shichun na nan yi wangque de 
wangshi” 父亲梁士纯那难以忘却的往事 [Those events in the past of (my) father Liang 
Shichun that are hard to forget], originally published in Nanjing yueyou 南京约友 [Nanjing 
friend], no. 44 (September 2009), available online at 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_61b84b4b0100v3pt.html, accessed February 20, 2013. 
17
 The last foreign-owned journal, the China Monthly Review, was closed down in 1953 by the 
editor. O’Brien, “John William Powell and the China Weekly/Monthly Review,” 448.  
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did not install a comparably unified and operational external propaganda 
bureaucracy. The Soviet Union (S.U.) did not have any such structure either.
18
 As 
was the case in China later, the responsibilities of the external propaganda sector 
in the S.U. were spread out across units that were supervised by two different 
super-ordinate bodies, neither of which had specialized personnel for external 
propaganda.
19
 China’s external propaganda activities were organized through a 
complex network of institutions that both belonged to the propaganda sector and 
to the foreign affairs sector without an all-encompassing bureaucratic organization 
at the top. In the 1950s, the external propaganda apparatus was dominated by a 
network of people who had also helped propagate the CPC during the previous 
wars and were loosely affiliated in some way with Zhou Enlai 周恩来, including 
journalist and later diplomat Qiao Guanhua 乔冠华, publicist Hu Yuzhi 胡愈之, 
Sun Yat-sen’s (Sun Zhongshan 孙中山) widow Song Qingling 宋庆龄, and three 
of her colleagues from the China Defense League: the Polish-born Jewish emigré 
Israel Epstein (1915-2005),
20
 and Chinese journalists Jin Zhonghua and Liao 
Chengzhi 廖承志 . 21  The external propaganda sector employed a number of 
foreigners (“foreign friends,” waiguo pengyou 外国朋友) since the earliest days, 
some of whom had worked with the CPC before the founding of the PRC while 
others came to China later on.
22
 One important mechanism to tie most of the 
institutions responsible for various aspects of external propaganda together in 
China was thus the existence of a network of people that had also worked in 
external propaganda during the previous years and with an ally at the very top, 
namely Zhou Enlai, who could provide some support. While his role is also a 
construct of post-Cultural Revolution historiography to a certain extent,
23
 Zhou 
                                                          
18
 Cf. Vladimir Pechatnov, “An Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early 
Cold War, 1945-47,” Cold War History 1, no. 2 (2001): 7. 
19
 Cf. Pechatnov, “An Exercise in Frustration,” 7. 
20
 Israel Epstein had come to China at the age of two and was a member of the China Defense 
League during the war against Japan with Sun Yat-sen’s widow Song Qingling. In the early 
1950s, Song brought him back to China in order to work in China’s external propaganda 
apparatus.  
21
 Liao was put in charge of overseas Chinese affairs after the founding of the PRC. 
22
 For the concept and system of political friendship and foreigners in China, see Anne-Marie 
Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
23
 Which divided politicians and cadres into bad ones affiliated with the “Gang of Four” and good 
ones affiliated with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.  
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interfered quite a few times, defending those in the external propaganda sector in 
favor of more restrained language.
24
  
The lack of a powerful organization at the top did not mean that external 
propaganda was not a priority; in fact, in its earliest year, the PRC spent 
considerable resources on foreign language magazines, which is particularly 
noteworthy in light of the many pressing problems the country faced at the time,
25
 
including a complete reorganization of the Chinese population to bring it under 
CPC control. China had good reason to want to propagate itself. Before the 
founding of the PRC, the CPC had not ruled out trade relations with the United 
States (U.S.), and Stalin had signaled that the S.U. would permit China to 
maintain diplomatic and trade relations with capitalist countries.
26
 After the 
outbreak of the Korean War, however, the U.S. imposed a total embargo on China. 
In May 1950, at the behest of the U.S., the United Nations (UN) passed a 
resolution to the same effect.
27
 While China certainly did not expect countries 
such as the United States to drop the embargo as a result of its external 
propaganda, it hoped to increase opposition among the populations in other 
countries against harsh policy measures against China. In addition, China wanted 
to gain recognition among foreign populations for its achievements and thus 
propagate the superiority of the socialist system so that more countries saw the 
advantages of joining the Socialist camp. 
China was itself the target of U.S. propaganda, although fewer resources 
were spent on it than on the S.U. and Europe
28
 and the barriers to block the flow 
of information established by the CPC proved to be quite effective. The U.S. had 
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 For example, in 1958, Zhou Enlai wrote to the foreign ministry, pointing out that words like 
“imperialism,” “fascism,” etc. were not well received abroad, a fact that had even been pointed 
out by people friendly to China. Cf. Sun Xupei 孙旭培, “Tan duiwai baodao de xin guannian 
he xin yishu” 谈对外报道的新观念和新艺术[On new ideas and new art (i.e. qualitative skills) 
of external reporting], Huaibei meitan shifanxueyuan xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 淮北
煤炭师范学院学报（哲学社会科学版）[Journal of Huaibei Coal Industry Teacher’s College  
(Humanities and social sciences edition) 25, no. 3 (June 2004) : 33. 
25
 Cf. Leonard Lazarick, “China’s Smiling Face to the World: Beijing’s English-Language 
Magazines in the First Decade of the People’s Republic” (M.A. thesis, University of Maryland, 
2005), 1. This quite remarkable M.A. thesis is available online at 
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/3276/1/umi-umd-3104.pdf, accessed October 25, 2012.  
26
 O’Brien, “John William Powell and the China Weekly/Monthly Review,” 219-220. 
27
 Hossein Askari, Case Studies of US Economic Sanctions (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 15. Also see 
Shuguang Zhang, Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo Against China and the Sino-Soviet 
Alliance, 1949-1963 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
28
 Department of State, “Memorandum for: Special Assistant to the President; Subject: 
International Radio Broadcasting by Radio Free Asia,” issued April 1, 1953, CK3100139128, 
accessed through Declassified Documents Reference System. 
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two radio stations, the official Voice of America and the “gray propaganda” 
initiative Radio Free Asia, which broadcasted into the PRC between 1951 and 
1953.
29
 However, broadcasts to the PRC were seen as inefficient because due to 
public loudspeakers and “group-listening centers” only very few private 
households had radios, and “clandestine listening” was difficult.30  
When the CPC established itself as the ruling party of China in 1949, the 
structures engaged in external propaganda and liaising with foreigners were not 
under centralized control and could still be broadly categorized into two types of 
different origin: first, there were media units which had been founded during the 
Second World War and which had nominally operated under the guidance of 
Zhou Enlai. Some of these units had been established with the help of Westerners 
and had focused on getting Western support throughout the Second World War as 
well as during the ensuing civil war with the GMD. Second, there were units that 
had been born out of an interaction with the Communist International and the S.U. 
These units were reorganized after the founding of the PRC, resulting, for instance, 
in the International Liaison Department (Duiwai lianluo bu 对外联络部), which 
was founded in 1951 and was given some responsibilities formally held by the 
United Front Department (Tongzhan bu 统战部), which only remained in charge 
of liaison work with Taiwan and ethnic Chinese.
31
 
Between 1949 and 1953, under the supervision of Soviet advisors, China 
set up a number of state organs and transferred to them administrative powers 
previously held by party institutions. In the propaganda sector, this change was 
exemplified by the creation and brief existence of the General Press 
Administration (GPrA, Xinwen zongshu 新闻总署, 1949-1952), and the General 
                                                          
29
 For instance, after Stalin’s death, the U.S broadcasts focused on the theme that “Malenkov [had] 
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Publication Administration (GPuA, Chuban zongshu 出版总署 , 1949-1954) 
under the Central Government Administrative Council (Zhengfu zhengwuyuan 政
府政务院), the predecessor of today’s State Council. These were charged with 
some of the former responsibilities of the Central Propaganda Department.
32
  
During the first few years of the PRC, some of the propaganda-related 
bodies established a specific subordinate body responsible for “international 
propaganda.” The GPrA, headed by Hu Yuzhi,33 subsumed the China Information 
Bureau (Guoji xinwen ju 国际新闻局, literally: International Press Bureau),34 
which is seen as the first predecessor of what is today the Foreign Languages 
Office.
35
 During these initial years, propaganda targeted at foreigners was still 
referred to as international propaganda (guoji xuanchuan 国际宣传).36 Soon after, 
external propaganda, duiwai xuanchuan, became the most established term to 
refer to propaganda aimed at foreign audiences.
37
 After the GPrA was disbanded 
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responsibilities included the editing (in foreign languages) and distribution abroad of news and 
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language journal People’s China, publishing the Esperanto journal El Popola Ĉinio, managing 
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the Cominform,  a Pr chnyy Mir,  a Nar dnuyu Demo r tiyu!  а  ро чный Мир,  а 
 аро дную  емокра тию [For a Lasting Peace, for a People’s Democracy]. Cf. Hou and Guo, 
Duiwai baodao celüe yu jiqiao, 40.  
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guanyu duiwai xuanchuan wenti de baogao” 外交部关于对外宣传问题的报告 [The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs’ report on problems in external propaganda], March 23, 1950, MFA 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Archive, no. 113-00055-03(1).  
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in 1952, the Bureau was turned into the Foreign Languages Press,
38
 the Chinese 
equivalent of Moscow’s Foreign Languages Publishing House in which all 
publications targeting foreigners were produced. This suggests that in this case, 
“international news” was used in its meaning from the Republican period: news 
aimed at foreigners. Similarly, in 1950, the Broadcasting Bureau (Guangbo shiye 
ju 广 播 事 业 局 ) established the Editorial Department for International 
Broadcasting (Guoji guangbo bianjibu 国际广播编辑部), responsible for editing 
and translating radio programs for foreigners.
39
 Between 1951 and 1954, the CPD 
had an International Propaganda Division (Guoji xuanchuanchu 国际宣传处),40 
which was headed by Zhou Enlai’s secretary Yang Gang 杨刚, who became 
deputy director of the People’s Daily responsible for international propaganda in 
1955 after the International Propaganda Division had been shut down.
41
 At least 
in the second case, at the People’s Daily, the term “international propaganda” 
must have already been used in the new meaning established during the first few 
years of the PRC: propaganda about international affairs.
42
 
In addition, China founded “popular” (minjian 民间 ) organizations in 
charge of “people-to-people” diplomacy, such as the Chinese People’s Institute of 
Foreign Affairs (Zhongguo renmin waijiao xuehui 中国人民外交学会, official 
                                                                                                                                                               
laodongju duiwai xuanchuan yuan gongzuo zongjie” 关于劳动局对外宣传员工作总结 
[Summary of the work of the Bureau of Labor’s external propagandists] in Ju dangzhibu 
guanyu yi jiu wu san xia ban nian zhibu gongzuo zongjie ji duiwai xuanchuan yuan gongzuo 
zongjie 局党支部关于一九五三下半年支部工作总结及对外宣传员工作总结 [Summary of 
branch work and of work of external propaganda workers of the Bureau’s Party branch in the 
second half of 1953], 1953, Beijing Municipal Archive, no. 110-001-00322, 9-13.  
38
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English acronym: CPIFA), founded in December 1949,
43
 and the Chinese 
People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (Zhongguo renmin 
duiwai youhao xiehui 中国人民对外友好协会 ), established in 1954 as the 
External Cultural Liaison Bureau (Duiwai wenhua lianluo ju 对外文化联络局).44 
In these popular networks, the PRC was integrated into and thus initially 
depended heavily on the structures created by the S.U. Likewise, many Soviet 
practices were adopted: The Chinese word youhao 友好 –political friendship– is a 
direct translation of the Russian word druzhba  ружба,45 and much of China’s 
people-to-people diplomacy was Soviet-inspired. For instance, China also adopted 
the delegatziya  елегация system of organizing highly coordinated visits of 
foreign delegations to China.
46
  
“Popular” media and associations were useful wherever other countries 
were suspicious of activities organized by a Communist government. The notion 
that messages are more persuasive when they are stated by a neutral party has 
been part of the conceptualization of propaganda since people began to 
systematically write about the topic.
47
 Similarly, creating new, seemingly 
independent media to broadcast messages that could not be broadcast for different 
reasons by the Voice of America (VOA) was one of the most important 
rearrangements of the U.S. external propaganda apparatus under the Eisenhower 
administration. “Popular” media, presented as independent though de facto part of 
the CPC’s organizational network, served a similar function for China. Of course, 
the Party-state also controlled popular organizations. Control was further 
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consolidated in 1953, when the Central Committee established the Commission 
for the Coordination of International Activities (Guoji huodong zhidao 
weiyuanhui 国际活动指导委员会), which oversaw all popular (minjian 民间) 
international activities, including participation in non-governmental international 
organizations, conferences, and dispatching or receiving delegations.
48
 
Nonetheless “popular” media, for example, faced fewer restrictions abroad than 
official publications, which were officially banned from being imported into the 
U.S.
49
 
The main activities of the first few years consisted of setting up a number 
of print publications with the help of people who had organized the CPC’s 
propaganda directed at foreigners earlier. People’s China was the first English 
language publication of the newly established PRC, its first issue published in 
January 1950, only three months after the CPC had officially proclaimed the new 
republic. China Pictorial was added in July 1950, with Chinese Literature 
following in July 1951.
50
 In 1950, Xinhua News Agency also established China 
Features (Zhongguo tegao she 中国特稿社), which acted as a “popular” (minjian) 
organization to the outside world and was not subjected to the same level of tight 
ideological control as other media.
51
 Moreover, it potentially enjoyed more 
credibility among those skeptical of China because it was not presented as a Party-
affiliated medium. In 1952, two additional external propaganda media were 
launched. The first was the magazine China Reconstructs, which was modeled on 
the U.S. magazines Life, Look, and Saturday Evening Post
52
 and was nominally 
edited by Song Qingling and could therefore avoid censorship by being classified 
as a “popular” (minjian) journal. 53  The second was China News Service 
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(Zhongxinshe 中新社), a new agency targeting overseas Chinese. Both were de 
facto headed by Jin Zhonghua.  
These media units could draw on predecessors and networks from before 
1949. According to Epstein, the two most important journals, People’s China and 
China Reconstructs should be seen as continuations of two earlier journals edited 
in Hong Kong prior to the founding of the PRC.
54
 People’s China was basically a 
continuation of China Digest, relying on the same staff and using the same list of 
readers to distribute the journal. In essence, China Digest was relocated from 
Hong Kong to Beijing, and renamed People’s China. 55  Likewise, China 
Reconstructs is considered a continuation of Song Qingling’s China Defence 
League Newsletter,
56
though, as will be seen below, it was more likely a 
continuation of other foreign language media closed down in the early 1950s.  
Foreign language media in the early PRC were not limited to periodicals. 
In May 1950, the CPD’s International Propaganda Division began publishing the 
first CPC-run English language daily, The Shanghai News. It was headed by Jin 
Zhonghua and was meant for the foreign population in Shanghai, which mainly 
consisted of Soviets and Jewish refugees from the Second World War.
57
 Shanghai 
was the ideal place for such an undertaking because the city still had a lot of 
equipment previously used by foreign language papers that had been closed down 
after the CPC’s takeover and thus could be reused. 58  In 1952, however, The 
Shanghai News was closed down. While many of Shanghai’s foreigners had 
already left the city by then, the main reason was that the Center wanted to expand 
its own external propaganda and needed both technical equipment and qualified 
staff. The entire printing equipment was moved to Beijing, and the personnel were 
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transferred to work for the new journal China Reconstructs, for the Foreign 
Languages Press, and for Xinhua 新华.59  
After the GPrA’s China Information Bureau (Guoji xinwen ju 国际新闻局) 
was disbanded in February 1952 and was transformed into the Foreign Language 
Press (Waiwen chubanshe 外文出版社), its News Office (Xinwenchu 新闻处) 
became Xinhua’s External News Editorial Department (Duiwai xinwen bianjibu 
对外新闻编辑部).60 With the rearrangement, Xinhua inherited the responsibility 
to distribute text and images both in China and abroad.
61
 Since the very beginning, 
this department was only responsible for reporting Chinese domestic news to 
foreigners; international news were handled by the International News 
Department (Guoji xinwen bu 国际新闻部 ),62  which was responsible for all 
international news whether targeting Chinese or foreigners, a division of 
responsibilities that still applies today.  
In addition to China’s foreign language media and Xinhua, there were two 
other media units that were considered external propaganda organs: Radio Peking 
and the People’s Daily. Radio Peking was launched in 1950 on the basis of earlier 
foreign language broadcasts during the Civil War.
63
 The People’s Daily, primarily 
intended for domestic consumption, was also treated as an external propaganda 
organ, as foreigners read the publication to get a glimpse of China’s political 
direction.
64
 
 
While print publications’ layouts were fashioned after U.S. examples,65 all 
media were brought under the control of the CPC’s Soviet style propaganda 
apparatus, which stressed heavy control by the Party and the top leadership, who 
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often read and approved important articles personally.
66
 Between 1949 and 1960, 
before the Sino-Soviet conflict became official and all advisors were pulled out of 
China, the country relied on the help of approximately ten thousand Soviet 
advisors.
67
 External propaganda units had Soviet advisors as well.
68
 Shen Suru 沈
苏儒 (1919-2009), who had transferred to the The Shanghai News after having 
worked for the USIS, later recounted the changes Chinese journalists had to 
accommodate under the influence of Soviet advisors: 
 
“According to Western press theory, the most important content that will attract 
readers the most needs to be placed at the very top of the news report, so when the 
editors need to delete something, they delete the end of an article, not the beginning. 
However, the theory of Soviet experts was precisely the reverse; they believed that 
each article had to have a political conclusion and that this conclusion could only be 
placed at the very end [of the article]. So when editing, we often had to reprint even 
long articles in full without any changes.”
69
 
 
Although Shen does not spell this out directly, for those Chinese 
journalists who had worked with relative independence during the Second World 
War and during the Civil War, this complete turn-around and integration into a 
propaganda system that functioned by completely different rules, not only in 
terms of control exercised but also in terms of what was considered good 
journalism must have come as quite a shock. Soviet advisors were also stationed 
at other external propaganda units, and although their influence later diminished, 
by then the new style of writing and the mechanisms to ensure compliance had 
fully established itself in China.  
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Texts to be published in external propaganda media were generally 
prepared in Chinese and then translated into different languages.
70
 One important 
phenomenon that needs to be noted is the CPC’s obsession with correct 
terminology that also had a significant impact on external propaganda work and in 
many cases continues to show until today. Schoenhals has studied this 
phenomenon as “formalized language”, which denotes a “restricted code”71 or 
linguistically reduced form of language, used, for example, in politics for the 
purpose of constituting one’s power. In this “restricted code” only a selection of 
the vocabulary, syntax, and speech patterns of everyday language is available for 
use.
72
 Formalized language has played an extremely important part in Chinese 
politics, to a degree where policy making can almost be equated with policy 
formulation.
73
 According to Schoenhals,  
 
“policy implementation at all levels is affected by concerns with questions like How 
should this be put? What happens if we put it like that? Will putting it like that put 
people off? What do they mean by putting it differently? Can we really let them put it 
like that?”
74
 
 
Political correct-speak
75
 is not limited to the Chinese context. However, in 
China it has taken on an importance and a dynamic of its own that might, in fact, 
be unparalleled anywhere else in the world.
76
 A famous passage in the Analects 
(Lunyu 论语) argues that wrong terms will lead to political disarray, and that 
therefore the prime responsibility of government is the rectification of names 
(zheng ming 正名).77 As Munro explains, this importance attached to the accuracy 
of words and the link between words and value judgments was present throughout 
pre-modern China: To call someone a king meant to morally approve of the way 
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this person occupied the position.
78
 Although to draw a direct connection may be 
a bit farfetched and insistence on one’s own terminology to be used in 
international diplomacy is not limited to China, there is some continuity in the 
importance attached to words as carrying moral judgement. Munro continues that 
in Maoist ideology “[t]o use the language of the peasants is to take a step toward 
both describing and evaluating the world as they would.”79 This idea becomes 
somewhat problematic, ideologically, when having to adapt one’s news reports 
language-wise to a Western target audience, some of whom are even considered 
hostile to China. Adopting their language is tantamount to agreeing with their 
point of view.   
Several documents attest to how important correct translations and the 
unification of slogans (tongyi xuanchuan koujing 统一宣传口径) were in external 
propaganda work.
80
 Aside from junior cadres, who were responsible for the 
translation and proofreading of texts, external propaganda units also employed 
senior cadres in charge of content and ideological correctness of the texts 
produced. The latter often did not speak any foreign languages.
81
 Each cadre in a 
unit had a “clearance level,” which determined both his access to classified 
information and which types of texts produced in the external propaganda unit 
they were allowed to sign off on.
82
 Foreign proofreaders did complain about the 
language and requested changes, but these were usually rebuffed, as their words 
did not correctly reflect what China wanted to say in the eyes of the Propaganda 
Department.
83
  
Moreover, anything touching on international relations or China’s foreign 
policy, particularly when published in the People’s Daily (Renminribao 人民日
报), which was read by foreigners in order to learn about official CPC and PRC 
policy, was treated as a diplomatic statement and controlled accordingly. It is 
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well-known that Zhou Enlai and other top leaders in the Party-state personally 
read, corrected and rewrote important pieces.
84
  
Speed, by contrast, was not considered as important. China had an almost 
complete monopoly on reporting China-related news. Although foreign media did 
pick up certain stories from Chinese domestic media before they could be reported 
in China’s external propaganda journals or even by Radio Peking,85 there was no 
competition over access to information from foreigners. Likewise, correct political 
commentary was more important than being the first to tell foreigners about a 
particular story. The importance attached to correct speech, which required 
several layers of control, combined with the lack of genuine competition meant 
that reporting on time was not an important priority. 
Before 1953, there were some exceptions to the language policies. The 
CPC’s instructions on how to handle the foreign press in China from January 
1949 had included special provisions for selected foreign publications that the 
CPC would continue to allow to operate and even protect from Chinese 
takeover.
86
 The China Monthly Review,
87
 edited since 1946 by American 
journalist John W. Powell (1919-2008), was one of the few foreign-run 
periodicals allowed to continue publication after the founding of the PRC. Powell 
had initially come to China working for the U.S. Office of War Information 
(OWI).
88
 Before the Communist take-over Powell had advocated against the U.S. 
policy in Asia to stop Communism by all means, although he had also been 
critical of the S.U. to some extent.
89
 After the takeover, he was mindful of 
Chinese sensitivities and also lobbied the U.S. to recognize the PRC.
90
 Powell’s 
journal vocally supported the PRC and attacked the U.S. war in Korea. Despite 
the fact that it was allowed to comment on political issues, its articles – 
particularly Powell’s editorials – were not subjected to the same language policies 
as other publications. Instead, articles included explicit disclaimers that the views 
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expressed were those of the editor and the respective journalists.
91
 In addition to 
original content, the journal also published policy documents and full texts of 
speeches made by Chinese politicians or attached them as supplements.
92
 The 
China Monthly Review was closed down in May 1953, officially for financial 
reasons and because it was no longer allowed to be distributed in the U.S. by 
American customs owing to its anti-American stance during the Korean War.
93
  
It is true that the journal had suffered financial difficulties for a long time, 
but if it had continued to exist, it would certainly have been tied into the overall 
propaganda apparatus more closely. The closing down of the journal came at a 
time when the CPC embarked on a new economic course, tightened Party control 
and wanted to expand its own external propaganda apparatus under stricter Party 
supervision. In 1953, all work was first divided into functionally related sectors 
called “gateways” (kou 口).94 This initiated a policy of strengthening party control 
over government bodies that was to be reaffirmed five years later in 1958 with the 
creation of five different Small Groups (one for each of the five functional areas 
of government) reporting directly to the Politburo and the Party Secretariat.
95
  
With plans for faster economic development, reinforced Party control and 
an increasingly anti-Soviet agenda, China’s interest in propagating its stance 
abroad was to rise dramatically over the next few years.  
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3.3 1955 to 1969: From Afro-Asian Solidarity to Spreading the 
Revolution 
Starting in the mid-1950s, China began to be more involved in the 
activities of what was later to become the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). This 
was accompanied by attempts to crank up China’s voice towards Asian and 
African countries. Concern with external propaganda clearly rose in 1958 and 
continued to grow throughout the 1960s. Reasons included the Sino-Soviet split 
following Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in 1956,96 which ended the period during 
which China saw itself mainly as a student of the S.U. rather than a teacher in its 
own right (although Chinese publications continued to stress that China should 
never force its own model on anybody else).
97
 The conflict with the S.U. turned 
into a security issue that made it necessary for China to gain more allies on the 
international stage in order to avoid complete isolation within the international 
system in general and to balance against the S.U. in particular. Thus, spreading 
China’s point of view and trying to turn others against the S.U. was not a mere 
struggle over the correct ideological line, but seen as a way to gain much-needed 
allies. 
In 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai took part in the Afro-Asian Conference in 
Bandung (Wanlong万隆). This new focus on Asian and African countries was 
also reflected in further media expansions. In 1955, Mao Zedong 毛泽东 
instructed Xinhua to “manage the globe” (Xinhua yao ba diqiu guan qilai 新华要
把地球管起来), and to “let the whole world hear our voice” (rang quan shijie dou 
neng tingdao women de shengyin让全世界都能听到我们的声音).98 In 1956, in 
order to make itself more international, Xinhua added a number of new cadres in 
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1956 and also transferred people from domestic Xinhua branches (guonei fenshe 
国内分社).99  
The idea to build a world news agency was also tied to activities at 
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) in 
the early 1950s. Although the MacBride Commission of the late 1970s and early 
1980s is the most famous UNESCO initiative regarding the world’s media and 
information order,
100
 the UN and UNESCO were committed to the setting up of 
national news agencies as early as during the 1950s
101
 and compiled reference 
material as part of the process. In 1953, UNESCO published News Agencies – 
Their Structure and Operation,
102
 which listed five “world news agencies”: 
Agence France Presse (AFP), the Associated Press (AP), Reuters, the Telegraph 
Agency of the S.U. (TASS, Telegrafnoye agentstvo Sovetskovo Soyuza 
Телеграфное агентство Советского Союза), and United Press International 
(UPI).
 
In late 1954, China sent a delegation to study TASS for two months and 
learn from its experience as a world news agency.
103
 The UNESCO report was 
translated and published by Xinhua under the title “Introduction to various 
countries’ news agencies” in 1957,104 after the decision to turn Xinhua into a 
“world news agency” had been announced. The 1957 version appears to have 
been published openly (gongkai 公开), and it is highly likely that there were 
earlier translations circulated internally. Thus, while the term shijiexing 
tongxunshe (世界性通讯社) is generally considered a coinage of Liu Shaoqi’s 刘
少奇 from the year 1956105 when Liu repeated Mao’s call on Xinhua to become a 
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“world news agency” on two occasions in May and June 1956, it may actually 
have been introduced into the Chinese language through the translation of the 
UNESCO report.  
There was, however, also an obvious link between the news agency project 
and the move away from the S.U. and towards African and Asian countries. On 
June 19, 1956, Liu Shaoqi told Xinhua employees that in the world, there was a 
large “neutral” camp (zhongli diqu 中立地区 ), which did not have its own 
international news agencies. Although they were not particularly fond of the way 
things were done, they were forced to rely on news releases either from British 
and American or Soviet news agencies. Thus, he explained, as long as China’s 
news were done well, there was a big market out there.
106
 Following a directive 
from Zhou Enlai, Xinhua was to first focus on Asia and Africa before trying to 
enter the West (xian Ya Fei, hou Ou Mei 先亚非，后欧美 ). 107  From the 
beginning, however, the goal was to enable Xinhua to compete with Western 
news agencies. A two-step plan with a timetable was released in 1956: During the 
first five to seven years, Xinhua should concentrate its forces to become the most 
authoritative news agency in the East (meaning Asia and Africa). Second, within 
ten to twelve years, Xinhua was to become a news agency able to compete with 
Western capitalist news agencies all over the world.
108
  
External propaganda was not the only reason for Xinhua’s planned 
overseas expansion. Better intelligence was at least as if not more important. At 
the same time that plans were made to strengthen China’s voice in the world, 
Xinhua’s internal reporting system was reformed. Xinhua’s main “semi-public” 
publication selectively translating news published by foreign media was re-
launched under the name Reference News (Cankao xiaoxi 参考消息) in March 
1957.
109
 Thus, while China wanted to increase its voice, it also sought more 
information about the world. 
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In 1956, with the Hundred Flowers movement and the growing 
disenchantment with the S.U., a search for new models for China’s news media 
began.
110
 A Xinhua report compiled during the Hundred Flowers Movement in 
1957 pointed out that one-sided external propaganda left a bad impression of 
China abroad.
111
 The idea of establishing more “liberal” media that were less 
strictly controlled by the Party was crushed with the Anti-Rightist Movement of 
1957. The Western education of much of the staff of People’s China caused some 
problems in the second half of 1957, just like the idea that external propaganda 
needed to be different from domestic content was condemned as unnecessary 
“exceptionalism.”112 According to recollections, entire editorial boards of media 
targeted at foreigners were affected by the Anti-Rightist campaign.
113
 The 
monthly journal was then turned into the weekly Peking Review, which placed a 
much larger emphasis on politics (see below). However, the renewed interest in 
propagating China’s stance to the world remained and with the Sino-Soviet 
conflict intensifying, China’s interest in publicizing its own stance and gaining 
allies increased. The year 1958 saw a major push in this direction. 
 China Reconstructs was less affected, possibly due to the interference of 
Zhou Enlai who openly opposed the idea of adding more political content to the 
magazine and generally argued in favor of toning down the rhetoric at the time 
owing to the negative feedback China received for its harsh attacks.
114
 One MFA 
document explained that turning People’s China into the Peking Review was 
primarily done in order to avoid overlap with China Reconstructs, which was to 
be aimed at the broad readership generally interested in China, whereas the Peking 
Review was to specifically target those researching China.
115
 In 1958, the CPC 
also briefly tried to ease the fear of cadres afraid of “committing mistakes.” 
However, this policy did not last long and the negative effects of too little control 
                                                                                                                                                               
copies was actually significantly increased. Cf. Fang Hanqi 方汉奇 , Zhongguo xinwen 
chuanbo shi 中国新闻传播史 [History of Chinese journalism and communication] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2002), 375-377. 
110
 Cf. Li Yue, “Xinhuashe guoji xinwen baodao de lishi fazhan jiankuang,” 129.  
111
 Ibid. 
112
 Cf. Zhai Shuyao, “Duiwai xuanchuan de lishi fazhan,” 6. 
113
 See Ungor, Reaching the Distant Comrade, 136-137. 
114
 Sun Xupei, “Tan duiwai baodao de xin guannian he xin yishu,” 33. 
115
 Cf. “Dui ‘Beijing zhoubao’ (Yingwen) de ji dian yijian” 对‘北京周报’（英文版）的几点意见 
[A few points on the Peking Review (English version)], November 1 to December 26, 1958, 
MFA Archive, no. 116-00233-02(1), 2.  
148 
 
were lamented in 1959 after the Campaign against Rightist Deviation had 
begun.
116
  
China’s new evangelism also translated into a major change in policy 
coordination as the responsibilities within the external propaganda sector were 
reshuffled after the introduction of (leading) small groups into the system. Small 
Groups were originally intended to strengthen Party control over government 
work, dividing the latter into five different functional areas, each with a Party 
group at the top. At the top of all foreign affairs work was the newly created 
Foreign Affairs Small Group (FASG). After the FASG was founded, 
responsibilities within the external propaganda sector were redistributed. The 
changes were claimed to be in response to an “Opinion” (yijian 意见) sent to the 
MFA and the FASG by Zhang Wentian, who was first vice foreign minister at the 
time.
117
 The Opinion mainly complained about the lack of a central structure to 
coordinate the reporting of Chinese affairs abroad, including at the local level 
when foreigners visited China.
118
 The direct counter-text for Zhang’s request was 
widespread fear among cadres after the Anti-Rightist Campaign of making 
mistakes.
119
 Zhang’s suggestion was to either create a group (zu 组) within the 
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Foreign Affairs Office (the institution through which the FASG interacted with 
other departments) or to establish an Office within the Central Propaganda 
Department.
120
 
Before 1958, media-related external propaganda had been the 
responsibility of the International Liaison Department (ILD), while propagating 
China’s foreign policies was the responsibility of the MFA.121 In 1958, the Center 
approved a report
122
 by the FASG that called for strengthened leadership over the 
foreign propaganda sector. In many respects, the concerns sound similar to more 
recent criticisms of the lack of a centralized body to coordinate foreign 
propaganda work. However, the FASG mostly wanted a clear division of labor 
(rather than one single powerful body overseeing all aspects of foreign 
propaganda work). Through its suggestions, the ILD handed most of its power 
over policy making to the FASG, while other bodies retained or gained influence 
in their areas of expertise. Most major responsibilities were handed over to the 
new Leading Small Group, including macro-level policy making, with an 
elaborate division of labour for specific tasks between a number of other units 
belonging to different functional bureaucracies (see Table 2).
123
 Thus, on the one 
hand, leadership over the sector was strengthened; on the other hand, the 
fragmentation of the field was further institutionalized. 
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Unit System (Xitong 系统)124 External Propaganda 
Responsibilities 
Foreign Affairs Small 
Group 
Foreign Affairs Macro-level policy making 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  
Foreign Affairs Propagating China’s foreign policy 
 Commission for 
External Cultural 
Liaison Work
125
 
Foreign Affairs Propagating China’s “basic 
conditions” through print publications 
and film 
Xinhua News Agency Propaganda and Education Policy making for written and oral 
broadcasting 
Local Propaganda 
Departments 
Propaganda and Education Helping with propaganda targeted at 
foreigners in China  
Guangdong Province 
Party Committee 
- -  Propaganda activities in Hong Kong 
and Macao 
Overseas Chinese 
Committee 
Foreign Affairs Propaganda aimed at ethnic Chinese in 
South East Asia 
International Liaison 
Department 
Foreign Affairs Propagating the Chinese experience to 
other Socialist parties 
Central Propaganda 
Department 
Propaganda and Education International news targeted at Chinese 
audiences 
Table 3.I: Units Involved in External Propaganda after 1958
126
 
 
All of this happened at a time when China tried to expedite its own 
transformation into an industrial society and overtake the UK within fifteen years 
through the Great Leap Forward. The results of this experiment are well-known: 
An estimate of 20 to 30 million Chinese starved to death. Although at the time, 
there were only rumors abroad, the CPC felt it had to take countermeasures. In 
June 1960, Edgar Snow was allowed to return to China in the hopes that he would 
write a book to dispel rumors about famine in China after the failure of the Great 
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Leap. Although Snow did not feel welcome and was alienated by the strongly 
anti-American rhetoric at the time, his new book The Other Side of the River: Red 
China Today did not reflect this, and he did assure his readers that he had seen no 
signs of mass starvation during his trip.
127
  
In 1960 and 1961, as the conflict with the S.U. worsened, the CPC 
strengthened its international reporting structures. In mid-December 1960, 
following the Moscow conference from November 11 to 25 of the same year that 
had deepened the Sino-Soviet split, a propaganda meeting was convened at which 
the question how to report international issues was discussed.
128
 In 1960, Xinhua 
began publishing a new classified journal dedicated to developments abroad.
129
 
The ILD received a temporary office specifically responsible for anti-Soviet 
propaganda and countering S.U positions.
130
 In 1963, Peking TV, the predecessor 
of today’s China Central Television (CCTV), which had been founded in 1958, 
established a group in charge of producing short news programs in foreign 
languages to be sent abroad (chuguopian zu 出国片组).131 
The obsession with correct terminology received new importance with the 
heightened conflict in order to prevent the S.U. (and all other “revisionist” 
countries) from exploiting such mistakes for their own counter-propaganda. A 
circular from early 1963 noted that the terminology used to translate important 
key terms and concepts was not unanimous and often diverged from the fourth 
volume of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, which was to serve as the standard 
in the future. In case someone disagreed with the translation in Selected Works, 
the Compilation and Translation bureau was to convene a meeting to discuss a 
                                                          
127
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128
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possible improvement of the translation.
132
 Consistency in translation was vital to 
avoid “misunderstandings” (wujie 误解) and “chaos” (hunluan 混乱).133 
Although generally the number of exceptions for external propaganda was 
reduced, some concern how to distinguish between domestic and external 
propaganda remained. A propaganda directive on how to cover the 40
th
 
anniversary of the founding of the CPC in 1961 limited the number of theoretical 
articles (lilunxing wenzhang 理论性文章 ) targeted at foreigners to two. 134 
Another circular from 1965 stressed that the slogan “Oppose the invasion of 
Vietnam by American Imperialism,” one out of eight slogans shouted at a rally 
against the American occupation of Taiwan was reserved for internal use only and 
was not to be propagated abroad, although the circular does not state what 
precisely distinguished it from the other slogans.
135
  
In early 1961, the Center approved the creation of the International 
Propaganda Small Group (Guoji xuanchuan lingdao xiaozu 国际宣传领导小组), 
which handled both domestic propaganda and propaganda targeting foreigners 
concerning international issues.
136
 It was comprised of the leaders of the External 
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五周年的 宣传要点和口号的通知 [Notification from the Center on propaganda points and 
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Affairs Office of the State Council,
137
 the MFA, the ILD, CPD, the External 
Cultural Liaison Commission, People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and Radio 
Peking (Guangbo diantai 广播电台) and was headed by Wu Lengxi吴冷西,138 
director of Xinhua news agency. Ungor, based on Gan Xianfeng, interprets the 
small group to have been in charge of external propaganda.
139
 However, duiwai 
对外 and guoji 国际 were clearly established as separate categories at the time, 
and international propaganda was usually understood as domestic and external 
propaganda regarding international events, developments, and ideological 
altercations. Thus the main purpose of this small group is not to be confused with 
that of the External propaganda small group created in 1980. Nevertheless, as 
China became increasingly evangelical regarding its stance and its opposition to 
Soviet policy on the international stage, international reporting had an important 
external propaganda dimension.  
While the conflict between the S.U. and China grew stronger in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, China did not immediately isolate itself completely from 
the Socialist bloc. China also continued to observe the external propaganda 
practices of other Socialist countries on which the MFA frequently produced 
reports.
140
 In 1958, Chinese delegates attended an external propaganda 
conferences for Socialist countries convened in Prague. China only had observer 
status (guanchayuan 观察员). The conference was primarily about agreeing on 
the overall stance to present to non-socialist countries as well as about the 
question whether the socialist camp needed to maintain unity towards the outside 
world, not circulating and profiting from other countries’ experiences. 
Nonetheless, this shows that in 1958, China still kept in touch with other Socialist 
countries regarding the overall external propaganda direction.
141
 Another report 
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produced for the MFA also shows that China and the S.U. made a largely 
successful deal to tone down each others’ external propaganda in the run-up to the 
Sino-Soviet talks held in Moscow in July 1963.
142
 Thus, while the propaganda 
battle was fierce, it could still be reined in for important diplomatic events.  
The 1960s cemented China’s orientation towards the world’s developing 
countries which it had started taking during the mid-1950. By the early 1960s, 
China hoped to be able to set up its own revolutionary network, and therefore, the 
focus on the developing world became increasingly strong. In September 1961, 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was formally founded in Belgrade. Shortly 
before the first conference of the NAM, the ILD had established the Research 
Institute for Latin American Issues (Lamei wenti yanjiusuo 拉美问题研究所) and 
the Research Institute for Afro-Asian Issues (Yafei wenti yanjiusuo 亚非问题研究
所 ), which produced backgrounders on the situation in various developing 
countries.
143
 This followed the 1958 founding of the Afro-Asian Writers 
                                                                                                                                                               
况的电报 [On sending Zhao Yimin, Wang Li, and Yao Qin to participate in the Prague 
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Association, whose headquarters were first based in Colombo, Sri Lanka and then 
moved to Cairo, Egypt in the 1960s.
144
 In 1963 and 1964, Zhou Enlai visited ten 
African countries with the hopes of setting the stage for a second Afro-Asian 
conference in which the S.U. would be excluded.
145
 Between 1960 and 1965, 
China established formal diplomatic relations with 14 new African countries that 
had just gained independence.
146
 In 1964, several university departments focusing 
on international relations and teaching foreign languages were set up at the behest 
of Zhou Enlai.
147
 In 1965, the China Institute of Contemporary International 
Relations was founded under the leadership of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small 
Group (FALSG).
148
 Chinese also intensified contacts with leftists and people 
sympathetic to China’s cause in the West. In 1965, the Society for Anglo-Chinese 
Understanding was founded in England, headed by the renowned scientist Joseph 
Needham.
149
 
 
As opposed to what is claimed in the official historiography of external 
propaganda,
150
 after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, external 
propaganda activities did not decrease but were expanded.
151
 For instance, by the 
end of 1966, Radio Peking was broadcasting in 33 different languages.
152
 
Although during the initial years, the majority of Chinese cadres involved in 
foreign propaganda under Zhou Enlai (Jin Zhonghua, etc.) were purged, others, 
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including foreigners, rose in importance and continued to have an active role in 
China’s external propaganda until early 1968. An extreme example is Sidney 
Rittenberg, who is alleged to have been in control of Radio Peking until he, too, 
came under attack in late 1967.
153
  
A circular issued for the Foreign Affairs Office in February 1967 
explained that Maoism was the highest and most alive form of Marxism and that 
with the progression of the world revolution, people all over the world had a 
demand to read his thoughts.
154
 This was strongly reflected in China’s external 
propaganda publications. In many ways, the understanding of external propaganda 
of those in control at the time resembled that of the internationalism expressed in 
the Red Flag (Hongqi 红旗) article from 1930 introduced above, except that 
China now played a more dominant role than in the 1930s. The main topics in 
China’s external propaganda during the high tide of the Cultural Revolution, as 
could be expected, were China’s role in the world revolution and condemnations 
of the S.U., with many highly polemical articles translated directly from Chinese, 
such as “Hit Back Hard at the Violent Provocations of the Filthy Soviet 
Revisionist Swine.” 155  The Peking Review and Xinhua’s news dispatches 
frequently highlighted the impact of Mao’s work on foreigners and the link 
between Maoism and the “revolutions” taking place all over the world, 156 
including on the U.S. Civil Rights Movement.
157
 Nonetheless, there were some 
restrictions. For instance, Mao noted in 1968 that China should not claim it was 
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the Center of world revolution, but only quote foreigners to this effect,
158
 a 
directive largely followed.
159
 
From a Chinese perspective, the idea that China was at the forefront of a 
global revolutionary struggle made sense. The 1960s had seen another wave of 
previously colonized countries gaining independence. In the U.S., the African-
American Civil Rights Movement was gaining momentum, Japan and several 
Western European countries were gripped by student movements, and in 1968 the 
Prague Spring demonstrated opposition to Soviet policies within the socialist 
camp. In sum, China’s opposition to the two “imperialist super powers” –a 
formulation first used in the re-evaluation of the world contradiction in 1969 to 
refer to the U.S. and the S.U.
160– was shared or quickly picked up by many around 
the globe.
161
 By contrast, China was completely isolated in the state-based system. 
It could neither participate in the international organizations of the capitalist nor in 
those of the socialist camp.
162
  
With the focus on structures outside the nation-state based framework, the 
Cultural Revolution was one of the few periods in Chinese history in which 
relatively unrestrained people-to-people diplomacy was permitted (or at least 
could not be prevented due to lack of authority of those opposing it) for a short 
while before the Party-state reasserted its monopoly over external propaganda. 
This dampening of people-to-people diplomacy and a return to state-to-state 
diplomacy observed by Brady
163
 started in 1968/1969 and was further 
consolidated with the resumption of diplomatic talks between China and the 
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United States and the partial reassertion of control over external propaganda by 
the “moderates” after 1970.   
 
3.4 1970 to 1976: Diplomacy or Revolution? 
In 1969, amidst fears of a nuclear strike by the S.U. against China, the 
country revised its foreign policy of opposing both superpowers and made first 
steps towards rapprochement with the United States.
164
 Among the many ways the 
willingness to work more closely with the U.S. was signalled was through the 
People's Daily, which, after all, had an external propaganda function: A large 
picture of Mao Zedong and Edgar Snow was printed on the front page, declaring 
“All peoples of the world, including the American people, are our friends” in the 
upper right hand corner, where Mao quotations were usually published.
165
 With 
the fall of Lin Biao 林彪  in 1971, Zhou Enlai’s political influence was 
strengthened, and some of his allies were appointed to positions in the foreign 
affairs sector.
166
 Zhu Muzhi 朱穆之 and Mu Qing 穆青, who were also to hold 
important positions in the external propaganda sector after 1978, became director 
and deputy director of Xinhua news agency.
167
 By the early 1970s, as the 
“moderates” regained political strength, the enthusiastic proclamation of China as 
the center of the world revolution was also curbed, although rhetorical solidarity 
with the third world continued.
168
  
Practically, this was achieved by centrally distributing a document with 
Mao quotations. A circular classified top secret (juemi 绝密 ) with Mao’s 
directives (pishi 批示) on external propaganda work between 1967 and 1971 was 
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published by the CPC Secretariat in August 1972,
169
 a few months after Nixon’s 
visit in February. The main points highlighted were the need to adapt to foreign 
target audiences, to avoid “forcing things on others” (qiangjia yu ren 强加于人), 
and not to carry the veneration of Mao too much to the outside world.
170
   
Though the standard history of external propaganda, as one would expect, 
presents 1978 as the most important turning point for external propaganda that 
reversed ten years of catastrophic external propaganda during the Cultural 
Revolution, the basis for the changes that were to become instituted in the late 
1970s was already laid during the informal rapprochement with the United States. 
A number of initiatives were launched to propagate China in a softer tone to the 
outside world. The change in China’s foreign policy was accompanied by a 
massive expansion of Xinhua branches, both in developing countries and in the 
West.
171
 In 1971, more Westerners were allowed back into the country and taken 
on supervised tours around the country again.
172
 Zhou Enlai instructed the people 
accompanying foreigners to not only present successes to foreign visitors but talk 
about problems as well, not to exaggerate China's achievement and to correct any 
false or exaggerated information that local officials might tell foreigners taken on 
tours.
173
 In 1972, Michelangelo Antonioni was invited to China by Zhou Enlai and 
received Chinese support to film his famous documentary Chung-Kuo/Cina. In 
1973, China launched its first partner city arrangements, called “friendship cities” 
in Chinese.
174
 The MFA’s international relations think tank that had stopped 
functioning during the high tide of the Cultural Revolution officially resumed 
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papers of the Xinhua news agency’s annual scientific conference 2001] (Beijing: Xinhua 
chubanshe, 2002), 388. 
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 Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China, 182. 
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 “Zhang Xiangshan tongzhi tan guanyu zuohao jiedai, lüyou gongzuo zhong de xuanchuan wenti” 
张香山同志谈关于做好 接待、旅游工作中的宣传问题 [Comrade Zhang Xiangshan talks 
about the issue of properly doing propaganda as part of hosting (foreigners) and tourism work], 
Xuanchuan dongtai xuanbian, 1979 宣传动态选编, 1979 [Selections from Propaganda trends, 
1979] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1981), 235-236. 
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 Cai Han 蔡涵, “Youhao chengshi: Minjian youhao hezuo de zhongyao qudao” 友好城市：民
间友好合作的重要渠道 [Friendship cities: An important channel for popular friendship and 
cooperaton], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 14 (1985): 25.  
160 
 
business in 1973.
175
 The early 1970s also saw the second major wave of 
establishing diplomatic relations with African countries.
176
 However, owing to 
continued political struggle over the course of the 1970s, tone and content of 
external propaganda continued to shift. For instance, while Antonioni’s 
documentary was initially well-received among Chinese diplomats, by 1974, 
when Zhou Enlai had come under attack during the “Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize 
Confucius” Campaign, the film was attacked in the People’s Daily.177  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
With the founding of the PRC, the CPC had the opportunity to set up a 
propaganda apparatus of a more pervasive kind with Soviet help. This propaganda 
apparatus was built so that it could reach the entire population reliably. While the 
CPC was also concerned with propaganda techniques, the effectiveness of the 
methods and techniques used was to a large extent contingent on the ability to 
prevent flows of information and block out alternative sources of information.  
China’s external propaganda media were integrated into the overall system of 
media control that insisted on long, theoretical texts and on the use of “correct” 
formulations. The establishment of the domestic propaganda apparatus and the 
fact that external propaganda work became a field somewhere in between 
propaganda work and foreign affairs work set China on a path of a 
bureaucratically weak and dependent external propaganda sector. People who had 
been involved in external propaganda work before the founding of the PRC 
suddenly saw themselves confronted with completely different journalistic 
standards. Many external propaganda cadres were aware that they needed to 
change their methods of propaganda in order to make their message more 
acceptable to anyone other than those already sympathetic towards China. The 
conflict between those who believed that propaganda needed to be adapted to 
foreign target audiences and those who believed that to do so would mean 
                                                          
175
 Cf. Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks,” 578. Shambaugh states that it 
did not become fully active again until 1978.  
176
 Cf. Taylor, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 9-10.  
177
 Cf. “Pekings Zorn auf Antonionis China” [Beijing’s wrath directed at Antonioni’s China], 
originally published in Der Spiegel, no. 10, March 4, 1974, available online at 
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41784228.html, accessed January 27, 2013.  
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abandoning one’s principles raged throughout most of the Mao period and, as will 
be seen below, continued into the post-Mao period.  
The primary purpose of external propaganda was contested as well, but 
largely followed the dominant line of the CPC’s foreign affairs work. In the first 
half of the 1950s, China wanted to propagate the superiority of the socialist 
system. By the mid-1950s, after the Bandung conference, alliance with the 
countries of the newly founded NAM at the state level gained in importance. After 
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in 1956, Sino-Soviet relations quickly deteriorated, 
and China’ interest in touting its own anti-Revisionist line both in front of 
Socialist and non-Socialist countries increased. This led to an expansion of 
propaganda instruments. As China was increasingly isolated diplomatically, its 
external propaganda came to be used as an instrument of spreading the revolution 
rather than of aiding diplomacy, and China began to target “the people” in other 
countries directly. Contrary to the official narrative, external propaganda was not 
curtailed, but all of China’s messages were political and delivered in a highly 
charged language. As China’s foreign policy was adapted yet again in the late 
1960s, external propaganda became softer and more restrained again, supporting 
China’s diplomatic efforts and focusing on liaison work and exchange. In the 
1970s, state-led external propaganda in support of improved state-to-state 
relations and possible economic reforms remained, by and large, dominant, but 
came under attack whenever the “moderates” were weakened.  
A few observations about organizational principles and work practices 
during the Mao period are also in order. First, despite attempts to gain exceptions 
for external propaganda work, China’s foreign language media were governed by 
the rules of the overall propaganda sector that insisted on correct formulations. 
The tone used in China’s external propaganda media varied according to the 
overall political climate, according to the status of the medium, and according to 
the topic, but compared to the Republican period, journalists and foreigners were 
much more limited. Texts were written in Chinese and then translated on the basis 
of authorized dictionaries and texts that served as standards. Foreign polishers that 
tried to change these formulations failed. In addition, whenever China saw itself 
provoked, it issued a response in “tit-for-tat” (zhen feng xiang dui 针锋相对) style, 
harshly attacking the opponent. The fact that correct terminology and correct 
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content were such an important part of external propaganda work already shows 
that timely release of news, by contrast, was not much of an issue.  
Second, according to the organizational logic of the Chinese bureaucracy 
as first instituted in 1953, which divides party and government work into 
functionally related sectors (“gateways,” kou 口), external propaganda was not 
considered a category in its own right, and units involved consequently belonged 
to different functional bureaucracies, most importantly propaganda work and 
foreign affairs work. Thus, there was no Chinese equivalent to the USIA, in the 
sense of a single independent and internally consolidated agency. Instead, one 
important organizational principle that emerged during the Mao period was a clear 
division of work with different departments responsible for different aspects of 
external propaganda. In the 1958 rearrangement, although the division of work 
regarding media and content was somewhat different from today’s, one can see 
the origins of a systematic and intentional division of work in the external 
propaganda sector that continues to exist today in a slightly different form and that 
involves many different units from different gateways with theoretically clearly 
defined fields of responsibility.  
Third, the CPC insisted on total organizational control over all of its 
external propaganda activities. Except for brief periods during the earliest days of 
the PRC and again in 1967 and 1968, when the bureaucracy was in disarray, the 
Chinese Party-state tightly monopolized external propaganda activities during the 
Mao period. All “popular” initiatives were part of the Party’s organizational net. 
Even in times when China was relatively eager to spread its revolutionary 
message, it tried to keep semi-private initiatives, such as those organized by 
Chinese exchange students abroad, at bay. 
Fourth, anything printed in the central Party-state media that were 
available outside of China was viewed as official policy statements, or at least 
could not contradict any principles and policies. The equation of news with policy 
partially explains the lines of division according to which news in the PRC were 
and until today continue to be sorted in order to ensure that the department or 
ministry that knows the policies in its own realm best gets to have the final say. 
The idea that statements made in official Party media are considered policy 
statements and therefore need to be controlled accordingly was not only shared 
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with other countries in the Socialist camp. One reason for the establishment of 
gray propaganda initiatives by the United States during the Cold War was that 
these “private” media could say things that official government media, such as the 
VOA could not say for a number of reasons. The difference was and continues to 
be that in the U.S., only a few media are directly under government control, 
whereas all media in the PRC are owned and controlled by the Party.  
 
In conclusion, external propaganda was considered an important activity 
during the first few decades of the PRC, and the Mao period thus left a legacy of 
external propaganda institutions and practices, but not one that was firmly 
established in consolidated, independent leadership structures. As opposed to 
Western countries, which pursued propaganda targeted at foreigners but officially 
rejected domestic propaganda in times of peace and therefore did not institute 
strong domestic propaganda structures comparable to those of the S.U. and the 
PRC, China had to work with an external propaganda apparatus that was squeezed 
in between foreign affairs work and overall propaganda work. In the next part, I 
will analyze how China dealt with this legacy after it had decided to open up and 
reintegrate itself into a media environment that required very different skills from 
those the Chinese propaganda apparatus had focused on. 
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Part II 
 
“Creating a Favorable International Environment” 
or “Winning the Struggle over International Public 
Opinion”? 
 
Shifting Rationales and Foci of External Propaganda Work 
 1977 to 2002  
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4 The Chinese Party-State: Ideology and Organization 
 
“In accordance with the spirit of the instructions [given to us by] the Center and in 
accordance with the actual situation of external propaganda work, we have proposed 
the following goals for external propaganda in the period to come: [We need to] 
strengthen macro coordination, fight a total war and build a big external propaganda 
pattern. […] [We need to] make efforts to break the Western monopoly on 
international public opinion, so that by the 21st century, we can occupy a more 
favorable position in the international public opinion pattern and can gradually attain 
visible improvement of our international public opinion environment.”
1
 
 
This quote is an excerpt of a speech delivered by Zeng Jianhui 曾建徽 
(1928 - ), a former director of the Central Office of External Propaganda of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC), also known as the State Council Information 
Office (SCIO),
2
 at the annual nation-wide conference on external propaganda 
work held in Beijing in January 1996. The 1996 conference marked the beginning 
of the Ninth five-year-plan (1996 to 2000). In the excerpt, Zeng Jianhui described 
China’s goals for the coming five years in a field that is arguably familiar to 
policy makers and politicians in almost any country in the world today: How can 
we improve our image, how can we sell our policies to foreign publics so as to get 
the most support from other countries? Yet he does so in a language that can only 
be partially understood by an outside listener and that clearly speaks differently 
about propaganda targeted at foreign publics than, say, a German or American 
politician would. Similarly, external propaganda policy making and 
implementation in China is influenced by junctures such as the beginning of a 
new five-year-plan and other rules according to which the bureaucracy functions 
that are particular to China. 
                                                          
1
 Chinese quote: “根据中央的指示精神和对外宣传的实际情况，我们提出了今后一个时期对
外宣传工作的奋斗目标，这就是：加强宏观协调，打总体战，建立大外宣格局 […] 努力
打破西方对国际舆论的垄断，使我们在 21 世纪的世界舆论格局中占据较为有利的位置，
使我们的国际舆论环境逐步得到明显改善。” Zeng Jianhui 曾建徽, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu 
wei: Zeng Jianhui lun duiwai xuanchuan 融冰架桥,突围:曾建徽论对外宣传 [Melting the ice, 
building bridges, breaking out of the encirclement: Zeng Jianhui on external propaganda] 
(Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2006), 125.  
2
 The Office of External Propaganda/State Council Information Office will be introduced in more 
detail in chapters 6.2 and 8.1.  
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As I will show in chapters 5 and 6, both in the 1980s and the 1990s, just 
like during earlier periods, China appropriated substantial amounts of knowledge 
about external propaganda from the West, which had become the most important 
role model again. The institutional environment into which “new knowledge” is 
absorbed, however, plays an important role in how external propaganda can be 
discussed and implemented: The last chapter has shown that in the Mao period, 
external propaganda was influenced by the ideological tenets of the Party, by the 
way the bureaucracy was organized as a whole and by more concrete values and 
work routines of the Party. Before analyzing the changes in how external 
propaganda was understood in the post-Mao period, I will therefore briefly 
introduce the institutional environment in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
that has shaped both external propaganda policies and the policy process, 
including organizational principles, regulations, modes of operation, ideology, 
informal conventions, etc. I will explain key characteristics of the Chinese Party-
state in three fields:  
1. The Basic Ideological Matrix. Contrary to the predictions of the 1980s 
and the 1990s, Chinese Marxism remains very influential, whether people believe 
in each of its individual tenets or not. As the last chapter has shown, external 
propaganda belongs into the realm of ideology and of “high politics”, in which 
people actually carrying out the work have relatively little to say and are often 
eclipsed by ideologues. Therefore, understanding the logic of Chinese Marxism is 
essential both in order to understand debates on external propaganda and to 
analyze how the factor of ideology constrains individuals and groups in the 
external propaganda policy process. 
2. The Set-Up of the Party-State. The Chinese external propaganda 
bureaucracy is a part of the overall Chinese bureaucracy and thus subject to the 
same categories according to which the entire apparatus is structured. Therefore, 
in order to understand how the external propaganda apparatus is set up, the basic 
parameters of the overall bureaucracy need to be understood. This includes more 
general aspects such as the relationship between the Party and the government, as 
much as what types of bureaucratic organizations exist and how they interact with 
one another.  
3. Rules and Routines of the Policy Process. External propaganda is 
affected by the rules and routines that play a role in various stages of the policy 
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process in China. This includes political cycles, how the Party Center 
communicates its intent to lower levels, how new policies are implemented, etc.  
The chapter has a dual function. First, it seeks to understand the formal 
and informal institutions in the PRC policy process that form the basic 
institutional environment within which all people involved in the external 
propaganda bureaucracy have to operate, including the overall ideology, political 
values, the set-up of the bureaucracy and the rules governing it, particular modes 
of operation, etc. This is vital to understanding choices made and solutions chosen 
in the external propaganda sector in the chapters to come. Second, this chapter 
also has a functional aspect from the perspective of the overall dissertation project. 
Understanding the institutional environment makes it possible to develop 
strategies for how to interpret texts used in the remaining parts of the thesis. For 
instance, by understanding the role of slogans in Chinese politics or basic 
rhetorical conventions, it becomes easier to decipher speeches and policy 
documents. 
 
4.1 The Ideological Framework  
“People who know the Chinese language well,” wrote Schurmann in 1970 
“are often misled into believing that they ‘understand’ what the Chinese 
Communists are saying.” 3  This was so, he stated, because seemingly regular 
words assumed a particular meaning that could only be understood by someone 
familiar with the ideology.
4
 During the Cold War, trying to understand remarks 
written in the language of a particular country’s or movement’s Marxist “dialect,” 
like other more specific forms of esoteric communication, constituted a somewhat 
established if not overly common approach in Western academia, both when 
studying the PRC and when studying the Soviet Union (S.U.). The emphasis on 
decoding ideological texts and finding “hidden messages”5 was to a large degree 
necessitated by the fact that few other sources than public statements written in 
                                                          
3
 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1973), 58.  
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Cf. Myron Rush, “Esoteric Communication in Soviet Politics,” World Politics 11, no. 4 (1959): 
614-620. In Chinese studies, one of the last works specifically devoted to the politics of 
language, published briefly after the end of the Cold War, is Michael Schoenhals, Doing 
Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies (Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of 
East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992). 
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Chinese Marxist code were available. Since the 1980s, when more sources 
gradually became available and references to Marxism-Leninism increasingly 
came to be seen as mere lip service and empty rhetoric, much less attention has 
been paid to understanding the language and internal logic of Chinese Marxism. 
References to ideology are now often read as an anachronistic leftover from the 
past that is basically meaningless and consequently not worth understanding in 
detail.  
Two different points of view on ideology are common: The first is that 
China’s official ideology and its reality are simply not compatible; China is 
adhering to “Marxism”/“Communism” in theory but has moved towards 
capitalism in practice. This opinion sees a radical disconnect between what is said 
and what is done and views references to Marxism as mere lip-service. The 
second, slightly more accurate point of view is that in the post-Mao period, 
ideology is frequently twisted to provide after-the-fact justifications for existing 
policies.
6
 Both views proceed from the assumption that Chinese Marxism, just 
like Marxism elsewhere, is in crisis, a view which became widespread, was 
actively encouraged for political reasons.
7
  
While there undoubtedly are differences between Chinese Marxism before 
and during the Mao period and in the post-Mao period, the dichotomy between a 
Marxism that was taken seriously in the Mao period and the post-Mao Marxism 
that primarily served a legitimizing role has been exaggerated. The relationship 
between the production of policies and the production of ideology has been 
complex throughout the 20
th
 century, and providing after-the-fact legitimacy for a 
policy that prevailed has arguably always been part of the function of ideology, 
                                                          
6
 For instance, Adrian Chan stresses that “while Marxism, Leninism and MZT [Mao Zedong 
Thought] have been repeatedly stated by the CCP as its guiding principles in the Reform period, 
I shall argue that although these principles have been regarded as important, their roles are 
different from those they had under Mao’s leadership, before the reforms. In the Reform period, 
they have become the legitimizers rather than goals.” Adrian Chan, Chinese Marxism (London 
and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2003), 173. Shambaugh, likewise, 
argues that the role of ideology has been reversed: In the Mao period, policies were derived 
from ideological principles, whereas in the post-Mao period, it “became an inductive means for 
validating empirical realities.” David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and 
Adaptation (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 2008), 105. Also see C. Cindy Fan, “Uneven 
Development and beyond: Regional Development Theory in Post-Mao China,” International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 21, no. 4 (1997):622. 
7
 First the need to portray Communism as an ideology in decline in the 1980s and then, in the first 
half of the 1990s, as part of a wave of post-Cold War triumphalism, which considered the 
Chinese system an anachronism that would soon disappear, just like the Soviet Union had.  
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such as in the introduction of a “principal contradiction” by Mao to explain why 
the CPC needed to join forces with the GMD. In fact, as Zheng Yongnian has 
pointed out, for the new generations of leaders who have no revolutionary 
experience to bolster their authority, ideology has become even more important.
8
 
Much of the Party’s rhetoric is, in fact, met with cynicism or made fun of. 
The question, however, is whether this actually makes the language used by the 
CPC and the ideology it is based on meaningless and insignificant. Since the 
1990s, everybody has had to learn (Chinese) Marxist code and principles through 
“education in theory” (lilun jiaoyu 理论教育) in high school (gao zhong 高中) 
and take additional classes if continuing to university. Special targets for theory 
education campaigns are cadres with leadership positions, party members, and 
young people, primarily students.
9
 Especially since 2004, as the CPC began to 
address inequalities in development and to search for alternative sources of 
legitimacy aside from economic performance and nationalism under the fourth 
generation leadership, ideology has regained in importance.
10
  
I argue that as long as the CPC manages to enforce the Chinese Marxist 
code as the only acceptable form in which certain statements can be made and as 
long as policy choices have to be justified ideologically, it is important to 
understand this language and the internal logic of the system, regardless of 
whether or not individual members of the political, and academic elite believe in 
the CPC’s rhetoric and the validity of Chinese Marxist patterns of assessing the 
domestic and global situation. Both the rules of dialectic logic and the currently 
valid assessment of objective reality are important factors influencing and 
restricting policy options.  
                                                          
8
 Yongnian Zheng, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, 
Reproduction and Transformation (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 83.  
9
 Cf. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju 中共中央宣传部干部局 [Cadre Bureau of the 
Central Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee], ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan 
sixiang gongzuo 新时期宣传思想工作 [Propaganda and thought work in the new period] 
(Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 2006), 25. 
10
 Cf. Heike Holbig and Bruce Gilley, “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China,” Politics and Policy 38, 
no. 3 (2010): 395-422. Simultaneously, cultural and ideological firmness and security, 
particularly its distinctly socialist identity, has been linked to China’s ability to develop its soft 
power (E.g. Ao Daiya 敖带芽, “Shehui zhuyi jiazhiguan shi woguo guojia ruanshili de hexin” 
社会主义价值观是我国国家软实力的核心 [The socialist value system is the core of China's 
soft power], Neibu canyue 内部参阅 [Internal reference readings], no. 30 (2006): 3-12. This 
issue will be addressed again in chapter 7. 
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This chapter understands Chinese Marxism as the CPC defines it: a highly 
complex and flexible “theory system” (lilun tixi 理论体系) or discourse system 
(huayu tixi 话语体系) that is based on dogmas clearly related to other ideologies 
in the Marxist families, but that has integrated and continues to integrate elements 
from various other ideologies.
11
 Though Chinese Marxism as a theory system and 
a discourse system on the surface seems fairly isolated from other ideologies or 
discourse universes (owing to what could be termed “methodological Cold War-
ism”12), it is as interrelated with, drawing on as well as inspiring debates in the 
rest of the world as Marx’ and Engels’ as well as Lenin’s writings themselves 
were. The Chinese ideological system has been relatively successful at 
appropriating and integrating new ideas –a conscious policy pursued by China 
with the intent of making Chinese ideology more relevant and applicable to the 
current times. The producers of theory keep track of developments in the 
international Marxist movement and in Western academia and selectively adapt 
ideas that then, once “translated” and integrated, become fully valid parts of the 
overall discourse universe. This was already true during the Mao period and has 
become more pronounced since the beginning of China’s reform and opening 
policies.  
There are a number of important flows, almost all of which are 
understudied. Since the 1990s, many major American debates pertaining to the 
field of international relations have been translated into the Chinese context.
13
 
While I will not be able to analyze this massive flow of concepts and entire 
debates within the framework of this chapter, all of these are important though 
neglected influences that are hard to overstate and that should be kept in mind. In 
                                                          
11
 See for example Du Feijin 杜飞进, “Jiji goujian Zhongguo tese huayu tixi” 积极构建中国特色
话语体系  [Proactively build a discourse system with Chinese characteristics], originally 
published in the Guangming ribao 光明日报 [Guangming daily], republished on People’s 
Daily Online, October 30, 2012, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/1030/c40531-
19430985.html, accessed November 15, 2012.  
12
 In analogy to the concept of “methodological nationalism,” “methodological Cold War-ism” 
refers to the tendency to study the two sides of the Iron Curtain in isolation from one another 
and therefore not to consider conceptual as much as institutional flows between the two camps. 
Although not terming the phenomenon “methodological Cold War-ism,” Jönsson pointed out 
this problem in his monograph Superpower, in which he constitutes a strong convergence 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Cf. Christer Jönsson, Superpower: Comparing 
American and Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984). 
13
 Cf. Yaqing Qin, “Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?” in Non-Western 
International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia, eds. Amitav Acharya and 
Barry Buzan (London: Routledge, 2009), 29-30.  
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other words, for almost any new development, one of the first questions asked 
should be: which transnational trend(s) does this change respond or correspond to?  
Although ideology is currently cautiously being reintroduced into Chinese 
studies as an area into which the CPC invests large amounts of money and energy 
and which it views as an important source of legitimacy,
14
 understanding the 
internal logic of Chinese Marxism and assessing its role in the policy process 
remains uncommon in studies on China produced in the West. Knowledge of the 
theoretical system of interrelated categories makes it possible to understand 
additional layers of a huge body of Chinese texts and to better pinpoint important 
policy changes. Thus, while understanding this system does not enable readers 
outside the Chinese bureaucracy to grasp all details in a speech or policy 
document, it adds vital clues and context to texts circulated publically that are 
deliberately written in abstract and obscure language without adding the 
explanations that people within the bureaucracy get through study sessions. 
Similarly, understanding the overall ideological framework is also vital to 
understanding the behavior of the CPC and the overall framework within which 
politicians today –none of whom have the authority of a Mao Zedong 毛泽东 or a 
Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 to single-handedly add or modify ideological tenets– have 
to operate within. 
The Chinese Marxist discourse system has two main constituent parts that 
will be addressed separately: The first part, the overall framework, or “skeleton,” 
consists of a set of key concepts (in the form of pairs of opposites) and a set of 
key relationships. This component is context-independent and can, theoretically, 
be understood throughout all of China, and, if translated accurately, it could also 
be understood (except for a number of Chinese Marxist idiosyncrasies, such as 
additional differentiations that are made in China) by people fluent in another 
“dialect” from the “Marxist family.” Second, there is the content with which this 
frame is filled, judgments or evaluations (panduan 判断) of reality and, on the 
basis of these evaluations, principles and policies (fangzhen zhengce 方针政策) 
that are usually expressed in the form of slogans that assume different concrete 
                                                          
14
 E.g. Heike Holbig and Bruce Gilley, “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China,” Another short article 
on the development of ideology in current China is Ren Jiantao, “Ideoloy: Its Role in Reform 
and Opening,” in China Today, China Tomorrow: Domestic Politics, Economy, and Society, ed. 
Joseph Fewsmith (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 181-191. 
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meanings under different circumstances, a tool for policy making that will be 
explained in chapter 4.3.  
 
Chinese Marxism in the Post-Mao Period 
Marxism today is defined as “a scientific thought system continuously 
developing through practice.”15 This system consists of Marxist “basic principles” 
and new additions based on the Chinese “experience” as much as on outside 
imports. Thus, Marxism in China is officially defined both as a selective absorber 
of new ideas from outside and as continually developing. Currently, each new 
generation of leaders is expected to make a contribution to Chinese Marxist theory. 
A handbook for cadres from 2006 edited by the Central Propaganda Department’s 
(CPD) Cadre Bureau, Propaganda and Thought Work in the New Period (Xin 
shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo 新时期宣传思想工作), states that the most 
fundamental way to maintain the guiding position (zhidao diwei 指导地位) of 
Marxism in contemporary China is to study, propagate, and implement (guanche 
贯彻 , luoshi 落实 ) Deng Xiaoping Theory, the “Three Represents” (Jiang 
Zemin’s contribution to theory) and the scientific development outlook (the fourth 
generation’s contribution to theory).16 These three have been summed up under 
the name “theoretical system of building socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
since the 17th Party Congress.
17
 Aside from saving some space, this collective 
                                                          
15
 Cf. “Makesi zhuyi shi zai shijian zhong buduan fazhan de kexue de sixiang tixi” 马克思主义是
在实践中不断发展的科学的思想体系 [Marxism is a thought system continually developing 
through practice], in Dai Zhou戴舟, Dang de jianshe yu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo党的建设
与宣传思想工作 [Party-building and propaganda and thought work] (Beijing: Zhonggong 
dangshi chubanshe, 1995), 63. Or a “complete theory system,” wanzheng de lilun tixi 完整的
理论体系, consisting of three main parts: philosophy (dialectical materialism and historical 
materialism), political economy, and scientific socialism. Cf. Wu Yurong 吴玉荣, “Makesi 
zhuyi lilun chuangxin yu wangluo shidai” 马克思主义理论创新与网络时代  [The 
rejuvenation of Marxist ideology and the age of the Internet], Neibu canyue no. 8 (February 27, 
2004), 6. Scientific socialism is “the application of the laws of historical materialism to that 
particular stage of social evolution in which capitalism takes shape, fulfills and exhausts its 
potential, and passes over to the higher formation of socialism.” (George Novack, “Sociology 
and Historical Materialism,” http://www.marxists.org/archive/novack/works/history/ch10.htm, 
accessed October 31, 2011.) Thus, whereas historical and dialectical materialism apply to all 
stages of the development of human society, scientific socialism only applies to the period of 
transition between capitalism and socialism.  
16
 Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju, ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 2006, 
129. 
17
Cf. Ren Lixuan 任理轩, “Makesi zhuyi lichang guandian fangfa de xianming tixian – Lun 
Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi lilun tixi de qunzhongguan renshiguan dongliguan shidaiguan” 马
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name also has the advantage that future theoretical contributions by future 
generations of leaders can be easily integrated without having to adjust the 
shorthand. Hence, all instances where tribute is paid to Marxism do not refer to 
the works of Marx and Engels, but to the parts that are considered applicable to 
contemporary China according to several generations of post-Mao leaders. This 
turns references to Marxism from empty rhetoric and mere lip-service into 
programmatic statements of the Party’s most basic policies, namely those 
subsumed under the name “theory system of building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” today. 
What does the Party mean by Deng Xiaoping theory or the “theoretical 
system of Socialism with Chinese characteristics?” Propaganda and Thought 
Work in the New Period (2001 version) states that “Deng Xiaoping theory is the 
fairly structured preliminary answer to the pressing question of how to build 
socialism in an economically and culturally backwards country like China”18 (my 
emphasis). The word “like” indicates applicability beyond the Chinese context, 
though only under similar circumstances, namely economic and cultural 
backwardness. Coming up with valid theories is important for the Party’s 
aspiration to make its own work more “scientific.”19  
 
The Objective World 
In order to understand how the CPC adheres to the basic tenets of 
Marxism, yet has adapted them to fit its post-Mao agenda, I will briefly explain 
the philosophical basis of Chinese Marxism, dialectical materialism and historical 
materialism, and how it is interpreted today. Dialectic materialism was developed 
                                                                                                                                                               
克思主义立场观点方法的鲜明体现 ——论中国特色社会主义理论体系的群众观认识观
动力观时代观 [A vivid embodiment of the Marxist stance, points of view and methods – The 
outlook on the masses, on cognition, on the driving force and on the times of the theory system 
of socialism with Chinese characteristics], Renmin ribao 人民日报  [People’s Daily], 
December 24, 2009, 9.  
18
 Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju 中共中央宣传部干部局 [Cadre Bureau of the 
Central Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee], ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan 
sixiang gongzuo 新时期宣传思想工作 [Propaganda and thought work in the new period] 
(Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 2001), 27. 
19
 This applies to all areas of Party work. For instance, since ca. 1998, the Party has been actively 
pursuing the development of external propaganda theory (duiwai xuanchuan lilun 对外宣传理
论). Conferences on waixuan theory started in 1998. Cf. Zeng Jianhui, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu 
wei – Zeng Jianhui lun duiwai xuanchuan, vol. 2, 54-60. Research institutes were inaugurated 
in 1999.  
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in the S.U. on the basis of Engels’ Dialectics of Nature20 and was subsequently 
adopted in China as well. 
One of the basic premises of dialectical materialism is that it is possible to 
understand the world, and that statements and actions can be clearly divided into 
correct (zhengque 正确) and false (cuowu 错误). Thus, the CPC, as a Communist 
Party, considers itself both able and dutybound to assess all things in the world. 
The importance of scientifically correct assessments of reality as a basis for policy 
making has increased in the post-Mao period rather than decreased. Verdicts on 
what is correct and what is false are not only limited to factual verdicts, but 
include moral questions as well; in fact, the two are not clearly separated. When a 
decision or an act is considered “scientific” in the sense that it conforms to 
objective laws and consequently helps human society to progress, it is also the 
correct choice morally speaking.
21
   
As in any Marxist and a fair share of other conceptions of the universe, the 
contemporary Chinese Marxist world consists of things (shiwu 事物), of which 
“the world” (shijie 世界) is the largest unit to be considered and all of which are 
in motion (yundong 运动), meaning that they are constantly developing and 
changing (fazhan bianhua 发展变化). Change, i.e. the development of things, 
usually follows objective laws (keguan guilü 客观规律 ). If something is 
determined by objective law, it is inevitable (biran 必然), whereas if it is not and 
the outcome could vary depending on various factors, it is accidental or not 
predictable (ouran 偶然). The reason for motion is the dialectical contradictions 
(bianzheng maodun 辩证矛盾) between different aspects (fangmian 方面) within 
the thing. Aspects are things within things, usually arranged in pairs which are in 
                                                          
20
 The dialectical materialism know today is first and foremost Plekhanov’s reading of Engels. It 
was also Plekhanov who coined the term dialectical materialism. See Allen W. Wood, 
“Dialectical Materialism,” in Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
Craig (London: Routledge, 2000), 208. 
21
 During the Mao period, throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, this emphasis on the one 
morally and scientifically correct line, path or verdict on a particular issue was frequently 
carried over into China’s external propaganda publications as well. The emphasis on 
“correctness” was most pronounced in the Beijing Review during the high tide of the Cultural 
Revolution, but also before and after. See for example “The Communist Party of China Is a 
Great, Glorious and Correct Party,” Beijing Review no. 6, February 7, 1969, 13-14; 
“Implementing Correct Cadre Policy,” Beijing Review, no. 15, April 14, 1978, 17; Eugene V. 
Dennett, “Correct Appraisal of Mao Zedong’s Role,” no. 51, December 19, 1983, 2 (in column 
letters from the readers); “Reform Deviations Must Be Corrected,” Beijing Review, no. 3, 
January 2, 1995, 23.  
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opposition to one another (duili 对立 ). 22  The development of a thing from 
beginning to end is called process (guocheng 过程 or shiwu fazhan guocheng 事
物发展过程). In the analysis of reality, which will be covered in more detail 
below, a thing such as, for example, “Socialism” can both be spoken of in its 
capacity as “thing” (describing its current state zhuangtai 状态) or in its capacity 
as “process” (describing its dynamics dongtai 动态, direction fangxiang 方向, 
trend qushi 趋势, etc.).  
The CPC ascribes an important role to itself as an interpreter of complex 
reality for the Chinese people. Each thing has attributes that distinguish it from 
other things. Tedian 特点  (characteristic) and tezheng 特征  (the defining 
characteristic that distinguishes one thing from other similar things) are both 
externally visible. In addition, there are properties that cannot be grasped through 
sensory perception alone, and it is in this field that the CPC sees one justification 
why its own existence is for the greater good of the Chinese nation. For these 
“hidden” attributes, a difference is made between changing properties or 
properties that depend on context (called xingzhi 性质 ) and static properties 
(called shuxing属性) that are inherent in the thing (shiwu guyou de 事物固有的23) 
regardless of external conditions.
24
 One of the functions of the CPC is 
determining these invisible properties and hence the thing’s essence.  
In accordance with Hegel’s dialectics adopted in Marxism, each thing has 
an appearance (xianxiang 现象) and an essence (Wesen und Erscheinung in 
Hegel’s writing), a term that is rendered in Chinese interchangeably as benzhi 本
质 (fundamental nature or fundamental property) or as shizhi 实质  (often 
translated into English as “true nature”). The essence is the internal connections 
                                                          
22
 An aspect, of course, is always also a thing in its own right and only becomes an aspect in 
relation to another thing.  
23
 When speaking of changing attributes, on the other hand, the formulation used is shiwu juyou de 
事物具有的, i.e. attributes “that the thing has concretely”.  
24
 Cf. entry “shuxing” 属性 [Static properties], in Zhexue da cidian, Zhongguo zhexue shi juan 
bianji weiyuanhui 《哲学大辞典・中国哲学史卷》编辑委员会编 [Editorial committee for 
the Dictionary of philosophy, Volume on the history of Chinese philosophy], ed., Zhexue da 
cidian, Makesi zhuyi zhexue juan 哲学大辞典，马克思主义哲学卷 [Dictionary of philosophy, 
volume on Marxist philosophy] (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 1990), 924.  
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(neibu lianxi 内部联系) of a thing,25 and, in accordance with the maxim that 
internal contradictions are what make a thing move, the part of the two that truly 
matters. Appearance (xianxiang), on the other hand, is the external connections 
(waibu lianxi 外部联系) of a thing (those which do not determine the existence 
and development of a thing).
26
 The two are related in that the appearance consists 
of the external manifestations of the essence in all its aspects (zai ge ge fangmian 
在各个个方面 ). 27  The essence is relatively stable 28  in contrast with the 
appearance, i.e. the fickle and quickly changing external aspect.
29
 To give a 
commonly cited example from the 1990s, the U.S. policy to contain China and the 
policy of engagement were considered two outward expressions of what is in 
essence the same underlying strategic aim, namely to “Westernize and split 
China.”30  Moreover, while Chinese media according to official CPC ideology 
(going back to Lenin) are supposed to tell the truth, this always refers to the 
essence of things. Thus, whereas Western media focus on superficial appearances 
and details, all of which are “true,” Party media first determine the essence of 
something and then report accordingly. 
This principle was explained by Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 in a speech on the 
nature of the press in China from February 1985, in which he addressed the 
problem of what the slogan “seek truth from facts”31 meant and what the ratio 
between positive and negative news should be – literally: 80 per cent positive, 20 
                                                          
25
 Liu Jianming 刘建明  et al., eds., Xuanchuan yulunxue da cidian 宣传舆论学大辞典 
[Dictionary on the study of propaganda and public opinion] (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 
1992), 517.  
26
 Ibid., 519-520. 
27
 Ibid., 517.  
28
 Stablility is defined as the ability to systematically return to one’s initial state (yuanlai zhuangtai 
原来状态) after interference from without or from within (lai zi waibu huo neibu de ganrao 来
自外部或内部的干扰). Cf. entry “Wending yu bu wending” 稳定与不稳定 [Stability and 
instability], in Zhexue da cidian, Makesi zhuyi zhexue juan, ed. Zhexue da cidian, Zhongguo 
zhexue shi juan bianji weiyuanhui, 976.  
29
 Entry “Benzhi yu xianxiang” 本质与现象 [Essence and appearance], in Zhexue da cidian, 
Makesi zhuyi zhexue juan, ed. Zhexue da cidian, Zhongguo zhexue shi juan bianji weiyuanhui, 
190. 
30
 Cf. Sha Qiguang 沙奇光, “Dui Xifang meiti sanbu ‘Zhongguo weixielun’ de pingxi (xia)” 对西
方媒体散布“中国威胁论”的评析（下） [A critical analysis of Western media’s spreading of 
the ‘China threat theory’ (part three of three)], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao 对外宣传参考 
[External propaganda reference], no. 6 (2001):8-9. 
31
 For the origin and uses of the slogan “seek truth from facts,” see Gucheng Li, A Glossary of 
Political Terms of the People’s Republic of China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 
1995), 412-413. 
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per cent negative, because the “main aspect of socialist society is brightness”32 
This is precisely the line of argument that the Chinese Party-state adapted in the 
21
st
 century when attacking Western media’s China coverage, albeit worded 
differently: By focusing too much on the negative and neglecting its progress, 
Western media are distorting China’s image. 
The internal relations of simple things and appearances are directly 
expressed (biaoxian 表现) in the form of a contradiction between two aspects. 
Complex things and appearances have complex internal relations, but officially, 
since Mao invented the category of the principal contradiction, one of these 
connections or contradictions is always the principal one.
33
 Likewise, in the 
contradiction between two aspects, one is always the principal, dominating aspect 
(zhuyao fangmian 主要方面 ), 34  though the relationship between aspects can 
change over time. For instance, according to Mao, in the conflict between the 
capitalist class and the working class on a global scale, the capitalist class was still 
the principal aspect that dominated the working class, but the relationship was to 
be inverted, with the working class becoming the principal, dominating aspect as 
history progressed.
35
 Hence, a contradiction between two aspects may continue 
while the balance of power between its two aspects changes, first quantitatively 
and later fundamentally. This is how the CPC continues to frame the struggle 
against its opponents today. In what it sees as the fight against those that want to 
destroy China, the CPC does not expect swift victory, but rather seeks to 
gradually shift the balance of power.  
Because contemporary life is complex, and the (internal) properties of 
things do not reveal themselves automatically, a thing’s essence or fundamental 
nature needs to be determined by way of scientific analysis (kexue fenxi 科学分
                                                          
32
 “Guanyu dang de xinwen gongzuo” 关于党的新闻工作 [On the Party’s press work], February 8, 
1985, Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan gongzuo wenxian xuanbian, 1957-1992 中国共产
党宣传工作文献选编 , 1957-1992 [Selected documents from propaganda work of the 
Communist Party of China, 1957-1992], eds. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu 
bangongting 中共中央宣传部办公厅 and Zhongyang dang’anguan bianyanbu 中央档案馆编
研部 (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1996), 675-676. 
33
 Entry “Neibu lianxi” 内部联系 [Internal connections], in Zhexue da cidian, Makesi zhuyi zhexue 
juan, ed. Zhexue da cidian, Zhongguo zhexue shi juan bianji weiyuanhui, 112. 
34
Cf. Mao Zedong毛泽东, “Maodun lun” 矛盾论 [On Contradiction], August 1937, available on 
Marxist.org,  http://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-
193708.htm, accessed March 2, 2013. 
35
 Ibid.  
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析).36 It is the responsibility of the Party to determine and explain the essence of 
potentially all things in the world to the people, who lack the necessary cognitive 
instruments to do so on their own. Importantly for political reality, the notion of 
the fundamental nature of things makes it possible to impose harsh sanctions or 
punishments in the case of (seemingly) innocuous offences, as the party can 
declare that while they may appear harmless, their essence is detrimental to the 
Party’s and the people’s interests. Thus, if the nature of a statement attacking the 
CPC is declared premeditated, political, or malicious, the reaction will be stronger 
and usually very polemical. This is one example where the ideological evaluation 
of events translates into real-life consequences. 
 
As opposed to dialectical materialism, which is intended to look at and 
explain everything, the object of study of historical materialism is human society 
(renlei shehui 人类社会). The process of the development of the thing that is 
human society functions just like any other process. Due to the unilinear historical 
model, development usually also means progress (jinbu 进步), in the form of a 
spiral spiraling up or ahead. In China, the master narrative of historical 
materialism has arguably been reinterpreted considerably, making each historical 
period significantly longer since the beginning of the post-Mao period by 
reference to “reality” and “actual experience” in China. What remains is the base-
superstructure relationship and the categories and rules according to which 
periodization of history occurs. The smaller, subordinate temporal unit of a 
process that falls into the sphere of historical materialism is called stage (jieduan 
阶段), which, of course, also means that stage as a category is always relative to a 
process, and each stage of a larger process always constitutes a process in its own 
right. A historical stage in the development of human society is called an era 
(shidai 时代).37 Thus, the process of human society is subdivided into eras such as 
feudalism, capitalism, and socialism, which can, again, be broken down into 
smaller units. In dialectic materialism, each thing is subdivided into different 
                                                          
36
 Cf. Liu Jianming 刘建明, Deng Xiaoping xuanchuan sixiang yanjiu 邓小平宣传思想研究 
[Research on the propaganda thought of Deng Xiaoping] (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin 
chubanshe), 44.  
37
 See entry “Shidai” 时代  [Era], in Xinhua cidian 新华词典  [New China dictionary], ed. 
Shangwu yinshuguan cishu yanjiu zhongxin 商务印书馆辞书硏究中心 [Research center for 
dictionaries of the Commercial Press] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2001), 892.  
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levels (cengci 层次), and during the process of development, the thing progresses 
from a lower to a higher, from a simpler to a more complex or from a relatively 
shallow to a deeper level. In historical materialism, or if the thing is analyzed in 
its capacity as a process, one speaks of stages (jieduan) rather than levels. 
However, the development process of every thing (shiwu) can potentially be 
declared to have several stages. Socialism as a process, for instance, is again 
subdivided into stages.
38
  
During the post-Mao period, the concept of qualitative change pertaining 
to a stage or a level of a thing (jieduanxing zhibian 阶段性质变, cengcixing 
zhibian 层次性质变), has increased in importance in order to justify China’s 
reforms (gaige 改革) and explain why a reform is also a form of revolution 
(geming 革命). A reform that changes the fundamental nature of a thing, i.e. one 
that constitutes a qualitative change, is a revolution with regard to that particular 
thing; hence replacing an old system with a new system makes reform a 
revolution of this system. By this logic, reforms are legitimate as an alternative to 
social revolutions because a completed reform of a particular sector or level of 
society (such as the economic system) constitutes a qualitative change and hence a 
revolution of this particular level in its own right.
39
 Thus, the CPC has been 
justifying its own gradual reform agenda in ideological terms.  
Although the international environment is becoming increasingly 
important for China, the CPC’s primary concerns are still at home. The primacy of 
domestic factors over international factors in impacting China’s development has 
also been explained in ideological terms. The internal contradictions of a thing 
constitute the fundamental reason for the direction (fangxiang 方向) in which it 
develops. External factors, called circumstances (tiaojian 条件) when they restrict 
or influence the existence and development of a thing, on the other hand, can 
speed up or slow down the development process, but they are always secondary to 
                                                          
38
 See for example Dai Zhou, Dang de jianshe yu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 54 
39
 A “qualitative change of a stage” (jieduanxing zhibian 阶段性质变) or a “qualitative change of 
a level” (cengcixing zhibian 层次性质变) refers to a qualitative change of a parameter (canshu 
参数) of a thing, while the essence of the thing remains the same. This change is, consequently, 
only a quantitative change with regard to the thing itself, but still elevates the thing to a new 
level and makes the process of its development enter a new stage. Cf. Dai Zhou, Dang de 
jianshe yu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 77. 
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internal factors and must act through internal factors in order to influence the 
thing (waiyin tongguo neiyin qi zuoyong 外因通过内因起作用).40   
 
The Objective and the Subjective World 
One decisive theoretical question that decides whether or not propaganda 
is of value and has a place in society is the relation between the objective and 
subjective world and how much influence each aspect has over the other, i.e. 
whether reality determines consciousness or whether consciousness determines 
reality. The perhaps best-known pair of dialectic opposites is the division into 
economic base and superstructure, where, officially, the economic base 
determines the superstructure and the superstructure reflects the base.
41
 This pair 
pertains only to human society and hence falls into the sphere of the study of 
history or historical materialism in particular.
42
 More generally speaking, i.e. in 
the study of all things, not just history, the world is subdivided into two basic 
categories: objective reality (keguan xianshi 客观现实), or the objective world 
(keguan shijie 客观世界) and subjective reality (zhuguan xianshi 主观现实), or 
the subjective world (zhuguan shijie 主 观 世 界 ). Anything that exists 
independently of human consciousness counts as objective reality. This 
encompasses the material world, but also objective laws. Subjective reality, on the 
other hand, is the world of ideas, consciousness; the things in peoples’ heads.  
According to the basic laws of materialism, subjective reality reflects 
(fanying 反映) and is derived from (you… paisheng de 由…派生的) the objective 
world; reversely, objective reality determines subjective reality. On the other hand, 
and this has been stressed more strongly again since the 1990s, the subjective 
world not only reflects but also creates the world. This pairing of opposites and 
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 Entry “Neiyin yu waiyin” 内因与外因 [Internal factors and external factors], in Zhexue da 
cidian, Makesi zhuyi zhexue juan, ed. Zhexue da cidian, Zhongguo zhexue shi juan bianji 
weiyuanhui, 113. 
41
 For base and superstructure, see for example Zhexue da cidian, Makesi zhuyi zhexue juan, ed., 
Zhexue da cidian, Zhongguo zhexue shi juan bianji weiyuanhui, 43. Other pairs of opposites 
describing different aspects of subjective and objective reality that should be mentioned here 
are consciousness and matter (yishi yu wuzhi 意识与物质), also known as spirit and matter 
(jingshen yu wuzhi 精神与物质), social consciousness and social existence (shehui yishi yu 
shehui cunzai 社会意识与社会存在), understanding and practice (renshi yu shijian 认识与实
践), thought and action (sixiang yu xingdong 思想与行动), theory and practice (lilun yu shijian 
理论与实践), etc.  
42
 Cf. Zhexue da cidian, Zhongguo zhexue shi juan bianji weiyuanhui, ed., Zhexue da cidian, 
Makesi zhuyi zhexue juan, . 43. 
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their relation with one another famously runs throughout the entire theoretical 
system. All of these pairs are in the same relationship: the objective part 
determines (jueding 决定) the subjective part, and the subjective part reflects the 
objective, but, importantly, can also direct (zhipei 支配) it.43  
Consciousness (yishi 意识) is defined as a philosophical category and the 
subjective world’s counterpart to matter (wuzhi 物质).44 Social consciousness is 
determined by and reflects social existence and changes when social existence 
changes. However, as indicated above the relationship is not entirely one way. 
Progressive social consciousness (i.e. consciousness that correctly reflects 
objective things) drives the development of social existence forward; backward 
social consciousness impedes it. This means that it is important to have correct 
consciousness in order to make full use of man’s subjective agency (zhuguan 
nengdongxing 主观能动性 or zijue nengdongxing 自觉能动性), i.e. their ability 
to change the world by seeing beyond the external surface of things and grasping 
their fundamental nature and laws.
45
  
The Marxist conception of understanding and knowledge is basically a 
consolidation of empiricism and rationalism: Understanding is “the active 
(nengdong 能动) reflection [happening] on the basis of practice46 in the human 
brain of external reality; it consists of sensory understanding (ganxing renshi 感性
认识) and theoretical understanding (lixing renshi 理性认识 ).” 47  The whole 
algorithm of understanding includes two “leaps” (feiyue 飞跃) between the two: 
The first leap is to turn sensory understanding (ganxing renshi), i.e. that which can 
be grasped through sensory perception, into theoretical understanding (lixing 
renshi).
48
 Particularly the essence of things, unlike the appearance, cannot be 
directly known through sensory perception.
49
 Therefore, knowledge gained 
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 See entry “Zhipei” 支配 [Direct], in Xinhua cidian, ed. Shangwu yinshuguan cishu yanjiu 
zhongxin, 1259. 
44
 See entry “Yishi” 意识 [Consciousness] in Cihai 辞海 [Cihai], ed. Cihai bianji weiyuanhui 辞海
编辑委员会 [Cihai editing committee] (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 1999), 5769.  
45
 See entry “Zhuguan nengdongxing” 主观能动性  [subjective agency], Xinhua cidian, ed. 
Shangwu yinshuguan cishu yanjiu zhongxin, 1295; Xuanchuan xulunxue da cidian, 522.  
46
 Practice as the basis of cognition goes back to Marx’s polemic against academics’ and 
philosophers’ lack of interest in changing the world 
47
 Entry “Renshi” 认识 [Understanding] in Cihai, 1094.  
48
 Cf. entry “Siwei” 思维 [Thought], Cihai, 4763. 
49
 Entry “Benzhi” 本质 [Essence], Zhexue da cidian, Makesi zhuyi zhexue juan, 187.  
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through practice must then be subjected to scientific thinking by the Party. The 
second leap is to reapply theoretical understanding to practice and let it guide 
practice. Thus, one can see whether theoretical knowledge passes the text of 
practice and can correct and perfect it. The correct formation of understanding 
needs both leaps, and the process will then be repeated over and over. Aside from, 
again, justifying the existence of a Communist Party as a purveyor of correct 
understanding, this definition has also been used to explain the need for 
experiments in Chinese politics, which will be addressed below in section 4.3.  
Understanding is a process that never stops,
50
 not only because there are 
always higher levels of understanding, but also because reality changes. This is so 
because of the development of objective reality itself, but is exacerbated through 
the agency of understanding. From the perspective of the material world, the 
development of objective reality itself, following objective laws, constantly 
already produces new things and new problems for the CPC. However, 
continuously updating understanding is also necessary because of the reciprocal 
relationship between objective reality and understanding of objective reality: 
Knowledge is derived from practice and is in turn used to improve practice, which 
will then require a new process of cognition. Thus, the CPC not only has the right 
but also the duty to keep Marxist ideology up to date.  
To get things right is extremely important: Correct understanding guides 
practice and promotes the development of practice; incorrect understanding 
impedes the development of practice. Hence, through correct understanding, the 
CPC can try to positively influence things over whose existence and development 
it finds itself able to exercise some control. Since the 1990s, the stress on the 
agency of understanding and the consequent need for the production and broad 
distribution among the people of correct understanding has gained, again, in 
importance and shows itself in the renewed emphasis on propaganda and thought 
work. The idea is that first, through having a correct understanding of reality and 
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using correct theory, the CPC can influence China’s development for the better 
from the top by making correct decisions. Moreover, by imbuing the Chinese 
people with correct thought, the Party can galvanize forces for China's 
development, which will again speed up and improve the process.  
 
The Party’s Assessment of Reality as a Basis for Policy 
The fact that cognition is supposed to guide practice means that the 
understanding of objective reality serves as a scientific basis (kexue yiju 科学依据) 
for the line (luxian 路线), principles (fangzhen 方针), and policies (zhengce 政策) 
for the CPC.
51
 Line refers to the very abstract formulation of how to realize the 
Party’s overall goals in a specific period; those goals being what it needs to fulfill 
in order to be able to end a historical process and progress to a higher stage of 
development and of history.
52
 Principle refers to an overall principle with which 
the Party approaches one particular aspect (fangmian 方面) of its work, usually 
expressed in abstract terms, which guides the formulation of more concrete 
policies.
53
 A prominent example is the principle of noninterference in the internal 
affairs of other countries. Policy refers to concrete policies (which are usually also 
formulated in the form of an abstract slogan) that apply to different aspects of 
party work and need to be adapted and interpreted according to local and other 
specific needs.
54
 The difference between principles and policies is that concrete 
policies may change over time and according to circumstances, whereas the 
underlying principles informing policies remain the same.
55
 In other words, 
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changing policies are outward expressions of what in essence (in the Marxist or 
Hegelian sense) remains the same principle. 
Whether or not the assessment of objective reality is correct determines 
whether the line, principles, and policies are correct; if it is not they “will be 
removed from reality and will violate objective laws of development,” 56  as 
happened last during the Cultural Revolution. The CPC therefore needs to have an 
official version of reality that is declared and officially informs the formulation of 
the Party’s “line, principles, and policies.” The egg-chicken relation of whether 
ideology really informs policy or is made up as an after-the-fact justification is 
irrelevant; what is important is that this link is strongly and repeatedly stressed in 
contemporary China and that the Party needs to maintain unity between its 
guiding ideology and the policies it pursues. 
With regard to the actual practice, the assessment of objective reality for 
national and international level affairs is naturally a normative enterprise that 
cannot be undertaken by anyone. It used to be the prerogative of the pre-eminent 
leader and has now, since the death of Deng Xiaoping, who can be considered the 
last leader to have had the authority to single-handedly re-define objective reality 
(although without using the standard terminology of the Chinese Marxist 
discourse universe), become the responsibility of the collective leadership of the 
Party in general and of research centers for Marxism-Leninism, the Party School, 
and the CPD (especially the Theory Bureau) in particular. Particularly for the 
leadership generations since Deng Xiaoping, the assessment of reality cannot 
simply be redefined over night, but needs to be renegotiated over time and thus 
serves as a guiding compass constricting the options of even the highest leaders of 
the CPC. Characteristically, redefinitions of reality since the post-Mao period and 
increasingly so since the 1990s, have taken place implicitly in the form of a shift 
in emphasis rather than a complete and explicit turnaround.  
According to the normative definition of objective reality, China is 
currently, and will remain for a long time, in the primary stage of Socialism 
(shehui zhuyi de chuji jieduan 社会主义的初级阶段). In this stage, the principal 
contradiction in Chinese society is “between the growing material and cultural 
needs of the people and the backwardness of social production.” This, in turn, 
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determines the core work (hexin gongzuo 核心工作) that the Party needs to focus 
on in order solve the contradiction and move to a higher level: Since the social 
production falls short of people’s needs, the fundamental responsibility is to 
develop the productive forces.
57
 This principal contradiction was originally 
defined in 1956 and revived in a slightly different wording in the 1981 Resolution 
on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (henceforth: 1981 Resolution).  
Between 1949 and 1956, the principal contradiction within Chinese 
society was the “contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie and 
between the socialist road and the capitalist road,” as defined in the General Line 
for the Transition Period proposed by Mao Zedong in 1952 and affirmed as 
correct in the 1981 Resolution for the period 1949 to 1956. The logic was that 
because the CPC first had to change production relations and eradicate the 
bourgeoisie before it could formally enter the period of Socialism. In September 
1956, the Eighth National Congress of the CPC declared the end of the period of 
transition (guodu shiqi 过渡时期) with the basic establishment of the socialist 
system in China and redefined the principal contradiction as lying “between the 
demand of the people for rapid economic and cultural development and the 
existing state of our economy and culture [falling] short of the needs of the 
people.”58 After 1962, according to current Party historiography, Mao incorrectly 
asserted that since the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, the principal contradiction 
in China had, again, consisted of that between the working class and the 
bourgeoisie.
59
 Consequently, because of the faulty evaluation, the CPC was acting 
against objective laws between 1957 and the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh Communist Party of China Central Committee (CPCCC), when the 
mistake was finally corrected.  
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in 
December 1978 turned time back to 1956, when things had started to go wrong. In 
1981, five years after Mao’s death, the principal contradiction in Chinese society 
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was officially re-evaluated and the 1956 understanding of objective reality was 
famously declared the last correct assessment before things got out of hand due to 
“leftist”’ influences.60 According to the 1981 Resolution and any major normative 
party documents today, class struggle had ceased to be the principal contradiction 
in Chinese society with the extinction of the exploiting class in 1956, although it 
would continue to be relevant “for a long time to come” “owing to certain 
domestic factors and influences from abroad.”  
The notion of the “primary stage of socialism”, which was to last for at 
least one hundred years, was first formally introduced by Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 at 
the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987
61
 although the term itself had been used 
and discussed by academics as early as 1979.
62
 The core work (zhongxin gongzuo 
中心工作) of the Party for as long as China was in the primary stage of socialism 
would be economic construction. By repeatedly emphasizing that the stage would 
last for at least one hundred years, the CPC has sought to provide reassurance to 
investors and private entrepreneurs that its policy of reform and opening is not a 
whim, but a long term commitment. After Zhao was ousted from power in 1989, 
the term “primary stage of socialism” was not mentioned in the report at the 
Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992. However, during his Southern tour, Deng 
Xiaoping did emphasize that the policy of reform and opening would continue for 
at least another hundred years.
63
 At the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, Jiang 
Zemin 江泽民 again emphasized that China would be in the primary stage of 
socialism “for a long time to come,” and that the principal contradiction “between 
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the growing material and cultural needs of the people and the backwardness of 
social production” would accompany China for the entire period of the primary 
stage of socialism, something which had been challenged and therefore needed 
reconfirmation in 1997 after Deng Xiaoping’s death in February.64 Unless there 
was a major hostile invasion of Chinese territory, economic construction would 
remain the core work of the Party.
65
 
Another important concept reintroduced into post-Mao China is “national 
circumstances” or the “Chinese situation”, probably better known under its 
Chinese name, guoqing 国情 . The compound guoqing first appeared in the 
Strategems of the Warring States (Zhanguo ce 战国策). Since the 20th century, it 
has been employed in various different circumstances to refute Western ideas, 
including Communism in the 1930s. Mao used the term in his 1939 “The Chinese 
Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party.”66 Guoqing in its present use is a 
re-invention of the Reform and Opening Period.
67
 After 1980, the term then came 
to be frequently used in the sense that anything done in China would have to be 
compatible with the Chinese circumstances. While it was rarely invoked between 
1988 and the mid-1990s in official speeches, it was revived in 1997 in Jiang’s 
report, which stated that the primary stage of socialism was a “basic national 
condition” (jiben guoqing 最基本的国情).68  
 One important development of the 1980s that justified the focus on 
economic development rather than preparedness for war was Deng Xiaoping’s 
                                                          
64
 Cf. Zheng Yongnian and Zou Ziying, “Power to Set Own Agenda: Jiang Zemin’s New Political 
Initiatives at China’s Fifteenth Party Congress,” in China after the Fifteenth Party Congress: 
New Initiatives, ed. the National Congress of the CPC and National University of Singapore, 
East Asian Institute (River Edge: World Scientific and Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
1997), 31.  
65
 Cf. Jiang Zemin 江泽民, “Guanyu jiang zhengzhi” 关于讲政治 [On stressing politics], in Neibu 
tongxin jingxuan huibian 内部通信精选汇编 [Collection of selected (articles) from Internal 
Communications], ed. Zhongxuanbu xinwenju 中宣部新闻局  [Press/News Office of the 
Central Propaganda Department] (Beijing: Zhongxuanbu xinwenju, 1998), 9. 
66
 Geremie Barmé, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000), 446, footnote 15.  
67
 The first time that guoqing was used in the People’s Daily in the sense of China’s national 
circumstances was in 1979. Ye Linsheng 叶林生 and Wang Zhizhong 王致中, “‘Guoqing’ lun 
xiaokao” “国情”论小考 [A brief study of the theory of ‘national situation’], Renmin ribao, 
August 10, 1979, 3. 
68
 “Jiang Zemin zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shiwu ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao 
(2)” 江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会上的报告 (2) [Jiang Zemin’s report at the 
Fifteenth National Congress of the CPC (2)], September 12, 1997, available on People’s Daily 
Online, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4526287.html, accessed 
March 2, 2013. 
188 
 
unofficial redefinition of the principal contradiction in the world and of the 
“characteristics of the times.” During the Mao period, the characteristics of the 
times were officially defined as “war and revolution,”69 so the need for readiness 
for war was stressed.
70
 The general idea of “war and revolution” as the 
characteristics of the times was that as long as imperialism existed, war was 
inevitable.
71
 Over the course of the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping began to push for a 
new assessment of objective realities regarding the international level. The 
immediate countertext for the redefinition of the characteristics of the era was the 
question of China’s military budget vis-à-vis other priorities.72  
 In September 1985, Deng Xiaoping identified the world’s “two biggest 
problems” (liang da wenti 两大问题), namely peace and development, rather than 
a single principal contradiction. Peace was a problem between East and West, and 
development a problem between North and South. Of these two, development was 
the “core problem” (hexin wenti 核心问题). In other words, Deng Xiaoping did 
his job as informal preeminent leader in identifying the principal contradiction in 
the world without claiming the status of preeminent leader or risking 
confrontation by labeling it thus.
73
 Deng Xiaoping’s introduction of the “two 
biggest problems”, due to the different vocabulary used, did not officially annul 
the principal contradiction as it was defined in the late Mao period, namely the 
contradiction between the two superpowers competing over global hegemony and 
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the third world opposing hegemony. Neither did it annul “war and revolution” as 
the “characteristics of the era.” However, obviously it implicitly challenged both 
by defining the North-South problem –i.e. the problem of development– to be the 
core problem while also stressing that the international situation was currently 
undergoing a thaw.  
One important aspect to back up the claim that war was no longer 
imminent was, initially, the weakening of the rivalry of the two superpowers. 
According to Deng, science and technology replaced arms as the new primary 
“focal point” of global competition.74 As such, Deng Xiaoping’s re-evaluation 
was linked to a larger global trend that started in the late 1970s, namely the 
emphasis on interdependence between countries and, consequently the reduced 
risk of war, as expressed in new theories of international relations that were 
translated into Chinese in the 1980s.
75
    
The events of the early 1990s forced China to officially re-evaluate the 
international situation. After 1989, and more so after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, the debate over the principal contradiction in the world 
came to the forefront again, as the global situation had obviously changed 
significantly, and the old principal contradiction from the second half of the Mao 
period needed to be officially reassessed now that one of the two poles –the two 
superpowers striving for hegemony– no longer existed. After a vigorous debate in 
the early 1990s,
76
 the CPC dropped the issue, though the semi-official position is 
that the world is too complex to have a principal contradiction.
77
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Similarly, there was a debate about the “world pattern” (shijie geju 世界格
局 ), an alternative term for “world order.” The world pattern changes 
fundamentally when there is a fundamental change (i.e. qualitative change) in the 
global power balance, as happened at the end of World War II or in the early 
1990s.
78
 After the end of the bi-polar world order, China debated what world 
order would come next. By 1993, a new consensus that is by and large maintained 
until today (though preserved in a different formulation) had emerged: “The old 
pattern is in the process of change, […] but the new pattern has not yet formed.”79 
Under the current world pattern (or non-pattern), often referred to as “one 
superpower and several strong countries” (“yi chao duo qiang” geju “一超多强”
格局),80 the goal of the United States (U.S.) was to strengthen its position as the 
only super power and to push the world pattern into the direction of a unipolar 
world as much as possible and by all means that do not hurt its own interests. 
China’s goal, on the other hand, was to strengthen the trend of multi-polarity. 
 
In conclusion, the basic principles of Marxism continue to serve an 
important function in the PRC’s political process. Adapting or reinterpreting 
Marxist principles is considered a legitimate exercise, justified by the link 
between practice and theory. Ideology can thus of course be used to provide after-
the-matter justifications for policies. At the same time, the existing ideological 
framework at any moment defines the room for maneuver for CPC leaders. 
Likewise, when new leaders want to make contributions to the “theory system of 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” they need to align their contributions 
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with the existing ideological framework. Thus, the existing framework and the 
rules by which it functions are a “guide to action” for the CPC. China’s evaluation 
of the world, which officially informs all policy, continues to serve as a battlefield 
in the struggle over China’s overall direction as much as concrete policies. 
 
4.2 The CPC and the Chinese Party-State in the Post-Mao Period  
One significant difference between the study of the Chinese and most 
other countries’ political systems is the relationship between the Party and the 
state, which officially form two separate vertical hierarchies.
81
 The first sector that 
external propaganda belongs to (namely propaganda and thought work) is clearly 
considered Party territory, although for representative purposes, bureaucracies are 
often paraded as state organs in public. Foreign affairs work, on the other hand, is 
primarily government work, although, as will be seen below, the Party also gets 
involved. While in the propaganda sector, it makes sense to speak of a Party-state 
(with the Party in command and the State in an administrative role), it should be 
remembered that two distinct bureaucracies that are administered through 
different channels and are governed by two separate sets of regulations are 
involved.  
The Party and the State have separate leadership structures. The CPC’s 
Central Committee (CC) is appointed every five years at the National Congress, 
usually in fall. It consists of circa 350 full and alternate members. The CC 
officially “elects” a number of leaders forming the Politburo, which has about 20 
to 25 members. Real leadership is exercised by the Politburo Standing Committee 
(PBSC). The number of members has varied; the PBSC of the 14
th
 and 15
th
 CC 
(1992-2002) consisted of seven members, the PBSC of the 16th and 17th CC 
(2002-2012) consisted of nine members, whereas for the 18
th
 CC (2012-2017), the 
number was again reduced to seven. The highest ranking leader is the General 
Secretary of the CPC who also serves as President of the PRC, a position 
currently held by Xi Jinping 习近平. However, as opposed to parts of the Mao 
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period, leadership of the CPC is no longer concentrated in a single individual 
today, but is collective.
82
  
The Chinese equivalent of a government Cabinet is called the State 
Council and combines the premier, vice premiers, state councillors, and the 
ministers and directors of other high ranking organs within the state hierarchy. 
Government dignitaries usually also concurrently occupy high ranking positions 
within the Party. The official legislative of the PRC is the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), which consists of circa 5000 members chosen by the CC and 
which meets once per year, usually in March. 
The relationship between the Party and the State has varied over the course 
of PRC history. In the Mao period, after it first looked as if China would separate 
the Party and the state relatively strictly, first in 1953 with the creation of 
“gateways” (kou 口) and then with the formation of small groups in 1958, the 
authority of the Party over the government was strengthened. In the post-Mao 
period, after initiatives in the 1980s that sought to separate the two more clearly, 
the pre-eminence of the Party was reasserted in the early 1990s.
83
 Since then, the 
leadership of the party has become a premise that no one is allowed to challenge 
in public. At the same time, in the 1990s, the Party worked on an official re-
conceptualization of its own leadership function that was different from what was 
known as “centralized leadership of the Party” (dang de yi yuan hua lingdao 党的
                                                          
82
 Cf. Zheng, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor, 76-83.  
83
 Between the promulgation of the new Party Statute in 1982 until the 13
th
 Party Congress, the 
Party Group (dangzu 党组) was the leading institution within each ministry. Starting in the 
mid-1980s, the reform-minded members of the Central Leadership supported by Deng 
Xiaoping began to push for a clearer separation of Party and State. Zhao Ziyang launched a 
reform that sought to abolish party groups and give ultimate power within the ministry to the 
minister. In November 1987, the Party Statute was amended, stating that party groups could be 
formed (keyi chengli dangzu 可以成立党组), implying that this was not obligatory. Further 
steps to disband party groups were taken in the summer of 1988. After Zhao Ziyang’s downfall, 
the reform was never properly implemented, and after the post-1989 power consolidation 
within the party, in October 1992, the passage in the Party Statute was changed back to its 
1982 wording. What has happened at the central level since then, however, is that the minister 
usually concurrently heads (jian ren 兼任) the party group of his ministry. This still makes him 
the most powerful person within the ministry, without, however, separating party and state. Cf. 
Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies,” 55-56; Zhongguo 
gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui 中国共产党组织史资料编审委员会, ed., 
Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao中国共产党组织史资料 [Materials on the history of 
organization of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao], vol. 
7: Shehui zhuyi shiye fazhan xin shiqi, 1976.10-1997.9 社会主义事业发展新时期: 1976.10-
1997.9 [The new period of developing the socialist enterprise: 1976.10-1997.9] (Beijing: 
Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000), 272-273. 
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一元化领导) during the Mao period – meaning that the Party was responsible for 
all aspects of government
84
 – without endangering the supreme role of the CPC in 
Chinese politics. The result, explained in any major work on China’s political 
system published during or after the second half of the 1990s,
85
 was an 
arrangement under which the CPC officially exercised leadership in three areas: 
politics, organization,
86
 and ideology. Its supremacy in these three sectors – not its 
all-pervasiveness – is what constitutes its ruling position (chizheng diwei 持政地
位). 87  Likewise, party members and party organizations at all levels have to 
preserve unity (baochi yizhi 保持一致) with the center on issues pertaining to 
politics, organization, and ideology.
88
 Of course, this is not always the case in 
practice, but formally, departments and locales are required to put their own 
interests aside.  
A look at the subordinate bureaucracies below the State Council and the 
Central Committee reconfirms that the State Council commands the technocratic 
bureaucracies (finance, development, etc.) while the Central Committee remains 
in charge of ideological and sensitive issues, including both propaganda and 
foreign affairs. External propaganda, which falls into the realm of politics and 
ideology, is clearly an area that needs to be controlled by the Party. The State 
Council bureaucracies that are concerned with matters of ideology and politics 
fall into two categories: First, there are institutions under the State Council 
existing only in name, mostly for representative purposes, with the real body 
under the authority of the CC (an arrangement known as “one organization with 
two nameplates,” yi ge jigou liang kuai paizi 一个机构两块牌子). The most 
important example for this thesis is the Office of External Propaganda, which 
                                                          
84
 Yu Keping 俞可平, Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi – Zhongguo 当代各国政治体制—中国 
[Current political systems of various countries: China] (Lanzhou: Lanzhou daxue chubanshe, 
1998), 4. 
85
 E.g. Yu Keping, Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi,; Xie Qingkui 谢庆奎, Dangdai Zhongguo 
zhengfu yu zhengzhi 当代中国政府与政治 [Contemporary Chinese government and politics] 
(Beijing Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003). 
86 Known as “the Party manages [i.e. appoints or fires] cadres” dang guan ganbu 党管干部 The 
primacy of the party over the state in terms of personnel management is clearly demonstrated 
by the fact that that Minister of Personnel is also deputy director of the Central Committee’s 
Organization Department, an arrangement which shows a leading-led relationship between the 
two.  
87
 Cf. Xie Qingkui, Dangdai Zhongguo zhengfu yu zhengzhi, 72; Yu Keping, Dangdai geguo 
zhengzhi tizhi, 4. 
88
 Cf. Yu Keping, Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi, 17.  
194 
 
presents itself under the name State Council Information Office. Second, there are 
institutions that largely fulfill the function of carrying out administrative duties 
(the General Administration of Press and Publication, GAPP,
89
 the State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television, SARFT,
90
 etc.), with policies 
devised in different bodies under the Central Committee.  
Besides this division of work, the party committee (dangwei 党委) at any 
level is always above the government at the same level.
91
 Again, at the national 
and provincial level, this arrangement is often, but not always, in practice 
managed through concurrent posts. In the case where the party secretary and the 
government head are not the same person, the government head is still a member 
or deputy secretary of the party committee. This ensures that government heads 
can deliberate with other members of the party committee first, and then 
implement the policies they decided on through the government structures.
92
  
In conclusion, the Party has reformed itself and redefined its own role, but 
continues to occupy a pre-eminent position in China. While the section above was 
dedicated to the most distinctive particularity of the Chinese bureaucracy at the 
macro level, namely the relationship between the Party and the State, the next 
section will give an introduction to the characteristics and structural arrangements 
defining the Chinese bureaucratic system at the micro level: the basic vocabulary 
needed to understand authority structures and relationships between different units 
in the system. 
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 GAPP is a ministerial level organization that monitors and regulates press and publication 
activities in China. It is under the joint leadership of both the CPD and the State Council, with 
the CPD being responsible for ideological and the State Council for administrative matters. Cf. 
Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Wor  in the People’s 
Republic of China (Lanham: Rownman & Littlefield, 2008), 17. GAPP’s tasks are to formulate 
regulations and development plans for the news and publishing industry, to monitor all 
publishing activities, and investigate as well as prosecute illegal publishing activities. Most 
importantly, it is charged with granting and revoking licenses to all work units involved in 
publishing activities, which gives it significant leverage to enforce regulations and guidelines. 
Cf. Yongnian Zheng and Lye Liang Fook, “Re-making the Party’s Image: Challenges for the 
Propaganda Department,” in China into the Hu-Wen Era: Policy Initiatives and Challenges, 
eds. John Wong and Hongyi Lai (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006), 123, 125. 
90
 SARFT is a ministerial level body in charge of administering the broadcasting industry. Like 
GAPP, it is under the joint leadership of the CPD and the State Council. Cf. Brady, Marketing 
Dictatorship, 17. 
91
 This system is known as “administrative chief executive responsibility under the leadership of 
the Party Committee” (dangwei lingdao xia de xingzheng shouzhang fuzezhi 党委领导下的行
政首长负责制). Cf. Yu Keping, Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi, 17.  
92
 Cf. Yu Keping, Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi, 18. Also see Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-
Policy Decisionmaking in China (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000, second edition), 17.  
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Fragmented Authority 
The most important framework used to analyze contemporary Chinese 
politics and policy making in the post-Mao Chinese bureaucracy, “fragmented 
authoritarianism” (fenge de quanwei zhuyi 分割的威权主义 ) model was 
developed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1990).
93
 As the name suggests, it argues 
that authority in the Chinese bureaucracy is not centralized but segmented, 
resulting in different bureaucratic players of equal rank engaging in “bureaucratic 
bargaining” and making compromises to realize their own interests. The 
“fragmented authoritarianism” model was originally developed on the basis of 
material from the energy policy sector and therefore cannot be easily applied to 
external propaganda studies. The authority structure in the Party-dominated 
propaganda sector as well as in the foreign affairs bureaucracy, which touches on 
issues of national security, is much more centralized. Nonetheless, the propaganda 
sector forces a number of bureaucracies, largely of equal rank (with a few 
exceptions), to devise and implement policies together, and individual 
bureaucracies have the possibility to work against certain reforms that are against 
their interests. 
 
Leading Small Groups 
At the top of each important field or policy sector at the central level is a 
Leading Small Group (LSG) that analyses the situation in the sector and acts as 
the de facto decision maker for the PBSC.
94
 LSG are usually comprised of leading 
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 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and 
Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).  
94  
Small groups were initially intended to strengthen party control over government work, 
countering the initial policy of the early 1950s to separate party and state.. In June 1958, 
government work was divided into five areas (finance and economy, politics and law, foreign 
affairs, science, and culture and education. Small groups that reported directly to the Politburo 
and the Party Secretariat were created for each of these sectors. The origin of small groups 
through the division of government work into “gatewaays” (kou) is traced back as early as 
1953. Through the establishment of small groups, Mao could weaken the power of the prime 
minister (Shaw Chong-hai 邵宗海, “Zhonggong zhongyang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu zuzhi 
dingwei” 中共中央工作领导小组组织定位 [The organization and position of leading small 
groups of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China],  website of National 
Chengchi University, www3.nccu.edu.tw/~chshaw/clg_staus.doc, accessed April 18, 2010, 6). 
On August 18, 1980, Deng Xiaoping addressed the problem of separating party and 
government again more clearly at the extended meeting of the Politburo (ibid., 7). In 1986, 
Deng again stressed the need for political reform in the form of strict separation of party and 
state. This, however, was never intended to weaken the power of the party (ibid., 8). According 
to some scholars, it was during the 1980s that the LSG were transformed from coordinating 
bodies supervising the state bureaucracy and subordinate to the CPC Secretariat to decision 
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cadres from both pertinent Party and state bureaucracies. The establishment and 
abolition of LSG is fairly flexible and according to (perceived) needs. Hence, 
some LSG have existed for a long time while others had only a short life span.  
LSG at any level are not automatically of equal standing and importance; their 
weight depends on the ranks of their constituent members.
95
 Party Committees at 
all levels can create LSG,
96
 although sub-central committees often do so following 
a directive from their central level equivalent.
97
 The party committees of media 
units also create LSG for specific tasks. For instance, in 1998, Xinhua 新华 
established the Leading Small Group for Responding to Sudden Events (Tufa 
shijian yingji zhihui lingdao xiaozu 突发事件应急指挥领导小组).98  
Policies deliberated in central LSG in regular mode and ratified by the 
central leadership usually indicate the general policy direction only and are open 
for interpretation and translation into actual policies by standing bodies, such as 
the various ministries and departments.
99
 Perhaps even more importantly, during 
times of crisis, LSG frequently convene to make ad hoc decisions.
100
  
Several sources state that Leading Small Groups are advisory bodies and 
officially do not have any decision making powers, but their suggestions are 
usually adopted by the central leadership.
101
 Nonetheless, the term leading 
actually suggests that they have the authority to make and enforce policies with 
relative autonomy. Although information about LSG is very sketchy and 
contradictory, the most important difference between Small Groups and Leading 
Small Groups appears to be that the latter have direct access to the Politburo 
because they are headed by one of its members.
102
 A similar distinction is made 
                                                                                                                                                               
making bodies directly under the PBSC and equal in rank with the Secretariat. Hence, their 
status was actually elevated under the policy of separating party and state. Cf. ibid., 8.  
95
 Cf. Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies,” 47.  
96
 Yu Keping, Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi, 21.  
97
 This was largely the case with external propaganda, for example, as will be seen below.  
98
Yan Wenbin 严文斌, “Shijiexing tongxunshe yu tufa shijian duiwai baodao” 世界性通讯社与突
发事件对外报道  [A world news agency and reporting sudden events abroad], Duiwai 
xuanchuan cankao, no. 11 (1998): 12. 
99
 Cf. Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies,” 50. 
100
 Cf. Thomas Bondiguel and Thierry Kellner, “The Impact of China’s Foreign Policy Think 
Tanks,” BICCS Asia Paper (2010): 18.  
101
 Cf. Shaw, “Zhonggong zhongyang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu zuzhi dingwei.” AliceMiller, “The 
CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 26 (2008):1, 
available online at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM26AM.pdf, 
accessed August 12, 2012.  
102
 This was tentatively suggested to me in an interview with a communication studies professor (I). 
Interview, Beijing, April 2011. None of the Central LSG for which information is available 
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between leading departments (lingdao bumen 领导部门), which are headed by a 
member of the Politburo and regular departments of ministerial level under the 
Central Committee.
103
  
 
Chains of Command: Vertical and Horizontal Divisions 
The entire Chinese bureaucracy is ordered according to two grids: tiao 条, 
referring to the vertical chain of command according to sector, i.e. one central 
organization and its sub-branches all over the country, and kuai 块, the horizontal 
bureaucracy, i.e. all organizations within one administrative unit, such as a 
department or a locale.
104
 A strict kuai hierarchy structure would mean that the 
party committee or government at a particular level had sole authority over a unit 
within its jurisdiction; no other unit would be authorized to give it binding orders. 
A strict tiao hierarchy would mean that a local propaganda department would only 
take orders from the propaganda department at the superordinate level and would 
not have to take orders from the party committee at the same level. Most often, a 
combination of the two is used. Such an integration of vertical and horizontal 
chains of command is called “integration of vertical and horizontal bureaucracies” 
(tiao kuai jiehe 条块结合), and usually needs to specify which arrangement takes 
precedence in case of a conflict.
105
 In the post-Mao period, as part of the 
movement towards decentralization, there was a trend towards rearrangement 
from favoring vertical towards favoring horizontal authority structures, that is, 
local party committees and local governments gained in power over their 
subordinate units at the same administrative level.  
                                                                                                                                                               
contradict this; all are headed by a member of the Politburo or, the more powerful ones, by a 
PBSC member. For the members of different LSG, see Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s 
Leading Small Groups.”  
103
 The distinction is, for example, mentioned in Hou Yingzhong 侯迎忠 and Guo Guanghua 郭光
华, Duiwai baodao celüe yu jiqiao 对外报道策略与技巧  [Strategies and techniques for 
external reporting] (Beijing: Zhongguo chuanmei daxue chubanshe, 2008), 45. 
104
 Cf. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform (London: W.W. 
Norton, 1995), 169-170.  
105
 “Integration of vertical and horizontal bureaucracies with precedence given to the horizontal 
bureaucracy” (tiao kuai jiehe, yi kuai wei zhu 条块结合，以块为主) means that a unit is led 
both by the party committee or government at its own administrative level and by its own 
equivalent or superior unit at its superordinate level, but that if in doubt, the local party 
committee or government’s decision is more important. “Giving precedence to the vertical 
bureaucracy” (yi tiao wei zhu 以条为主 ) conversely means that the orders given by a 
subordinate unit at a higher level (usually a specialized department) outweigh those given by 
the local party committee or government. See Lieberthal, Governing China, 169-170, who also 
introduces these principles, albeit without explaining most of the Chinese vocabulary.  
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Administrative Ranks 
In the Chinese bureaucracy, each institution has a rank that determines its 
powers vis-à-vis other institutions as well as its access to information within the 
system. In the vertical (tiao) grid, ranks below the central (zhongyang 中央) or 
national (guojia 国 家 ) level 106  are – in descending order – the 
department/ministry
107
 (bu 部), the bureau (ju 局, or ting 厅), the office (chu 处), 
and the division (ke 科). Their hierarchical equivalents in the kuai grid are the 
province (sheng 省), the prefecture (di 地), the county (xian 县), and the township 
(xiang 乡). Each of these levels is further subdivided into full (zheng 正) and 
deputy (fu 副) status, so that a unit of vice-ministerial rank (fu bu 副部) is below 
the ministries and provinces, but above the bureaus and prefectures in the power 
hierarchy. Previously, each unit, including state-owned enterprises and service 
units, automatically had a fixed rank in the hierarchy, although in recent years, 
attempts have been made to abolish the ranking system for certain sectors, such as 
for universities, for better and more economical management of personnel.
108
 For 
ministries and departments, however, the ranking naturally still applies. The 
Office of External Propaganda, for example, has the rank of a ministry (zhengbuji 
正部级).109 In the past, there was a clear division between bodies called bu 部, 
which had ministerial level, and those called commission (weiyuanhui 委员会), 
which usually ranked higher at full or deputy national level (as they usually 
supervised several ministries). Today, some bodies that are headed by Politburo 
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Usually, the prefix central is used for Party institutions, while national is used for state 
institutions.  
107 
Party organs are called “department” whereas state organs are translated as “ministries” into 
English, but the Chinese term is bu in both cases. 
108
 See “Zhongguo jiang quxiao gaoxiao deng shiye danwei xingzheng jibie” 中国将取消高校等
事业单位行政级别  [China will eliminate administrative levels for service units such as 
universities], People’s Daily Online, June 7, 2010, 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/11800797.html, accessed October 25, 2012.  
109
 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu huifu zhongyang duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu de tongzhi” 中共
中央关于恢复中央对外宣传小组的通知 [Notification from the CPC Central Committee on 
the resurrection of the Central External Propaganda Small Group], Zhongwei [1990] no. 48, 
March 19, 1990, reprinted in Zhongyang xuanchuanbu bangongshi, ed., Dang de xuanchuan 
gongzuo wenjian xuanbian (1988-1992) [Selected documents from the Party’s propaganda 
work (1988-1992)] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), 1904. 
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members, such as the Central Propaganda Department, also have a higher rank 
than others, but the name (bu 部 or wei 委) is no longer a criterion to tell.  
 
The Nomenklatura System 
One important mechanism through which control over lower levels can be 
maintained is the Chinese equivalent of the Soviet nomenklatura  оменклатура, 
called zhiwu mingcheng biao 职务名称表 in Chinese, i.e. the list of leadership 
positions of subordinate organs to be appointed by an upper rank party committee. 
Positions on each nomenklatura list are listed in hierarchical order, indicating the 
importance of each post and its associated unit. For instance, since 1992, the head 
of CPD has been listed above the head of the Central Organization Department in 
the central nomenklatura.
110
 Each party committee Organization Department 
manages (guanli 管理)111 the cadres below. In the past, the reach would go down 
two levels. For instance, the Organization Department of the Central Committee 
would be responsible for leading cadres (head and vice heads in both the party and 
the state) at ministerial and provincial as well as at bureau and prefectural level. In 
recent years, control has been relaxed. While appointments at the bureau and 
prefectural level still need to be reported to the Centre,
112
 only ministerial and 
provincial level leading positions (both full, zheng 正, and deputy, fu 副) are 
actually appointed by the Center.
113
 This means that for a ministerial level body, 
such as the Office of External Propaganda, the director and deputy directors are 
appointed by the Center, whereas other positions are recruited through exams or 
other recruitment processes, with bureau-level heads also reported to the Center. 
The nomenklatura should not be confused with the bianzhi 编制, which fixes the 
number of posts within one unit.
114
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 Cf. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 23. 
111
 “Mangement” encompasses inspecting (kaocha 考察), providing further training (peiyang 培
养), choosing (xuanbo 选拨), recommending (tuijian 推荐) [i.e. recommending to the state 
bureaucracy], supervising (jiandu 监督), and dismissing (renmian 任免) cadres. Cf. Yu Keping, 
Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi, 20. 
112
 Cf. Hon S. Chan, “Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990–
1998,” The China Quarterly 179 (September 2004): 705.  
113
 Cf. Yu Keping, Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi, 19. These positions are listed on the Zhonggong 
Zhongyang guanli ganbu mingchengbiao 中共中央管理干部名称表 . Cf. Chan, “Cadre 
Personnel Management in China,” 705.  
114
 Cf. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China,” The China 
Quarterly 170 (June 2002):363; Chan “Cadre Personnel Management in China.”  
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Although most positions on the Central Committee’s nomenklatura as well 
as at lower levels are still appointed by the Central Organization Department and 
its lower local counterparts, other departments (propaganda, united front, etc.) 
also have responsibilities to varying degrees of managing cadres at their level. For 
instance, the propaganda department at any certain level will (often in conjunction 
with the organization department) manage cadres of the same level and one level 
below belonging to departments related to culture, art, education, broadcasting, 
television, research, etc.
115
  
 
Types of Units and Types of Relationships 
 With increasing institutionalization and codification of the functioning of 
the Chinese bureaucracy under the policy of “governing the country by law” (yi fa 
zhi guo 依法治国) that gained traction in the 1990s,116 a large number of different 
types of units have been defined either through laws or other official documents. 
First, with regard to types of units, a differentiation needs to be made between 
standing bodies (changshe jigou 常设机构 ) and non-standing bodies (fei 
changshe jigou 非常设机构). The two are often referred to as “real agencies” 
(shiti jigou 实体机构 ) and “nominal agencies” (xushe jigou 虚设机构 ), 
respectively.
117
 A standing body has a fixed office address, a fixed number of staff 
(i.e. a fixed bianzhi 编制), and exists for a relatively long time.118 Conversely, a 
non-standing body does not have an office or permanent staff and is usually 
composed of leading cadres from various party and state bureaucracies that hold 
membership in the body ex officio. An important example of non-standing bodies 
is LSG, whose function will be explained below.  
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 Cf. Yu Keping Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi, 20. Also see Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 14, 
16.  
116
 The “rule by law” (fazhi) was first introduced into the Party agenda as part of the project to 
‘build a Socialist spiritual civilization’ in 1995. In 1999, the principle to “rule the country in 
accordance with the law” (yi fa zhi guo) was included in the Chinese Constitution. Zhu Weijiu, 
“Towards Governance by Rule of Law,” in China’s Journey Toward the Rule of Law: Legal 
Reform, 1978-2008, eds. Dingjian Cai and Chenguang Wang (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 
2010), 103-104.  
117 Cf. “Ge lei jigou jianjie” 各类机构简介 [Introduction of various (types of) structures], website 
of the government of  Emin county in Xinjiang, 
http://www.xjem.gov.cn/bw/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=10967. Aug 18, 2010.  
118 Cf. “Ge lei jigou jianjie.” Also see Yu Keping Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi, 92.  
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In late 1987 a new system was introduced under which all institutions 
under the Central Committee had to be assigned one of three categories: decision-
making advisory organs (juece zixun jigou 决策咨询机构), executive organs 
(banshi jigou 办事机构) or work departments (gongzuo bumen 工作部门), and 
service organs (shiye jigou 事业机构).119 Decision-making advisory bodies are 
commissions/committees or LSG responsible for assisting the Central Leadership 
in macro policy making. They are usually non-standing bodies. Executive organs 
or work departments are the standing bodies of LSG or other non-standing bodies. 
For instance, in 1988, the CPD was defined as a general work department 
(zonghexing gongzuo bumen 综合性工作部门) under the dual leadership of the 
CC and the Propaganda and Thought Work LSG.
120
 They have a permanent office 
and permanent staff that do administrative work on behalf of their LSG. All party 
departments, including the Central Propaganda Department, are executive organs 
or work departments with administrative powers. Service organs, on the other 
hand, are organs which carry out procedures or tasks on behalf of and provide 
services for other units. Examples are media units (most importantly the People’s 
Daily (Renmin ribao 人民日报)), and educational institutions (most importantly 
the Central Party School).  
There is one more important distinction between different types of 
departments at the highest level, namely between leading departments (lingdao 
bumen 领导部门 ) and institutions directly under the central committee 
(zhongyang zhishu jigou 中央直属机构). One major difference, as the name 
already suggests, is that leading departments can circulate documents with new 
policies or policy directions on their own, whereas institutions directly under the 
central committee usually write documents that first need to be approved by and 
then distributed through the Center.
121
 This is an important difference between the 
Central Propaganda Department and the Office of External Propaganda. The CPD 
is a leading department which circulates orders directly (called zhong xuan fa 中
宣发 ). The Office of External Propaganda (Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai 
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 Cf. Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies,” 46. 
120
 Cf. Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui, ed., Zhongguo 
gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, vol. 7, 231.  
121
 CPD had to do the same during the Mao period. Cf. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 36.  
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xuanchuan bangongshi 中共对外宣传办公室, OEP), on the other hand, is a unit 
directly under the Center, so it produces Opinions and sends them to the Center 
for approval. In addition, there are structures which are not directly under the 
authority of the central committee and therefore cannot communicate with the 
Center directly but have to go through the unit leading them.   
The relationship between two units defines what rights and duties they 
have towards each other. One relationship is the leading-led relation (lingdao yu 
bei lingdao guanxi 领导与被领导关系). In this case, the leading unit is fully in 
charge of the led unit and can issue legally binding orders that have to be carried 
out.
122
 The second is the guiding-guided relation (zhidao yu bei zhidao guanxi 
指导与被指导关系). Here, one unit provides “guidance” to another in its area of 
expertise, but its legal repertoire of punishments if the guided unit does not follow 
the suggestions is limited. In addition, the activities of a unit led or guided by 
another unit can be subdivided into administrative work (xingzheng 行政) and 
professional work (yewu 业务).  
For professional work both leadership (yewu lingdao 业务领导 ) and 
guidance (yewu zhidao 业务指导) are possible.123 In this area, it is again possible 
to establish a key difference between the propaganda and thought work sector and 
the external propaganda sector with regard to their relationship with their lower 
level equivalents. The central propaganda department leads propaganda 
departments at departmental/provincial level and below.
124
 In the external 
propaganda sector, however, the Central Office of External Propaganda only has a 
guiding relationship over its lower level equivalents (zai yewu shang zhidao 在业
务上指导).125  
 
 
 
                                                          
122
 Such a relationship can only exist if the leading unit has a higher administrative rank than the 
unit led, although the reverse is not true: higher rank does not automatically mean being 
allowed to issue binding orders.  
123
 Lieberthal still presents all professional relationships (yewu guanxi 业务关系) as non-binding 
(Governing China, 170). However, this is clearly not the case.  
124
 Yongnian Zheng and Liang Fook Lye, “Re-making the Party’s Image: Challenges for the 
Propaganda Department,” in China into the Hu-Wen Era: Policy Initiatives and Challenges, 
eds. John Wong and Hongyi Lai (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006), 128.  
125
 Cf. Zeng Jianhui, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei: Zeng Jianhui lun duiwai xuanchuan, vol. 2, 45. 
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Management According to Sectoral Division (guikou guanli 归口管理) 
One particularity of the Chinese bureaucracy that dates back to the Mao 
period is an arrangement called management according to sectoral/functional 
division (guikou guanli 归口管理). This expression traces back to the time when 
state work was still clearly grouped into “gateways” (kou), each under the 
supervision of a party small group. It basically refers to a vertical (tiao) authority 
structure, i.e. a unit that is actually formally established under a different 
geographical or sectoral unit, but is – either professionally or completely – led by 
its functional equivalent higher up in the bureaucracy. The subordinate units in a 
guikou guanli relation are usually referred to as vertical structures (chuizhi jigou 
垂直机构).126  
In external propaganda, just like during the Mao period, this results in an 
elaborate division of work between different departments, in which each 
department is responsible for those aspects of external propaganda that touch on 
its area of expertise, either in terms of content, or in terms of target audience. For 
instance, the OEP is responsible for reporting “general” (zonghexing 综合性) 
domestic news to foreigners, excluding news specifically aimed at ethnic Chinese, 
which is the responsibility of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs is responsible for reporting international news, while military 
news always need to be handled through the military propaganda system.
127
 News 
related to culture, trade, or tourism are most likely the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Commerce, and the National Tourism 
Administration respectively.
128
 The advantage of the guikou guanli system is that 
                                                          
126
 “Management” primarily refers to the management of cadres, the principal avenue for exerting 
control. However, the term is also used in relation to the division of work along sectoral lines 
in a particular field. See for example Huang Zecun黄泽存, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao
新时期对外宣传论稿 [Preliminary discussions of external propaganda in the new period] 
(Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002), 264.  
127
The Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun ribao 解放军日报) is directly under the command of 
the Propaganda Department of the General Political Office of the People’s Liberation Army. Cf. 
David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 135. The assumption that the PLA GPD is 
probably the only organ authorized to release military news is also confirmed by the 
observation that it was only through a co-operation with the PLA Daily that English 
translations of military news could be made available on the China Daily website. Cf. Peng 
Lan 彭兰, Zhongguo wangluo meiti de di yi ge shi nian 中国网络媒体的第一个十年 [The 
first ten years of China’s Internet media] (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 2005), 32.  
128
 This is inferred from “Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo shixing guikou guanli, fengong fuze 
zhidu de yijian” 关于对外宣工作实行归口管理、分工负责制度的意见  [Opinion on 
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for each news category, the highest organization in charge is also the one that 
understands the sector best and can therefore make sure that news do not 
contradict policy, but in real life, this arrangement requires a lot of coordination 
and cooperation between different departments, a process that is both time-
consuming and a potential source of conflict. 
 
4.3 Other Factors Influencing the Policy Process 
 This last section introduces a number of institutions and mechanisms that 
impact policy making and implementation in China at various levels. This 
includes things such as political cycles, established modes of policy-making (such 
as experimentation), conventions of macro policy-making (slogans), and channels 
of communication, to list a few.  
 
Political Cycles 
Just like electoral cycles impact policy debates and the range of choices 
available to a particular political actor in democracies, certain events and cycles 
exert influence on how policy making takes place in China. First, China took over 
the habit of making five-year-plans (as well as fifteen-year-plans or “long term 
goals,” yuanjing mubiao 远景目标129) from the Soviet Union. These five-year-
plans basically cover all policy fields, including propaganda and thought work and 
                                                                                                                                                               
implementing the system of management according to gateway and division of labor in 
external propaganda work], Tingzi 厅字 [1993] 22 hao 号 [Note from the General Office of the 
Shandong Provincial party Committee [1993] no. 22], in Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan 
gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian 1992-1998山东省对外宣传工作文件资料汇编 (1992-1998) 
[Document collection on Shandong Province’s external propaganda work (1992-1998)], eds. 
Shandong shengwei duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi 山东省委对外宣传办公室  [Office of 
External Propaganda of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee] and Shandongsheng 
renmin zhengfu xinwen bangongshi 山东人民政府新闻办公室 [Information Office of the 
People’s Government of Shandong Province] (Jinan: Shandong youyi chubanshe, 1999), vol. 1, 
6. The result of this arrangement at the level of individual media units is that different editorial 
departments are led or guided by different departments or ministries. For instance, Xinhua’s 
International News Department would have to coordinate with the MFA, whereas Xinhua’s 
External News Department works together with the OEP. If a sudden event occurs in any of 
these fields, media need to check not only with CPD, but also with the relevant ministry or 
department before releasing news. Cf. ibid. Also see “Youguan jiqing de baodao yao yange 
baguan”有关疫情的报道要严格把关 [Reports on epidemics need to be checked strictly], 
Neibu tongxin  内部通信 [Internal communications], no. 21 (2001): 8.  
129
 For an external propaganda five-year-plan at the provincial level, see for example “1996 nian – 
2000 nian Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan shiye fazhan guihua” 1996年—2000年对外宣
传事业发展规划 [Development plan for Shandong’s external propaganda work between 1996 
and 2000], in Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian (1992-1998), 
vol. 1, 27. 
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external propaganda work. While an overall plan exists, each sector also produces 
its own five and fifteen-year-plans. As opposed to the earlier days of the Mao 
period, five-year-plan cycles have been very regular since 1966. Thus, at any 
point in time, China is at a certain (and relatively predictable) stage in the 
planning, drafting, implementation, and evaluation of a particular five-year-plan.  
Another benchmark in the policy process is the National Congress of the 
CPC, which takes place every five years, and, less importantly, its government 
equivalent, the National People’s Congress (NPC), which takes place once a year, 
usually in March, and is also newly reconstituted every five years. Both events 
mark, first, a power transitions (nearly complete replacing every ten years, partial 
power transition at the congress in between) and, second, the opportunity to 
formalize the policy focus on the party for the coming five years. Due to the fact 
that most cadres occupy a position both in the Party and in the state bureaucracy, 
they first take over the party position at the party congress, usually held in fall, 
and then formally get power in the state bureaucracy at the annual NPC held in 
spring of the following year. For institutions like OEP/State Council Information 
Office (Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 国务院新闻办公室, SCIO) that are part 
of the party bureaucracy but presented as part of the state, it must be assumed that 
the actual power hand-over takes place in fall, but cannot be publically announced 
until the next spring. In addition, the occurrence of a National Party Congress also 
greatly impacts the media environment. Media regulations as well as enforcement 
are tightened significantly in the year that a Party Congress takes place, and many 
positions that can otherwise be expressed become taboo.
130
 
In a one-party-state in which the ruling party has relatively tight control 
over the media, different modes of controlled debates are possible than in a 
country whose political debates are influenced or shaped by multi-party elections. 
This set-up makes it possible to raise and drop certain slogans and debates fairly 
easily. Of course, this does not mean that there is no competition whatsoever over 
who gets to dominate the discourse, but disagreements (whether real or contrived) 
are usually not fought out in public. Thus, the parts of the debate which are 
available in public or in the semi-public are influenced by and adapted to political 
cycles. 
                                                          
130
 Cf. “Reminwang jiaqiang ‘Qiangguo luntan’ guanli” 人民网加强‘强国论坛’管理 [People’s 
Daily Online reinforces control of ‘Strong Nation Forum’],  Neibu tongxin, no. 19, 2002, 13-15.  
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The Role of Experiments 
In its reform and opening project, the CPC has chosen gradual or 
incremental reforms. This is usually contrasted with the approach later taken in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, which went for more sweeping 
reforms.
131
 Incrementalism is not only limited to the economic sector, but has 
been applied to all other arenas as well. One of the most important features of 
incremental reforms that constitutes a particularity of the Chinese policy process 
is the use of experiments.  
Studies on the policy process usually break down the policy cycle into 
different stages. This division is artificial in terms of time, as usually all stages 
overlap to a higher or lower degree, but is useful to isolate and examine different 
steps in the process. The first stage is agenda setting. Analyses of agenda setting 
deal with the question how a certain issue comes to the attention of a government 
or other political authority. In the second stage, policy formulation, different 
options to solve the (perceived) problem are presented to policy makers by 
different stakeholders. Studies of the third stage, decision-making, assess why a 
specific policy option is chosen over another. The fourth stage is policy 
implementation. Here, the object of enquiry is how the policy is implemented 
and what unintended outcomes it might produce. The fifth and final stage is 
policy evaluation.
132
  
While the stages of policy processes that have been identified in academic 
literature are always artificial to a certain degree and blur in reality, the Chinese 
case is special in that China has not been restricted by the need to legislate new 
policies before implementing them.
133
 Instead, it has been possible for China to 
                                                          
131
 Cf. Jeffrey Sachs and Wing Thye Woo, “Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, 
Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union,” Economic Policy 9, no. 18 (April 1994): 101. 
As the title already indicates, this article rejects the “gradual versus sweeping reform” thesis, 
arguing that structural factors accounted for the differences in how reforms played out. 
132
 There are various different categorizations of stages in the policy process. I am using this 
division into five stages as introduced in Michael Howett and M. Ramesh, Studying Public 
Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 13.  
133
 Sebastian Heilmann, “Experimentation under Hierarchy: Policy Experiments in the 
Reorganization of China’s State Sector, 1978-2008,” CID Working Paper no. 172 (June 2008), 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-
programs/centers/cid/publications/faculty/wp/172.pdf, accessed August 11, 2012, 3.  
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“cross the river by feeling the stones,” (mozhe shitou guo he 摸着石头过河)134 or 
to “feel its way” (mosuo摸索). The approach of experiments has been justified by 
the Chinese definition of “understanding” (renshi 认识), whereby one always 
needs to gain experience through practice first and then re-apply one’s preliminary 
understanding to practice to refine it (cf. chapter 4.1). 
The study of experiments as a part of the PRC political process first 
concentrated on the economic sector in the post-Mao period, where consequently 
the practice is very well documented.
135
 The origins of the policy can be traced 
back to the earliest days of the CPC. Even before the founding of the PRC, 
experimentation was affirmed as legitimate practice during the Rectification 
Movement in Yan’an 延安.136 During the early Mao period, the Center frequently 
used “experimental points” (shidian 试 点 ) to try a policy first before 
implementing it on a larger scale.
137
 The approach was weakened in the 
ideologically charged climate marked by attempts at rapid modernization as well 
as Mao’s attempts to reassert his authority after 1957.138 In the post-Mao period, 
the policy regained in importance and was applied to economic reforms in a 
modified form.
139
 For proponents of reform, it served as a vital strategy to 
overcome domestic opposition to the reform and opening policies in a situation in 
which opponents wielded strong ideological arguments.
140
 Today, the policy 
usually comes in three stages: “From point, to line, to surface” (cong dian dao 
xian dao mian 从点到线到面): A policy is first tried - with approval from the 
Center - in one place or very few places. If it is evaluated as successful, a larger 
number of locales or sectors implement the policy in a second test stage before it 
is adopted on a national level. 
 
 
 
                                                          
134
 Although the slogan is attributed to Deng Xiaoping, it was actually coined by Chen Yun and 
only later applied to characterize China’s overall economic reform approach. Sebastian 
Heilmann, “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s Distinctive 
Policy Process,” The China Journal, no. 59 (2008): 26. 
135
 E.g. Heilmann, “Experimentation under Hierarchy.”  
136
 Cf. Heilmann, “From Local Experiments to National Policy,” 4-8.  
137
 Ibid., 11.  
138
 Ibid., 13-16.  
139
 Ibid., 25-27. 
140
 Heilmann, “Experimentation under Hierarchy,” 1.  
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Channels of Appropriation in the Chinese Party-State 
The current policy to absorb advanced technology and other experience 
from abroad was formally (re-)established in 1978 and 1979 as part of the reform 
and opening package. Pragmatically, the policy has been justified by arguing that 
through drawing on foreign expertise and experience, China can develop faster;
141
 
ideologically, the CPC can argue that the Law of the Negation of the Negation 
mandates this policy.
142
 The practices of learning from capitalist countries and of 
accepting foreign investment were legitimized in one go in late 1978 and early 
1979.
143
 Notably, especially since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
“using the foreign to serve China” has also referred to negative models.144 For 
external propaganda work, authors frequently suggest to appropriate other 
countries’ practices and techniques. For instance, Egypt has been held up as a 
model for China for how to successfully portray oneself as an ancient civilization 
and promote oneself as a tourist destination.
145
 In the early 21
st
 century, when 
                                                          
141
 Speeding China’s development up by various means is referred to as “winning time” (zhengqu 
shijian 争取时间).  
142
 The law of the negation of the negation (Gesetz von der Negation der Negation), attributed to 
Engels, means that as a stage or level of a thing is negated (i.e. when the thing moves on to a 
higher stage or level), the good things from the lower stage or level are kept. 
143
 Its initial difficult standing becomes apparent when looking at the texts that were adduced to 
justify the policy, namely writings by Lenin, Stalin, and Mao on the usefulness of absorbing 
foreign knowledge. Cf. “Le yu xiqu waiguo de ao dongxi - jieshao zuijin chuci yicheng 
zhongwen de Lienin lunshu” 乐于吸取外国的好东西 ——介绍最近初次译成中文的列宁论
述 [Happily absorb the good things from abroad – Introducing one of Lenin’s expositions 
recently translated into Chinese for the first time], Cankao ziliao 参考资料  [Reference 
Materials], no. 2, (1978): 22-26. Issue 1, 1979 of Cankao ziliao first offered a compilation of 
Mao’s writings on learning from progressive foreign experience (“Mao zhuxi guanyu xuexi 
waiguo xianjin jingyan he kexue jishu de bufen lunshu” 毛主席关于学习外国先进经验和科
学技术的部分论述  [A part of Chairman Mao’s exposition on learning from foreigners 
advanced experience and science and technology], Cankao ziliao, no. 1 (1979): 2-6) and then 
added remarks by Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Fang Yi on the 
need to absorb foreign technology and other advanced knowledge or experience (“Zhongyang 
lingdao tongzhi guanyu xuexi waiguo xianjin jingyan he yinjin waizi, jishu zhuangbei de zhishi” 
中央领导同志关于学习外国先进经验和引进外资、技术装备的指示 [Instructions from 
central leading comrades on learning from foreign advanced experience and introducing 
foreign investment, technology, and equipment], Cankao ziliao, no. 1 (1979): 17-25). 
144
 Both Brady’s Marketing Dictatorship and Shambaugh’s China’s Communist Party: Atrophy 
and Adaptation already mention that the Soviet Union serves as a powerful counter-model. Cf. 
Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 175-176; David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: 
Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 126.  
145
 E.g. Li Xin 黎信, “‘Mingxing’ shi zenyang shengqi de – Aiji lüyou xuanchuan jieshao” ‘明星’
是怎样升起的——埃及旅游宣传介绍 [How did the ‘star’ rise – An introduction to Egyptian 
tourism propaganda], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 3 (1990): 5-7.  
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China tried to expand its cultural propaganda, one author stressed that China 
needed to learn from countries such as the U.S. and Japan.
146
  
I will distinguish here between four different routes in which foreign 
experiences and debates held in or across other countries reach China, all of which 
are also established in various different forms and to various degrees in other 
countries.
147
 The first is extended intelligence work, including the systematic and 
organized translation of news clippings from the foreign press as much as the 
monitoring of academic and other trends abroad, including the translation and 
introduction of key works to China. Through this route, countries pick up large 
amounts of information about new developments and discussions abroad. The 
second route is exchange and cooperation with individual foreigners as well as 
with foreign organizations and is usually geared towards rather specific 
knowledge and concrete skills. The third is transnational networks. The fourth is 
systematic studies of different approaches to a similar problem across different 
countries. These four will be introduced in more detail below. 
Like most other countries, China monitors media and academic trends 
abroad. This was already the case during the Mao period. For instance, Rostow’s 
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto
148
 was translated and 
published internally in 1962.
149
 The number of units involved in the translation of 
material that is publically available abroad is huge. For news media, Xinhua 
carries the heaviest responsibility and has an elaborate system for internal 
reporting (both for original reports and for relaying translations from foreign 
media to various groups of people with different levels of “clearance”). While 
some point out Xinhua’s mandate to collect intelligence as a particularity of China, 
                                                          
146
 Xu Ge 许革, “Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan yu shi jujin de ji dian sikao” 关于对外宣传与时俱进
的几点思考 [A few thoughts on external propaganda going with the times], Duiwai xuanchuan 
cankao, no. 4 (2003): 7. 
147
 Needless to say, these do not exhaustively describe all channels through which China 
appropriates knowledge and experience from abroad. 
148
 Walt Whitman Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1960).  
149
 Luosituo 罗斯托 [Walt Whitman Rostow], Jingji chengzhang de jieduan: fei gongchandang 
xuanyan 经济成长的阶段——非共产党宣言 [Translation of Stages of Economic Growth: A 
Non-Communist Manifesto], trans. Guoji guanxi yanjiusuo bianyishi 国际关系研究所编译室 
[Translation and compilation office of the research center for international relations] (Beijing: 
Commercial Press, 1962. Published internally). The book was officially introduced as 
“negative teaching material” (fanmian jiaocai 反面教材) so as to enable Chinese to understand 
and criticize Rostow’s “reactionary theory.” Li Zongzheng 李宗正, “Jianping Luosituo de 
Jingji chengzhang de jieduan” 简评罗斯托的《经济成长的阶段》  [Short criticism of 
Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth], in Luosituo, Jingji chengzhang de jieduan, 7.  
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the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) International Service has been 
gathering information on developments around the world since the 1930s, and the 
Voice of America network has, similarly, been used to gather intelligence.  
The most widely read publication is Reference News (Cankao xiaoxi 参考
消息), edited by Xinhua’s Reference Department (cankao bianji bu 参考编辑部), 
which has been openly available (gongkai 公开) since the 1980s.150 Reference 
News itself does not have the mission to provide the Center with intelligence, but 
has a propaganda mandate and is used as a channel to provide ordinary Chinese 
citizens with carefully selected news from foreign media. However, it is at the 
lowest level of a system that is set up in order to feed information to China’s 
leaders: Reference News also has a qingyang 清样 edition with a much more 
limited distribution that contains very sensitive news (Chinese arms sales, 
espionage allegations against China, etc.). While openly available or lower-level 
internal (neibu 内部) media serve no intelligence purpose and cannot predict what 
is contained in higher level publications, they demonstrate the breadth of what is 
translated into Chinese on a daily basis. 
In addition, Xinhua carries a large number of other internal publications 
with foreign press clippings or reports on foreign affairs classified as top-secret 
(juemi 绝密), confidential (jimi 机密) or as secret (mimi 秘密).151 One example is 
Internal Reference Materials [about] International [Affairs] (Guoji neican 国际
内参), which is classified as “confidential.”152 Lower classifications include the 
note “internal material” (neibu cailiao 内部材料 or neibu ziliao 内部资料) or 
                                                          
150
 Cankao xiaoxi has been available to all Chinese since the 1980s. Cankao xiaoxi also has a 
qingyang 清样 edition with a much more limited distribution (usually classified as juemi 绝密) 
that contains very sensitive news (Chinese arms sales, espionage allegations against China, 
etc.). Cf. Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies,” 53. 
151
 Cf. “Bude gongkai yinyong fabiao Xinhuashe neican de shemi cailiao” 不得公开引用发表新
华社内参的涉密材料  [Do not quote or publish classified material from Xinhua News 
Agency’s internal publications], Neibu tongxin, no. 17 (2002): 13. The classification is 
according to Article nine of the Law on Protecting State Secrets (保守国家秘密法 Baoshou 
guojia mimi fa). Cf. Zhongguo zhengfu ruhe kongzhi meiti 中国政府如何控制媒体 [Parallel 
English title: Media control in China], report by Human Rights in China (HRIC), 2004, 43. The 
report is available online at http://ir2008.org/PDF/initiatives/Internet/Media-
Control_Chinese.pdf, accessed December 17, 2012.  
152
 See “Huanying dingue 2005niandu Xinhushe jimiji kanwu Guoji neican” 欢迎订阅 2005年度
新华通讯社机密级刊物《国际内参》 [Call to subscribe to the confidential Xinhua 
publication International internal reference for 2005], Xinhuanet, 
http://www.jl.xinhuanet.com/shangye/neican/guojineican/guojineican.htm, accessed December 
30, 2012.  
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“only for distribution within China” (xian guonei faxing 限国内发行). Many of 
these publications also feature translations of texts originally published abroad. 
Xinhua’s many internal publications, however, are only the tip of the iceberg at 
the central-national and general or “non-subject-specific” (zonghe 综合) level. 
Party committees at lower levels usually also have institutional structures to 
provide them with press clippings from the foreign press on more or less 
particular topics.
153
   
For academic trends in the humanities and social sciences, the most 
important responsibilities at the central level lie with the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS),
154
 the Central Party School,
155
 and various different 
centers of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau.
156
 Again, most major 
units and governments tend to have their own institutions for keeping track of 
general or specific international trends.
157
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 For example, one article on Guangzhou’s external propaganda structures explains that one 
responsibility of the External Propaganda Division of the Guangzhou Municipal Propaganda 
Department (广州市委宣传部外宣处) is to edit the journal Selections from the Overseas Press 
(Haiwai baokan xuanji 海外报刊选辑), consisting of selected press clippings from the foreign 
press for the municipal party committee and government. “Guangzhou waixuanchu ‘liu si’ yilai 
shi ruhe kaizhan gongzuo de” 广州外宣处“六四”以来是如何开展工作的 [How Guangzhou’s 
External Propaganda Division has worked since “June Fourth”], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao no. 
7 (1990): 11.  
154
 CASS is a service unit officially under the direct authority of the State Council. CASS was 
formed in May 1977 by transforming the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the 
CAS into a separate academy. Cf. Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen 
weiyuanhui, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao vol. A 1, 950-951. 
155
 The Central Party School of the Communist Party of China (Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao 
中共中央党校) is a service unit under the direct authority of the Central Committee. It is 
nominally headed by the deputy party secretary, meaning it is among the units under direct 
control of the PBSC.  
156
 Established in 1953, the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (CCTB, Zhongyang 
bianyi ju 中央编译局) has been under the direct authority of the Central Committee since 1988. 
Despite its name (bureau, ju 局), it actually has vice-ministerial rank (fu bu ji 副部级). CCTB’s 
main responsibility is to compile and translate as well as research classical works of Marxism, 
to translate important Party-State documents and works by Chinese leaders, to research and 
develop basic Marxist theory and their applicability to Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, 
to research the history and current state as well as theory and practice of the global Socialist 
movement, and to collect and collate literature, information, and data from the field of study of 
Marxism and Socialism. Attached to the CCTB are a number of subordinate research centers 
(zhishu jigou 直属机构), such as the Research Center for Contemporary Marxism (Dangdai 
makesi zhuyi yanjiusuo 当代马克思主义研究所), which actively seeks international co-
operation and researches such questions as good governance (cf. “Zhongyang bianyiju jianjie” 
中央编译局简介 [Brief introduction to the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau], 
Website of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, http://www.cctb.net/introduce/, 
accessed August 13, 2012).  
157
 For instance, The Central International Liaison Department, which manages party-to-party 
relations of the CPC, has an “Information Center” (Xinxi bianyan shi 信息编研室), which 
gathers information on international affairs and political parties in other countries and 
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The second route, exchange and cooperation also happens through a large 
number of different channels, including taking advice from “friends of China” as 
well as “foreign experts,” sending official delegations to “study” foreign news 
organizations, sending personnel for internships at foreign news organizations, 
setting up co-operations with foreign news organizations, usually by allowing 
foreign media companies certain access to the Chinese market in return for 
technology transfer or for helping Chinese products get a footing abroad, and 
inviting foreign guest professors or trainers. Many of these activities are today, at 
least in theory, coordinated through the State Administration of Foreign Expert 
Affairs (Guojia waiguo zhuanjia ju 国家外国专家局, SAFEA) and its local and 
sectoral equivalents at lower levels in the bureaucracy. Strategies are officially 
divided into “inviting in” (qing jinlai请进来), i.e. inviting foreigners to come to 
China and contribute with their expertise, and “going out” (zou chuqu走出去), i.e. 
sending Chinese abroad to do training.
158
 SAFEA is also responsible for devising 
policies and plans how to “import foreign knowledge” (yinjin guowai zhili 引进国
外智力) into China.159 In addition, central level units often have a department for 
cooperation with foreign organizations. For instance, the People’s Daily has a 
Department for Foreign Exchange and Cooperation (Duiwai jiaoliu hezuo bu 对外
交流合作部, a neishe jigou), and the Foreign Language Press has a Department 
for International Cooperation (Guoji hezuo bu 国际合作部 ). In the external 
propaganda sector, much like in any other sector, Chinese units invite foreign 
experts or advisors or send foreign delegations abroad to study. 
160
 “Development 
                                                                                                                                                               
maintains a database on the latter. Cf. “Guanyu Zhonglianbu – Jigou shezhi” 关于中联部 —— 
机构设置 [About the International Department of the CPC – Institutional set-up], Website of 
the International Department of the CPC], http://www.idcpc.org.cn/about/jgsz.htm, accessed 
November 7, 2012.  
158
 The slogan is used differently in other contexts. On the adaptation of slogans to different 
sectors, see below in 4.3, “Communicating the Spirit of the Center.”  
159
 For its responsibilities, see “Jigou zhineng” 机构职能 [Responsibilities of the institution], 
http://www.safea.gov.cn/intro/jgsz.php, accessed August 11, 2012.  
160
 For instance, Chinese journalists also participated in the classes of the European exchange 
initiative ‘Journalists in Europe/ Journalistes en Europe,’ a program which still exists today 
(that is, in 2002-2003) and in which Chinese journalists continue to participate. Cf. Zhao Jian 
赵坚, “‘Jizhe zai Ouzhou’ peixunban xiaoji” ‘记者在欧洲’培训班小记 [Brief notes on the 
training program ‘Journalists in Europe’], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 3 (1985): 25. Some 
more information on the program can be found here: Sources.com: Resources for Journalists, 
Reporters, Writers, Freelancers, Editors, and Researchers, 
http://www.sources.com/SSR/Docs/SSR12-02-JournalistesEnEurope.htm, accessed April 25, 
2012. Originally published in Sources, Winter 1983-1984. 
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aid” can be sent to China from foreign media, as was, for example, the case when 
the China Daily was set up in 1981.
161
 Hiring foreign trainers and advisors is 
another popular route to bring foreign expertise to China. 
Participation in international organization and transnational networks 
obviously also serves as a link between policies in China and similar policies in 
other countries. Such initiatives can be official and organized at the state or Party 
level, unofficial, or semi-official, for instance in the form of academic exchanges. 
In the early years of the CPC, the Party’s most important formal network was the 
Comintern (1919-1943). In the 1950s, China maintained strong ties to other 
countries in the Socialist bloc, including through the Cominform (1947-1956). 
After nearly two decades of isolation in international governmental organizations 
following the Sino-Soviet split, China became more active again in the 
international system. Between 1977 and 1989, following the entry to the United 
Nations (U.N.) in 1971, China’s membership in intergovernmental organization 
increased from 21 to 37.
162
 Much more significantly, its membership in 
international nongovernmental organizations rose from a mere 71 in 1977 to a 
striking 677 in 1989.
163
 
Another vital platform for networking is the International Department of 
the CPC (IDCPC, Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai lianluo bu 中共中央对外联络
部 ), before 1995 known as the International Liaison Department (ILD) in 
English.
164
 Established in 1951, the IDCPC is a ministerial level department of the 
CPC under direct authority of the Central Committee. Primarily only intended for 
contacts with Socialist parties, its functions were gradually expanded in the 
1980s
165
 and 1990s to include relations with all parties that were willing to 
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 Cf. John Lawrence, “China Daily News,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 8 
(July 1982): 147-151. 
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 Prior to its entry into the UN in 1971, China had only been represented in one 
intergovernmental organization, owing to the fact that China oposed both the U.S. and the S.U. 
See Samuel S. Kim, “China’s International Organizational Behaviour,” in Chinese Foreign 
Policy: Theory and Practice, eds. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 405-406. Also see Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in 
International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).  
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 Samuel S. Kim, “China’s International Organizational Behaviour,” 406.  
164
 The official English name was changed from International Liaison Department to International 
Department in 1995. David Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy’: The International 
Department of the Chinese Communist Party,” China: An International Journal 5, no. 1 (2007): 
29.  
165
 In 1986, the ILD began to establish relations with European Socialist Democratic parties. Cf. 
Shaumbaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’” 39. 
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establish contacts with the IDCPC. Its party-to-party diplomacy is very useful for 
China’s diplomacy, as it allows it to establish extensive contacts with the political 
opposition
166
 and is often used as an intermediary in sensitive issues or when 
official diplomatic ties are strained.
167
 The IDCPC has a research department, 
which researches developments abroad and is also in charge of academic 
exchange.
168
 
In addition to those more formal platforms, there are also initiatives 
organized below the state level, such as partnerships between cities, academic 
exchanges or connections to transnational epistemic communities. Through all 
these channels, China can keep up to date with developments in other countries. In 
the last few years, China has become much more proactive in initiating 
international conferences itself. In October 2009, the first (and, as of February 
2013, the only) World Media Summit (Shijie meiti fenghui 世界媒体峰会) took 
place in Beijing under the motto “Cooperation, Action, Win-Win & Development” 
(hezuo, yingdui, gongying, fazhan 合作、应对、共赢、发展), organized and 
largely funded by Xinhua News Agency.
169
 While China’s more proactive role in 
this area serves multiple purposes, including improving foreign journalists’ 
perception of Chinese journalism and increasing acceptance for its idiosyncrasies, 
such conferences and seminars are also part of the attempt to build networks.  
Finally, whenever the CPC plans important reforms of a particular policy 
sector, it conducts relatively systematic studies of different policy options from 
other countries. Studies that are released in public, particularly those looking at 
the U.S. external propaganda apparatus, also have to be seen as a tool to 
demonstrate that China’s opponents not only engage in propaganda but also 
outspend and outwit China, thus showing the urgency for China to catch up. 
Nonetheless, the external propaganda institutions and practices of foreign 
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 And consequently does not need to build a new network of contacts when a different party 
comes to power.  
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 Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’” 30-32. 
168
 “Guanyu Zhonglianbu, Jigou shezhi.” 
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 Participants had to pay for their travel to Beijing, but accommodation, food, and transport costs 
were covered by Xinhua. Cf. “World Media Summit Beijing, Letter of Invitation,”  website of 
the World Media Summit, http://www.worldmediasummit.org/english/2009-
03/20/content_16010173.htm, accessed October 13, 2012. According to Lye and Chong, the 
idea was conceived of during talks between Xinhua and the heads of various Western news 
organizations (including Rupert Murdoch) during the time of the Olympic Games. Cf. Lye, 
Liang Fook and S.K.C. Chong. China’s Media Initiatives and Its International Image Building. 
EAI Background Brief , no. 555 (2010): 4. 
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countries are primarily studied with the goal of finding areas that China can 
emulate.  
 
Integrating Expert Opinions 
In the post-Mao period, China has worked on ways to integrate expert 
opinions into its decision-making process. This shows both in the increasing 
number of think tanks, often affiliated with a particular ministry or department,
170
 
and in the integration of outside expertise at high level meetings. Both LSG and 
other decision-making bodies invite external experts (such as scholars, 
businesspeople, etc.) to part of their sessions to get some input. For instance, 
Wang Yiwei was invited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to speak as 
part of a lecture series on “public diplomacy” in 2003, one year before the MFA 
added a Division for Public Diplomacy.
171
 Since at least the 1990s, Chinese 
bureaucratic organizations have also relied on permanent advisors from the 
academic field. For instance, Li Xiguang 李希光, professor at Qinghua University 
and author of, among others, the 1996 bestseller Demonizing China (Yaomohua 
Zhongguo 妖魔化中国), has been heavily involved in creating China’s external 
propaganda policy since the late 1990s and continues to be involved.
172
  
 
High Politics and Low Politics: The Core Category of the Political 
The distinction between what is called “high politics” (i.e. issues that 
matter to the security of a state) and “low politics” in Political Science is 
important at all stages of the Chinese policy process. Issues and events are 
categorized into political and non-political, which in turn triggers different types 
of responses and of dealing with things or making decisions. A problem is 
considered political in China if it touches on national security, regime security, or 
“core interests” of China. This naturally includes all sensitive topics, such as 
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 Cf. David Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and 
Process,” The China Quarterly 171 (2002): 579-580. 
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 Cf. Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” ANNALS of the 
American Academy 616 (March 2008), 260.  
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 Cf. “Zhao Qizheng: ‘Zhongguo xingxiang dashi’ jiu jue xin chang” 赵启正：“中国形象大师”
旧角新唱” [Zhao Qizheng: The ‘master of China’s image’ sings an old role in a new tune], 
originally published in Zhongguo jingmao jujiao中国经贸聚焦 [China business focus], no. 4, 
2009, available online at http://www.xzbu.com/2/view-454291.htm, accessed December 15, 
2012.  
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Taiwan, Tibet, Tiananmen, Falungong, etc. A similar division exists for policy 
arenas, which can be divided into technical areas (“low politics”) and ideological 
areas (“high politics”).173 For decision-making, too, there is a “regular mode” 
(Normalmodus), characterized by prolonged bureaucratic bargaining and 
willingness to compromise and a “crisis mode” (Krisenmodus), characterized by a 
high degree of centralization, personal decisions, and ideology as the most 
important criterion for decisions.
174
  
This distinction between high and low politics is carried into all areas of 
Chinese public life. “Mistakes” committed by Chinese media, for instance, can 
either be political or not political.
175
 In the first case, the response is much more 
serious. Moreover, reforms that have possible effects on political issues are much 
more difficult to defend. In the post-Mao period, there has been a policy to strictly 
distinguish between political issues (zhengzhi wenti 政治问题) and academic 
issues (xueshu wenti 学术问题). In the latter case, the new “hundred flowers, 
hundred schools” (shuang bai 双百) policy applies, and people are free to voice 
their own opinions and deviate from the position of the Party however much they 
like without having to fear repercussions.
176
 Once an issue is categorized as 
political, however, anything that is published in writing or otherwise transmitted 
through the media is expected to maintain unity with the position of the Center.  
This is relevant for external propaganda because it explains two different 
modes in which China communicates with the outside world. For apolitical issues, 
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 Suisheng Zhao, “The Structure of Authority and Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework,” 
in Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders, eds. Carol Lee Hamrin and 
Suisheng Zhao (M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 239. 
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 Sebastian Heilmann, Das politische System der VR China (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissensczhaften, 2004), 32-32, 42-43 Zhao, “The Structure of Authority and Decision-
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 For a “political mistake,” see “Jiefang ribao she dui ‘Xinwen chenbao’ zhongda zhengzhi 
cuowu zuochu chuli” 解放日报社对《新闻晨报》重大政治错误作出处理 [The Liberation 
Daily agency deals with the major political mistake of the Morning News], Neibu tongxin, no. 
19 (2000): 10. In this case, the Xinwen chenbao, a subsidiary of the Liberation Daily (Jiefang 
ribao), referred to Taiwan as the “country which exports the most electronic products in the 
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“Zhengzhou wenyi guangbo diantai rexian dianhua jiemu chuxian yanzhong cuowu shou 
jinggao” 郑州文艺广播电台热线电话节目出现严重错误受警告 [Zhengzhou literature and 
arts radio’s hotline program receives a warning for a serious mistake], Neibu tongxin, no. 3 
(2001): 15. In this case, Zhengzhou radio station received a warning because it broadcast a ten 
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 Cf. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju, ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 
2001, 18.  
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external propaganda workers are asked to explain China’s stance in a kind and 
patient manner. For political issues, however, they need to “take a clear stance,” 
which usually results in attacks on opponents as well as rhetorical overdrive. 
These ideologically charged texts are referred to in Chinese as “having a high tune” 
(diaozi gao 调子高) or “singing a high tune” (chang gao diao 唱高调).177  
As mentioned above, the essence, which only the CPC can correctly 
determine, is decisive for whether an issue is political or not. Therefore, 
statements or actions are not judged by what is said or done, but by what the CPC 
thinks the underlying purpose is.  
 
Communicating the Spirit of the Center: Speeches, Policy Documents, and the 
Role of Slogans 
In analyzing the external propaganda debate (and debates in other policy 
sectors as well), certain regularities can be observed. For each given period, there 
is one particular text, usually a speech by a high-ranking leader, which serves as 
the “master text.” This text constitutes a point of reference and is often listed by 
name by an author writing on external propaganda. Additionally, circulars from 
the center are also frequently invoked as master texts; the period during which 
they are invoked may overlap with the period during which a certain speech 
serves as master text. Generally speaking, a speech remains quotable for longer 
periods of time than a circular. During the time that a master text is valid, new 
ideas are gradually introduced through a number of different channels, some of 
which are included in the next master text, while others are not. Moreover, there 
are instructions by high level leaders which might only apply to a particular aspect 
of external propaganda. 
Documents in the Chinese bureaucracy can be divided into different types 
according to two criteria: First, documents are classified according to content. 
Documents from subordinate units to their superior units include reports (baogao 
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 To adjust the tone depending on diplomatic aims and agreements was not uncommon during the 
Mao period and remains important today as well. For instance, a document from the MFA on 
problems with external propaganda in China and the Soviet Union at a time when the two 
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报告, huibao 汇报), requests for instruction (qingshi 请示), and opinions (yijian 
意见). Circulars sent from the top include decisions (jueding决定, jueyi决议), 
orders (ling 令 ), and notifications (tongzhi 通知 ), among others. Replies to 
requests for instructions from subordinate units are called pifu批复. Instructions 
left on other types of documents, usually directly written on the paper and often 
from top leaders, are called pishi 批示. Often, binding circulars only approve a 
certain document; in that case, the approved document (a report, an opinion, etc.) 
is attached (fu 附).  
Second, binding circulars carry different abbreviations depending on 
which organization issued (xiafa 下发) them. Circulars issued by the Party Center 
are called “Central [Committee] Circular” (Zhongfa 中发 ). The government 
equivalent issued by the State Council is abbreviated Guofa 国发 (State Council 
Circular). In addition, central leading departments (zhongyang lingdao bumen 中
央领导部门) may also issue binding documents without having to go through the 
CPC Central Committee. Circulars sent by the CPD (which has been authorized to 
directly issue binding documents since the post-Mao period) are called CPD 
Circular (Zhongxuanfawen 中宣发文 or Zhongxuanfa 中宣发). 178 Circulars are 
referred to by their number, with counting starting over each year. The year of 
issuance is usually indicated before the number in square brackets (e.g. Zhongfa 
[1990] no. 21). 
In addition to official policy documents, there are “important speeches” 
(zhongyao jianghua 重要讲话 ) from leading cadres that provide the basic 
direction of work. People in all sectors are asked to study them and “interpret their 
spirit” to apply it to their own work sector. Below, I will explain what 
“interpreting the spirit” means, using one type of rhetorical form in Chinese 
politics that makes up a part of both policy documents and “important speeches”: 
Slogans. 
Above, the Chinese Marxist discourse system has been divided into two 
basic components: An ontology that provides the overall framework and concrete 
principles and policies, usually expressed in the form of slogans. Slogans are a 
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 Brady notes that during the Mao period, “[m]any recommendations by the Central Propaganda 
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component of the discourse system in the Chinese bureaucracy and Chinese 
politics of nearly inflationary use. Slogans, particularly their frequency and any 
change made to them have been watched in the past to get a sense of China’s 
policy direction, both overall and in specific fields. Qian Gang, former editor at 
Nanfang zhoumo and now the director of the China Media Project at Hong Kong 
University, has recently argued in favor of both continuing to watch the frequency 
of slogans and understanding what they mean in order to gain an insight into elite 
politics.
179
 This is definitely true, but what has been neglected thus far is the role 
that slogans play in policy making in the Chinese bureaucracy.  
Compared to understanding the basic principles of the Chinese Marxist 
ideology or determining the position and function of external propaganda in the 
overall universe of the CPC and its plans for China’s future, interpreting and 
translating slogans is a more difficult task for several reasons: First, slogans are 
ubiquitous in Chinese politics, and their potential number has no limits. Second, 
slogans are usually not explained in documents publically available; their meaning 
needs to be reconstructed on the basis of additional speeches or context. Third, 
slogans are coined with a particular central policy in mind, but then assume 
different meanings in different policy sectors and across time. Additionally, one 
slogan can be used with different meanings in the same policy sector at the same 
time. 
180
 Basically, the party centre (usually through the Central Propaganda 
Department) invents a new or reuses
181
 an old slogan and defines its particular 
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 Cf. Qian Gang, “Watchwords: The Life of the Party,” website of the China Media Project at the 
University of Hong Kong, http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/09/10/26667/, accessed November 22, 2012.  
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daobao 宣传导报 [Propaganda herald], no. 8 (1986): 12. 
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shuangbai slogan has been reused starting in the 1990s to express the center’s policy to strictly 
distinguish between political and academic issues, meaning that substantial academic freedom 
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Cf. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju, ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 
2001, 18. 
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meaning with regard to the overall or entire situation (quanju 全局182). Leaders in 
central departments and below the central level are then tasked with interpreting 
the slogan to fit the particular needs of their professional work sector or 
geographic jurisdiction. Afterwards, the concrete meaning of the slogan in a 
particular field is usually communicated to a limited number of people through 
study sessions and internal publications. Slogans devised at the central level for 
the overall situation provide the basic framework for policy making at the lower 
levels. Departments and locales are relatively free in interpreting slogans to match 
what they perceive as the most pressing problems, but policy making cannot be 
done completely independently. This does not only apply to the ministerial and 
provincial level, but to all levels below, which take the interpretation of their 
immediate superiors as the point of departure for their own policy interpretation of 
the slogan.  
Thus, in each context at a particular point in time, slogans assume different 
and usually very concrete meanings. Sometimes it is possible to get enough 
information to reconstruct the exact meaning of a slogan in a particular area at a 
particular point in time, but even where that is not possible, there are a number of 
strategies to get a better understanding of what a slogan is referring to in a 
particular situation. In order to further illustrate the use of slogans, selected 
slogans with multiple meanings in external propaganda work will be dissected 
below. This is important both to grasp one of the most important tools with which 
the Chinese bureaucracy works and in order to be able to properly interpret texts 
on external propaganda. As will be seen throughout the following chapters, the 
translation of slogans provided as broad guidelines by the CPC into concrete 
policies significantly shapes the external propaganda debate. Principles and 
policies originally devised for other policy sectors, most importantly propaganda 
and thought work and foreign affairs work, are also frequently re-interpreted and 
adapted to the external propaganda sector.  
There are various ways to gain more information about a slogan. First, 
articles and speeches targeted at cadres within a particular sector often explain 
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slogans or give vital clues in documents that are openly available. Second, it often 
helps to get an idea of the meaning of the slogan in other contexts around the 
same time, such as in another sector or in a higher or lower administrative level. 
Third, when little additional information is provided, the context in which the 
slogan is used becomes crucial. Moreover, it can be helpful to look at the precise 
meanings of components of slogans. Often, two slogans are listed together. When 
this is the case, there is no universal formula for determining the relationship 
between the two, but three options are most common: In the first case, the two 
form one single slogan, and the first part indicates what needs to be done in order 
to achieve the desired result, which is spelled out in the second part.
183
 In the 
second case, the two parts are two separate principles (fangzhen) that constitute 
dialectic opposites and need to be balanced against each other.
184
 When no 
dialectic opposite is provided, it makes sense to try to figure out its implied 
opposite. In the third scenario, two related slogans are simply listed together.
185
 
To give an example, according to a handbook from 2006, external 
propaganda work needs to “continue to rely mainly on positive propaganda, rely 
on ourselves, and speak through facts” (jianchi yi zhengmian xuanchuan wei zhu, 
yi wo wei zhu, yong shishi shuohua 坚持以正面宣传为主，以我为主，用事实
说话).186 These are actually three different slogans as well as underlying policies, 
and each of them needs an implied opposite in order to gain meaning.  
The first, “relying mainly on positive propaganda” (yi zhengmian 
xuanchuan wei zhu 以正面宣传为主) is a principle that was devised specifically 
for propaganda and thought work and therefore does not have a “general” 
meaning applicable to all policy sectors. The slogan, first introduced in a speech 
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 An example is “continue to take the initiative in order to gain the upper hand” (jianchi dahao 
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by Li Ruihuan at a conference for domestic propaganda and thought work on 
November 28, 1989,
187
 is often interpreted to comment on the balance between 
positive news and more critical or negative reports.
188
 However, this is only one 
usage of the slogan. Its more common implied or explicit opposite in domestic 
propaganda work is “supervision and control” (jiandu kongzhi 监督控制). Thus, 
“rely mainly on positive propaganda” asks propaganda workers to flood the news 
market with positive stories rather than relying excessively on censorship.  
In external propaganda, zhengmian xuanchuan has two main meanings. 
Which one of the two meanings applies can only be reconstructed by looking at 
the context and searching for the implied opposite. In summaries of speeches in 
the People’s Daily, such context is not necessarily provided, but full texts of 
speeches usually provide a frame of reference. First, it can be used to make 
statements about the ratio of positive versus negative news. To “rely mainly on 
positive propaganda” does not mean that problems should not be addressed at all, 
but rather that China needs to focus on the essence of Chinese society, namely 
“bright aspects” and progress. When covering problems, reports should 
simultaneously address how China intends to solve them. However, the slogan has 
had another main implied opposite since the 1990s, namely “engaging in the 
struggle over international public opinion” (kaizhan guoji yulun douzheng 开展国
际舆论斗争). In that case, “rely mainly on positive propaganda” means that 
China should primarily introduce itself abroad and help improve its image by 
means of non-polemical news stories. Refuting “lies” by hostile forces and 
publishing stories on sensitive issues, something which is usually done in the 
much harsher “crisis mode” of reporting, should be reduced. While such 
refutations are necessary where China’s national interests are at stake, excessive 
struggle would put China into a passive and reactive position, something which is 
to be avoided.  
 “Speaking through facts” usually means providing selective factual 
information to get people to arrive at a certain conclusion, instead of telling 
people directly what their opinion on a certain issue should be, as used to be 
                                                          
187
 Cf. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 46-47. 
188
 E.g. Wu Zheng 吴征, Zhongguo daguo diwei yu guoji chuanbo zhanlue 中国的大国地位与国
际传播战略  [China’s great power status and (its) international communication strategy] 
(Changzheng chubanshe, 2001).  
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common in the state-owned media across the Socialist bloc. This principle was 
introduced to Chinese external propaganda workers as an important strategy of 
Western propaganda media vis-à-vis the S.U. in the early 1970s.
189
 This slogan 
has been used relatively consistently throughout the post-Mao period. Its opposite 
is a practice that used to dominate Chinese journalism and that external 
propaganda experts have been trying to combat since the 1980s, namely to tell the 
target audience what its point of view on a particular issue should be in direct 
terms.
190
  
“Relying mainly on ourselves” (yi wo wei zhu 以我为主) can again be 
used in different contexts and with different dialectic opposites at the time. For 
instance, it can refer to the notion that China cannot parrot what others say (for 
instance with the goal of raising the credibility of Chinese media in the eyes of 
foreigners), but needs to strictly uphold its stance (lichang 立场, guandian 观点, 
or zhuzhang 主张) on particular questions of importance. Producing “news with 
Chinese characteristics” rather than parroting what the West says was also 
promoted as a means to become more competitive and attractive to the rest of the 
world.
191
 In this case, its dialectic opposite is you di fang shi 有的放矢, i.e. 
tailoring content and form of one’s message in order to make it more effective.192  
“Relying mainly on ourselves” can also refer to external propaganda 
channels. In this case, the implied opposite of yi wo wei zhu is “using foreign 
forces to propagate China” (yong waili xuanchuan Zhongguo 用外力宣传中国), 
for example by cooperating with foreign media or trying to win over foreign 
journalists. This option was considered in the 1990s because Chinese media 
enjoyed low credibility. In the end, it was rejected as a main strategy because 
China’s efforts to “convert” journalists and foreign media and try to get them to 
report more favorably on China were evaluated as not successful enough. Of 
course, China continues to work with foreign media, but yi wo wei zhu means that 
its main strategy is to invest in its own forces and infrastructure.   
                                                          
189
Cui Yongchang 崔永昌, “Xuanchuan ‘xinlizhan’ mantan” 宣传‘心理战’漫谈 [Discussion of 
the “psychological war” through propaganda], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 2 (1988): 30. 
190
 Cf. ibid. 
191
 Cf. Zeng Jianhui, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei, vol. 1, 100-101.  
192
 For an explanation of the dialectic pair in this meaning, see for example Yi Xianfei 易先飞, 
“Tigao waixuan xiaoguo bixu jiaqiang zhenduixing” 提高外宣效果必须加强针对性[In order 
to raise the effectiveness of external propaganda, we need to strengthen its accordance with the 
target audience’s tastes and needs], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 5 (2001): 36-37.  
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As these examples have shown, it is not only worthwhile to watch the use 
and frequency of slogans at the general central level, but also makes sense to 
decode the meaning of a slogan in a particular context. Applying the “general” 
meaning of the slogan can help to get an idea, but at the same time, awareness that 
many different concrete meanings of the same slogan exist is important in order to 
understand any text rich in slogans.  
From a perspective of policy making, slogans are umbrella terms that can 
be translated into a broad range of specific actions. As such they are a very 
effective way of giving both consistence at a given moment to different actions, 
and allow for specific application to the context in which they are used. As a form 
of political guidance they are a rather effective instrument that provides both a 
structure for lower level players but also gives them sufficient agency to deal with 
the problems they identify. 
 
4.4  Conclusions 
This chapter has provided an introduction into the post-Mao institutional 
environment and thus given both background knowledge and tools for the analysis 
in the following chapters. From a functional perspective, this chapter has 
explained the basic terminology needed in order to understand anything written in 
the language of Chinese Marxism and texts about the set-up of the external 
propaganda bureaucracy and its interaction with other units. It has also explained 
strategies how to understand slogans in a particular context. From a substantial 
perspective, it has demonstrated the change and development of the organizational 
and ideological order since the beginning of the post-Mao period and has 
highlighted the most important trends. Throughout the rest of the dissertation, I 
will come back to the ideological and organizational principles outlined here.  
The most important particularity of the Chinese case is, obviously, the fact 
that China is ruled by a Communist Party. The CPC has understood itself as the 
vanguard (xianfengdui 先 锋 队 ) of the Chinese people, and, its many 
transformations notwithstanding, that is the role it continues to see itself in until 
today. This role is well-institutionalized: Party structures continue to be above 
government institutions, and while the CPC has delegated administrative work to 
the state, it maintains tight control over political, ideological, and organizational 
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matters. The CPC has reorganized and reinvented itself multiple times over the 
course of its history. Nonetheless, it retains guiding ideology and distinct 
organizational features that are no longer shared by many other parties today and 
that make it stand out. Ideology remains an important factor in Chinese policy-
making that both shapes and is shaped by the CPC’s agenda at a particular point 
in time. The overall ideological universe is a restricting factor on individual actors, 
but it is not a completely inflexible construct that inevitably ties China down. 
This chapter has introduced some of the basic mechanisms of policy 
making: First, important principles and policies devised for the “overall situation” 
(quanju) are meant to be adapted to each policy sector and each locale. Under the 
cover of shared terminology, locales and departments interpret policies and adapt 
them to their own needs. Second, experiments have played an important role in 
the post-Mao period, both as a regular mode of policy making and as a means to 
push policies that face ideological objections from other leaders. Third, using 
foreign models is a legitimate way of trying to speed up China’s development 
process, although since the 1990s, the CPC has highlighted selective appropriation 
and the need to adapt any idea of practice that is imported to the Chinese 
circumstances. 
The difference between high politics and low politics pervades all aspects 
of Chinese politics and communication. If something is low politics, it means 
decisions are made regular mode, China tries to compromise and accommodate 
everyone’s needs. In altercations, potential opponents are generally portrayed as 
reasonable. If something is high politics, the crisis mode of policy making and 
communication kicks in, marked by a high tone and readiness for struggle against 
the perceived enemy. As the next chapters will show, this division into two modes 
of operating and communication has played an important role both in external 
propaganda policy making and in actual external propaganda output based on 
policies built around this distinction. 
Finally, the chapter has touched both on restrictions placed on individuals 
or groups as much as on possible avenues to overcome these restrictions. First, 
there is the issue of consensus politics. The absence of a “supreme leader” who 
can take decisions single-handedly means that at the highest levels, the Politburo 
and the PBSC, structure gains in relative importance vis-à-vis agency. By and 
large, individual leaders do not have the necessary political clout to simply 
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implement reforms or changes in contested or political arenas; they are 
constrained by organization, institutional and ideological conventions. Policy 
documents do not necessarily provide certainty to have eclipsed one's opponent, 
as different positions are usually included and different aspects of a policy 
document can be highlighted at a later point in time when the political climate 
changes. This does not mean that individual leaders are helpless in the face of the 
institutions they have to work with, but their room for maneuver is limited. At the 
same time, the Chinese bureaucracy has some inbuilt mechanisms that make it 
potentially very flexible, such as the tradition of experiments before full 
implementation of a policy and the general willingness to appropriate new ideas 
from abroad. 
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5 The Long 1980s: The (Relative) Rise and Fall of External 
Propaganda 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, with the overall reform project that China 
embarked on, external propaganda received a new and important role: To serve 
economic development by diminishing foreigners’ doubts about China’s reform 
course and by attracting foreign investment.1 Thus, China not only had reason to 
propagate itself abroad, but also to do it in a way that would be accepted by the 
most important target audience, which were no longer leftist revolutionaries, but 
overseas Chinese and Westerners. External propaganda reforms could be couched 
in the language of the opening up policies, presenting them as part of China’s 
historical shift towards the world. The new importance resulted in a number of 
organizational changes, including the setting up of a small group at the top of the 
sector –the first such group for external propaganda in the People’s Republic of 
China’s (PRC) history– and the launching of various new media and exchange 
initiatives. The reforms were so substantial that I propose to read the 
developments of the 1980s in the sector as part of the attempt to change the 
Chinese media system and make external propaganda at least as, if not more, 
important than domestic propaganda work –a project that enjoyed Hu Yaobang’s 
胡耀邦 support and that ultimately failed after his ouster and left an external 
propaganda apparatus that was structurally dependent on domestic propaganda 
institutions. 
As I will show, external propaganda became a part not only of the change 
in economic policy, but also of a larger struggle over China’s political direction. 
The 1980s were a time in which the political orientation of China and the way it 
would turn was relatively open again. Rejection of the Cultural Revolution and 
condemnation of the “Gang of Four” had opened a window in which it became 
possible to attack the ways China had been run during the Mao period, including 
the Chinese understanding of journalism and media control. Like the 1920s, the 
decade was a time in which China tried to reform itself and “catch up” with the 
rest of the world by systematically –and, compared to the 1990s, relatively 
                                                          
1
 Cf. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in 
Contemporary China (Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 151.  
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uncritically– importing “Western knowledge.” 2  Hu Yaobang was generally 
supportive of political reforms, including in the realm of propaganda and media 
control. Between 1978 and 1987, China gradually moved in the direction of 
weakening the domestic propaganda apparatus, and strengthening its external 
propaganda apparatus instead. This was a non-linear, complex project, neither 
supported by all members of the CPC nor given cohesion by a single 
understanding of external propaganda shared by all involved in the debate. While 
there was no strong opposition towards strengthening external propaganda per se, 
the issue became a part of the larger struggle over the direction that China was to 
take. 
Against this larger backdrop, I will first introduce the overall domestic and 
international context of the late 1970s and 1980s affecting the development of the 
external propaganda sector. I will then analyze the different phases in the upgrade 
(and, after 1987, in the relative downgrade) of external propaganda. A detailed 
analysis helps to understand both what drove the changes and how supporters of 
external propaganda went about instituting them. 
 
5.1 External Propaganda between the Domestic and the International 
In 1978, China officially launched its policies of reform and opening that 
would help develop and modernize China while at the same time ensuring that 
foreigners literally had an investment in an internally stable and prosperous China. 
External propaganda was declared an important part of this new plan. By and 
large, new initiatives in external propaganda followed expansions of reform and 
opening. Although initial economic reforms had already been launched under the 
supervision of Zhou Enlai 周恩来 and Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 between 1971 and 
early 1976, when Deng was purged for a second time,
3
 formally, the Reform and 
Opening (gaige kaifang 改革开放) policies began with the famous Third Plenary 
Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, held December 18-22, 1978, when 
Deng Xiaoping consolidated his power and became the unofficial pre-eminent 
leader of the Central Party Committee and China.  
                                                          
2
 Cf. ibid., 67. 
3
 For a brief account, see, for example, Raphael Shen, China’s Economic Reform: An Experiment 
in Pragmatic Socialism (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 27-28.  
229 
 
In 1979, Deng Xiaoping first came up with the notion of the “moderately 
well-off society” (xiaokang shehui 小康社会) as a goal for China to achieve by 
the end of the 20
th
 century. Deng named a per capita Gross domestic product 
(GDP) of $1,000 as a reference value for what the target meant in terms of GDP. 
The Twelfth Party Congress 1982 then officially declared the moderately well-off 
society as China’s strategic goal (zhanlüe mubiao 战略目标) for the end of the 
20
th
 century.
4
 The new policies also allowed for foreign investments, and in 1980, 
the first batch of special economic zones was created. A second batch was opened 
after the reforms shifted their focus from rural to urban areas in 1984 at the Third 
Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee.
5
 As will be seen below, the 
launching of both stages of reform was accompanied by increased attention to 
external propaganda. 
With the beginning of reform and opening, China found itself operating in 
a new environment. Domestically, the PRC relaxed controls on foreign 
broadcasting signals within its territory. For instance, in October 1978, the Voice 
of America (VOA) was unblocked. The Central Propaganda Department (CPD) 
issued a circular which stated that while Chinese citizens would not be 
encouraged to listen to VOA, they were allowed to listen to broadcasts teaching 
English.
6
 External propaganda, too, lost much of its monopoly on PRC-related 
news and information abroad. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, people involved 
in external propaganda were reminded not to exaggerate achievements so as to 
avoid disappointment once foreigners actually visited a place.
7
 Aside from trying 
                                                          
4Cf. “Deng Xiaoping tichu de ‘xiaokang shehui’ shi shenme hanyi?” 邓小平提出的“小康社会”是
什么含义 ? [What does Deng Xiaoping’s ‘moderately well-off society’ encompass?], 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64156/64157/4418455.html, accessed September 8, 2011.  
5
 Cf. Shanquan Gao, Yu-Ling Wang, and Youling Wang, Two Decades of Reform in China 
(Singapore: World Scientific, 1999), 19-20.  
6
 “Zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu shouting ‘Meiguo zhi yin’ Huayu guangbo zhong Yingyu 
jiaoxue jiemu ji shifou keyi xiang ‘Meiguo zhi yin’ zhu Xianggang banshi jigou hansuo 
Yingyu jiaocai deng wenti” 中央宣传部关于收听“美国之音”华语广播中英语教学节目及是
否可以向“美国之音”驻香港办事机构函索英语教材等问题的通知 [The Central Propaganda 
Department on the issues whether it is allowed to receive the English teaching programs of the 
Voice of America and whether it is allowed to enquire at the Hong Kong office of the Voice of 
America for material to learn English], Zhongxuan fawen [1979], 1 hao中宣发文 [1979], 1 号
[Circular from the CPD (1979), no. 1], January 5, 1979, Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian 
xuanbian (1976-1982) 党的宣传工作文件选编 (1976-1982) [Selected documents from the 
Party’s propaganda work (1976-1982)], 667 . 
7
 E.g. “Zhang Xiangshan tongzhi tan guanyu zuohao jiedai, lüyou gongzuo zhong de xuanchuan 
wenti” 张香山同志谈关于做好 接待、旅游工作中的宣传问题 [Comrade Zhang Xiangshan 
talks about the issue of properly doing propaganda as part of hosting (foreigners) and tourism 
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to get away from a particular model of journalism that played up China’s 
successes, these reminders also showed that opening up confronted China with a 
new situation it had to adapt to. Following the adoption of the policies of reform 
and opening up, China’s external propaganda apparatus had to adapt to working in 
an environment in which foreign media correspondents began to be gradually 
allowed into the country.
8
 Initially, foreign journalists’ access to most parts of the 
country and news sources was extremely limited. Nevertheless, allowing 
journalists to be stationed in Beijing and incrementally increasing their access 
weakened the monopoly CPC media had previously held on China-related news. 
On the one hand, this took away some of Chinese media’s freedoms to report as 
they pleased while foreign media did not have access to the country and thus 
could not challenge their version of events except by means of wholesale 
dismissal of anything coming out of “Red China.” On the other hand, it 
potentially increased the credibility of news emerging from the country and 
opened up new possibilities for using foreign journalists and media organizations 
to propagate China abroad.  
In the 1980s, external propaganda reforms also overlapped with the larger 
project of challenging domestic propaganda. As is well-known, the concept of 
propaganda became contested, and the question what constitutes proper 
journalistic practices and ethics were debated vigorously in China
9
 as new 
journalism departments were added to universities and disciplines that had been 
established in the West for decades, such as communication studies, were for the 
                                                                                                                                                               
work], published in Xuanchuan dongtai xuanbian, 1979 宣传动态选编, 1979 [Selections from 
Propaganda trends, 1979] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1981), 236. Zhang’s 
statement was actually from the early 1970s but circulated again in 1979. Also see remarks by 
Turkish foreign expert: “Guangbo shiyeju waiguo zhuanjia tan ticai, xiezuo he shixiao” 广播事
业局外国专家谈题材写作和时效 [Foreign experts from the Broadcasting Bureau speak about 
(choice of) topics, writing, and timeliness], Duiwai baodao cankao对外报道参考 [External 
reporting reference], no. 2 (1981): 13.  
8
 This monopoly had never been absolute: During the Mao period, news were often picked up by 
foreign media organization through Chinese domestic media before China’s waixuan media 
could report. Cf. Cagdas Ungor, “Reaching the Distant Comrade: Chinese Communist 
Propaganda Abroad (1949-1976)” (PhD diss. Binghamton University, 2009), 205-206. 
However, by and large, China had had more control over what was reported than after the 
changes initiated in 1978.  
9
 E.g. Junhao Hong and Marlene Cuthbert, “Media Reform in China since 1978: Background 
Factors, Problems, and Future Trends,” Gazette 47, no. 3 (1991); Chin-chuan Lee, ed., Voices 
of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism (New York and London: Guilford Press, 
1990). 
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first time introduced systematically in China.
10
 Challenging the propaganda 
concept of the Mao period was possible, first, because the effort could be framed 
as part of the fight against the remnants of the “Gang of Four” in China and, 
second, because the idea enjoyed some support within the highest ranks of the 
Party. Especially with the introduction of communication studies, more concrete 
means to improve the “art of propaganda” (xuanchuan yishu 宣传艺术) were 
systematically explained. However, ultimately, issues went well beyond the 
merely technical level of how to be able to better persuade readers. There was, for 
example, a debate about why China had never produced anyone comparable to 
Walter Lippmann, who was seen in China as the prototype of a journalist with 
influence on (U.S.) policy.
11
 The message was clear: Instead of being influenced 
by politics, journalists should influence policy, and to be able to do so, the 
Chinese system had to change. People from the external propaganda sector did not 
challenge the CPC’s concept of propaganda directly. 12 Nonetheless, in a way, 
external propaganda served as a precursor and an apt vehicle to push for changes 
in the conceptualization of propaganda. Many of the suggested changes in 
external propaganda followed the overall debate on proper journalistic practice, 
                                                          
10
 For instance, in May 1982, Wilbur Schramm (transliterated as Xuan Weibo 宣伟伯 in Duiwai 
baodao cankao) gave a series of lectures in Beijing which had been organized with the help of 
his student, Yu Yelu (余也鲁), who was head of the Journalism Department of the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong (CUHK). Zhang Liang 张梁, “Meiguo chuanboxue bizu -- Xuan 
Weibo boshi” 美国传播学鼻祖——宣伟伯博士 [The father of American communication 
studies -- Dr. Wilbur Schramm], Duiwai baodao cankao no. 12, (1982): 12-13. Schramm’s 
tour lasted six days, and he spoke, among others, at the People’s Daily and at People’s 
University (Renmin daxue 人民大学), which had first translated and published Four Theories 
of the Press in 1980 (Wilbur Schramm et al., Baokan de si zhong lilun [Four theories of the 
press], transl. “The Press Department of People’s University”, 1980). His talks were highly 
influential, as works for translation were chosen on the basis of his recommendations. Cf. 
Zhang Yonghua 张咏华, Dazhong chuanbo shehuixue 大众传播社会学 [Sociology of mass 
communication] (Shanghai: Shanghai waiyu jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998), 37. In 1982, the first 
national conference on communications studies (chuanboxue 传播学) was held in Beijing. Cf. 
Zhang Yonghua, Dazhong chuanbo shehuixue, 39 
11
 For a publically available article calling for reform of the Chinese press system to make possible 
the emergence of a Chinese Lippmann, see for example Siren 斯人, “Zhongguo hui you 
Lipuman ma?” 中国会有李普曼吗? [Can China have a Lippmann?], Xinwen jizhe 新闻记者 
[News reporter], no. 6 (1989): 47. Lippmann was well-known in China as both Cankao Xiaoxi 
and the Renmin ribao frequently carried translations of or summaries of his articles, 
particularly in the 1950s and 1960s.  
12
 Though some such as Shen Suru argued that external propaganda needed to be exempt from 
some of the Party’s assumptions of propaganda work, such as the relationship between sender 
and receiver. Whereas for domestic propaganda work, there was a teacher-student relationship 
between the Party and the masses, for external propaganda, the relationship between external 
propaganda workers and foreign readers should be one of equal status. See for example Shen 
Suru 沈苏儒, Duiwai baodao yewu jichu 对外报道业务基础 [Professional basics for external 
reporting] (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe, 1989), 31-32. 
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but at the same time, the need to be understood and accepted by foreign audiences 
served as one powerful (and relatively apolitical) argument in favor of changing 
existing journalistic practices and conventions. 
 
China’s external propaganda reforms had a lot of material from abroad to 
draw on, and analyses of other countries external propaganda activities or reforms 
frequently showed up in open and internal publications.
13
 In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, there were multiple changes to the most important U.S. external 
propaganda organization during the Cold War, the United States Information 
Agency (USIA, called Meiguo xinwenshu 美国新闻署 in Chinese) that were 
reported in the U.S. media and consequently selectively translated and published 
in China internally in Reference Materials (Cankao ziliao 参考资料), Reference 
News (Cankao xiaoxi 参考消息) and in other specialized (zhuanyexing 专业性) 
journals.
14
 First, Jimmy Carter reorganized the USIA and renamed it International 
Communication Agency (ICA, Chinese translation: Guoji jiaoliushu 国际交流署
15
) on April 1, 1978. He also gave a number of talks outlining the responsibilities 
of the restructured agency that were translated into Chinese and analyzed.
16
 
Ohmstedt has argued that Carter’s changes were not only cosmetic, but also tried 
to re-conceptualize the agency’s purpose from one focused primarily on 
protecting U.S. national interests to one genuinely promoting international 
                                                          
13
 E.g. “Riben kaishi zhongshi duiwai xuanchuan” 日本开始重视对外宣传 [Japan has started to 
pay attention to external propaganda], Bianyi cankao 编译参考 [Compilation and translation 
reference], no. 2 (1982):84-87; “Meiguo ying ruhe jinxing duiwai xuanchuan” 美国应如何进
行对外宣传  [How should America conduct external propaganda], Bianyi cankao, no. 10 
(1983):78-84. Like many Reference (Cankao) publications, these two articles consisted of 
translated articles from the U.S. and Japanese press. 
14
 Such as Journalism Abroad (Waiguo xinwen shiye ziliao 外国新闻事业资料), an internal 
journal launched in the late 1970s. 
15
 In the 1980s, Communication Studies was translated, like today, as chuanboxue, but could also 
be translated as jiaoliuxue (See for example Kuang Hua 匡华 , “Guangyi qingbaoxue – 
Jiaoliuxue” 广义情报学——交流学 [Information studies in the broad sense: Communication 
studies], in Qingbao kexue 情报科学 [Information studies] 5, no. 4 (1984): 20. 
16
 An article on ICA mentions that the functions of ICA as outlined in the article were 
reconstructed on the basis of various talks Carter gave. Shu Zongqiao 舒宗侨, “Meiguo de 
duiwai xuanchuan he wenhua jiaoliu – Guoji jiaoliushu de qingkuang he gongzuo” 美国的对
外宣传和文化交流——国际交流署的情况和工作  [America’s external propaganda and 
cultural exchange – Overall circumstances and work of the International Communication 
Agency], Waiguo xinwen shiye ziliao 外国新闻事业资料) [(Material on) Journalism Abroad], 
no. 4 (1979): 5-6. 
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understanding,
17
 thus re-introducing elements from the humanist discourse into 
U.S. international propaganda work again.  
Under Reagan, the reinforced propaganda war against the Soviet Union 
(S.U.) led to a reversal of Carter’s changes and a major boost of U.S. external 
propaganda organs. Between 1981 and 1986, the USIA’s budget increased by 93 
per cent.
18
 Many of the changes were due to Reagan’s personal contacts into the 
Hollywood PR scene, where Charles Wick, newly appointed head of ICA, named 
back to USIA in 1982,
19
 had worked previously. In the same year, the U.S. 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was founded, based largely on the 
model of German political foundations.
20
 In early 1983, Reagan’s National 
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) Number 77 (an executive order), 
“Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security,” announced the 
establishment of a Special Planning Group (SPG) under the National Security 
Council with five subordinate committees in charge of all public diplomacy 
activities.
21
 From the document itself it becomes clear that the SPG would be 
responsible both for domestic propaganda (called “public affairs” and handled by 
the Public Affairs Committee) and external propaganda (handled by the 
International Information Committee, the International Political Committee, and 
the International Broadcasting Committee).
22
 In late 1983, Wick launched 
“Worldnet,” the first worldwide television network consisting of five satellite 
networks. Regular operation of the channel began in April 1985,
23
 and although 
the effort ultimately failed, the new developments in using satellite technology for 
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 Cf. Holger Ohmstedt, Von der Propaganda zur Public Diplomacy: Die Selbstdarstellung der 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika im Ausland vom Ersten Weltkrieg bis zum Ende des Kalten 
Krieges (Doctoral dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 1993), 143-145.  
18
 Cf. Robert S. Fortner, Public Diplomacy and International Politics (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 
6-7.  
19
 Cf. Ohmstedt, Von der Propaganda zur Public Diplomacy, 158. 
20
 Cf. Rainer Thiel, Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion: The United States and the 
Polish Liberalization, 1980-1989 (Springer, 2010), 223. For some more details, see footnote 
216 on the same page. 
21
 The document is available in full on the website of the Federation of American Scientiests and 
on of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum. Ronald Reagan, “Management of 
Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security,” NSDD-77, January 14, 1984, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1966t.gif, accessed December 15, 2012, 1; 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD77.pdf, accessed 
December 12, 2012. 
22
 Cf. ibid., 2-3.  
23
 Cf. Ohmstedt, Von der Propaganda zur Public Diplomacy, 164-165.  
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news transmission across the globe was taken very seriously by China and other 
countries at the time.
24
  
The developments at the USIA showed up in Chinese public and semi-
internal media (People’s Daily, Reference News). For example, on January 23, 
1983, following Reagan’s signing of the NSDD 77 on January 14, the People’s 
Daily reported on the establishment of “two special small groups” (liang ge 
zhuanmen xiaozu 两个专门小组).25 While articles in the People’s Daily were 
obviously primarily meant to “expose” U.S. activities, they also confirm that 
developments abroad were watched rather closely by China and that, despite the 
fact that NSDD 77 remained classified until 1996, whatever had leaked to the 
Western press was reported in China as well. It can safely be assumed that a large 
number of additional reports and assessments exist on the Chinese side that were 
classified at different levels.  
The Soviet Union also served as a model in this regard, but there are a 
number of indications that it was outranked by the U.S. For instance, a book by 
China Reconstructs journalist Li Chaochen from 1989 noted that the S.U.’s 
external propaganda forces and budget (at more than $ 3 billion) were larger than 
the United States’, but Li still devoted less space to its resources and actions 
compared to the longer and more detailed explanation of the external propaganda 
apparatus of the U.S.
 26
 Nonetheless, points newly introduced to Chinese external 
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 As the U.S. improved its capacities to transmit news via satellite and planned worldnet, Chinese 
officials also began to stress the need for China to improve satellite technology for the 
transmission of news. Cf. Mu Qing 穆青, “You mianxiang guonei zhuanxiang mianxiang shijie” 
由面向国内转向面向世界 [From facing China to facing the world], Mu Qing lun xinwen 穆青
伦新闻 [Mu Qing on news] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2003), 271-272. Compared to the 
Soviet Union (see Alvin Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation [New York: Arcade, 1995], 23) 
China was obviously not as worried about the prospect of having to deal with U.S. propaganda 
in their territory. 
25“Mei chengli liang ge zhuanmen xiaozu jiaqiang duiwai xuanchuan, yi ge duifu Su heping 
gongshi, yi ge zhengqu Xi’Ou zhichi Mei bushu daodan” 美成立两个专门小组加强对外宣传 
一个对付苏和平攻势 一个争取西欧支持美部署导弹 [The United States sets up two special 
small groups, one to deal with the Soviet Union’s peace offensive and one to win Western 
European support for the deployment of U.S. missiles], Renmin ribao 人民日报 [People’s 
Daily], January 23, 1983, 6. 
26
 Cf. Li Chaochen李超尘, Mantan dui wai dui Tai xuanchuan 漫谈对外对台宣传 [Thoughts on 
external propaganda and propaganda targeted at Taiwan] (Beijing: Zhongguo jianshe 
chubanshe, 1989), 4-5. Li refers to a report from a U.S. journal to note that the number of S.U. 
external propaganda broadcast workers was seven times that of the U.S. It appears that figures 
about Soviet external propaganda, at least those that were publically or semi-publically 
presented, were largely derived from Western sources, not independent Chinese intelligence 
work. Since China’s relations with the S.U. were not good and Soviet media did not report on 
the details of the Soviet external propaganda apparatus, Western media are likely to have been 
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propaganda workers were often backed up by references both from Western and 
from Soviet research to demonstrate a broad international consensus.
27
 External 
propaganda initiatives of other countries such as Japan were also reported in 
Chinese journals.
28
 
At the same time, the drive to improve external propaganda was inspired 
by and rhetorically linked to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)/United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) debate over 
establishing a new media world order that prompted the U.S. to withdraw from 
UNESCO in 1984 and that has recently (2011) been picked up in China again.
29
 
Beginning during the early 1970s, the NAM had begun to raise issues concerning 
“cultural imperialism” and misrepresentation of third world countries supported 
by the media world order at the time.
30
 These were taken up at UNESCO in the 
second half of the 1970s in the debate over what was called the New World 
Information and Communication Order (NWICO) or New World Information 
Order (NWIO), translated into Chinese as Guoji xinwen xin zhixu 国际新闻新秩
序. The debate culminated in the MacBride Commission report, Many Voices, 
One World: Towards a New, More Just, and More Efficient World Information 
and Communication Order, published in 1980.
31
 China did not have a 
representative in the MacBride Commission, but followed the UNESCO 
developments closely. Many Voices, One World was translated and published in 
Chinese in 1981.
32
 The issue was also taken up at the Organization of Asia-Pacific 
                                                                                                                                                               
an important source of information on Soviet propaganda or intelligence operations. The 
figures quoted in the U.S. were usually based on CIA estimates. For a table of these estimates, 
see for example Starr, Richard Felix, “Soviet Foreign Propaganda,” in Foreign Policies of the 
Soviet Union (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1991), 76.  
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 E.g. Li, Mantan dui wai dui Tai xuanchuan, 4-5.  
28
 E.g. “Riben kaishi zhongshi duiwai xuanchuan,” 84-87. 
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 For instance, an article by Xinhua’s president Li Congjun published on the website of the Wall 
Street Journal referred to the initiative. Cf. Li Congjun, “Toward a New World Media Order,” 
website of the Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704816604576335563624853594.html, 
accessed December 15, 2012.  
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 A UNESCO report called World Communications: A 200-Country Survey of Press, Radio, 
Television, and Film was published in 1975. The report was mentioned, for example, in Zhang 
Longdong 张隆栋, “Shijie xinwen shiye gaikuang (yi)” 世界新闻事业概况(一) [The state of 
the world press (part 1)], Guoji xinwenjie国际新闻界 [International press circles], no. 1, 1979.  
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 MacBride Commission: Many Voices, One World: Towards a New, More Just, and More 
Efficient World Information and Communication Order (Paris: Unesco, 1980).  
32
 Lianheguo jiaokewen zuzhi 联合国教科文组织 [UNESCO], Yi ge shijie duo zhong shengyin 一
个世界多种声音 [Translation of Many voices, one world, literally: One world, many voices] 
(Beijing: Duiwai fanyi chuban gongsi, 1981). 
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News Agencies,
33
 of which Xinhua 新华 was a member. 34  Although China 
initially lost some of its interest in the Third World with improving relations with 
the United States,
 
the country was bent on declaring its continued solidarity with 
the developing world. All in all, the Chinese rhetoric during the 1980s –and the 
external propaganda discourse was no exception– was still frequently linked to the 
rest of the socialist movement (internationalist theme) and of the NAM (solidarity 
against imperialism).  
In sum, a number of domestic and international factors came together in 
the 1980s that had an impact on how external propaganda was discussed: External 
propaganda was, most importantly, seen as necessary to support China’s new 
reform agenda. Reforms in the field of external propaganda were impacted by and 
in turn impacted the overall debate over proper journalistic norms and control of 
the media. Finally, new ideas were constantly generated both as the U.S. and the 
S.U. fought a propaganda war against one another and as UNESCO discussed a 
new media world order.  
 
5.2 1977 to 1981: Institutionalizing the New Consensus 
 
“Each author, translator, or editor engaged in external propaganda should put a sign 
on his or her desk that reads ‘foreigners are not Chinese.’”
35
  
 --- Felix Greene, speech at Xinhua News Agency, 1977 
 
The first reform of external propaganda in 1977-1981 was part of the 
overall movement to “cleanse” China of the remnants of the Cultural Revolution 
and reorganize Chinese society around the new political goals. This process 
entailed, among many things, the rehabilitation of individuals that had been 
purged during the Cultural Revolution, the reintegration into urban society of 
                                                          
33
 The Organization itself had been stipulated by UNESCO in the early 1960s. 
34
 Cf. Teng Wenqi 滕文启, “Yatai tongxunshe zuzhi he Yatai xinwen jiaohuanwang" 亚太通讯社
组织和亚太新闻交换网 [The Organization of Asia-Pacific News Agencies and the news 
exchange net in the Asia Pacific], Duiwai baodao cankao, no. 1 (1982): 21-22. 
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 Chinese quote “从事对外宣传的每一个作者、翻译和编辑，都应该在他的写字台上放一个
标语牌，上面写着：外国人不是中国人。” Quoted in Yi Xianfei 易先飞, “Tigao waixuan 
xiaoguo bixu jiaqiang zhenduixing” 提高外宣效果必须加强针对性 [In order to raise the 
effectiveness of external propaganda, we need to strengthen its accordance with the target 
audience’s tastes and needs], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao对外宣传参考 [External propaganda 
reference], no. 5 (2001): 36. 
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youths and others who had been sent to the countryside, reforming the 
organizational structure of the political apparatus, and inculcating Party members 
with the content of the new general line and new “core values” of the new 
leadership as encapsulated in the slogans “liberate thought” (jiefang sixiang 解放
思想), and “seek truth from facts” (shishi qiushi 实事求是). With regard to 
concrete external propaganda practices, the focus was on re-establishing the 
principle of “distinguishing between domestic and external (propaganda)” (nei 
wai you bie 内外有别), on de-ideologizing the language used in propaganda 
targeted at foreigners, and on getting away from the “positive news only” model 
of reporting China. During these early years, the notion of media competition 
between China and either of the two superpowers was conspicuously absent from 
the debate. China’s foreign relations were relatively smooth at the time and 
China’s main concerns were domestic, so problems identified in external 
propaganda work had to do with the remnants of the Cultural Revolution, not with 
any external factors. 
The intention to change external propaganda practice was largely 
formalized in 1977, more than a year before the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh Central Committee, with first institutional changes following suit in 
early 1978. The way the changes were introduced is representative of the role 
foreigners played in the institutionalization of new practices. Their main role was 
not to stipulate change (although they were frequently asked for advice and 
listened to) but to legitimize changes and to make suggestions that external 
propaganda cadres in favor could not make as easily. Felix Greene (1909-1985), a 
British journalist who had first come to China in 1957 with the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Vice President of the Society for Anglo-
Chinese Understanding (cf. chapter 3.3) at the time, gave a talk in front of 
Xinhua’s external department on April 6, 1977 in which he criticized the habit of 
Chinese media to directly translate texts from Chinese into foreign languages 
without any changes in style.
36
 Greene was clearly considered a “friend of China” 
(cf. chapter 3.2). He had been friends with Zhou Enlai and was well-known 
internationally for his positive accounts on a number of socialist countries written 
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 Cf. Gan Xianfeng 甘险峰, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi 中国对外新闻传播史 [A 
history of China’s external news communication] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004), 
210. 
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over the course of the 1960s and 1970s.
37
 Deng Xiaoping officially approved the 
points Greene had made in August 1977 and had them circulated to units involved 
in external propaganda.
38
 Until 1979, when Hu Yaobang delivered a speech on 
external propaganda work, Deng Xiaoping’s short instructions (pishi 批示 ) 
regarding Greene’s words were the official master text on China’s external 
propaganda policy. Although Greene later met with the Dalai Lama and was, 
according to the latter’s account of the meeting, ultimately convinced that the 
situation in Tibet was not as rosy as he had portrayed it in one of his 
documentaries, he remained a revered person in China whose advice on external 
propaganda work continues to be invoked until today.
39
  
Half a year later, the first changes were implemented. In January 1978, 
briefly after its re-establishment in late 1977 and almost a year before the 3
rd
 
Plenum of the 11
th
 Central Committee, the CPD added a Bureau for External 
Propaganda (Duiwai xuanchuan ju 对外宣传局).40 Xiao Ximing 肖希明, who 
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 Cf. “Felix Greene, Reporter, Dies; Visited North Vietnam in 60’s,” AP, published June 27, 1985, 
available on the website of the New York Times, 
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doing propaganda as part of hosting (foreigners) and tourism work], in Xuanchuan dongtai 
xuanbian, 1979 宣传动态选编, 1979 [Selections from Propaganda trends, 1979] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1981), 236. Deng Xiaoping’s evaluating comment (pishi) 
on the talk was “I believe that Greene’s opinion is very important for propaganda, writing style 
and other aspects; in each case, it deserves our attention. I suggest to transmit [his opinion] to 
comrades working in propaganda and external affairs work so they can take a look at it.” (我认
为，格林的意见很重要，无论宣传和文风等等方面，都值得注意。建议印发给作宣传、
外事工作的同志看看。) Cited in Gan, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi, 210. 
39
 This is probably so because Deng Xiaoping did not make any other comments on external 
propaganda work, so his approval of Greene’s opinion is the only clear directive Deng ever 
gave on the issue. One relatively recent text invoking Greene is Yi Xianfei, “Tigao waixuan 
xiaoguo bixu jiaqiang zhenduixing,” 36.  
40
 Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui 中国共产党组织史资料编审委
员会 [Editorial committee for Materials on the history of organization of the Communist Party 
of China], ed., Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao中国共产党组织史资料 [Materials on 
the history of organization of the Communist Party of China], vol. 7: Shehui zhuyi shiye fazhan 
xin shiqi, 1976.10-1997.9 社会主义事业发展新时期: 1976.10-1997.9 [The new period of 
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had worked at Xinhua for the previous 32 years, including as head of the External 
Department (Duiwaibu 对外部), became the first director of the Bureau.41 At the 
first Xinhua conference on external propaganda since the end of the Cultural 
Revolution in November and December 1978, the Xinhua party group (dangzu 党
组)42 first stipulated to turn Xinhua into a “large proletarian world news agency” 
(wuchanjieji de shijiexing de da tongxunshe 无产阶级的世界性的大通讯社),43 a 
plan that was to be pursued further after 1982. On March 21, 1979, Hu Yaobang 
gave a speech on external propaganda at the “Briefing for press, broadcasting and 
print publication propaganda (and) reporting work targeted at abroad” convened 
by the CPD, at which he offered a thorough criticism of existing external 
propaganda practice. This was briefly after having ascended to the Politburo in 
December 1978 and at a time when he was still head of the CPD. The speech was 
circulated widely through internal channels, among others in the journal 
Propaganda Dynamics (Xuanchuan dongtai 宣传动态).44  
The speech introduced the concerns and main points on the agenda in the 
immediate period after the “official” end of the Cultural Revolution. The main 
problems identified by Hu were that of “Ultra-Leftism” –a standard attack on the 
politics of the Cultural Revolution– and that of subjectivism (zhuguan zhuyi 主观
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external propaganda (part 2): Getting to know the former director of the Bureau for External 
Propaganda of the Central Propaganda Department, Xiao Ximing], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, 
no. 8 (2004): 1.  
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主义), meaning behavior that was grounded in theory and removed from reality, 
as defined in 1942 by Mao Zedong 毛泽东 in Yan’an 延安.45 In addressing the 
problem that external propaganda did not distinguish enough between domestic 
and foreign audiences (bu kan duixiang 不看对象) Hu linked his concerns to the 
Yan’an rectification campaign and thus used the common strategy of invoking 
Mao’s authority. In those early years, there were few discussions on external 
propaganda per se, which only followed in the second half of the 1980s. While 
adapting the content, form, and style of media messages to the target audience in 
order to increase acceptance seems like a reasonable thing to do and was in line 
with the basic tenets of communications studies that were being introduced in 
China at the time,
46
 it must be assumed that, as during the Cultural Revolution, 
doing so was not at all undisputed, and that people advocating for it continued to 
run the risk of being accused by political opponents of selling out on principles 
and abandoning the traditional Chinese-Leninist concept of the press and the role 
of propaganda. 
The main reason why existing problems were difficult to eradicate, 
according to Hu, was fear of making mistakes, a point also highlighted in 1958 
after the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Hu Yaobang picked the issue of “fear” up more 
than once in his speech
47
 and later also reiterated it in private conversations with 
leading external propaganda cadres.
48
 A policy document issued a year later 
likewise noted that most departments and cadres were still “afraid of doing 
external propaganda work, afraid of approaching foreigners, afraid of making 
mistakes, afraid of taking responsibility.” 49  The prevailing attitude, stated the 
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49
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外宣传小组关于改进和加强对外宣传工作的意见 [The External Propaganda Small Group’s 
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xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he wenxian, 1951-1992 党的宣传工作会议概况和文献, 
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document, was that it was “better to do one too few than one too many” (duo yi 
shi bu ru shao yi shi 多一事不如少一事).50 External propaganda did have to 
adhere to principles, but it also had to remain flexible (jidong linghuo 机动灵活) 
at the same time; it needed both central guidance and for individual workers to 
take the initiative (zhudongxing 主动性).51  
Hu Yaobang also updated participants of the conference on the new goals 
and target audience. To “further the world revolution” could no longer be the aim 
of external propaganda.
52
 Instead, Hu “suggested” that the primary goal should be 
to increase foreigners’ “understanding of and friendly feelings towards China.” 
With regard to the target audience, Hu stressed that all foreigners were a potential 
target, explicitly correcting the notion that only the political middle (zhongjian 
fenzi 中间分子) was the target of external propaganda, a “misunderstanding” 
which had arisen while combating the policy of targeting mainly the international 
left. While it was true that the majority of foreigners belonged to the political 
middle and therefore it was important “not to sing too high a tune” (bu yao chang 
gao diao 不要唱高调), any foreigner, regardless of political leanings, should be a 
potential target.
53
  
The conventions of Party journalism at the time also came under attack in 
the speech. Hu introduced four standards against which external propaganda 
should be measured: First, there was truthfulness (zhenshixing 真实性), which 
attacked the habit not only to report success stories, but to exaggerate them to boot. 
External propaganda workers were allowed to report some “shortcomings” 
(quedian 缺点), though “there [were] some ugly things which [did] not need to be 
told” (you xie chou shi bu bi jiang 有些丑事不必讲).54 Second and third were 
variety (fengfu duocai 丰富多彩),55  and liveliness (shengdong huopo 生动活
                                                                                                                                                               
1951-1992 [Overview and documents from the Party’s propaganda work conferences, 1951-
1992] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), 390.  
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 Ibid., 390-391.  
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 Ibid., 391.  
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 Cf. “Hu Yaobang tongzhi tan ruhe ba duiwai xuanchuan gao de geng hao yixie,” 40. 
53
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., 41. 
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泼),56 which opposed the bias towards political topics and the tendency towards 
long theoretical explications. Number four, speed or timeliness was deliberately 
de-prioritized: While it was important to release news on time, haste was also the 
cause of many mistakes. Thus, according to Hu’s speech, thoroughness came first 
and speed only came second.
57
 A few years later, by 1982, this was to change as 
well.  
At the time, foreign models were also used to argue for reforms indirectly. 
There were some conspicuous similarities between the points advocated by Hu 
and a description of the U.S. International Communication Agency (ICA, the 
name of the USIA between 1978 and 1982) published in an internal journal 
around the same time.
58
 The piece on ICA, for instance, highlighted the fact that 
employees of the VOA and other broadcasting institutions had relatively high 
editorial independence as long as they stayed within the overall focus prescribed 
by ICA.
59
 Hu Yaobang, correspondingly, stressed the need for external 
propaganda workers to make certain decisions on their own. Hu also encouraged 
people to let the CPD know if its orders were confusing (xia zhihui 瞎指挥).60 
While ICA employees did, in fact, have considerably more editorial freedom than 
China’s external propaganda workers, the most likely scenario is that this aspect 
about ICA was stressed in Chinese texts so as to argue indirectly for relaxed 
control in China.  
During this early period, China again selectively allowed foreigners into 
the country to film. Some outcomes of this policy were Murray Lerner’s 
documentary, From Mao to Mozart (1980), portraying Isaac Stern’s visit to China 
                                                          
56
 Hu did not explain this point any further, but it probably mainly meant that news should be 
written in an interesting way that would attract readers. “Hu Yaobang tongzhi tan ruhe ba 
duiwai xuanchuan gao de geng hao yixie,” 40. 
57
 “Ibid.,  41. 
58
 Shu Zongqiao, “Meiguo de duiwai xuanchuan he wenhua jiaoliu – Guoji jiaoliushu de 
qingkuang he gongzuo,” 5-16. 
59
 Ibid., 11-12. In addition, the four work principles attributed to ICA are also reminiscent of the 
four standards that Hu prescribed four China's external propaganda work, although Hu de-
prioritized speed. ICA’s supposed four work principles were 1. Speed (xinwen liqiu kuaisu jishi 
新闻力求快速及时). 2. truthfulness, 3. Clear and succinct coverage, saying the important 
things in only a few sentences, with simple background info. 4. Variety of material (ticai de 
duoyangxing 题材的多样性). Cf. Shu Zongqiao, “Meiguo de duiwai xuanchuan he wenhua 
jiaoliu – Guoji jiaoliushu de qingkuang he gongzuo,”  12. Hu’s four standards were 
truthfulness (zhenshixing 真实性 ), variety (fengfu duocai 丰富多彩 ), and liveliness 
(shengdong huopo 生动活泼), and speed. 
60
 “Hu Yaobang tongzhi tan ruhe ba duiwai xuanchuan gao de geng hao yixie,” 45. 
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and cooperation with the China Central Symphony Society and an interview with 
Hua Guofeng 华国锋 made by Felix Greene.61 Nonetheless foreign television 
channels were treated with caution in the early 1980s. For example, while 
newspaper correspondents were already allowed into the country, TV stations did 
not get permissions at first. Jim Laurie, who opened the first TV bureau in Beijing 
for the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) in 1981, recounts that officials 
told him not to use the world “television” on his visiting card and instead stick to 
a strict translation of broadcasting as guangbo 广播, which only refers to radio 
broadcasts in Chinese.
62
 This seems to suggest that there was some disagreement 
whether to allow foreign television into China, and the solution was to first grant 
permission to TV stations whose name sounded like a radio station in Chinese.  
In April 1980, the External Propaganda Small Group (Duiwai xuanchuan 
xiaozu对外宣传小组, henceforth EPSG) was founded in addition to the CPD’s 
External Propaganda Bureau and charged with supervising all external 
propaganda work,
63
 following a directive from Hu Yaobang.
64
 The EPSG was not 
a leading small group, i.e. not headed by a Politburo member, but it served a 
similar function by combining cadres from various units involved in external 
propaganda as well as in foreign affairs work. It was nominally headed by Zhu 
Muzhi 朱穆之 (the de facto director of the Central Propaganda Department), and 
its de facto director was Xiao Ximing. CPD’s Bureau for External Propaganda 
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 Cf. “Hua Guofeng Interview with Felix Greene,” China Digital Times, posted June 16, 2007, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/06/hua-guofeng-interview-with-felix-greene/, accessed 
August 29, 2012.  
62
 Interview with Jim Laurie, Hong Kong, January 14, 2011. An official later told Laurie that the 
reason why some people in the Chinese government did not want to allow foreign TV stations 
into the country was the famous documentary Chung Kuo - Cina (1972) made by Michelangelo 
Antonioni during the Cultural Revolution, which authorities thoroughly disliked as they felt it 
portrayed China as backward.  
63
 The notice announcing its creation to Party Committees at the ministerial/provincial level was 
dated September 16, 1980. Cf. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianli duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu 
jiaqiang duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo de tongzhi” 
中共中央关于建立对外宣传小组加强对外宣传工作的通知, [Notification from the CPC 
Central Committee on establishing the Central External Propaganda Small Group and 
strengthening external propaganda work], in Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he 
wenxian (1951-1992) 党的宣传工作会议概况和文献(1951-1992), ed. Zhongyang 
xuanchuanbu bangongting 中央宣传部办公厅 [General Office of the Central Propaganda 
Department] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), 386-387. 
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 Huang, Zecun 黄泽存, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao 新时期对外宣传论稿 [Preliminary 
discussions of external propaganda in the new period] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 
2002), 178; also see Yang Jianye and Yang Guoren, “Gengyun waixuan fengxian rensheng (xia) 
– Zoujin Zhongxuanbu yuan duiwai xuanchuan ju juzhang Xiao Ximing,” 1.  
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continued to exist and served as the EPSG’s “executive body,”65 meaning that it 
was a non-standing organization without an independent permanent office. The 
EPSG was comprised of cadres from fourteen different units that mainly 
combined bureaucratic organizations from the propaganda system, the foreign 
affairs system, as well as the bureaucracies in charge of Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Macao, and overseas Chinese affairs work.
66
 It had six main responsibilities: 
 
1. Researching public opinion abroad, especially on China-related topics, thus 
providing “intelligence” what kind of “misunderstandings” or problems China 
needed to react to, 
2. Devising external propaganda policies, 
3. Overseeing the implementation of particularly important tasks, 
4. Coordinating the work of different units, 
5. Researching external propaganda work and  
6. Making development plans both for China’s external propaganda work and for the 
training of cadres.
67
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 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianli duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu jiaqiang duiwai xuanchuan 
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xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he wenxian: 1951-1992, ed. Zhongyang xuanchuanbu 
bangongting, 388. 
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 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianli duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu jiaqiang duiwai xuanchuan 
gongzuo de tongzhi,” 386; “Duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu chengyuan mingdan,” 388. 
67
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要关系的国际政治、思想、舆论情况), and reflect these to the centre on time (jishi xiang 
zhongyang fanying 及时向中央反映). 2. Coming up with external propaganda principles, 
policies, and propaganda slogans regarding important problems on time and in accordance with 
the development of the situation in China and abroad as well as with new trends in politics, 
thought and public opinion outside of China. 3. Organizing, inspecting and supervising the 
completion of especially important external propaganda responsibilities. 4. Coordinating the 
external propaganda work of all respective work units as well as summing up and circulating 
(zongjie jiaoliu 总结交流) experience. 5. Regularly familiarizing (jingchang liaojie 经常了解) 
itself with the circumstances and problems (qingkuang he wenti 情况和问题) in external 
propaganda work; researching and formulating, improving and developing important measures 
for external propaganda work. 6. Researching and outlining (yanjiu he niding 研究和拟定) 
development plans (fazhan guihua 发展规划) for the enterprise (shiye 事业) of external 
propaganda and proposals for the training and improvement of external propaganda cadre 
personnel. 
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Aside from arrangements at the Central level, provinces were also asked to 
participate. External propaganda had not been an issue for the provinces during 
the Mao period, as aside from Guangdong 广东, which had a clear mandate for 
propaganda aimed at Hong Kong and Macao,
68
 no other provinces were regularly 
engaged in external propaganda work except during highly scripted visits from 
foreigners that were organized by the Center.
69
 As early as in October 1979, the 
CPD had published “Notification on strengthening local external propaganda 
work,”70 one of the first steps towards involving locales more actively. Following 
the establishment of the EPSG at the central level, a number of provincial 
equivalents were founded.
71
 For instance, Shandong 山东 established an external 
propaganda small group as early as in October 1980,
72
 and Hunan 湖南 created an 
External Propaganda Division (duiwai xuanchuan chu 对外宣传处) within its 
provincial propaganda department in 1985.
73
 Some provinces also established 
external propaganda small groups or offices at sub-provincial level,
74
 especially in 
locales officially opened up to foreigners. By the early 1980s, much of the 
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同志在省委对外宣传小组会议上的讲话 [Comrade Dong Fengji’s speech at the meeting of 
the External Propaganda Small Group of Shandong Provincial Party Committee], May 18, 
1992, in Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian, eds. Shandong 
shengwei duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi 山东省委对外宣传办公室  [Office of External 
Propaganda of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee] and Shandongsheng renmin zhengfu 
xinwen bangongshi 山东人民政府新闻办公室  [Information Office of the People’s 
Government of Shandong Province] (Jinan: Shandong youyi chubanshe, 1999), vol. 1, 124.  
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 Cf. Hunansheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 湖南省地方志编纂委员会编 [Local chronicle 
compilation committee of Hunan province], ed., Hunan Sheng Zhi: Minsu zhi 湖南省志: 民俗
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 E.g. Hunan in 1986, cf. ibid.  
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responsibility to advertise themselves in order to gain foreign direct investment 
was handed directly to the coastal provinces. The first external propaganda 
conference in 1984 accordingly took place in Guangdong, not Beijing.
75
  
In June 1980, the Center approved and circulated a document from the 
newly founded small group called “The EPSG’s Opinion on Improving and 
Strengthening External Propaganda Work” (Duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu guanyu 
gaijin he jiaqiang duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo de yijian 对外宣传小组关于改进
和加强对外宣传工作的意见 ). The document took up most points in Hu 
Yaobang’s speech, presenting them in a more systematic way adding concrete 
policy suggestions. It thus constituted the first official “agenda” (gangling 纲领) 
for external propaganda work in the post-Mao period. The “Opinion” defined the 
“fundamental responsibility” of external propaganda as “serving the general line 
and the external line of the party” (wei dang de zong luxian fuwu, wei dang de 
duiwai luxian fuwu 为党的总路线服务，为党的对外路线服务 )76  and tied 
external propaganda to the successful completion of China’s strategic goals, 
which were later, at the 12
th
 Party Congress in 1982, termed the “three grand tasks 
of the 1980s:” first, opposing hegemonism and protecting world peace, second, 
returning Taiwan and realizing unification of the motherland, and third, 
intensifying the Four Modernizations.
77
 This meant affirming that external 
propaganda was “related to” (sheji dao 涉及到) China’s “big policies” (dazheng 
fangzhen 大政方针), as well as China’s overall tasks and goals (zong renwu, zong 
mubiao 总任务，总目标).78   
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Crucially, the 1980 “Opinion” constituted the first step towards making 
external propaganda as important as domestic propaganda. It identified the current 
institutional structure as a problem, with external propaganda structures isolated 
and departments doing both domestic and external propaganda work focusing 
mainly on domestic issues, either neglecting external propaganda or even 
believing that it was optional (ke you ke wu 可有可无). Thus, in all areas (news, 
broadcasting, books, films, TV, art, pictures, exhibitions, etc.), institutions really 
suiting the needs of external propaganda were rare. The “Opinion” announced that 
especially in departments responsible for both domestic and external propaganda, 
external propaganda would be strongly reinforced.
79
 Importantly, as opposed to 
many later documents, the 1980 “Opinion” was not a typical “compromise” 
document in which different political positions were included. The problem of 
insufficient external propaganda was identified, reasons given, and solutions as 
well as an agenda for development offered.  
External propaganda priorities laid out in the “Opinion” were first, 
external propaganda through broadcasts, films, television, news agencies, 
newspapers, and journals, second, external propaganda books (notably listed 
separately from all other media
80
), third, sending artist troupes abroad (focusing 
on many small rather than a few big events), fourth, targeting foreigners living in 
or visiting China, fifth, providing material to newspapers run by overseas Chinese, 
sixth, opening up propaganda centers abroad,
81
 seventh, using the culture 
departments of Chinese embassies as well as Xinhua and China News Agency 
(Zhongxinshe 中新社) branches abroad for external propaganda purposes, and 
eighth, cooperating with journalists stationed in China as well as with news and 
cultural personnel at foreign embassies and with “foreign experts” (waiguo 
zhuanjia 外国专家).82  
                                                                                                                                                               
bridges, breaking out of the encirclement: Zeng Jianhui on external propaganda] (Beijing: 
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The “Opinion” noted that letting foreigners speak on China’s behalf would 
be much more effective than China speaking for itself.
83
 Means to improve work 
with foreign journalists included interacting with them through press conferences 
or meetings, systematically introducing them to certain topics and providing them 
with material to use in their news reports. Moreover, China would have to allow 
journalists to venture out of Beijing for interviews or sightseeing. Journalists, 
academics, and tourists who came to China for only a short time would also have 
to be won over. 
84
 While most external propaganda units did not generate income, 
incentives should be given to do so by allowing each unit to keep any surplus 
income and reinvest it in their enterprise,
85
 a plan imitating contemporary Chinese 
agricultural policy and thus a typical example of translating the “spirit” of the 
Center into concrete policies in each sector. 
 
By 1981, the first projects were under way. On July 1, 1981, after a very 
short trial period, the first official issue of the newly founded China Daily was 
published. The paper was not only available on the mainland. but also in Hong 
Kong, where it was printed and distributed through the CPC-controlled Wen Wei 
Po (Wenhuibao 文汇报).86 According to one source, the idea to launch an English 
language paper was first proposed by the first wave of foreign tourists let back 
into the country, some of whom had suggested that China present its development 
and other news through an English language paper.
87
 While such proposals 
probably did exist in some form, this represents a very typical way of justifying 
new initiatives on the part of Chinese proponents of external propaganda work, 
namely “We are only responding to foreigners’ needs.” This pattern also showed 
up in other places: Interviews with foreigners were frequently cited in order to 
justify particular policies. Seeking out the opinions of foreigners was a common 
tactic to bolster and legitimize one’s own plans.88  
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shiyeju Xide zhuanjia Nuote tan duiwai xuanchuan” 广播事业局西德专家诺特谈对外宣传 
[West German expert ‘Nuote’ from the Broadcasting Bureau speaks about external 
propaganda], Duiwai baodao cankao, no. 1 (1981): 15. 
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The first English language daily since the founding of the PRC was set up 
by the People’s Daily (Renminribao, 人民日报 ) with significant help from 
Australian partners, most importantly the publishers of The Age (David Syme and 
Co., Ltd.) and the Australia-China Council.
89
 Compared to most of China's 
domestic media, the China Daily was very modern in terms of layout and 
content.
90
 Moreover, one aspect that was entirely new about the China Daily 
among China’s foreign language publications was that articles were actually 
originally written in English rather than first written in Chinese and then 
translated.
91
 While this sounds like a natural thing to do, this must be considered a 
major innovation that gave editors significant leeway to report more freely and 
with less interference from censors, whose English language skills were not good 
enough to pick up certain nuances. This is not to say that there was no control 
over content in the China Daily at all, but composing pieces in English rather than 
translating them represented an important move away from the absolute control 
over terminology that had played such a central role during the Mao period and 
made a completely different writing style possible again. 
In addition, in the early 1980s, overseas Chinese became an important 
target of nearly all external propaganda units. There are at least two reasons for 
this development: First, China was seeking foreign investments, and overseas 
Chinese had cultural and familial ties to China and thus were most likely to invest. 
They were also the easiest to reach, as reporters and journalists could write news 
dispatches in their mother tongue. While there were still language issues, they 
were presumably easier to improve than articles and releases written in foreign 
languages – and at a lower cost. Second, one of the “three grand tasks”of the 
1980s was reunification with Taiwan. Thus, more than before, China saw itself in 
a competition with Taiwan over public opinion on the issue among ethnic Chinese. 
Previously, work aimed at overseas Chinese had been done mainly through 
China News Agency (Zhongxinshe). Xinhua’s external department established an 
editorial department for Chinese language news releases as early as in 1980, 
supposedly in response to requests from Hong Kong papers for better Chinese 
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language news releases. Before 1980, Xinhua had sent two types of releases to 
Chinese language papers in Hong Kong: English dispatches sent by the External 
Editorial Department (Duiwaibu 对外部), which needed to be translated into 
Chinese first before they could be used, and Chinese language dispatches sent by 
the Domestic Editorial Department (Guoneibu 国内部).92 In August 1980, Xinhua 
leaders established the Chinese Editorial Group (Zhongwen bianjizu 中文编辑组) 
within the External Department. Releases produced by this group were first sent to 
Chinese papers in New York City and later, starting in early 1981, also to Hong 
Kong papers.
93
 Additionally, Xinhua staffers were sent to the Dagongbao 大公报 
and the Wenhuibao 文汇报 in Hong Kong for internships to improve the quality 
of Xinhua’s Chinese language news work.94 In the same year, China Reconstructs 
published its first Chinese edition.
95
  
Taiwan also became a key target of PRC propaganda, although the 
question how to call propaganda work targeted at Taiwanese was somewhat 
sensitive. While people from Hong Kong, Macao, as well as Overseas Chinese, 
were explicitly included in the target audience of external propaganda, “Taiwan 
compatriots” needed a special justification: “Because they have been separated 
from the mainland for a long time, our external propaganda is also used on 
them.”96 However, in addition, to dui wai xuanchuan 对外宣传, the separate 
category of dui Tai xuanchuan 对台宣传 has existed since at least the 1980s. 
Thus, while Taiwanese are considered targets of external propaganda in general, it 
is also possible to speak of propaganda targeted at Taiwanese in particular.
97
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During those early years, China’s external propaganda organs still planned 
to use strategies that had been common during the Mao period. China’s officials 
were also quite aware of the fact that foreigners read the Chinese press and 
particularly articles on literature and the arts to decipher any possible signal or 
clue that they could get about the internal workings and direction of the CPC. This 
knowledge was used strategically in order to dissipate foreigners’ worries. For 
example, after the poet Bai Hua 白桦 had been criticized, Xinhua deputy director 
Li Pu 李普 insisted it had been vital to publicize the fact that Bai Hua had also 
recently received a poetry award, otherwise, foreigners would have speculated 
that the Party Center was internally unstable and beset with factional struggles.
98
 
Li Pu further explained that while Western journalists’ stance was very different 
from China’s, they quickly caught on to subtle changes in the news and had 
interpreted the article on Bai Hua quite closely to the message Xinhua had wanted 
to send.
99
  
In 1981, Xinhua therefore planned to establish two “authoritative 
commentators” akin to famous commentators at the Soviet news agency TASS 
(Telegrafnoye agentstvo Sovetskovo Soyuza Телеграфное агентство Советского 
Союза) and to China’s own collective pseudonyms during the Mao period.100 This 
was to be achieved by establishing two collective pen names to publish articles of 
a good quality on a regular basis, one on politics, culture and education (called 
Zhao Ping 赵平) and the other on the economy.101 The pseudonym Zhao Ping had 
been used in the past, but it appears the plans for a regular political commentator 
were not realized,
102
 most likely because shortly after the announcement, Xinhua 
was busy with much bigger plans. In addition, a year later, China began to move 
towards a system of announcing the Chinese government’s position more openly 
through the establishment of a spokesperson system (see below in chapter 5.3).  
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With regard to style, as Hu Yaobang had already indicated in his speech, 
China’s external propaganda workers were expected to fundamentally change the 
standards of what was considered good journalism again, reverting the changes of 
the 1950s. In June 1981, in order to provide more people with access to 
information about external propaganda and re-train them according to the new 
journalistic values, the internal Xinhua journal External Reporting (Duiwai 
baodao 对外报道) was renamed External Reporting Reference (Duiwai baodao 
cankao 对外报道参考) and began to be circulated outside of Xinhua.103 Over the 
next few years, large sections of the journal were dedicated to systematically 
teaching journalists how to adapt to the reading habits of foreigners.
104
 This 
included publishing translations of foreign (usually U.S.) works.
105
 One article 
noted that since the term “propaganda” (xuanchuan) already had a connotation of 
being dishonest, Chinese propaganda would totally fail if China did not pay 
attention to the art of propaganda and instead propped its articles with political 
jargon and lofty adjectives. The most important propaganda art was to use facts to 
draw readers towards a particular conclusion.
106
 In a speech to foreign affairs 
cadres, Zhu Muzhi also explained that the best way to do propaganda was not to 
tell, but to show, and how to show best was a matter of skills that could be 
learned.
107
 
Content provided to foreigners was primarily to be chosen on the basis 
whether it replied to their concerns, which could be largely determined by 
following reports on China in the foreign media. While some external propaganda 
workers likely also had access to other publications on foreign media trends, such 
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as Reference News, External Reporting Reference frequently provided selected 
excerpts from foreign media. With regard to quantitative surveys on foreigners’ 
attitudes towards the country, China was forced to rely on data generated in 
Western surveys. External propaganda workers were kept up to date on such 
developments through the selective translation and analysis of U.S. 
polls.
108
According to a speech delivered by Li Pu in front of Chinese journalists 
stationed in China but writing for foreign target audiences, foreigners had eight 
main questions about China that they wanted answered in the early 1980s:
109
 
 
1. Is China’s political situation stable or are there factions fighting each other? 
2. Is China’s economy collapsing? (Question arose because of economic 
adjustment) 
3. Is China “De-Mao-ifying”? (Question arose when the “two whatevers” were 
opposed) 
4. Is China no longer socialist, but actually capitalist? (This question came 
about when China introduced economic reforms) 
5. When China is speaking about democratization, is it serious or not? (This 
question arose when China began stressing the Four Basic Principles) 
6. What is China’s path for the future really (daodi 到底)? 
7. Can business be made with China or not (daodi)? 
8. Has China made new rich friends and forgotten its old poor friends? 
(Question arose when diplomatic relations with the United States 
improved)
110
 
 
The attention paid by foreigners to China, which was presented as both an 
opportunity and a challenge that needed to be met, became one of the standard 
arguments for why external propaganda was necessary. As was and remains 
common, Li Pu framed foreigners asking these questions in terms of the common 
ideas about “the people” (renmin人民): Some individuals asking these questions 
did have ill intentions, and this simply reflected international class struggle. 
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However, these people were outnumbered by those genuinely concerned.
111
 This 
was an extension of the previous classification between contradictions among the 
people and contradictions between the people and the enemies of the people,
112
 
which, in turn, can be traced back to earlier framings of the people (min民) in 
China (cf. chapter 2). Li Pu dedicated large parts of his speech to creating 
understanding among Chinese news workers that foreigners’ doubts were normal 
and the natural outcome of the vast changes taking place in China.
113
 Explaining 
these changes to foreigners was the “sacred duty” that “history [had] conferred 
upon” foreign propaganda workers.114  
Importantly, there was also an attempt to get away from the Chinese 
concept of propaganda in people’s heads in order to change journalistic practices. 
Chinese journalists were used to lecturing and thinking on behalf of their 
audiences by providing the correct conclusions to be drawn from an article. As is 
quite common in China, trying to change this was done by introducing a 
terminological change. Although duiwai xuanchuan continued to be the most 
common term used in official documents and was also in the name of the External 
Propaganda Small Group that was established in 1980, in sub-sectors of external 
propaganda work, use of the word xuanchuan was challenged. In a letter to CPD 
from August 1979, Hu Qiaomu 胡乔木 (1912-1992) 115 gave instructions to refer 
to Xinhua’s work as “external reporting” (duiwai baodao 对外报道 ), not 
“external propaganda” (duiwai xuanchuan). 116  For the radio sector, “external 
broadcasting” (duiwai guangbo 对外广播) became common.117 Challenging the 
CPC’s traditional understanding of the media as a propaganda tool was not 
uncontested, but through the use of different terminology in different sectors 
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while maintaining “external propaganda” as an umbrella term seemed to work as a 
compromise.  
 
5.3 1982-1984: Conflict and Competition 
Over the next few years, China embarked on the first series of structural 
reforms taking a first step towards making external propaganda at least as 
important as domestic propaganda and reorganizing China’s media to be ready to 
“face the world” (zhuanxiang shijie 转向世界). Although China’s relations with 
the U.S. had cooled by the time, this did not discourage reforms. Instead, the CPC 
began to frame the reinforcement of its external propaganda apparatus as a matter 
of solidarity with the Third World and of propagating “the superiority of the 
Socialist system”, arguing that it was important for China to be able to compete 
against Western news agencies.  
This renewed focus on Socialism reflected China’s foreign relations. 
According to official Chinese evaluations, whereas between 1978 and 1982, 
China had clung to the “one line” strategy, i.e. trying to isolate the Soviet Union 
by allying with the United States, after 1982, it changed its diplomatic policy 
towards one of “independence and non-alignment.” 118  In 1982, Sino-U.S. 
relations worsened over arms sales to Taiwan. As the relationship cooled, China 
was confronted with an increasingly negative portrayal in U.S. media. The two 
trends were not linked with one another officially in external propaganda speeches 
and documents at the time, but presumably, they contributed to the sentiment that 
the West was a competitor at least as much as a target and towards wanting to re-
focus on third world countries, as they were potentially more sympathetic to 
China.  
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The work that was seen as the most representative of China’s bad image in 
the United States at the time was Fox Butterfield’s China: Alive in the Bitter 
Sea,
119
 a bestseller in the United States in 1982-1983.
120
 Butterfield had been 
stationed in Beijing as a correspondent for the New York Times. When the Beijing 
Review published an article criticizing the U.S. press three years later in the midst 
of a campaign for the Party Principle (dangxing yuanze 党性原则), Alive in the 
Bitter Sea was the primary work criticized by name.
121
 Butterfield's work was 
probably singled out because it was a bestseller in both 1982 and 1983, and 
because it had been described as one of the best books on China since Edgar 
Snow.
122
  
As opposed to today’s historiographies of Chinese external propaganda, 
external propaganda experts in the 1980s did point out the seeming contradiction 
that during the Cultural Revolution, China’s image had been much better than in 
the 1980s. One explanation given for this phenomenon was that, first, when 
foreigners came to China in the 1970s, they still had the “old” China in mind; they 
imagined women to have bound feet and men to be addicted to opium. Of course 
they were impressed by the new China, despite all the destruction the Cultural 
Revolution had wrecked.
123
 Second, during the Cultural Revolution, China had 
only presented the best side of the country to foreigners, and this false and overly 
positive representation had led foreigners to believe that everything was perfect. 
The result of China’s actions was that foreigners obtained a fake image (jiaxiang 
假象) of the country.124 By contrast, when foreigners came to China in the early 
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1980s, they read all those reports exposing what had gone wrong during the 
Cultural Revolution. Thus, there was a phase of “exposing China” in the Western 
media.
125
 The negative experiences with journalists stationed in China and the 
impact their writings had on China’s image were likely a reason why Chinese 
external propaganda soon stressed the need to work better with foreign journalists 
and others visiting China.
126
 
In addition, the Party used the need to limit foreigners’ access to 
information that could be used against China to caution media not to report too 
freely on China’s problems in the open domestic press. A circular from April 
1983 distributed by the CPD addressed the repercussions of too open reports in 
the domestic sphere for China’s international image.127 The example it cited was 
that of frequent reports on the mistreatment of women and female infanticide in 
the countryside by various Chinese papers and radio stations, which were then 
picked up by the foreign press and supposedly used to attack “the Chinese policy” 
as a whole. The “Chinese policy”, of course, in this case referred to the newly 
introduced one-child-policy. Such news pieces, especially if they cited details and 
statistics, should be reserved for internal reports only. The circular cautioned 
media that they ought not only to consider domestic repercussions, but also the 
damage to China’s image abroad before releasing such stories. Instead, the press 
should “positively” (zhengmian 正面) propagate the new policy and, if anything, 
convey the intention of the government to eradicate resulting abuses rather than 
describe concrete cases of malpractices or mistreatment in detail.
128
 
The notion that one of the functions of external propaganda was to project 
a certain “image” of China was a new idea that was only integrated into the 
Chinese debate on external propaganda in 1982 and 1983. Central circular [1983] 
no. 15, another “Opinion” (yijian 意见) on external propaganda work, spoke of 
“clearly establishing an image of socialist new China” on the international 
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stage.
129
 The term “national image” or “image of the state” (guojia xingxiang 国
家形象) had only entered the open media relatively briefly before that; it was first 
used in the People’s Daily in 1982.130 In Hu Yaobang’s speech from 1979 and the 
1980 “Opinion”, the idea that China had an image to protect or improve had still 
been completely absent. The most important reason for “image” entering the 
discourse probably was the concern with “image” of Ronald Reagan. Attempts by 
the Reagan administration to create a favorable image of the president as well as 
of the United States as a whole were frequently analyzed in External Propaganda 
Reference, though China of course insisted that its own image projection 
campaigns were fundamentally different from America’s.  
 
Despite the failure to improve China’s image right away, external 
propaganda continued to be strengthened. A text from 1987 explains that after 
1983, China’s official aim was to turn its news industry into one that “focused 
mainly on the outside” (duiwai wei zhu 对外为主).131 A speech by Xinhua’s 
president Mu Qing 穆青132 from 1985 in which he addressed the issue confirms 
that this was definitely a concern for domestic propaganda units.
133
 According to 
Mu Qing, domestic and external were equally important, and in some aspects, 
external reporting was more important (guo nei wai bing zhong, zai mou xie 
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fangmian yi duiwai wei zhu 国内外并重，在某些方面以对外为主).134 While 
this structural realignment of the Chinese media towards the outside world came 
to a sudden halt in 1987 with the Campaign against Bourgeois Liberalization and 
the reorganization of the domestic propaganda sector, various reforms were 
implemented before that. 
In August 1982, the link between external propaganda work and the “three 
grand tasks of the 1980s” was confirmed explicitly, and external propaganda was 
for the first time declared to be “a task of important strategic significance.”135 Due 
to the increasing number of negative reports on China, the Chinese debate turned 
towards how to allow China to become more pro-active rather than constantly 
having to react to foreign accusations. Consequently, in 1982 and 1983, plans for 
three important institutional changes emerged, two of which were directly meant 
to raise the importance of external propaganda vis-à-vis domestic propaganda or 
at least put it on equal footing: First, Xinhua News Agency was to be turned into 
an “international news agency” (guojixing tongxunshe 国际性通讯社) or a “world 
news agency” (shijiexing tongxunshe 世界性通讯社), primarily targeting the 
Third World. Second, domestic propaganda and external propaganda were to be 
put on equal footing in potentially all units, locales, and departments, and third, 
China began to set up a spokesperson system in order to improve its relationship 
with foreign journalists. 
 
Turning Xinhua into a World News Agency 
First plans for an international news agency had been presented in 1979. 
The drive to assign more international responsibilities to Xinhua took up speed 
after April 1982, when Mu Qing became president of Xinhua. It was under the 
new head that the plans to turn Xinhua into a world news agency materialized. In 
early 1983, Xinhua wrote a report to the CPC Center, in which it asked for 
permission to turn Xinhua into a “world news agency with Chinese and socialist 
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characteristics.” 136  The goal was to catch up to the level the most advanced 
Western news agencies had in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the year 1990.
137
 
The report was quickly approved by the Center and circulated in February 
1983.
138
 This was the formal beginning of the 1980s initiative to expand Xinhua’s 
international role.  
In early 1984, Xinhua presented a concrete seven year plan for the 
development of the news agency between 1984 and 1990, in which the plan to 
turn Xinhua into a world news agency was presented as the overall goal (zong 
mubiao 总目标 ). 139  The plan also presented a two-step timetable to follow, 
according to which the first three years, from 1984 to 1986, were intended as a 
planning period before full-scale implementation of the policies was to be 
undertaken between 1987 and 1990.
140
  
The plans for Xinhua’s expansion were couched in the same language as 
UNESCO’s NWICO project: The goal of creating a “world news agency with 
Chinese characteristics” was to break through the monopolization of the 
international news market exercised by the four big Western news agencies;
141
 to 
“break the old international news order and establish a new international news 
order.”142 On February 6, 1985, Mu Qing delivered a speech at the conference for 
                                                          
136
 Cf. Zheng Dejin 郑德金, “Mu Qing yu jianshe shijiexing tongxunshe” 穆青与建设世界性通讯
社 [Mu Qing and the construction of a world news agency], in Chuanmei yunxing moshi 
biange: 2003 nian Xinhuashe xinen xueshu nianhui lunwenxuan 传媒运行模式变革 2003年
新华社新闻学术年会论文选 [Transformation of the media’s mode of operation: Selected 
papers from Xinhua’s annual academic conference 2003] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2004), 
45, 48.  
137
 Mu Qing 穆青, “Zhenfen jingshen, jianchi gaige, jin yi bu tuijin jianshe shijiexing tongxunshe 
de shiye” 振奋精神，坚持改革，进一步推进建设世界性通讯社的事业 [Further promote 
the cause of building a world news agency by uplifting the spirit and persisting in reform], 
speech given on March 4, 1986, republished in Guoji xinwen caixie jingyan huicui, ed. 
Xinhuashe xinwen yanjiusuo, 1. Also see Zheng Dejin, “Mu Qing yu jianshe shijiexing 
tongxunshe,” 49.  
138
 Chuanmei fazhan zhanlue: 2001 nian Xinhuashe xinwen xueshu nianhui lunwenxuan 媒发展方
略：2001 年新华社新闻学术年会论文选 [Media development strategy: Selected papers of 
the Xinhua news agency’s annual academic conference 2001] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 
2002), 390.  
139
. Cf. Zheng Dejin, “Mu Qing yu jianshe shijiexing tongxunshe,” 50.  
140
 Cf. ibid., 52.  
141
 Mu Qing, “Jianshe juyou Zhongguo tese de shijiexing tongxunshe” 建设具有中国特色的世界
性通讯社 [Constructing a world news agency with Chinese characteristics], Xinwen yewu 新闻
业务 [The news profession], no. 3 (1983): 6. The four big news agencies are not listed by name, 
but can be assumed to be the same ones identified in Many Voices, One World, i.e. AP, UPI, 
Reuters, and AFP. 
142
 Mu Qing, “You mianxiang guonei zhuanxiang mianxiang shijie,” 270.  
261 
 
Xinhua’s work abroad (Xinhua guowai gongzuo huiyi 新华国外工作会议)143 in 
which he gave two reasons why the Third World should be the primary target: 
First, there was a political need (as the population of third world countries made 
up 75 percent and was the most important force for peace and against 
hegemonism) and second, because conditions were most favorable for a Chinese 
expansion, as third world countries were generally interested in cooperating with 
Xinhua.
144
 The strategic goal behind the whole plan, according to Mu Qing, was 
to strengthen the voice of all people supporting the just cause and of expanding 
the voice of Third World countries.
145
 A focus on the Third World also meant 
fighting with Western news agencies over the news market in the developing 
world.
146
 Thus, by 1982-1983, when Sino-U.S. relations were less rosy than in the 
late 1970s, the argument of having to compete against the West had been 
introduced into and figured prominently in the Chinese discourse.  
 
Internal and External are Equally Important; Hold up Both Internal and 
External! 
 Second, under the slogans “hold up both internal and external” (nei wai 
bing ju 内外并举) and “internal and external are equally important” (nei wai bing 
zhong 内外并重), external propaganda as a whole was to be strengthened and 
upgraded to be as important as domestic propaganda. This referred both to the 
overall institutional infrastructure (i.e. domestic propaganda departments) that was 
to be reformed and to the volume of news releases. 
In the second half of 1982, plans to further train external propaganda 
cadres with dual competences in ideological matters and in professional 
journalism were announced. It would be the responsibility of each propaganda 
department to provide training to its cadres. These plans would have to be fulfilled 
over the course of the next three years, starting in the second half of 1982 and 
running until 1985.
147
 In May 1983, Central Circular [1983] no. 15 asked all 
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central departments engaged in external propaganda work and all provincial level 
propaganda departments to come up with a plan how to strengthen external 
propaganda work for their department or province and report this plan to the 
EPSG and the CPD before the end of July 1983.
148
 The goal was to make external 
propaganda work a part of the daily work of departments and locales. The 
document stressed that external propaganda was “a work of important strategic 
significance to internationally win the hearts of the people and speed up the 
realization of the Four Modernizations” by attracting foreign capital, experience 
and technology without which China’s modernization would take much longer.149   
In 1983, at the National Conference for External Television Propaganda, 
China Central Television (CCTV) and local TV stations
150
 were also asked to 
implement the nei wai bing ju principle, to establish a professional external 
propaganda structure within their unit, educate cadres, solve the problem of TV 
broadcast equipment, and make a plan how to strengthen external TV propaganda. 
The goal was “to change the current backward and passive situation in external 
TV propaganda within three to five years.”151  
 
The Spokesperson System 
Third, in early 1982, the EPSG stipulated the creation of a spokesperson 
system for all units which had contact with foreigners in order to make use of 
foreign journalists stationed in China and increase the CPC’s agenda setting 
capabilities over how China was reported.
152
 China had begun convening press 
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conferences at very irregular intervals as early as during the 1950s and 1960s, but 
a more systematic approach was only initiated in 1982.
153
 The EPSG’s request for 
such a system was approved in early 1983, requiring the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) and all other departments of the State Council which often came in 
contact with foreigners to establish a spokesperson system and give press 
conferences regularly.
154
 Thus, although China wanted to compete with Western 
media and had realized that many of the Western journalists stationed in China did 
not report favorably, it tried to improve its relation with foreign journalists by 
offering them information on a regular basis in a format that they were used to.  
 
Aside from these larger structural reforms, smaller, concrete projects 
continued to emerge. In the post-Mao period, as Chinese citizens slowly began to 
interact with foreigners in a less strictly controlled environment both abroad and 
at home,
155
 people involved in external propaganda naturally considered how they 
could make use of “unofficial spokespeople.” One article from 1982 explored 
various different avenues for organizing social forces to propagate China on the 
CPC’s behalf. For instance, Chinese exchange students could and should be used 
for external propaganda abroad. To do this, exchange students should be 
familiarized with “foreigners’ psychology” and the basic content to be propagated 
before leaving China. Exchange students could potentially be more useful than 
official spokespeople, as Westerners did not trust government spokespeople, 
particularly those from socialist countries. Two things were important to note: 
First, Westerners were more likely to trust Chinese students who were self-
financed, whereas those on a government stipend were seen as suspicious. Second, 
students should be instructed to give their opinions “according to the spirit of” 
what was written in the papers, as any verbatim rephrasing of official papers’ 
contents would make foreigners suspicious.
156
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In June 1983, the China Daily launched a North American edition.
157
 At 
the time, print publications still clearly constituted an important part of China’s 
external propaganda efforts. However, in the same year, China succeeded in 
broadcasting CCTV in Xinjiang 新疆 via satellite television for the first time,158 
laying the basis for TV-based waixuan, in which Chinese cadres ostensibly 
became more interested at a time when provincial TV stations proliferated, and 
after the USIA had launched Worldnet.  
The heightened importance was also signaled by the number of general 
and more specific conferences. In June 1982, the EPSG held its first documented 
conference, focused on local foreign propaganda targeted at Taiwan (Quanguo 
difang dui Tai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi 全国地方对外对台宣传工作会议). 
Although it was aimed at local cadres, central cadres participated, and Hu 
Yaobang even delivered a speech,
159
 a sign of his continued concern for external 
propaganda after he had become General Secretary. In August 1983, the Ministry 
of Radio and Television
160
 convened a conference on television-based foreign 
propaganda in Beijing.
161
 The first formal conference on external propaganda 
work in general was convened in Guangdong 广东 in 1984.162 The choice of the 
location in Guangdong is representative of the focus of external propaganda 
before 1985-1986, when the Center and the coastal provinces were most involved 
in external propaganda work.  
The choice of topic of this latter conference was representative of the 
overall trend in this period: To propagate the superiority of the Socialist system.
163
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For instance, one article in External Reporting Reference (Duiwai baodao cankao 
对外报道参考) explained that during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, 
some people had seen the disadvantages of the Chinese system and therefore now 
they thought – incorrectly – that there was no superiority of the socialist system 
that could be propagated.
164
 However, upon proper investigation of the problems 
in capitalist countries, one would find a lot that was superior about socialism and 
that was worth propagating.
165
 External Reporting Reference also carried a large 
number of articles on the problems in capitalist societies so that external 
propaganda workers had enough reference material to fall back on.
166
  
Zhang Xiaoling has argued that the topic of the 1984 conference in 
Guangdong was chosen because too many Chinese people had left the PRC for 
Hong Kong.
167
 However, I would argue that there were several larger issues at 
work. First, the cooled relations with the United States had led to a renewed focus 
on China’s socialist identity and its role as a leader of the Third World. Second, it 
also constituted a move against framing external propaganda in terms of humanist 
ideals of mutual understanding and of uncritically wanting to join China with the 
rest of the world. The choice of the topic was thus also a reminder that external 
propaganda was first and foremost to serve the interests and goals of the Party.  
China was presumably also implicitly replying to the VOA whose charter 
defined one of the goals of the radio station as demonstrating the superiority of the 
American system in contrast to Communism.
168
 This focus on the superiority of 
the socialist system waxed and waned over the course of the 1980s, changing with 
the overall political climate as well as following struggles over the role of 
propaganda and journalism in general. First and foremost, it shows that during the 
1980s, there were different visions for the role external propaganda was to play, 
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just like there were different visions for the path that China should take 
economically and politically. 
 
5.4 1985-1986: “Let the World Understand China; Let China 
Understand the World” 
In 1985 and 1986, external propaganda received its second major upgrade 
from the Party Center, introducing a range of new projects as well as expanding 
its role to include “letting the Chinese people understand the world.” While 
different ways of conceptualizing external propaganda continued to compete, the 
discourse on fostering mutual understanding had regained in strength compared to 
the earlier years.  
The upgrade was due to several interrelated developments in China’s 
reform course and its foreign relations. Most importantly, in 1985, China entered 
the second stage of its opening and reform policies, and the number of foreigners 
coming to China increased by more than 80 per cent compared to the previous 
year.
169
 Both the closer interaction and the need for even more foreign investment 
provided strong arguments for external propaganda, which was confirmed as an 
important means to ensure (baozheng 保证) the successful implementation of the 
opening up principle.
170
 Moreover, in 1984 and 1985, China’s image in the West 
improved significantly,
171
 mainly due to improved relations between the U.S. and 
the PRC, symbolized by Reagan’s visit to China in April 1984.172 All of this 
created a climate in which the theme of struggle and ideological conflict could be 
de-emphasized, and China’s “reformers” were in a relatively strong position. 
China’s further reintegration into the world was buttressed ideologically by Deng 
Xiaoping’s informal move away from the idea that war was inevitable for as long 
as imperialism existed by defining the two main problems and themes of the 
world as peace and development (cf. chapter 4.1).  
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The upgrade was arguably started by a call from Hu Yaobang in an 
unlikely place, namely in a speech reaffirming the Party Principle (dangxing 
yuanze 党性原则 ) of the Chinese press. A year after the Campaign against 
Spiritual Pollution in late 1983, opposition to China’s concept of domestic 
propaganda had begun to form again. Following relatively successful calls for 
more freedom of expression in literature and the arts, journalists tried to extend 
the same principles to the press. In February 1985, Hu Yaobang gave a speech on 
the nature of the Chinese press,
173
 which has been primarily interpreted as a 
defense against attacks from elderly party members.
174
 In the speech, Hu stressed 
the “party nature” of the press, thus expressly distinguishing press work from the 
field of literature and art. However, he also used the speech to further argue that 
Chinese media needed to “go towards the world” (zou xiang shijie 走向世界). 
The parts of Hu’s speech that were concerned with the international expansion of 
Chinese media were republished in External Propaganda Reference.
175
  
While the speech itself is well-known, the external propaganda perspective 
has not been analyzed. In the speech, Hu Yaobang noted China was still unable to 
fully meet foreigners’ demands to learn more about China and emphasized the 
need for the country to work on satellite transmission of news.
176
 He criticized the 
continued lack of adapting to the needs and tastes of the foreign target audience
177
 
and defined the responsibility (renwu 任务) of the press as “to let the people know 
China and improve China, [and to let them] know the world and improve the 
world.” 178  While the latter point obviously referred primarily to the Chinese 
public, the climate of Internationalism gave external propaganda a purpose. Thus, 
external propaganda at the time was presented as both in the national interest in 
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the positive sense –by helping to build China– and as means to genuinely connect 
China to the rest of the world in the humanist tradition.  
In the first half of 1986, the Center heard a report (huibao 汇报) from the 
EPSG, after which it criticized that external propaganda’s did not sufficiently take 
the initiative and was not vivid enough.
179
 The need to improve China’s external 
propaganda was justified by referring to the “China craze” abroad, which was 
predicted to last for a long time.
180
 In June of 1986, the CPC released Central 
Circular [1986] no. 17, called “Notification on the Center approving the EPSG’s 
‘Opinion on how to strengthen and improve external propaganda work.’”181 The 
document referred to external propaganda as an important work mattering to 
“establishing an image of socialist China in the international arena” (Shuli shehui 
zhuyi Zhongguo zai guoji shang de xingxiang 树立社会主义中国在国际上的形
象), “winning the hearts of the people of the world” (zhengqu shijie renxin 争取
世界人心 ) and “ensuring smooth implementation of the opening policy” 
(baozheng duiwai kaifang zhengce shunli shishi de zhongyao renwu 保证对外开
放政策顺利实施的重要工作).182  Various different ways of framing external 
propaganda were included in the document: It had an “important strategic 
significance” for propagating the superiority of the socialist system, expanding 
China’s international influence, winning the empathy and support of the people of 
the world, strengthening friendly and cooperative relations with other countries, 
and creating favorable international conditions for the realization of the Four 
Modernizations.
183
  
While the entire document is not publically available, the main points 
dominant in 1985 and 1986 were explained at what is officially considered the 
first national external propaganda conference in November and December of that 
year. Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳  all met with 
conference participants, which signaled the PBSC’s commitment towards external 
propaganda. The conference took place shortly before Hu Yaobang’s fall, after 
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which it became clear that the 1986 “Opinion” was another “compromise 
document” that included the positions of various factions. For instance, it also 
portrayed external propaganda as an important tool in the fight against the 
capitalist class trying to infiltrate China, an aspect that was emphasized in 1987.
184
 
In late 1986, however, the conversation was still largely held in a non-
confrontational mode. It introduced or buttressed a number of important points 
that will be explained below in some detail in order to capture the status quo 
before external propaganda reforms were thrown off course in 1987. 
 
First, the dual function of external propaganda – “letting the world 
understand China and letting China understand the world” – was highlighted at 
the conference. Zhu Muzhi stated that thus far the second function of informing 
China about the rest of the world (indicating both education of the masses and 
providing intelligence to leaders) had been neglected. This argument is somewhat 
reminiscent of Carter’s transformation of the USIA into ICA and drew on the 
same discourse of “mutual understanding” (huxiang liaojie 互相了解). From a 
practical perspective, the external propaganda structures of various countries had 
been transmitting information two ways, serving both as propaganda structures of 
and as gatherers of intelligence for their national government. However, the 
notion that guoji xuanchuan 国际宣传, i.e. the education of the Chinese people 
about international matters, should be the responsibility of the external 
propaganda apparatus also expanded the latter’s responsibilities –quite possibly at 
the expense of the domestic propaganda apparatus.  
External propaganda departments at the provincial level were to improve 
and strengthen training. Units concerned with both domestic and external 
propaganda were to come up with further concrete measures to realize the “hold 
up both internal and external” (nei wai bing ju) policy and thus strengthen external 
propaganda. Each department, enterprise or organization that had to do with 
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foreigners (she wai 涉外) was to establish an external propaganda structure and 
train the personnel needed for the task. The exact structure and number of people 
employed (bianzhi 编制) could be decided freely by the locale’s or department’s 
party group as appropriate. A part of the training and further education of external 
propaganda cadres was to be organized by the center, another part by the locales 
or departments. A concrete plan for this was still to be worked out. In order to 
familiarize themselves with things foreign, external propaganda workers should 
be given the opportunity to participate in events or visits involving foreign 
countries (duiwai huodong he chufang 对外活动和出访). Outstanding external 
propaganda workers should get material rewards,
185
 i.e. a higher salary and better 
amenities within their work unit (danwei 单位) to ensure a higher living standard.  
Second, at the conference, China’s “image” featured prominently. To 
create a “correct and fresh” image of China should be the principal responsibility 
(zhuyao renwu 主要任务) of external propaganda.186 Zhu Muzhi first summed up 
the official historiography of China’s international image at the time. Much like in 
the late 1970s, the fault was seen as lying with China itself; China had ruined its 
image through historical one-sidedness (pianjian 偏见) and the suppression of 
news flows to the outside world:
187
 Through the founding of the People’s 
Republic, the CPC made a significant contribution to eliminating the image of 
China as the “Sick Man of Asia,”188 but the Cultural Revolution had damaged 
China’s image and reversed previous progress severely. This setback had been 
partially overcome during the 1980s, but needed further effort to improve mutual 
understanding.  
Zhu Muzhi explained to participants that whether a country’s image was 
good or bad affected whether world public opinion supported or opposed it and 
affected the country’s international position. Therefore, each country in the world 
paid attention to its international image. For example, the U.S. used the restoration 
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of the Statue of Liberty as an occasion to hold a large-scale celebration and 
propaganda event.
189
 The fact that by 1986, “public relations” as a discipline 
(gonggong guanxi xue 公共关系学) was beginning to become popular in China190 
also showed in the speech. Zhu Muzhi explained at the conference that American 
businesses spent up to one third of their capital on propaganda, and that each 
dollar spent returned ten dollars. In China, by contrast, people did not make 
similar long term considerations.
191
 
Third, to improve its image, China should make use of new measures that 
it could learn from other countries. One new point raised by Zhu Muzhi was 
pushing Chinese as a foreign language. The head of the EPSG presented this as 
being inspired by his visit to France, where he learned that one third of French 
external affairs expenditures were spent on exchanges with other countries and 
external propaganda, most importantly on pushing the study of the French 
language. Developing Chinese language studies included compiling text books 
and accompanying audio material. Teaching materials to be provided to Chinese 
schools abroad for overseas Chinese were to be homogenized over the next two or 
three years (Gong huaren zidi xuexiao xuexi de jiaokeshu, yao zai liang san nian 
nei chuqi 供华人子弟学校学习的教科书，要在两三年内出齐). Particularly in 
countries with a lot of overseas Chinese, embassies should support teaching 
Chinese.
192
 As a consequence of the decision to push Chinese as a foreign 
language, the organization that is today known as Hanban 汉办 and that is also in 
charge of Confucius Institutes was founded under the name of National Leading 
Small Group for Teaching Chinese Abroad (Guojia duiwai Hanyu jiaoxue lingdao 
xiaozu 国家对外汉语教学领导小组) under the leadership of the Ministry of 
Education. 
Fourth, the conference also marked another important juncture in the move 
towards focusing on audio-visual media. In improving the quantity and the quality 
of external propaganda materials (xuanchuan cailiao 宣传材料, xuanchuanpin 宣
传品 ), the key task for the Center was to prepare films and TV programs 
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reflecting China’s reforms, everyday life and spirit of the people and improve 
subtitling. Locales and departments were also asked to produce films.
193
 Thus, by 
1986, China clearly wanted to use audiovisual rather than only print media. The 
interest in television-based waixuan began to manifest itself in the form of 
concrete initiatives. On October 1, 1986, Shanghai launched its first English news 
TV channel, long before CCTV established a regular English channel in 2000 
(though CCTV did begin broadcasting English language news on January 1, 
1987).
194
  
Fifth, external news reporting was to focus on how to enter the 
international news market. For radio broadcasts, China should reach agreements 
with foreign countries to re-broadcast Chinese radio programs. With regard to 
books, China should stop relying on sympathetic leftists abroad (“left agents” 
zuopai dailishang 左派代理商), who could only reach a small readership, and 
instead try to get books into big bookstores to ensure wide distribution. China 
should also distribute books for free to influential libraries and cultural centers 
abroad, but it should only do so in a manner that was well-planned and focused, 
indicating that too much money was wasted on books at the time without ensuring 
that they reached and were well-received by their intended targets.
195
  
Likewise, China needed to become better at tapping into foreign resources. 
This included dealing with foreign journalists stationed in China and “helping 
them to correctly understand and report China’s situation” (bangzhu tamen bijiao 
zhengque de liaojie he baodao woguo de qingkuang 帮助他们比较正确地了解和
报道我国的情况). The primary avenue for this was press conferences, over 
which central departments and committees were to strengthen their control and 
support more. The Journalists’ Association was to arrange meetings between 
various “personalities” (renshi 人士) and foreign journalists.  
 
In sum, everything seemed to be on its way for further reforming external 
propaganda. Departments were asked to start preparing for propagating the 13
th
 
Party Congress in 1987 as well as the 40
th
 anniversary of the founding of the PRC 
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in 1989.
196
 Unlike the backlashes between 1982 and 1984, which led to a stressing 
of Socialism and Third World solidarity but did not weaken external propaganda, 
the next two ideological backlashes in 1987 and 1989 destroyed any plans to 
gradually increase the importance of external propaganda compared to domestic 
propaganda and possibly even eventually have the first replace the latter.  
 
5.5 1987-1989: The Re-emergence of Domestic Propaganda and 
Thought Work 
Briefly after the conference, in December 1986, after a series of student 
demonstrations, protests escalated and led to Hu Yaobang’s removal from power 
and the Campaign against Bourgeois Liberalization. While China’s image 
remained an issue after and even during the crackdown, institutional 
rearrangements following the campaign marked the beginning of the relative 
decline in importance of external propaganda.  
To be sure, the debates surrounding the question how to deal with student 
demonstrations in December 1986 showed a clear concern for China’s image in 
international public opinion. Instead of arguing that world public opinion was 
secondary, for example, Deng Xiaoping invoked Wei Jingsheng’s 魏京生 arrest, 
which had prompted few repercussions for China, to argue that China’s image 
would not be affected by dealing harshly with dissidents.
197
 While Deng 
obviously underestimated the reactions that were to follow the crackdown on the 
Chinese democracy movement in 1989, China’s image was not disregarded in the 
decision, but figured into the debate. During the campaign in early 1987, the 
China Daily and Beijing Review published a number of articles playing down the 
student protests
198
 and pointing towards the role the VOA supposedly played in 
instigating the students.
199
 
                                                          
196
 Cf. ibid.  
197
 Cf. Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China, 206.  
198
 E.g. “Students Name Demo Instigator,” China Daily, January 8, 1987; C.L. Wong, “Letters to 
the Editor: Implications of Student Unrest,” China Daily, January 8, 1987. China Daily 
Commentator, “Confidence in Reform,” China Daily, January 12, 1987, 4. China Daily articles 
from 1987 were accessed through a special CUHK Service Center collection, which 
unfortunately did not provide any page numbers for most articles. “Demonstrations Good 
Intentioned, But…,” Beijing Review, December 28, 1986, 7. 
199
 “Demo in Tiananmen Passes Peacefully,” China Daily, January 3, 1987.  
274 
 
So what changed for the external propaganda sector? First, Hu Qili 胡启立 
replaced Hu Yaobang as the cadre in charge of propaganda and thought work in 
January 1987. Although Hu Qili was an ally of Hu Yaobang’s who had worked 
with him in the Communist Youth League and definitely did not count among the 
“hardliners,” the external propaganda sector still lost its most powerful ally. At the 
same time, Zhu Houze 朱厚泽, who was also considered too liberal, was replaced 
by “hardliner” Wang Renzhi 王忍之 as head of the CPD.200  
Aside from the leadership changes, the campaign changed how external 
propaganda was framed and brought the theme of struggle against hostile forces to 
the forefront. Similarly to what happened later in 1989, China accused Western 
media of peddling the protests.
201
 Zhu Muzhi, who remained in his position, gave 
a speech on March 23, in which he declared his alliance to the Campaign against 
Bourgeois Liberalization and explained the important function external 
propaganda had in the international ideological struggle. In the speech, Central 
Circular [1986] no. 17 remained the point of reference, but other aspects that had 
previously been disregarded were stressed now. Zhu Muzhi quoted the document: 
 
“External propaganda is an important part of the international struggle in the 
ideological realm. The capitalist class abroad is also directing its propaganda at us 
and is infiltrating us ideologically. In this field, the struggle is very fierce. Comrades 
at external propaganda departments need to understand this, keep a clear head at all 
times, and must not be steered by foreign capitalist propaganda.”
202
 
 
This turn-around in focus is a good example of the way in which central 
documents were –and continue to be– composed. Ideological ammunition for all 
factions is usually included in a written document, and whoever has the upper 
hand gets to decide which aspect is stressed. Many of the points emphasized by 
Zhu Muzhi in 1987 were re-used verbatim after 1989. Thus, the conference from 
1986 provided many of the non-crisis mode points on the external propaganda 
agenda during the 1990s, whereas the 1987 speech foreshadowed the crisis mode 
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points used during the 1990s. The post-Tiananmen master text on external 
propaganda thus also had predecessors to rely on.   
The campaign was not the immediate end of external propaganda reforms. 
Later that year, CPD and the EPSG circulated a document which asked media to 
report faster, to stop refuting Western media directly, to include more critical 
news in order to raise the credibility of Chinese media, and, in some cases, to 
report news abroad first rather than focusing on reporting them at home to make 
sure they were still “news” when they reached foreign countries.203 
The most important long-term consequence of the Campaign against 
Bourgeois Liberalization was a readjustment of the relationship between domestic 
and international propaganda that resulted in an institutional reinforcement of 
domestic propaganda work, which clearly weakened external propaganda in 
relative if not in absolute terms. In late 1987, the Propaganda and Thought Work 
Leading Small Group (PTWLSG) was formed. While this was not the first small 
group to be concerned with propaganda work,
204
 the formation of the new group 
clearly raised the importance of the field. The responsibilities of the PTWLSG 
were quite similar to those of the EPSG, only focused on domestic propaganda 
work. They consisted of regularly analyzing the trends in the field of ideology, 
researching the principles and policies of propaganda work as well as other 
problems that concern the overall situation, coordinating the ideological work of 
departments in the field of propaganda, culture, news and publishing, and making 
suggestions and proposals for the building of a strong team of cadres engaged in 
propaganda and theory work.
205
 The term propaganda and thought work 
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(xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo 宣传思想工作) itself –at least in this particular 
combination– appears to be a neologism created in the aftermath of the Campaign 
against Bourgeois Liberalization.
206
 Hence, institutionally and conceptually, 1987 
marked the most important turning point in the reaffirmation of domestic 
propaganda. Although without the events of 1989 and the restructuring of the 
world order in the early 1990s, it is questionable whether these changes would 
have been able to establish themselves permanently in the political landscape, the 
Campaign against Spiritual Pollution marked the first step on the path towards 
enshrining domestic propaganda in the post-Mao period as a pillar for regime 
security. 
In 1988, the EPSG was disbanded as part of the central streamlining that 
year.
207
 The dissolving of the small group was announced on February 15, 
approximately a month after the PTWLSG was officially launched. This did not 
mean the end of all external propaganda work. The document disbanding the 
EPSG explicitly stated that local party committees did not have to follow the 
center, but could maintain their small groups.
208
 The responsibilities of the EPSG 
were divided up between several institutions. The day-to-day responsibilities of 
the EPSG were officially handed back to the CPD Bureau for External 
Propaganda, but the director and most of the personnel remained the same.
209
 Zhu 
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Muzhi stayed in charge of foreign propaganda by virtue of his seat on the 
Propaganda and Thought Work LSG and due to CPD’s decision that the entire 
waixuan sector would continue to report directly to Zhu Muzhi.
210
  
In terms of decision-making at the highest level, two different Leading 
Small Groups were put in charge of external propaganda: The new PTWLSG was 
made responsible for overall direction and policy-making, whereas the Foreign 
Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) received the responsibility for external 
propaganda concerning larger issues in the international situation and China’s 
diplomacy. Concrete enforcement of policies was made the responsibility of CPD, 
while administrative matters and allocating the budget was to be handled by the 
State Council Foreign Affairs Office,
211
 which had an External Propaganda Group 
(Duiwai xuanchuan zu 对外宣传组) until 1991, when its responsibilities were 
transferred to the newly established EPSG.
212
  
Although the disbanding of the EPSG was downplayed by external 
propaganda leaders at the time who reassured everyone that “external propaganda 
could only become more important, not less important” in the future, there was 
obvious concern about the downgrade.
213
 However, this unequivocally reversed 
the trend of the past decade of focusing on external propaganda work while 
neither directly attacking nor strengthening domestic propaganda work. 
In retrospective, the Central EPSG of the 1980s was evaluated as 
ineffective. While this must also be seen as part of a master narrative after the 
establishment of new structures organized differently in the 1990s, it is highly 
likely that the EPSG did, in fact, encounter significant problems during its eight 
years of existence. Because the External Propaganda Small Group was not a 
proper executive organ but only a group of leaders whose office was part of and 
dependent on the CPD, it already had problems with giving orders within the 
horizontal (kuai 块) track, i.e. to units at the central level such as Xinhua, the 
People’s Daily Overseas Edition, CRI, and CCTV. In the vertical (tiao 条 ) 
bureaucracy it had even more difficulties as its uncertain position in the power 
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hierarchy made it difficult to issue orders to external propaganda small groups and 
news organs at the provincial level.
214
 Its only executive power was derived from 
having a bureau within CPD, which made it dependent on the domestic 
propaganda apparatus.  
 
Without Hu Yaobang’s support, external propaganda was transformed 
from a matter of strategic interest that played a key role in China’s historic 
reversal from isolation towards facing the world into a “professional” and 
“academic” topic. The way external propaganda was spoken about reflected the 
fact that much of the urgency attached to external propaganda reforms during the 
previous years had dissipated. For example, one article published in External 
Propaganda Reference in 1988 explained that: “We are a poor country; we cannot 
invest enormous amounts of money into our external broadcasting industry like 
the developed countries do. But we are a big country, so our voice also cannot be 
missing from the world.”215 Such a framing obviously attached little strategic 
importance to the sector. Reasserting control over the external propaganda sector 
was considered more of a priority than innovation. For instance, an article in 
External Propaganda Reference introduced the mechanisms how different 
countries prevented the leaking of secrets in their external propaganda work.
216
 
Nonetheless, the knowledge that had been accumulated over the course of 
the 1980s how to write for foreigners was put on record through a series of 
publications on external propaganda that show that external propaganda workers 
were already quite familiar with many of the issues discussed again in the 21
st
 
century. The late 1980s were marked by attempts to turn every possible field into 
an independent “discipline” (yi men kexue 一门科学). In the second half of the 
1980s, as part of the effort to be more “scientific” but also to establish “disciplines 
with Chinese characteristics” that would counter the phenomenon of “blindly 
copying from the West,” China began to work on Chinese theories of journalism, 
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Chinese theories of propaganda, etc. After the call to establish “propaganda 
studies” (xuanchuanxue 宣传学) as an independent discipline or area of inquiry, 
calls to establish “external propaganda studies” (duiwai xuanchuan xue 对外宣传
学) soon followed suit.217 Foreigners arguing that external propaganda was an 
independent discipline were cited to buttress the enterprise.
218
 External 
propaganda veterans quoted studies from the U.S. and the S.U. that found that if a 
piece was too far from the fixed ideas (guyou guannian 固有观念) a target held 
about the world, it would be rejected and have no influence whatsoever on the 
target audience.
219
 This shows another rationale for pushing “external propaganda 
studies”: The move accompanied another attempt to reform China’s external 
propaganda practices, including conducting systematic research on the target 
audience,
220
 better tailoring messages to foreigners,
221
 reporting faster,
222
 and 
reporting on issues that were considered sensitive.
223
  
Between 1987 and 1990, the first wave of monographs systematically 
introducing external propaganda (or its subfields, such as “external reporting” or 
“external broadcasting”) was published.224 These monographs were by and large 
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supportive of the need to adapt to foreign target audiences. The accumulation of 
publications in 1989 and 1990 after the Tiananmen crackdown has to be seen as 
the outcome of the previous four years’ work rather than as an immediate reaction 
to the perceived failure of Chinese external propaganda in June of 1989. All of the 
books had clearly been prepared earlier, and the master text regarding what had 
happened in 1989 was only added hastily in some prefaces.
225
  
 
While the reinforcement of domestic propaganda remained contested after 
1987, the events of 1989 cemented the change. During the 1989 Student 
Movement, the external propaganda media (except Xinhua) behaved similarly to 
the People’s Daily (whose role and behavior during the protests has been studied 
relatively well
226
), that is, after printing or reporting on the April 26 editorial 
denouncing the students,
227
 they began to support the protests carefully but 
increasingly strongly,
228
 even printing the students’ demands 229 and carrying 
headlines such as “A Million March in Support of Students.”230 It should be noted 
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that during the protests, China Daily reports were almost exclusively written by 
staff reporters,
 231
 with only a few Xinhua releases.
232
 Compared to reports by 
China Daily staff, Xinhua releases were relatively pro-CPC, often speaking on 
behalf of the government and Li Peng 李鹏 , but there were also some 
exceptions.
233
  
 
  
Ill. 5.1. China Daily, May 5, 1989 
 
The problems with “propaganda discipline” of the Party media were 
blamed, in hindsight, on remarks made by Zhao Ziyang regarding how the 
protests should be covered.
234
 As the PBSC members in charge of propaganda 
(Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili) were generally speaking supportive of the 
movement,
235
 Premier Li Peng established an “Emergency Period Propaganda 
Working Group,” which was under his direct leadership, in late May as part of the 
imposition of martial law.
 236
 Articles in the China Daily and Beijing Review also 
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Still Absent at Beijing U.,” China Daily, May 9, 1989; “Fasters Making History,” China Daily, 
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Source: Xinhua. 
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indicate a “takeover,” though not a very forceful one, shortly before June 
Fourth.
237
  
China accused the United States of plotting to stage a “peaceful evolution” 
(heping yanbian 和平演变 ) in China, and aside from harsh crackdowns on 
“ringleaders” of the movement, strengthening domestic propaganda work was 
considered one of the most important and urgent steps. The crisis meant a 
complete reshuffle of cadres in charge of propaganda work after the crackdown. 
Hu Qili was replaced by Li Ruihuan 李瑞环 as PBSC member in charge of 
propaganda and thought work. Zhu Muzhi again survived the crisis, making him 
one of only two members of the PTWLSG that did not lose their position.
238
 
Directly after the movement in July 1989, the CPD convened several crisis 
meetings and issued new directives to reorganize propaganda work.
239
 Just as for 
domestic propaganda, the reaction in external propaganda was fairly immediate. 
First, external propaganda was also represented at these crisis sessions for overall 
propaganda work.
240
 Second, the heads of the central external propaganda units 
convened on June 17 and July 5,
241
 one before and one after the Fourth Plenary 
                                                          
237
 Towards late May and early June, a number of articles written by China Daily staffers or 
unsigned appeared that urged students to abandon the strike or that published complaints about 
the protests. E.g. “Square Statue ‘Insult to Site’,” China Daily, May 31, 1989; “Students Urged 
to End Boycott,” China Daily, June 2, 1989; “Give Priority to Nation’s Interests,” China Daily, 
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either, they were never published or they were excluded from the database. A full-fledged 
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and reorganization at the Beijing Review had been completed.  
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上的讲话 [Vigorously strengthen external propaganda work to engage in the struggle over 
international public opinion proactively – Speech by Zeng Jianhui, deputy head of the Central 
Propaganda Department at the nationwide conference for propaganda department heads], 
Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no 10 (1989): 2-5. 
241
 “Dangqian ying dali jiaqiang guoji yulun douzheng – Ji pingbao hou Zhongyang duiwai 
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Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee on June 22 and 23, in which Jiang 
Zemin 江泽民 became General Secretary of the CPC.  
Zeng Jianhui 曾建徽, who was deputy director of the CPD and was soon 
to take up a leading position in the reorganized external propaganda bureaucracy, 
explained that while China had won the overall battle, it had clearly lost the 
propaganda war,
242
 particularly on the international front. During the events, 
China’s external propaganda machinery had not been able to refute the VOA and 
other Western media. Thus for the first time in the history of the PRC, hostile 
forces had completely dominated international opinion.
243
 Even now, after the 
events, China was still under attack: In the immediate aftermath of the crackdown, 
the VOA had added four additional hours per day to its China program, increasing 
the number of hours per day to twelve.
244
 Although China had had some very 
moderate successes in countering this point of view after the crisis was over, 
hostile forces had long managed to establish their point of view by reporting first 
(xian ru wei zhu 先入为主 ). 245  To resolve this “misunderstanding” and re-
establish a favorable image of China would take long years of hard external 
propaganda work.
246
 The most important step was to organize an external 
propaganda apparatus that was organized and strong enough to counter China’s 
enemies. Thus, external propaganda regained in importance at the end of the 
decade, albeit this time clearly subordinated to domestic propaganda. 
Likewise, the immediate reaction in external propaganda after 1989 was to 
stress China’s socialist identity. Directly after the Tiananmen crackdown, 
“socialist China” was presented as the dialectic opposite of “ancient Chinese 
civilization.” On September 6, 1989, Zhu Muzhi gave a talk to the heads of 
various TV stations and the directors of their external departments. In this speech, 
he noted that in the past, external propaganda workers had primarily focused on 
                                                                                                                                                               
对外宣传单位的两次座谈会 [Currently the struggle over international public opinion needs 
to be vigorously reinforced – Notes from the two central conferences on external propaganda 
after having quelled the riots], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 10 (1989): 4. 
242
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个问题 [Comrade Zeng Jianhui talks about a number of problems in external propaganda 
work], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao no. 7 (1990): 2.  
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how to establish an image for ancient China. The most important task now was to 
establish a correct image for socialist China.
247
  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
The late 1970s and 1980s provided a constellation in which external 
propaganda was continually strengthened for a decade (1977-1986), both in 
absolute terms and in relative terms vis-à-vis domestic propaganda. First, external 
propaganda was vital for China’s economic reforms, whereas first the concrete 
practices and later even the entire concept of domestic propaganda gradually came 
under attack by an increasing number of people. Some of those critical of 
domestic propaganda practices almost certainly saw external propaganda as a 
welcome opportunity to give a new function to China’s overall propaganda 
apparatus –a function that was more in line with China’s new role as a country 
facing the world. While it would be overly dramatic to say that China was at a 
crossroads, there was a serious possibility during parts of the 1980s that China 
could have abandoned or substantially changed its approach to domestic 
propaganda work. However, first in 1987, at the institutional and conceptual level, 
and then more forcefully in 1989, this trend was stopped and reversed. External 
propaganda did not completely lose its importance, but it was weakened and 
eclipsed by domestic propaganda work again.  
There are two additional points about the development of external 
propaganda during the 1980s: 
First, it is reasonable to argue that the “hold up both internal and external”  
and the “internal and external are equally important” policies, which attempted to 
make domestic propaganda institutions pay more attention and shift resources to 
external propaganda, were the origin of institutional problems identified later 
during the 1990s, as they tied the two sectors very closely together. At the time, 
those supporting external propaganda and pushing the “equal importance” policy 
may have hoped that domestic propaganda would continue to lose significance 
and that external propaganda would eventually be able to take over and make use 
                                                          
247
 “Zhu Muzhi tongzhi huijian ge dianshitai taizhang he duiwaibu fuzeren shi de jianghua” 朱穆
之同志会见各电视台台长和对外部负责人时的讲话[Comrade Zhu Muzhi’s speech while 
meeting with various TV station’s directors and the heads of their external departments], 
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of the existing domestic propaganda infrastructure. This expectation was certainly 
not unjustified judging by the overall climate in the 1980s, but it lost much of its 
plausibility with Hu Yaobang’s downfall in 1987 and had to be buried in 1989.  
Thus, by ensuring that each propaganda unit also established external propaganda 
structures, assigned personnel, and made sure that the head of the unit was 
responsible both for internal and external propaganda work, an institutional 
structure had been established that made external propaganda highly dependent on 
domestic propaganda units, including financially. 
Second, in the struggle over which direction China was to take, neither 
faction opposed external propaganda. Instead, depending on the political climate, 
external propaganda was simply framed in very different ways: There was the 
humanist discourse, focusing on mutual understanding and the need to reintegrate 
China into global society, an internationalist discourse, focusing on third world 
solidarity against imperialist oppressors monopolizing the media sector, a “bloc 
solidarity” discourse, focusing on the need to demonstrate the superiority of the 
socialist system, a “struggle” discourse, focusing on the need to struggle against 
hostile forces, and the “functionalist” discourse, highlighting that external 
propaganda needed to serve China’s goals. While all have shown up occasionally 
since then, and particularly the theme of “mutual understanding” has been stressed 
when speaking to foreigners, only the last two genuinely survived the crackdown 
in 1989 and were carried into the next decade: Propaganda needed to serve the 
national interest as defined by the CPC, both as it pursued its overall development 
goals and as it tried to fight off “hostile forces.” 
 
 
 
286 
 
 
6 External Propaganda in the Jiang Era: “Struggle” versus 
Reform 
  Paradoxically, in the 1990s, Chinese external propaganda both 
received a major boost and was stunted at the same time. On the one hand, it 
continued to grow in importance. The external propaganda sector seized the 
opportunity to re-establish itself and demonstrate its own importance in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown. Most of the external propaganda 
organizations and mechanisms as we know them today were first established in 
the 1990s. Facing widespread international isolation, China discovered external 
propaganda as vital for its diplomacy and as a tool to mitigate the adverse effects 
of the world’s reaction to the crackdown. On the other hand, external propaganda 
was much more politicized than in the 1980s,  making it more difficult to realize 
important qualitative reforms. 
There were various institutional rearrangements, including the resurrection 
of the External Propaganda Small Group (EPSG) as well as the founding of new 
external propaganda institutions, but both in the immediate aftermath of 
Tiananmen and throughout the 1990s, domestic propaganda was considered a 
higher priority than external propaganda. Just like during the Mao period, this 
strongly affected the latter: At the very top, the external propaganda sector was 
led by the Propaganda and Thought Work Leading Small Group (PTWLSG).
1
 
After external propaganda work was expanded, cadres were often transferred from 
the domestic propaganda sector or even worked for both at the same time.
2
 In 
units that did both domestic and external propaganda, the latter continued to be 
de-prioritized.  
                                                          
1
 Cf. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu huifu zhongyang duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu de tongzhi” 中共
中央关于恢复中央对外宣传小组的通知 [Notification from the CPC Central Committee on 
the resurrection of the Central External Propaganda Small Group], Zhongwei [1990] 48 hao 中
委 [1990] 48 号 [Central Committee (circular) [1990] no. 48], March 19, 1990, reprinted in 
Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian xuanbian (1988-1992) 党的宣传工作文件选编 (1988-
192) [Selected documents from the Party’s propaganda work (1988-1992)], ed. Zhongyang 
xuanchuanbu bangongshi 中央宣传部办公室  [General Office of the Central Propaganda 
Department] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), 1904. 
2
 Cf. Wang Wurong王武榮, “Shuli xin guannian kaizhan quan fangwei duiwai xuanchuan” 树立
新观念 开展全方位对外宣传 [Establish a new concept and engage in all-dimensional external 
propaganda], Duiwai da chuanbo 对外大传播 [Big external communication], no. 3 (1996): 38.  
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 China continued to learn from Western models, but as Brady has pointed 
out, whereas in the 1980s, Western models were used to criticize the Chinese 
propaganda model, in the 1990s and beyond, approaches from Western PR and 
mass communications studies were consulted in order to modernize and thus 
strengthen Chinese propaganda.
3
 Despite this pragmatism, the issue of adapting 
language and journalistic habits to foreigners’ tastes was further complicated by 
the debate over a “Chinese concept of journalism” that was different from 
“Western journalism” because of China’s “national circumstances.” 4  This 
discourse, again, put those arguing for more flexibility in the external propaganda 
sector in a very vulnerable position. While external propaganda veterans were 
quite aware that China needed to adapt content and rhetoric to foreigners’ tastes, 
once China encountered a crisis, this knowledge was often cast aside.   
China’s international relations and major powers’ China policies had been 
relevant factors influencing China’s external propaganda debate and policy since 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but in the 1990s, the tone 
as well as concrete policies adopted were determined by developments in the 
international arena, by the relations between China and the United States (U.S.), 
and by the U.S. China debate and policy to an exceptionally high degree. This is 
true for immediate reactions to sudden events, which often determined the climate 
of the annual external propaganda conference, but also for the entire external 
propaganda policy and content to focus on. One reason for this was that after 1989, 
China had become an important topic in U.S. politics that became an issue of 
contention between Congress and the Executive and featured prominently in every 
election debate. Much of what has been termed the “China collapse theory” and 
the “China threat theory” was born out of electoral debates in the United States, 
with candidates attacking one another for their China or Taiwan policy. More 
informed Chinese texts show awareness of this fact, but rightly point out that 
                                                          
3
 For instituting and improving patriotic education (aiguo jiaoyu 爱国教育 ), China studied 
examples from the U.S., Germany, France, Japan, and Singapore. Britain, particularly the 
Labor government under Tony Blair served as a model for spin doctoring and how to 
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 Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju 中共中央宣传部干部局 [Cadre Bureau of the 
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intent and context do not matter, as China’s image among the United States public 
and third countries is damaged regardless of the context, and the fact that anti-
China rhetoric has such a large market in the U.S. is disconcerting in any case.
5
 
Thus, for most of the 1990s, the discourse that external propaganda was an 
important part of China’s struggle against hostile forces was very strong, and the 
“high politics” mode of conversation, in turn, influenced both external propaganda 
policy and behavior. 
This chapter will show that although the tone of the debate was, by and 
large, much more martial in the 1990s than in the 1980s, it varied. Aside from the 
ups and downs in Sino-U.S. relations, the most important international events and 
developments influencing the Chinese external propaganda debate were China’s 
application for entering the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) launched in 1994 and intensified in 
1998,
6
 the triangular conflict between China, the U.S., and Taiwan, the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997 and 1998, and the handovers of Hong Kong and Macao 
in 1997 and 1999 respectively. 
After the immediate crises of the early 1990s had been weathered, the CPC 
had the capacities to rethink its overall strategy. In the second half of the 1990s, 
the idea that China was or ought to be a great power and therefore should behave 
accordingly became dominant. This idea did not, in fact, emerge in a vacuum in 
China, but was linked to various international debates on China’s future that 
began to predict a “Chinese century” and discussed the implications of China’s 
rise.
7
 At the same time, several successes, such as the handover of Hong Kong and 
                                                          
5
 For instance, one article from early 2000 points out that George W. Bush’s statement that the U.S. 
and China are not “strategic partners” but “strategic competitors” is probably only a strategy to 
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宣传的若干思考 [Taking precautions before it starts to rain – A number of thoughts on 
entering the WTO and external propaganda], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao 对外宣传参考 
[External propaganda reference], no. 1 (2000): 5. Another article points out that the worst part 
of fear mongering about China in the West is its impact on other countries. Sha Qiguang 沙奇
光, “Dui Xifang meiti sanbu ‘Zhongguo weixielun’ de pingxi (shang)” 对西方媒体散布“中国
威胁论”的评析（上） [A critical analysis of Western media’s spreading of the ‘China threat 
theory’ (part one of three)], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 4 (2001): 5. 
6
 Jiang Fei and Huang Kuo, “Transnational Media Corporations and National Culture as a Security 
Concern in China,” in Security and Everyday Life, ed. Vida Bajc (New York: Routledge, 2009), 
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 Cf. Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking 
(Washington: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1998), 1.  
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China’s successful strategy of not devaluing the Renminbi 人民币 (RMB) during 
the Asian financial crisis, gave the country more confidence. As China planned its 
next steps that included taking on a larger global role, the question of China’s 
image and the role of external propaganda in China’s overall foreign policy were 
upgraded in importance. While during the first half of the 1990s, external 
propaganda had been considered an instrument to aid China’s concrete diplomacy 
and overcome its isolation, in the second half of the 1990s, external propaganda 
gradually began to be reframed as an important part of China’s long term 
ascendancy. 
Below, I will analyze the different shifts in external propaganda’s role over 
the course of the Jiang era. Before that, however, I will first give a brief 
introduction to what has arguably been the most disruptive factor preventing 
external propaganda from implementing some of the most basic points already 
suggested by external propaganda cadres in the 1980s: Domestic propaganda and 
its new role in maintaining regime security as envisioned in the language and 
logic of Chinese Marxism. 
 
6.1 Domestic Propaganda in the New Period 
The importance of domestic propaganda in the post-1989 era is well-
established. Brady explained that the Communist Party of China (CPC) believed 
that if it “lets go of controls over the propaganda sphere, then chaos would 
ensue.”8 After the “lessons” of the 1980s, the CPC introduced the slogan “seize 
with both hands, both hands have to be strong” (liang shou zhua, liang shou dou 
yao ying 两手抓，两手都要硬). In its overall (quanju 全局) interpretation, this 
slogan meant that China could not only focus on the economy, but also had to pay 
attention to politics and ideology.
9
 In fact, the Party spent quite a bit of energy on 
redefining the role of propaganda in the new period in its overall ideological 
universe. While of course it makes sense to read the embedding of propaganda in 
the overall ideology as a mere justification for a step to bolster regime security, 
anchoring it in the ideological universe was an important part in giving it 
permanence and making it an untouchable consensus.  
                                                          
8
 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 51. 
9
 Cf. ibid., 44-45. 
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The official turning point for propaganda work in terms of consolidation 
and introduction of a new policy that is still largely valid today was the Fourteenth 
Party Congress in 1992.
10
 In late 1992, Jiang Zemin 江泽民 ordered the powers of 
the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) to be expanded
11
 while the CPC 
simultaneously pushed for media commercialization in order to combat the 
legitimacy crisis of China’s media. 12  In January 1994, the new direction in 
propaganda and thought work was cemented with Jiang Zemin’s “important 
speech” (zhongyao jianghua 重要讲话) at a work conference.13 The timing was 
no coincidence: 1992 was also when Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 embarked on his 
Southern Tour and when the Party subsequently enshrined the reform and opening 
policies at the Fourteenth Party Congress, which required additional ideological 
protection in the official political imaginary of the CPC. The reasons for why 
China needed domestic propaganda consisted of three separate points:  
First, there was a positive rationale for propaganda and thought work: to 
motivate the Chinese population to partake in the reform project and to fully 
develop their “subjective agency.” Correct understanding and correct 
consciousness –both of members of the Party and of the people– have 
consequences for the success of the core work as well as other work areas of the 
party. Correct thought allows people to use their subjective agency to the fullest 
extent and for the right purposes. There are two ways to acquire (and constantly 
improve) it: through practice, and through instruction carried out by a vanguard 
with a firm grasp on correct thinking.
14
 With practice moving in the wrong 
direction according to Marxist standards (i.e. towards marketization), proper 
instruction was even more important. 
This already implies that in addition to this positive function, there were 
two problems that propaganda and thought work was meant to deal with: the 
                                                          
10
 Cf. ibid., 48-49.  
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 Cf. ibid, 49. 
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 Cf. Chin-chuan Lee, Zhou He, and Yu Huang, “‘Chinese Party Publicity Inc.’ Conglomerated: 
The Case of the Shenzhen Press Group,” Media, Culture & Society 28, no. 4 (2006): 584; 
Chengju Huang, “Trace the Stones in Crossing the River: Media Structural Changes in Post-
WTO China,” The International Communication Gazette 69, no. 5 (2007): 419.  
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 Cf. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 50. For the new policy line decided on in 1994, see Jiang 
Zemin 江泽民, Zai quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi shang de jiang hua 在全国宣传
思想工作会议上的讲话 [Talk at the nationwide conference for propaganda and thought work] 
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994).  
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temporary move back towards a market economy, which constitutes an 
unprecedented
15
 reverse transition from the perspective of “orthodox” Marxist 
ideology by gradually turning China’s planned economy into a “socialist market 
economy,” and the fact that China was confronted with constant attempts of 
hostile forces to ideologically infiltrate Chinese society. While the latter was 
stressed in the popular discourse on propaganda, it had a less prominent position 
in the more formal theoretical debate on propaganda and thought work, which 
held that the primary problems China’s ideological environment faced stemmed 
from economic reform, and that ideological infiltration by the West was only 
added on top of that.
16
 
In official texts, the most dangerous problem is Chinese society and the 
transformations it is currently undergoing. The reverse transition means that 
instead of increasingly converging interests among the “people” (renmin 
qunzhong 人民群众) as reform progresses towards the ideal Communist society, 
the Party needs to deal with a populace whose interests are becoming more 
divergent by the day. The Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992 spelled out that the 
goal of China’s economic reforms was to establish a socialist market economy. 
Realizing the transformation (zhuanbian 转变) from a planned economy to a 
socialist market economy touches many fields (lingyu 领域) both in the economic 
base and in the superstructure.
17
 It must (biran 必然, i.e. according to objective 
laws of development) have a broad and profound impact on people’s interests 
(renmen de liyi guanxi 人们的利益关系 ), social relations, ideas (sixiang 
guannian 思想观念), mode of thinking (siwei fangshi 思维方式), and lifestyle 
(shenghuo fangshi 生活方式).18 As reforms progress, differences between various 
social strata will increase. Big differences lead to contradiction and conflict 
(maodun chongtu 矛盾冲突).19 The Party recognizes that as economic reform 
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 See Lei Jia 雷珈, “Wei quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui yingzao lianghao de guoji yulun 
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 Ibid., 1.  
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 Ibid., 1-2.  
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progresses, there will be an increasing number of clashes of interest, and hence, 
sources of conflict. This is the ideological background of statements that as reform 
of the socialist market economy progresses, propaganda and thought work will be 
become ever more important.
20
 
When comparing texts on propaganda from the Mao period and from the 
post-Mao period, particularly from after the year 1992, one key difference stands 
out: The belief in the short-term malleability of man and short-term solutions to 
reforming people’s thought has been de-emphasized. The point of departure for all 
propaganda and thought work need to be the realities of the primary stage of 
socialism.
21
 Cadres need to become more understanding of the people’s 
ideological shortcomings and must avoid moving too far away from the realities 
of the primary stage of socialism. Propaganda workers should not commit the 
mistake of being too impatient, but rather be mentally prepared to do long-term 
difficult work.
22
 Patience (naixin 耐心) is a quality that propaganda workers not 
only have to display towards foreigners, but also towards the Chinese people.
23
 
This call for patience on the part of the Party elite with the ordinary masses (and, 
for external propaganda, with foreigners) has become a vital part of the 
propaganda discourse in China.  
 
The second –external– problem the CPC has identified for the current 
period is ideological infiltration, largely because of the U.S. Cold War policy of 
“peaceful evolution” (heping yanbian 和平演变) that it supposedly integrated into 
its China policy in the 1990s. Propaganda and Thought Work in the New Period 
notes that “when hostile forces want to bring disarray to a society and overthrow a 
political regime, they always start by opening a hole to creep through in the 
ideological field and by confusing people’s thought.” 24  The idea of peaceful 
evolution is generally attributed in China, as elsewhere, to John Foster Dulles 
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 See for example ibid., 4: 越是改革开放，越要重视宣传思想工作， 宣传思想工作在新形势
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 Cf. ibid., 17.  
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 Ibid.  
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从搞乱人们的思想下手。” Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju 中共中央宣传部干
部局 [Cadre Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee], 
ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo 新时期宣传思想工作 [Propaganda and thought 
work in the new period] (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 2006), 2.  
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“peaceful evolution” policy of the early 1950s, which sought to undermine 
Socialist societies without having to engage in military warfare.
25
 “Traditional” 
strategies of “peaceful evolution” include trade, and economic aid provided with 
the goal of planting Western values in these societies as an outcome of the 
interaction.
26
 When the notion experienced a major revival in China after 
Tiananmen, one of the most important tools of peaceful evolution in the eyes of 
the CPC was the international media. This ideological “war,” driven by capitalist 
countries’ desire to eradicate socialism is considered to be a long-term battle.27  
According to an evaluation published in 1990 (but still valid today), the 
thaw in East-West relations has not caused Western countries to cease their 
activities undermining socialist countries. Under the new historical circumstances, 
this subverting has only changed its form (xingshi形式); it now has more of a 
propaganda nature (xuanchuan xingzhi 宣传性质) and economic nature (jingji 
xingzhi 经济性质).28 A large part of the master text on peaceful evolution was 
most likely picked up from the U.S. debate. After the end of the Cold War, the 
future of U.S. external propaganda programs was uncertain. The way the U.S. 
media, particularly the Voice of America (VOA), presented their own role in 
China’s democracy movement 29  probably contributed significantly to China’s 
framing of the events as much as to China’s increased attention to external 
propaganda. In addition, while Francis Fukuyama declared the “end of history,”30 
Samuel Huntington famously predicted that the next conflict would be a cultural 
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 Zeng Jianhui曾建徽, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei: Zeng Jianhui lun duiwai xuanchuan 融冰架桥,
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 Chen Minyi 陈敏毅, ed., Dangdai guoji chuanbo yanjiu 当代国际传播研究[Contemporary 
international communications research] (Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guanbo chubanshe, 2006), 
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 Cf. Liu Jianming 刘建明, Deng Xiaoping xuanchuan sixiang yanjiu 邓小平宣传思想研究 
[Research on the propaganda thought of Deng Xiaoping] (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin 
chubanshe, 1990), 161. 
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 Cf. Zhou He and Jianhua Zhu, The ‘Voice of America’ and China:  eroing in on Tiananmen 
Square (Columbia: Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, 1994); 
“The Role of the United States Embassy and the Voice of America in the recent China 
Uprising”, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, June 15, 
1989. 
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 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
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one between the West and the Islamic world or Confucian Asia.
31
 The emergence 
of a number of works and arguments associated with what China has termed the 
“China threat theory” provided ammunition to those in China arguing that China 
had been chosen as the new enemy to succeed the Soviet Union (S.U.), or at least 
as a target for cultural infiltration.
32
  
Even books that did not paint China as a potential threat were used as 
proof of the war of ideas waged by the West against China. Parts of Joseph Nye’s 
Bound to Lead were almost immediately
33
 translated into Chinese and published 
by the Military Affairs Translations Press in January 1992 under the title “Is it 
certain that America can lead the world?” (Meiguo dingneng lingdao shijie ma? 
美国定能领导世界吗?). The introduction pointed out that one important thought 
put forth in the book was the concept of soft power, translated as ruan liliang 软
力量 at the time, and “how to turn it into a means for American hegemony of the 
world” (shi qi zuowei Meiguo duba shijie de yi ge zhongyao shouduan 使其作为
美国独霸世界的一个重要手段).34 As is common for books reflecting ideologies 
considered dangerous or at least disadvantageous to China, the Chinese publishers 
justified the translation in the preface by explaining the book’s “reference value” 
(cankao jiazhi 参考价值): First, it reflected the extreme feelings of chauvinism 
that had emerged in the U.S. after the end of the Cold War.
35
 Second, it showed 
America’s ambition to “establish complete world hegemony.”36 Third, the book 
offered a concrete policy for America’s plans to further peaceful evolution in the 
socialist world and the Third World. Nye, the publishers stated, was proposing to 
intensify cultural and ideological in-flows into China, the S.U., and the Third 
World in order to make these countries accept the American value system. From 
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 See for example Sha Qiguang 沙奇光, “Dui Xifang meiti sanbu ‘Zhongguo weixielun’ de pingxi 
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Xiaodong 何小东 and Gao Yuyun 盖玉云 (Beijing: Junshi yiwen chubanshe, 1992), 4.  
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 Ibid., 2.  
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 Ibid., 1-2.  
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this it could be inferred that America was not only planning to dominate the world 
politically, but also culturally and ideologically. Therefore, China needed to 
clearly realize that the importance of the struggle against peaceful evolution 
would be long-term, complex, and intense.
37
  
According to the CPD, the West’s cultural infiltration (wenhua shentou 文
化渗透) has two levels (cengci 层次 ): The first layer is using international 
broadcasting (guoji guangbo 国际传播) to distribute hostile political views and to 
spread degenerate capitalist lifestyle through the distribution of pornographic 
films and books. This level of infiltration can be fairly easily discovered and 
destroyed by using press and propaganda measures (xinwen xuanchuan shouduan 
新闻宣传手段) and “operations to eliminate pornography” (sao huang xingdong 
扫黄行动) to prevent and refute it,38 although it should be mentioned that today, 
the CPC has concluded that because of the Internet, controlling this type of 
infiltration is no longer that simple (cf. chapter 7). For the second level, namely 
high-level (gao cengci 高层次) ideological and academic infiltration (sixiang 
xueshu shentou 思想学术渗透), “hostile forces” use modern social science theory 
and values to win over intellectuals whose academic base (xueshu gendi 学术根底) 
is not deep and whose Marxist world outlook is not strong in order to distribute 
seemingly correct Western cultural research results in China.
39
 Those results (that 
spread to China because of being embraced by Chinese intellectual and academics) 
usually contain new discoveries that have some worth for the development of 
science, but also anti-Marxist theoretical points of view.
40
  
The influence of the latter type of cultural infiltration cannot be countered 
on the propaganda and thought front through simple replies and criticism. Instead, 
the CPD needs to use the basic theories (jiben lilun 基本理论) of Marxism, 
analyze the development of new historical circumstances and of ideological trends 
in contemporary society, guide the people so that they grasp the objective world 
outlook and methodology, and continuously increase the Marxist theoretical level 
(shuiping 水平) of the entire party and the entire society. Only thus can this type 
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of high-level ideological and cultural infiltration be successfully vanquished.
41
 
Consequently, in order to win the fight against “peaceful evolution,” China 
depends on Marxist theorists and social scientists to let the people deeply 
understand (shenke de renshi 深刻的认识) the true reactionary nature (fandong 
shizhi 反动实质) of Western propaganda.42 A danger also lurks for Chinese who 
go abroad, so it is important that everyone who gets in contact with things foreign 
be armed with Marxist theory in order to be keenly aware of Western attempts to 
split and Westernize China.
43
 This argument lays the basis for what later became a 
debate about China’s “ideological security,” “value security,” and a “discourse 
system with Chinese characteristics.”  
Although propaganda was weakened in the U.S. after the end of the Cold 
War, reforms of the U.S. propaganda apparatus provided plenty of material for 
China to analyze. Over the course of the 1990s, the United States Information 
Agency (USIA) was restructured multiple times. In 1990, the USIA established 
the Bureau of Broadcasting in order to enable closer cooperation between its radio 
and television services, most importantly the VOA and Worldnet. In 1991, the 
Office of Affiliate Relations was established within the Bureau in order to liaise 
with foreign radio and TV stations rebroadcasting the USIA’s products. In 1994, 
Clinton signed the International Broadcasting Act that created the International 
Broadcasting Bureau within the USIA, as well as the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors located within the USIA to oversee non-military broadcasting, which 
further strengthened the consolidation of radio and TV broadcasting. In 1997, the 
Clinton administration first proposed to merge the USIA into the Department of 
State, a move which was generally supported by the U.S. Advisory Commission 
on Public Diplomacy at the time.
44
 According to the “Reorganization Plan and 
Report” from December 1998, the consolidation was to enable the State 
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Department to make more persuasive and flexible foreign policy.
45
 The 
reorganization has also been interpreted as a move to bolster short term 
propaganda campaigns accompanying specific policies (such as, for example, 
influencing news coverage during the war in Kosovo in 1999) in favor of long 
term projects of mutual understanding.
46
 The consolidation was finalized on 
October 1, 1999. With the changes of the late 1990s, funding also decreased 
significantly; after all, saving money had been one of the main goals of the 
streamlining.
47
 The consolidation of the USIA into the Department of State was 
evaluated largely negatively by the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy in 
2000, especially with regard to its effect on former USIA personnel.
48
 
What was seen as a major cutting of funds in the U.S. following the end of 
the Cold War was largely presented as an expansion in China.
49
 From a Chinese 
perspective, U.S. external propaganda initiatives actually did intensify. Although 
in general U.S. external propaganda institutions were weakened over the course of 
the 1990s (which is also acknowledged in Chinese publications
50
), culminating in 
the dissolution of the USIA in 1999, there were, in fact, a number of new 
initiatives targeted at Asia and China in particular, most importantly the launching 
of Radio Free Asia in 1995.  
Thus, both the potential for conflict in China because of economic reform 
and the constant threat of ideological infiltration have ensured that the need for 
domestic propaganda can never be questioned again in a similar way that it was 
questioned in the 1980s.  
 
6.2 1990-1994: Entering the Smokeless Battle 
Although domestic propaganda was considered more important in the 
early 1990s, external propaganda cadres also successfully portrayed external 
propaganda as China’s “weak link” (boruo huanjie 薄弱环节 ) in the early 
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1990s.
51
 The framing was quite similar to how international propaganda was 
discussed in the 1930s: Although China was right and told the truth about the 
movement, it was not heard, and its image was wrecked –with drastic 
consequences for its diplomacy and economic development. This was because of 
a combination of China’s own weakness in the field and of being confronted with 
a formidable enemy bent on destroying China’s image in order to bring about its 
demise as a socialist country.
52
 While many of the initial reactions were focused 
on restricting the activities of foreign media in China, the country also realized 
that it could not improve its image through censorship and control alone. 
In order to be able to compete in what was seen as a propaganda war 
against “hostile forces” 53  after the CPC had crushed the Chinese democracy 
movement on June 4, 1989, a new EPSG was established in March 1990 under the 
leadership of Zhu Muzhi 朱穆之, this time as a “real entity” (shiti 实体), meaning 
that it had a fixed rank and staff.
54
 The resurrected EPSG was led by the 
PTWLSG and had the rank equivalent to that of a ministry or a province (zheng 
bu ji 正部级).55 The initial staff of the EPSG’s office was fixed at 60 people. 33 
of them came from the CPD’s Bureau of External Propaganda; the others were to 
be picked by the EPSG from “relevant departments.”56 Propaganda pertaining to 
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the overall international situation and China’s foreign policy remained in the 
hands of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG).
57
  
The EPSG had 11 members in late 1990: Zhu Muzhi (the group’s director 
and a member of the PTWLSG), Zeng Jianhui 曾建徽 (vice-head of CPD and 
“second in command” after Zhu Muzhi), Zhou Jue 周觉 (former ambassador to 
France and vice-head of the permanent office of the EPSG), Tian Cengpei 田曾佩 
(vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFA), Li Shuzheng 李淑铮 
(vice-head of the International Liaison Department, ILD), Liu Deyou 刘德有 
(translator and journalist with experience in external propaganda, and Vice-
Minister of Culture), Yu Fang 余放  (a high-ranking cadre from the security 
apparatus), Ma Qingxiong 马 庆 雄  (vice-head of what is today State 
Administration for Radio Film and Television, SARFT), Zhang Yunsheng 张云声 
(deputy editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily), Lin Shuilong 林水龙 (head of the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office), and Wang Mengkui 王梦奎 (vice-head of the 
Research Office of the State Council Guowuyuan yanjiushi 国务院研究室 and 
professor at Beijing University after 1991).
58
 This indicates that during the initial 
years, the small group still functioned like a non-standing advisory body, with 
relatively high-ranking representatives of different units coming together to 
deliberate and coordinate policies. However, as opposed to the 1980s, its 
executive office (banshi jigou 办事机构) was no longer a structure within the 
CPD, but had a degree of independence because it had a rank, and a seal of its 
own. Despite the creation of a permanent office in charge of external propaganda, 
the sector was still part of two different systems with responsibilities split between 
different Leading Small Groups (LSG), with the PTWLSG in charge of the 
majority of affairs. 
After the EPSG was resurrected, not only locales but also central 
departments began to establish corresponding external propaganda structures. 
Directly after the 1990 conference on foreign propaganda work, for example, the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT) established an external propaganda small group 
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under the leadership of the Ministry’s Party group, which was headed by one of 
the vice-ministers. Each division and bureau (ge si ju 各司局) of the Ministry 
assigned one cadre specifically responsible for external propaganda work.
59
 
 
The post-1989 changes in external propaganda policy were formalized in 
late 1990. In November 1990, the second national level external propaganda 
conference with participation from China’s top leaders (Jiang Zemin, Li Peng 李
鹏, Li Ruihuan 李瑞环, etc.) was held in Beijing. In late December 1990, the 
consensus formally agreed on at the conference was published in Central Circular 
(Zhongfa 中发) [1990] no. 21. The circular summarized the most important post-
1989 changes in the conceptualization of external propaganda and in concrete 
policies: 
First, in addition to “strategic significance” external propaganda was now 
also declared to be of “practical significance” (xianshi yiyi 现实意义).60 In the 
immediate aftermath of Tiananmen 1989 and 1990, China faced both economic 
sanctions and diplomatic difficulties. While official diplomacy was halted on the 
surface (although it continuing in secret),
61
 partner city agreements proved useful 
as they were, by and large, detached from state-to-state diplomacy.
62
 These 
remained relevant not only in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen 
crackdown but also after China had normalized most of its foreign relations 
again.
63
 It was during this time that the concept of “comprehensive diplomacy” 
(zongti waijiao 总体外交) drawing on a wide variety of channels was introduced, 
and external propaganda was declared a part of said “comprehensive diplomacy.” 
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Its purpose was to “create a favorable international environment.” Although the 
link was not made explicit in the document, this is likely what “practical 
significance” referred to: External propaganda was recognized as a powerful 
supplement for China’s diplomatic work.64   
Second, Central Circular [1990] no. 21 affirmed the need for external 
propaganda to “establish the image of socialist China in the world” (zai shijie 
shang shuli shehuizhuyi Zhongguo de xingxiang 在世界上树立社会主义中国的
形象).65 The concrete points in the circular about the image to be propagated 
placed “socialist China” first (before “reforming China,” “open China,” “ancient 
China,” and “peaceful China”): The first thing that foreigners needed to 
understand about China was that it was a socialist country in which the entire 
population worked under the leadership of the CPC to build socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. It can be assumed that there was awareness among 
external propaganda cadres that stressing China’s socialist nature could be 
counterproductive in trying to improve its image. Some people probably raised the 
problems caused by the lack of credibility that state media enjoyed, especially the 
state media of socialist countries. However, the early 1990s were not the time 
when such an argument could be made in public or in a prominent place. It was 
only in the late 1990s and early 2000s that both the focus on socialist China and 
the predominance of the state and the Party began to be challenged.
66
 
Third, the document introduced two different types of external propaganda, 
which were later juxtaposed directly. On the one hand, there was “positively 
propagating China” and on the other hand, there was “refuting lies spread by 
hostile forces.” The latter type constituted a major battle in the eyes of the CPC 
and was later during the 1990s referred to as the “international public opinion 
struggle” (guoji yulun douzheng 国际舆论斗争). As has been indicated above, 
both aspects were already present in the Central Circular [1986] no. 17, with the 
first highlighted before and the second emphasized after the Campaign against 
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Bourgeois Liberalization. Notably, however, the document emphasized that 
refuting lies should be very selective and only be a last resort when China’s 
national interests were threatened, because retorting meant giving “hostile forces” 
a platform and drawing attention to them.
67
 Instead, China should “rely mainly on 
positive propaganda” (zhengmian xuanchuan wei zhu 正面宣传为主) and focus 
on propagating China’s real image rather than getting bogged down in a passive 
and reactive position by constantly issuing refutations. It is interesting to note that 
this was already explicitly laid down in the circular from 1990, as this dilemma 
continues to be a problem until this day. 
Fourth, in 1990, the economic West, first and foremost the U.S., formally 
became the primary target of external propaganda. The rationale behind this was 
that the portrayal of China in Western media influenced third parties. Of course, 
China also had the most severe diplomatic issues with the West that needed to be 
resolved for China to be able to conduct business as usual again. The developing 
world still placed second, before the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. China’s 
neighboring countries, which became more important a few years later starting 
with the disintegration of the S.U., were listed last and without further 
specification of what needed to be done concretely. The main group of people to 
target was the “political middle” (zhongjian qunzhong 中间群众), as the left was 
already fairly sympathetic to China, and “hostile forces” on the other end of the 
spectrum had ill intentions and could not be convinced.
68
  
Fifth, Central Circular [1990] no. 21 included another important policy 
point, namely to “distinguish between internal and external, and to be strict 
internally and lax externally” (nei wai you bie, nei jin wai song 内外有别、内紧
外松).69 This is mentioned here because the fact that in 1990, leading propaganda 
cadres still thought that reporting certain events abroad but not in China was 
viable is in stark contrast to the position it took only a few years later.    
                                                          
67
 Cf. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang he gaijin duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo de tongzhi,” 
1922. 
68
 For the latter point, see “Zeng Jianhui tongzhi tan waixuan gongzuo de ji ge wenti” 曾建徽同志
谈外宣工作的几个问题 [Comrade Zeng Jianhui talks about a number of problems in external 
propaganda work], Duiwai baodao cankao, no. 7 (1990): 3. “当然，对于国外的敌对势力，
不管你怎么讲，他总是要歪曲你、攻击你的。” [Of course, hostile foreign powers will 
always attempt to misrepresent and attack you, no matter what you say.] 
69
 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang he gaijin duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo de tongzhi,” 1923. 
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Sixth, while television and film were described as the “weakest link” in 
external propaganda work, radio and news releases were listed as the first priority. 
The focus on the radio was likely due to the important role that the VOA had 
played during the Tiananmen protests. In order to replace backward technology, 
the Center pledged to grant external propaganda a place in the national budgeting 
plan, although, of course, the precise budget was not specified in the document.
70
 
 
Between late 1990 and early 1994, no further nationwide external 
propaganda conferences took place (although a number of specific conferences 
were organized
71), and no “agenda” documents (ganglingxing wenjian 纲领性文
件) updating Central Circular [1990] no. 21 were released by the Center. Instead, 
following the 1990 conference, a number of organizational changes in the foreign 
propaganda sector were implemented and adjusted over the next few years. In 
January 1991, the EPSG got a second nameplate under the arrangement known as 
“one organization with two nameplates” (yi ge jigou liang kuai paizi 一个机构两
块牌子): State Council Information Office (Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 国务
院新闻办公室 , SCIO). 72  As explained above (cf. chapter 4.2), the “two 
nameplates” solution can describe different concrete arrangements that are unique 
to China and are first and foremost a product of the lack of separation of Party and 
state. In the case of external propaganda, the highest organization has two names, 
one for internal communication within the regular Party structures and one for 
representative purposes and for communication with government departments. 
There is no ambiguity about its place in the party-state: It is an organization 
directly under the Central Committee (Zhonggong Zhongyang zhishu jigou 中共
                                                          
70
 Ibid., 1929. 
71
 Such as an external propaganda conference for opened coastal areas (Yanhai kaifang diqu 
duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo zuotanhui 沿海开放地区对外宣传工作座谈会) convened in 
August 1991, and an external propaganda conference for areas bordering the Yangtse (Yan 
Changjiang diqu de duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo zuotanhui 沿长江地区的对外宣传工作座谈
会) held in the second half of 1993. Cf. Zeng, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei, vol. 1, 77. Moreover, 
in 1991, China organized a conference to discuss propaganda targeted at the different countries 
of what used to be the Soviet Union and in 1992 held a similar conference but with a focus on 
South East Asian countries. Cf. ibid., 79. 
72
 Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui 中国共产党组织史资料编审委
员会 [Editorial committee for Materials on the history of organization of the Communist Party 
of China], ed., Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao中国共产党组织史资料 [Materials on 
the history of organization of the Communist Party of China] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi 
chubanshe, 2000.), vol. A1, 896-897 
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中央直属机构), not under the State Council, and thus clearly part of the Party 
bureaucracy.
73
   
Here, the CPC has found an acceptable solution for a conflict between an 
internationally established practice (that governments should have a press or 
information office) and the rules according to which the Chinese bureaucracy 
functions, namely that media-related work must remain within the hands of the 
Party. In accordance with international conventions, the Chinese government 
needed a press office to speak on its behalf, but the CPC was reluctant to actually 
vest a government bureaucracy with that power. Therefore, the EPSG/SCIO was 
put under the direct authority of the Party Center, but acted to the outside world as 
if it were a government agency.  
With Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992 that affirmed the policy of 
Reform and Opening and closed the debates over whether or not China should 
continue to interact more closely with the rest of the world, external propaganda 
fully regained its purpose as a precursor of reform and opening. If China had 
headed in the opposite direction and decided to seal itself off once again or 
significantly slow down its opening process, external propaganda’s function 
would have had to be redefined once more to adjust it to the general line. 
However, once it was clear that economic reforms would accelerate, external 
propaganda’s position and function, too, was affirmed. 
After the 14
th
 Party Congress, another reshuffle in the entire propaganda 
sector took place. Ding Guan’gen丁关根74 became head of CPD, while former 
director Wang Renzhi 王忍之  (who had opposed economic reform) was re-
assigned to the position of deputy director of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS). Simultaneously, Ding replaced Li Ruihuan as the leading cadre 
in charge of propaganda work and head of the Propaganda and Thought Work 
                                                          
73
 Ibid. Circular no. 11 from 2008 issued by the State Council, which classifies the institutions 
under the State Council into different types of work units, reconfirms that OEP/SCIO is “one 
organization with two nameplates [that] belongs to [the institutions] under direct authority of 
the Central Committee” (一个机构两块牌子，列入中共中央直属机构序列). Cf. “Guofa 
[2008] 11 hao: ‘Guowuyuan guanyu jigou shezhi de tongzhi’” 国发 [2008]11号：《国务院关
于机构设置的通知》[National circular (2008) no. 11: Notice from the State Council on the 
institutional set-up], website of the Propaganda Department of Qinghai Province, April 25, 
2008, http://www.qhnews.com/index/system/2008/04/25/002492334.shtml, accessed August 
12, 2012.  
74
 Ding Guan’gen had been alternate member of the Politburo since 1987 and was elevated to full 
membership at the 14
th
 Party Congress. 
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LSG.
75
 In the external propaganda sector, former vice head of EPSG/SCIO, Zeng 
Jianhui, replaced Zhu Muzhi (who was 76 years old at the time and thus due to 
retire). 
In July 1993, the EPSG was “adjusted” to become the Office of External 
Propaganda (Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi 中共对外宣
传办公室, OEP).76 As explained above, when the EPSG was re-established in 
1990, it still took the form of an advisory committee in which leaders of different 
units came together, but at the same time, it had, attached to it, a relatively 
independent executive office that represented it when interacting with other units 
and a clearly defined rank in the system. Likely, what happened in 1993 was that 
the advisory committee and the standing body were fully separated in name. The 
OEP got full-time leaders, whose main task was external propaganda. In the 
background, there probably continued to be an advisory body comprised of 
relatively senior cadres, and the new name of the executive office, “Office of 
External Propaganda,” was short for “Office of the External Propaganda Small 
Group” (Duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu bangongshi 对外宣传小组办公室), although 
the continued existence of a small group was not acknowledged in public.  
There are two main arguments for this: First, in early 1994, Shandong 
Province made a similar rearrangement in line with “the spirit of the center” by 
renaming its external propaganda small group and establishing a non-standing 
committee consisting of cadres from all departments somehow involved in 
external propaganda to macro-manage the sector, called Joint Committee on 
External Propaganda.
77
 Beijing also has an External Propaganda LSG, whose 
executive office (banshi jigou 办事机构 ) was the city’s OEP. 78  While local 
arrangements do not necessarily have to mirror the center, they are often similar. 
Second, in 2004, around the same time that external propaganda had been 
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 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 49. 
76
 Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang 
zuzhishi ziliao, vol. 7, 243. 
77
 Cf. “Guanyu queding shengwei duiwai xuanchuan lianxihui canjia renyuan de tongzhi” 关于确
定省委对外宣传联席会参加人员的通知 [Notification appointing the members of the Joint 
Committee for external propaganda of the provincial party committee], in Shandongsheng 
duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian (1992-1998), vol.1, 53. 
78
 Cf. “Zhonggong Beijing shiwei fushuji Long Xinmin tan Beijing duiwai xuanchuan” 中共北京
市委副书记龙新民谈北京外宣工作 [Long Ximin, deputy secretary of the Beijing Municipal 
Party Committee speaks about Beijing’s external propaganda work], Duiwai xuanchuan 
cankao, no. 7 (2001): 2. 
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elevated to the level of regime security, former head of OEP/SCIO Zhu Muzhi 
remarked that the EPSG had recently been upgraded to the status of Leading 
Small Group,
79
 which indicates that there had been a small group before 2004, 
whose status in the overall system was upgraded. The fact that the continued 
existence of the small group was not publicized is unsurprising, given that none of 
the small groups and leading small groups at the central level are officially 
acknowledged in documents that are fully public (gongkai 公开).80 However, as 
opposed to other, more important small groups, no unofficial information on its 
full composition is available.
81
  
 
The most important new practices introduced during the period 1990 to 
1994 were institutionalized press conferences for China-related news and the 
release of white books at OEP/SCIO. In November 1991, China published its first 
white book, which was on China’s human rights situation, with large parts written 
in the very polemical “struggle” rhetoric of the CPC reserved for the 
condemnation of China’s enemies, the defense of core interests as well as crisis 
situations in post-Mao China.
82
 Before the end of 1994, five more had been 
released.
83
 The idea to publish white books had supposedly been stipulated at a 
session of central leaders in early 1991,
84
 shortly after the release of Central 
Circular [1990] no. 21. White books have been issued by states and international 
organizations since the 20
th
 century to announce and justify policies, test the 
ground for a particular policy or invite. Thus, starting in 1991, China joined in the 
practice fairly late. The primary purpose of Chinese white books, however, is not 
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 Zhu Muzhi 朱穆之, Fengyun jidang qishi nian 风云激荡七十年 [Seven turbulent decades] 
(Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2007), vol. 2, 248. 
80
 Cf. Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership 
Monitor, no. 26, 2008, 1-21. Available online at 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM26AM.pdf, accessed August 12, 
2012, 1.  
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 The composition of the External Propaganda Work LSG, as the body was called after 2004, will 
be discussed below in chapter 8.3. 
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 Particularly the recounting of China’s history in Sections I. (“The Right to Subsistence -- the 
Foremost Human Right the Chinese People Long Fight for”) and II (“The Chinese People Have 
Gained Extensive Political Rights”). See Human Rights in China, available online at 
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/index.htm, accessed February 9, 2013. 
83
 Two in 1992: “Criminal Reform in China,” and “Tibet -- Its Ownership and Human Rights 
Situation,” one in 1993: “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China,” and another two 
in 1994: “The Situation Of Chinese Women,” and “Intellectual Property Protection in China.” 
See “White Papers,” http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-08/17/content_24165.htm#1991, 
accessed January 31, 2013. 
84
 Cf. Zeng Jianhui, Rong bing, jiao qiao, tu wei, vol. 2, 47.  
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to invite domestic debate, but to present Chinese principles, policies, and 
developments in a particular sector to foreigners. As such, most of them have 
replied directly or implicitly to accusations leveled against China. White books 
can be in reply to long-term or short-term attacks. For instance, two months before 
Jiang Zemin visited the U.S. in 1997, U.S. media began attacking China for its 
suppression of religion, especially repressions against Christians.
85
 Zeng Jianhui 
explains that OEP/SCIO produced a white book on religion in China (as well as a 
film on Protestant Christians in China) particularly to counter that attack.
86
 As 
such, white books’ role in China’s external propaganda is both proactive and 
reactive: Their mission is to refute certain accusations, but they usually do so 
without naming them directly. 
The role of the OEP was further strengthened in 1993, when Premier Li 
Peng decided that it should be responsible for all of the State Council’s press 
release work.
87
 Before that, the director of the Policy Research Office of the State 
Council had acted as the State Council’s official spokesperson. OEP used its 
mandate to set up a spokesperson system that involved cadres from each ministry 
and commission and in which it primarily functioned as coordinator.
88
 Previous 
lines of division within the bureaucratic system continued to apply; however: 
OEP/SCIO was only allowed to cover domestic issues; anything considered 
“international” was and continues to be handled by the MFA.89 As part of this 
new responsibility, the Office also met with foreign correspondents stationed in 
China to get their opinions, facilitate their access to Chinese high level politicians 
and organize trips for them to different parts of the country to do interviews or 
investigate (caifang 采访).90  
In addition, a number of smaller changes occurred between 1990 and 1994. 
In 1989/1990, China Reconstructs received a makeover and got the more 
                                                          
85
 Ibid., 48. The debate in the U.S. around the time of Jiang’s visit is also addressed, for example, 
in Todd Crowell, “China’s Crusage Against Christians: No Change,” Christian Science 
Monitor, October 31, 1997, 6; accessed through Lexis Nexis.  
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 Zeng, Rong bing, jiao qiao, tu wei, vol. 2, 48.  
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 Cf. ibid., 45.  
88
 Cf. ibid. 
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 Cf. Du Shengcong 杜圣聪 , Liang’an zhenxiang mima:  honggong dui Tai xuanchuan de 
zhengce, zuowei yu tujing 两岸真相密码：中共对台宣传的政策，作为与途径 [Password to 
the truth between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait: Policies, practices and approaches of CPC 
propaganda targeted at Taiwan] (Taibei: Xiuwei zixun keji gufen youxian gongsi, 2008), 105. 
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 Cf. Zeng, Rong bing, jiao qiao, tu wei, vol. 1, 80. 
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“fashionable” name China Today.91 In 1991, the Foreign Languages Office (FLO), 
which published all journals and books targeted at foreigners and had been part of 
the Ministry of Culture since 1982, was put under the leadership of OEP/SCIO.
92
 
In 1994, the FLO began publishing a new journal called Big External 
Communication (Duiwai da chuanbo 对外大传播).93 In 1993 and 1994, China 
founded two publishing houses: the Jiuzhou Press (Jiuzhou chubanshe 九州出版
社 ) under the leadership of the Taiwan Affairs Office and the China 
Intercontinental Press (Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe 五洲传播出版社 ) under 
OEP/SCIO, which prepared publications primarily targeted at Taiwanese and 
foreigners respectively but which also published research on external 
propaganda.
94
 In May 1990, China Radio International (CRI) began to issue an 
English newsletter called The Messenger, distributed to listeners abroad as well as 
to foreigners in China. According to CRI’s website, the newsletter was to inform 
listeners about developments at the radio station, but today, it also does 
background pieces on various aspects of Chinese society as well as on current 
political events.
95
 Since 1993, CRI has been broadcasting content in the U.S. by 
buying air time at local stations.
96
 Chinese ambassadors in certain key countries 
gave talks on China in the countries they were stationed in.
97
 
In 1992, OEP/SCIO issued a circular on how to strengthen and improve 
the production and distribution of local external propaganda materials. The 
circular required each locale and each unit opened to foreigners to produce a set of 
materials introducing itself: a picture brochure, an investment guide, a tourism 
brochure, a map, an introduction booklet, and one television feature program.
98
 
                                                          
91Cf. “China Today Marks Future with Anniversary,” China Daily USA, February 14, 2012, 
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In 1993, China established the Research Council for Human Rights 
(Renquan yanjiuhui 人权研究会), whose first director was Zhu Muzhi and which 
does both research and engages directly in the “struggle over public opinion.”99 A 
few years later, the Council also began to conduct human rights dialogues with 
other countries.
100
 The founding of a research institution shows that early on, 
China tried to counter attacks by working on an alternative human rights concept 
“with Chinese characteristics,” stressing the right of a people for sovereignty and 
the right to develop. 
Between 1990 and 1994, external propaganda consisted of two main types 
of content. The first, commensurate with the policy of “relying mainly on positive 
propaganda,” there was introducing China with a strong focus on the economy.101 
The fundamental responsibility of external propaganda was to “let the world 
understand China,” and to do this, the most important issue was to propagate 
China’s economy.102 Zeng Jianhui explained at the 1994 conference for external 
propaganda that the rationale for this was the new important position the economy 
now took in international relations and each country’s (ge guo 各国) foreign 
policy. According to Zeng Jianghui, because after the end of the Cold War the 
economy had become the most important factor (zhuyao yinsu 主要因素) in 
international relations, not only China but every country had made developing the 
economy its strategic focus and principal responsibility (zhanlüe zhongdian he 
shouyao renwu 战略重点和首要任务).103 Propagating a healthy economy could 
prompt other countries to reconsider their China policy. Second, in line with the 
dialectic opposite of “positive propaganda,” the policy to “engage in the 
international public opinion struggle,” EPSG/SCIO focused on those issues which 
China was under attack for, namely human rights, Tibet, and Taiwan.
104
 A few 
years after Tiananmen, “lies” were still to be refuted, but this was to be done 
mainly in a “proactive” way by not directly issuing refutations (although that also 
had to be done in extreme cases), but by providing systematic information about 
                                                                                                                                                               
志 [Hunan provincial chronicles: Folk customs] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2005), 
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China’s human rights, Tibet and other areas of interest.105 The two foci –economy 
and sensitive issues– were also the main topics that determined the debate on 
China in the U.S. in the early 1990s. In the 1992 presidential election, Clinton 
accused Bush of being “soft on China.” In 1993 and 1994, the Clinton 
administration had tied most favoured nation (MFN) status to China’s human 
rights record. Thus, EPSG/SCIO’s priorities were primarily replying to the U.S. 
debate over an appropriate China policy that became particularly fierce around the 
time of presidential elections, but also dominated congressional elections and 
rarely subsided entirely even when there was no election.  
 
As official statements from the government, white books were written in 
Chinese and then translated into English, resulting in the type of language that had 
characterized external propaganda work during most of the Mao period that Hu 
Yaobang 胡耀邦 had identified as a problem as early as in 1979. Xinhua 新华, 
too, often made use of this “official” or “traditional” CPC rhetoric, explaining, for 
example, that the “Tibetan people have launched epic struggles against imperialist 
invasions and have thwarted the schemes of imperialist and pro-imperialist 
separatist forces” which “have never ceased their anti-government and anti-people 
activities.”106 Thus, as could be expected, despite the quantitative expansion of 
external propaganda, the “targetedness” (zhenduixing 针对性) of works produced 
declined. 
The China Daily had been allowed to write its news releases directly in 
English, which gave it quite a bit of leeway to choose a style of reporting that 
would be accepted more easily by foreigners, or at least one that was different 
from typical CPC “correct-speak.” In the early 1990s, however, after the “lapse in 
judgement” of the paper in 1989, the autonomy of China Daily’s staff reporters 
was significantly curtailed. For the first few years after the crackdown, the China 
Daily was forced to rely on Xinhua releases when reporting on political matters, 
either those originally composed by the news agency (which were often formal, 
contained some awkward language, and focused on leaders’ activities and 
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speeches) or news from foreign news agencies, usually about international events, 
whose style was much more adapted to the reading habits of foreigners, but which 
were also handpicked by Xinhua.
107
 Reports by China Daily staffers were limited 
to success reports or policy announcements on local and sectoral matters 
rephrasing government officials
108
 and to the culture section of the paper.
109
  
Some strategic changes intended to improve the credibility of reports 
coming from China were made in the early 1990s. For instance, an article from 
1990 in External Propaganda Reference pointed out Israel as a potential model 
for China, particularly for its ability to incorporate scholars and experts in its 
external propaganda enterprise.
110
 Xinhua News Agency, for example, made use 
of this strategy much more frequently over the coming years than in the 1970s and 
1980s.
111
 “Expert opinions” were particularly used for sensitive topics or when 
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refuting accusations,
112
 but also when reporting positively about China’s 
economy.
113
  
 
By the time of the next nationwide external propaganda conference in 
January 1994, a lot of the points outlined in Central Circular [1990], no. 21 
remained valid, but some had shifted their focus. For instance, by early 1994, TV 
had officially joined radio as the main priority for China’s external propaganda 
work.
114
 While radio was still linked to the role of VOA in the region, the interest 
in television had, among others, been renewed by the powerful role TV, especially 
CNN (Cable News Network), had played during the first Gulf War.
115
 While other 
countries paid attention to these important channels of external propaganda, in 
China, they were still the “weakest link.”116 In 1991, China Central Television 
(CCTV) established an External TV Center (duiwai dianshi zhongxin 对外电视中
心).117  In 1992, CCTV-4, a Chinese-language TV channel targeted mainly at 
Overseas Chinese, was set up. CCTV-9, broadcasting in English, followed suit in 
2000.
118
  
Second, China’s most important four external propaganda media (the 
CCTV Overseas Center, CRI, the China Daily, and Beijing Review) were 
supposed to enter the foreign news market, particularly Western mainstream 
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society.
119
 This was the first time that this goal was spelled out rather than only 
implied in the hierarchy of target audiences, as it had been in Central Circular 
[1990] no. 21. The main focus on a few influential countries was justified by 
referring to their leading role in shaping international public opinion and other 
countries’ behaviour towards China. For instance, after the U.S. detached human 
rights from the Most Favored Nation (MFN) question and German chancellor 
Kohl had visited China in 1994 other countries began to adjust their China policy 
as well. If “Western mainstream public opinion” regarding China could be shifted 
that would have a tremendous impact on other countries.
120
 Likewise, China 
should foster good relations with foreign journalists stationed in China and 
foreign media organizations because their reports on China were the main channel 
through which people abroad learned about China.
121
  
Third, aside from focusing on the U.S. and Western Europe, China was 
also to strengthen its propaganda targeted at neighboring countries.
122
 In the 1990s, 
China largely adhered to the policy of keeping a low profile in international 
politics (taoguang yanghui 韬光养晦), instead focusing on its domestic priorities, 
a principle defined by Deng Xiaoping.
123
 This did not mean, however, that China 
did not try to improve its diplomatic relations to aid its domestic development. In 
times of limited capacities, the immediate environment was the most pressing 
security concern that China’s foreign policy had to take into consideration. The 
country settled several territorial disputes on its Northern border and in South East 
Asia in a very cooperative fashion in order to improve its foreign relations.
124
 
Particularly in and after 1994, China became more active in regional multilateral 
agreements, which it had opposed earlier.
125
 In line with this shift, China began to 
organize conferences that discussed propaganda specifically targeted at its 
neighboring countries.
126
 Much of the responsibility for researching public 
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opinion in neighboring countries and organizing external propaganda was 
delegated to the provinces directly bordering these countries,
127
 which were asked 
to produce television programs and print publications in the local languages of 
their neighboring countries.
128
 
In sum, after four years of institutional restructuring and setting up the 
basic infrastructure for governmental external propaganda, such as press 
conferences and white books, China was ready to draw the conclusions from its 
previous work, adapt its strategy, and make plans for the future of external 
propaganda work. This was to happen in the period 1994 to 1996, in an overall 
climate of triumph on the one hand, and strained triangular relations between 
China, the U.S. and Taiwan on the other.  
 
6.3 1994-1996:  Triumph, Crises, and New Plans 
By and large, the period 1994 to 1996 was marked by a sense of victory as 
Western countries began to deal with China on a more regular basis again in order 
to profit from China’s economic rise. The attempt of the Clinton Administration 
to tie China’s MFN status to certain human rights standards in 1993 and 1994 
failed and was abandoned.
129
 Instead, the U.S. began to accommodate the idea 
that China would not collapse any time soon and therefore, in order to integrate 
the country into the current world order, the proper strategy was to engage it.
130
 
This shift obviously did not go unnoticed in China and was used as an opportunity 
to declare victory for China’s post-1992 strategy. Zeng Jianhui proclaimed in 
September 1995 that the international environment had changed in China’s 
favor.
131
 Asian economies flourished, while the West’s did not do very well. 
Among the Asian economies, China’s was developing the fastest. While 
previously the West had hoped that China would disintegrate, explained Zeng, 
since 1995, it had been re-evaluating its stance; there were even signs of a “China 
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craze” (Zhongguo re 中国热 ). 132  By April 1996, the Clinton Administration 
conceded that trying to constrain China only hurt U.S. businesses, and engaging it 
was the best way to change China from within.
133
  
In the same period, China began to take note of what it has called the 
“China threat theory,” seen as an instrument used by “Western hostile forces” to 
impede China’s development and to protect the unipolar world order. 134  
According to an article on the topic by Sha Qiguang 沙奇光 (the head of the 
Theory Bureau of the Office of External Propaganda), between 1989 and 1992, 
the mainstream Western media had focused their energy and attention on the 
“China collapse theory.” Western countries were convinced that China would 
undergo political change and disintegrate like the S.U.
135
 The “China threat 
theory,” according to Chinese evaluations, emerged in 1992 and was linked to the 
reassessment of the Chinese economy in the West.
136
 The birth of the “China 
threat theory” is considered to be a book by Richard Nixon, in which he 
“imagined a new world with new enemies, the most prominent of which would be 
China.”137 Two other works published the same year also played a role, according 
to Sha Qiguang, “Awakening Dragon: The Real Danger in Asia is from China,” 
by Ross. H. Munro, published in September 1992 in Policy Review, and 
Huntington’s first article on the “Clash of Civilizations.” In late 1995, in order to 
“protect China’s image” (and to act against the policy option of containing China 
that had emerged in the media),
138
 Chinese media, including some academic 
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journals, began publishing a number of articles to refute the “China threat 
theory.”139  
The period 1994 to 1996 was also marked by tension in the triangular 
relations between China, the U.S., and Taiwan, which influenced both the rhetoric 
and concrete developments in the external propaganda sector and most likely 
contributed to the leadership’s full-scale affirmation of the importance of the 
sector in early 1996. In 1993-1994, Lee Teng-hui 李登辉 had made efforts to gain 
United Nations (UN) membership for Taiwan. In 1994, China announced its 
intent to isolate Taiwan through economic and diplomatic means,
140
 which it 
subsequently did. This followed a period in which several countries in Africa had 
changed recognition from the PRC to the Republic of China (ROC) after having 
received financial incentives.
141
 In fall of 1994, partially in response to an incident 
in which Lee Teng-hui had been refused a visa into the U.S. during a stopover in 
Honolulu, the U.S. reviewed its Taiwan policy to strengthen “unofficial” 
economic and political ties.
142
 In January 1995, Jiang Zemin reacted with a 
relatively conciliatory gesture by presenting his Eight Point Proposal to Taiwan in 
which he stated, among other things, that the PRC sought more economic and 
political exchange across the Taiwan Strait and did not oppose Taiwan’s attempts 
to build “nongovernmental economic and cultural ties” with other countries as 
long as it stopped pushing towards independence.
143
 However, after Lee Teng-hui 
gave a speech at his alma mater Cornell University in June, the PRC considered 
this softer approach a failure. A month after the speech, China conducted missile 
tests in the Taiwan Strait. In response, the U.S. sent vessels to the Strait in 
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December,
144
 but China was convinced that the Clinton administration was 
primarily preoccupied with the domestic economy and would not risk a war that 
could put Americans at risk and leave Clinton vulnerable to criticism. Thus, the 
vessels were not seen as a threat, but as a bluff, and in March of 1996, before 
Taiwan’s presidential elections, China conducted more missile tests near 
Taiwan.
145
  
Despite the fierce conflicts in triangular relations, by the mid-1990s, the 
focus on hostile forces trying to bring about China’s demise had abated in China’s 
media messages to foreigners (cf. Graph 6.I in chapter 6.4). Instead, China’s 
external propaganda media tried to support China’s diplomacy through more 
restrained and more specific attacks. The China Daily, whose staff writers were 
allowed to write pieces on political matters again, including international politics, 
frequently wrote “Opinion” pieces on the damages to Sino-U.S. relations in the 
period.
146
  
 
Making Long Term Plans 
Between 1994 and early 1996, China’s plans for external propaganda 
during the Ninth five-year-period (1996-2000) and beyond were devised and 
presented. In early 1994, external propaganda cadres began to push for making 
strategic mid- and long term plans covering spans of five, ten, and even fifty 
years.
147
 This was after the plans for domestic propaganda work had been 
consolidated over the course of 1993 and summed up in a speech by Jiang Zemin 
in early 1994.
148
 During the second half of September 1995, OEP/SCIO convened 
a symposium in Wuhan for the heads of external propaganda offices in selected 
provinces in order to come up with plans for the development of the external 
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propaganda sector.
149
 The most important change came in early 1996, when 
OEP/SCIO delivered a report to the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) on 
January 18, after which the PBSC formally affirmed the importance of external 
propaganda and strengthened the sector’s position. By the time, OEP/SCIO had 
developed a full macro policy program (referred to as silu 思路 ) that was 
presented to and approved by the PBSC
150
 and later further handed down and 
adapted to the requirements of provincial external propaganda.
151
 The article on 
the 1996 conference published in the People’s Daily announced that the Center 
had recognized and openly affirmed the importance of external propaganda and, 
as opposed to a year earlier, had already made a decision on the major policies.
152
  
The fundamental responsibility (genben renwu 根本任务 ) of external 
propaganda was defined as “creating a favorable international public opinion 
environment” (chuangzao lianghao de guoji yulun huanjing 创造良好的国际舆
论环境).153 First and foremost, this reflected a shift from the approach of the first 
half of the 1990s, in which external propaganda had accompanied concrete 
diplomatic tasks, towards long-term, strategic aims. The idea of a public opinion 
environment or public opinion front (yulun zhanxian 舆论战线) roughly derives 
from the division into different types of “wars” or areas of competition between 
different states, as first conceptualized in the inter-war years (cf. chapter 2). The 
“public opinion environment” can thus be listed alongside the “military 
environment,” the “economic environment,” etc.154  
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The definition of the fundamental responsibility was an extension of a 
slogan used in domestic propaganda work (cf. chapter 4.3 for the flexible use of 
slogans). In 1994, Jiang Zemin had defined the guidance of public opinion as one 
of the four core responsibilities of propaganda and thought work.
155
 By 1996, the 
notion of the “public opinion environment” had been further conceptualized for 
the domestic arena and recast as a matter of both national and regime security. 
The idea was formally established a few months later, in September 1996, when 
Jiang Zemin, while inspecting the People’s Daily, introduced the notion that the 
fate of the Party and the Chinese people hinged on the correct direction of public 
opinion.
156
 In October 1996, the Party published a Fifteen-Year-Plan on the 
building of “spiritual civilization,” which specified the media’s role in guiding 
public opinion (yulun yindao 舆论引导).157 This was the last step that finalized 
the inclusion of the “public opinion environment” in the CPC’s conceptualization 
of the press, and the idea had obviously already circulated during the previous 
years and been transferred to external propaganda slogans and policies.  
The policy program is not available in full, but was introduced and 
explained by Zeng Jianhui at a conference, providing more details. The goal 
behind creating a favorable environment was to speed up China’s development 
and economic construction, so that the country could gain a favorable position 
(youli diwei 有利地位) with regard to the ever increasing economic competition 
and with regard to its comprehensive powers.
158
 According to the evaluation of 
the international situation (guoji xingshi 国际形势), each country at the time 
sought to get the best possible position in the post-bipolar world order that had not 
yet been again locked down in a particular power constellation (cf. chapter 4.1).
159
  
Zeng Jianhui explained that the current international public opinion 
environment continued to be very unfavorable towards China because the West 
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controlled the most powerful public opinion tools (yulun gongju 舆论工具), 
which enabled it to monopolize international public opinion, suppress (fengsuo 封
锁) the truth about China and spread lies.160 This could only be changed through 
long term efforts. Therefore, creating a favorable international public opinion 
environment would not only be the fundamental responsibility for China’s current 
external propaganda work, but would require long-term commitment.
161
 The 
argument of monopolization of the international media by the West was 
reminiscent of the UNESCO’s (United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization’s) New World Information and Communication Order 
(NWICO) debate of the 1980s, but now, the focus was entirely on the effects this 
had on China, temporarily omitting the rhetoric of solidarity with other 
developing countries.
162
 
The overall goal for external propaganda work in the ninth five-year-plan 
reflected the new trend towards long-term, “proactive” solutions to China’s 
problems. By joining its different waixuan units and fighting a “comprehensive 
battle” (zongtizhan 总体战), China would strive to have its voice “be heard in the 
main regions of the world by the end of the century [… and] break the Western 
public opinion monopoly, so that we will occupy a relatively favorable position in 
the world public opinion pattern of the 21st century and will gradually see a 
marked improvement in our international public opinion environment.”163  
The policy program (silu 思路 ) also defined principles for external 
propaganda. The first and most important principle was to “take China’s 
fundamental interest as the highest standard” (yi guojia de genben liyi wei zui gao 
zhunze 以国家的根本利益为最高准则):164 The national interest should inform 
all choices in external propaganda work. In the 1980s, there had been several 
different ways of framing external propaganda work, with humanist discourses on 
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mutual understanding and internationalism coexisting alongside discourses on 
external propaganda in the service of helping China develop in order to serve the 
national interest or to show the superiority of socialism. Thus, in the mid-1990s 
the CPC still felt the need to clarify that the national interest, not internationalist 
ideals, should guide and direct all external propaganda work.  
Chinese external propaganda needed to use a “combination of principle 
and flexibility” (yuanzexing yu linghuoxing xiang jiehe 原则性与灵活性相结
合).165 Principle and flexibility are a clear case of dialectic opposites. Principle 
refers to the need to defend China’s key interests, even if that means having to 
engage in tit-for-tat struggle. While the CPC realizes that issuing polemical retorts 
to provocative statements made by “hostile forces” might draw attention to them 
and do China more harm than good, being principled (jiang yuanze 讲原则) is 
code for doing so anyway because the need to be consistent and not be perceived 
as giving in to “hostile forces” outweighs potential harm. Thus, anything that falls 
into the category of “high politics,” i.e. anything touching on policy principles 
(zhengce yuanze 政策原则), important issues (zhongda wenti 重大问题), and 
sensitive issues (min’gan wenti 敏感问题), needs to be dealt with in a “principled” 
manner so as to prevent any harm to the national interest.
166
 Flexibility, on the 
other hand, means that whenever China’s key interests are not at stake, external 
propaganda should get as much leeway as is possible within the overall Chinese 
propaganda apparatus in order to experiment with new strategies that might 
increase foreigners’ acceptance of Chinese media (such as adapting the language 
to suit foreigners’ tastes, including more negative news, etc.). The idea behind this 
dialectic pair is that external propaganda work needs to “be controlled without 
being killed off and vivid without being chaotic” (guan er bu si, huo er buluan 管
而不死，活而不乱).167  
The new program asked external propaganda workers to differentiate 
between Chinese and foreigners as well as between foreigners from different 
countries. Moreover, China would have to “fight a proactive battle” and try to 
break stories as quickly as possible, ideally before Western news agencies did, so 
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that hostile forces could no longer use sudden events to “smear China’s image.”168 
China should also make use of foreign resources (like foreign journalists, foreign 
media, etc.) wherever possible (jieyong waili 借用外力).169 
In terms of target audiences, China should mainly focus on targeting and 
winning over the political middle, i.e. neither waste resources on people who were 
already sympathetic towards China nor on people who were hostile towards China 
and therefore could not be convinced. The framing of propaganda as both 
necessary and useful at the time was very similar to previous framing patterns. 
Zeng Jianhui explained that after meeting with ordinary Americans, external 
propaganda cadres usually had the impression that “they had goodwill towards 
China, but had many misconceptions”170 about the country. These misconceptions 
could usually be resolved once they learned more about China, and in fact, said 
Zeng, foreigners often asked why China did not introduce and explain itself 
more.
171
 In this common depiction of foreigners, as already explained by Li Pu 李
普 in the early 1980s and valid until today, there are a few bad Westerners who 
really want to harm China, and a large majority that is only deceived by biased 
Western media.
172
 Emphatic statements like Zeng Jianhui’s and Li Pu’s indicate 
the continued opposition against the belief that Westerners can be influenced in 
China’s favor from people who believe that there is a plot against China supported 
by more than just “a few people” or who think that Western “stereotypes” cannot 
be changed through propaganda. 
Finally, China needed to “build a combined force” (xingcheng heli 形成合
力),173 that is, coordinate different departments and organizations in the external 
propaganda sector so that they could bring their work into agreement instead of 
being rivals or wasting resources due to overlapping responsibilities. In domestic 
propaganda work, too, this slogan had been used earlier to explain to media that 
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 Ibid., 112-113. 
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 Cf. ibid. 
172
 E.g. Sun Xupei, “Tan duiwai baodao de xin guannian he xin yishu” 谈对外报道的新观念和新
艺术 [On new ideas and new art (i.e. qualitative skills) of external reporting], Huaibei meitan 
shifanxueyuan xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 淮北煤炭师范学院学报（哲学社会科学版）
[Journal of Huaibei Coal Industry Teacher’s College  (Humanities and social sciences edition) 
25, no. 3 (2004): 35.  
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 Zeng, Rong bing, jia qiao, tuwei, 127-128. 
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while competition was encouraged in order to raise the quality of the Chinese 
mass media as a whole, they should not forget that they had a common goal (to 
spread the Party’s message) and therefore had to cooperate as well.174 The ability 
to “concentrate forces” (jizhong liliang 集中力量) was presented as an inherent 
advantage of Socialism that China needed to make use of.
175
 However, 
particularly in the external propaganda sector, the call to “join forces” addressed a 
problem that an increasing number of external propaganda workers pointed out at 
the time and that was the legacy of the decision to split external propaganda work 
up between different bureaucracies: There were too many units involved that did 
not coordinate their work properly, resulting in conflict and inefficiency.
176
 
 
6.4 1997-1998: “Breakthrough” and Additional Reform 
While the overall tenor of the period 1994 to 1996 had been upbeat, and 
1997 and 1998 saw another overall climate of triumph, early 1997 witnessed an 
ideological “backlash” around the time of Deng Xiaoping’s death,177 reflected in 
the reporting on the external propaganda conference in the People’s Daily, which 
published a speech given by China’s outgoing premier Li Peng in which he 
openly addressed the challenges posed to China by the ideological opposition in 
the West. Foreign propaganda had to engage in a long-term struggle over global 
public opinion (guoji yulun douzheng 国际舆论斗争) in order to stop those who 
wished to “Westernize” and “split up” China.178 The harsh tone and the focus on 
ideological struggle were the outcome of the Taiwan crisis, new developments in 
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 See for example “Yi zhengque de yulun yindao ren shi xinwen gongzuo de genben renwu” 以
正确的舆论引导人是新闻工作的根本任务  [Guiding people with correct opinion is the 
fundamental responsibility of press work], Neibu tongxin 内部通信 [Internal communications], 
no. 11 (1994): 3.  
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a big external propaganda pattern], Duiwai da chuanbo, no. 5 (1999): 23; Xia Zhifang 夏志方, 
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 The annual conference on external propaganda took place at the same time that Deng Xiaoping 
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waixuan gongzuo huiyi zai Jing juxing” 围绕经济建设和今年两件大事加强外宣工作-全国
外宣工作会议在京举行 [Focus on economic construction and this year’s two big events to 
strengthen external propaganda: Nationwide conference for external propaganda work held in 
Beijing], Renmin ribao, February 22, 1997, 4. 
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domestic propaganda work, a renewed focus on Marxism,
179
 and political 
struggles at the time accompanying the death of Deng Xiaoping. Li Peng, who 
was scheduled to leave the PBSC later that year, may have used the brief power 
vacuum after Deng Xiaoping’s death to push the overall debate in this direction. 
Having been the strongest supporter of the crackdown on Tiananmen, it was 
clearly in his interest for China to keep up the post-1989 master narrative of 
having to combat hostile forces.  
Nonetheless, the report on the conferences in 1997 first used the 
formulation “establishing a favorable image of China” (rather than “of socialist 
China”), repeated again in 1998, indicating a move away from stressing 
ideological content and China’s socialist identity. 180  After debates regarding 
China and the rest of the world had often been led in crisis-mode, which restricted 
many policy options, parts of 1997 and most of 1998 constituted the first test case 
at the national level of de-emphasizing ideology while at the same time 
highlighting China’s successes in actively creating a more “favorable public 
opinion environment” both in China and internationally.  
All of this took place amidst a partial leadership transition. At the Fifteenth 
Party Congress in September 1997, Zhu Rongji 朱镕基 , who led China’s 
intensified World Trade Organization (WTO) bid, ascended to the PBSC, and in 
March 1998, he replaced Li Peng as premier. Ding Guan’gen took over all leading 
positions within the propaganda sector. Zeng Jianhui was replaced by Zhao 
Qizheng 赵启正 (1940 - ),181 former deputy mayor of Shanghai and one of the 
many people that Jiang Zemin gradually brought to Beijing to bolster his own 
power base. Zhao Qizheng had made his career in the organization sector of the 
Party and had had little previous contact with external propaganda work (as 
                                                          
179
 As an article from Shandong province suggests, the focus on ensuring a proper ideological 
stance was in part in reaction to the increased popularity of Confucianism amongst cadres. The 
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180
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supposed to set the mode of the overall debate.  
181
 Zeng Jianhui became head of the Foreign Affairs Commission (Waishi weiyuanhui 外事委员
会 ). Cf. Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui, ed., Zhongguo 
gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, vol. A1, 727.  
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opposed to Zeng Jianhui, who had risen within the external propaganda 
bureaucracy). He did, however, have a lot of experience in dealing with foreigners 
from frequently receiving foreign delegations as the former Party Secretary of the 
Special Economic Zone Pudong 浦东 between late 1992 and 1998.  
By 1997/1998, OEP/SCIO had a fixed staff of 110 working at its Beijing 
office
182
 and nine main responsibilities: First it was tasked with researching and 
drafting plans on China’s external propaganda strategy as well as its principles 
and policies. These drafts were then approved by the Center.
183
 Second, it also 
researched and drafted plans for future development of the external propaganda 
sector, subject to the same procedure of approval by the Center. Third, it had to 
research trends in international public opinion as well as come up with strategies 
how to present issues that other countries paid attention to as well as how to report 
sudden events. The word used to describe OEP/SCIO’s responsibility was 
devising “countermeasures” or “counterstrategies” (duice 对策), implying that 
attacks from foreign media or politicians were already expected in these areas.
184
 
Fourth, OEP/SCIO guided and coordinated the external propaganda work of 
other central departments, locales, and embassies. The term “guide” is essential 
here, as it implies that OEP/SCIO had no authority to give binding orders to any 
of these players. Fifth, the Office was to research public opinion in Hong Kong 
and Macao and come up with “countermeasures,” again implying that discontent 
with China was expected. Sixth, OEP/SCIO served as press office of the State 
Council and coordinated press releases from the other ministries and commissions. 
Seventh, OEP/SCIO was in charge of organizing and coordinating the “struggle” 
against Western attacks on China’s human rights record. Eighth, OEP/SCIO 
managed special funds (zhuanxiang jingfei 专项经费) for external propaganda 
work. Ninth, it managed the cadres of its affiliated (guakao 挂靠) units and was 
to devise plans for training external propaganda cadres. Tenth, it had to complete 
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ziliao, vol. 7, 243.  
183
 Cf. Zhang Xiaoling, “Chinese State Media Going Global,” East Asian Policy 2, no. 1 (2009), 
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any other tasks handed to it by the PTWLSG,
185
 which clearly maintained a 
leading relationship over the OEP in the 1990s. Under Zhao, OEP/SCIO received 
a new important task: It was put in charge of overseeing all internet news content, 
not just news targeted at foreigners, but news primarily intended for domestic 
consumption as well.
186
 
 
The year 1997 was an eventful year and has been widely portrayed as the 
“breakthrough year” (tuwei nian 突围年) for China’s external propaganda.187 
Particularly, the reporting of the Hong Kong handover was presented as a success. 
OEP/SCIO had been entrusted by the PBSC in 1995 with organizing all coverage 
related to the handover in and had planned accordingly.
188
 Other events external 
propaganda workers claimed to have reported successfully included Deng 
Xiaoping’s passing away, the completion of the Three Gorges Dam, the official 
meeting between the Chinese and the U.S. president, and the 15
th
 Party 
Congress.
189
 Again, the “breakthrough” in external propaganda was mostly a spin-
off discourse of China’s “breakthrough” in foreign affairs that was propagated at 
the same time. The period 1997 to 1998 saw relatively good Sino-U.S. relations. 
Jiang Zemin visited the U.S. in 1997, which was presented as a symbol of China’s 
return to the center stage of world politics,
190
 and Clinton visited China in June 
1998.  
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01/07/content_4823763_3.htm, accessed April 9, 2012; Li Xiguang 李希光 and Yu Jiadi于家
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China in the U.S. media], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 12 (1998): 10-14. 
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shuoming Zhongguo’ - Gaige kaifang 30 nian lai Zhongguo waixuan sixiang de yanjin.” 
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 See ibid. 
190
 E.g. in Zheng Peimin郑培民, “Nuli yingzao da waixuan geju“ 努力营造大外宣格局 [Make 
efforts to create a big external propaganda pattern], Duiwai da chuanbo, no. 7 (1998). Zhao 
Qizheng recounted in 2005 how he saw a photo of the the leaders of the UN security council 
wil Jiang Zemin in the middle while visiting New York in 2000. This photo, he explained, was 
of historical significance because it symbolized China’s return to the center stage of world 
politics. Zhao Qizheng 赵启正, “Xinwen fabu you liyu yingxiang he yindao guoji yulun” 新闻
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While Li Peng’s speech at the external propaganda conference in early 
1997 had still been very martial, by 1998, the overall rhetoric about the 
international situation in China was restrained. The “struggle over international 
public opinion” was de-emphasized, and commentators noted that the prevalence 
of the “China threat theory” in the United States had waned. Even Li Xiguang 李
希光, author of the 1996 bestseller Demonizing China (Yaomohua Zhongguo 妖
魔化中国) and an advisor to OEP/SCIO under Zhao Qizheng,191 joined in the 
chorus of people claiming that China had overcome its post-Tiananmen image 
crisis. For instance, during Clinton’s visit to China, National Security Advisor 
Sandy Berger stated in Xi’an 西安: “I think China's human rights record is terrible. 
I think China is an authoritarian nation.”192 Instead of focusing on the criticism 
regarding China’s human rights, which would have happened under different 
circumstances, Li Xiguang instead reported that the U.S. had reclassified China 
from being a “totalitarian” to being an “authoritarian” state. 193  An article in 
External Propaganda Reference by one of Xinhua’s deputy editors-in-chief noted 
that China needed to “seize the opportunities” (zhuazhu jiyu 抓住机遇) that 
presented themselves while the whole world was watching the country’s rise.194 
As Graph I (see below) indicates, there was not only a toning down of internal 
rhetoric in most of 1998, but also fewer references to “anti-China forces” and 
“hostile forces” in Xinhua releases than in 1997 and in 1999, albeit more than in 
1994, 1995, and 1996, when China was still focusing on concrete diplomatic 
struggles and had only just decided that it wanted to crank up its voice. 
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Graph 6.I: China’s enemies between 1989 and 2002
195
  
The graph shows two things: first, the morphing of the main enemy from the reactionary 
forces into the anti-China forces (also see below in chapter 7.3), which is indicative of the 
transformation from a socialist to a nationalist identity in official rhetoric. Second, it shows 
the changes in how much Xinhua highlighted or de-emphasized China’s enemies in a 
particular year. 
 
At the 1998 annual conference, the tone of debate was completely different 
from 1997 and much more conciliatory. The new Politburo cadre put in charge of 
all propaganda and thought work, Ding Guan’gen, gave a speech196 in which he 
stressed globalization as a factor outside of the control of the CPC that constituted 
a major rationale for foreign propaganda: While the world was growing closer by 
the day (riyi jinmi 日益紧密), the need for mutual understanding, promoting 
friendship, and broadening the consensus was also increasing. Interaction with the 
world was no longer defined as a strategic choice of the leadership (however 
necessary), but as inevitable. Such arguments were of course part of a larger 
polemic directed against those that did not want the country to become more 
closely integrated into the global economy and that therefore opposed China’s bid 
                                                          
195
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for WTO accession. Nonetheless, the bid provided a good opportunity for external 
propaganda cadres to argue for the importance of their work and to use the overall 
toning down of ideological polemics to push for more reforms.  
Their efforts were successful. The Chinese government’s “Work Agenda” 
(gongzuo yaodian 工 作 要 点 ) for 1998 specifically mentioned external 
propaganda work as a pressing issue to be tackled that year: “We have to 
strengthen external propaganda work in order to establish and protect a good 
international image of China even further.”197 This inclusion again marked an 
upgrade of external propaganda work, or at least an important confirmation of the 
1996 upgrade. An article in External Propaganda Reference applied the “grasp 
with both hands” (liang shou zhua 两手抓) slogan to domestic propaganda and 
external propaganda, indicating that external propaganda had been neglected for 
too long.
198
 The largest part of 1998 was devoid of crisis mode events (not least 
due to the CPC’s lack of interest in creating any that could spoil the “public 
opinion environment” needed for the WTO bid). However, the fact that 1998 was 
only a year of Congressional elections in the U.S. that had a shorter run up than 
presidential elections probably also helped.
199
  
As China’s leaders were both bent on toning down aggressive rhetoric and 
on making China’s message more acceptable to foreigners, external propaganda 
workers were asked to “distinguish between domestic and external propaganda” 
(neiwai youbie 内外有别). Articles in External Propaganda Reference again 
focused primarily on the basic issues to make China’s external propaganda media 
look more professional and less ideologically motivated in the eyes of Westerners. 
Aside from the overall political climate, the fact that OEP/SCIO had a new leader 
who had not had much contact with domestic propaganda work probably also 
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yingzao da waixuan geju,” 7.  
198
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(1998): 2. 
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why he visited in June. He was still attacked by domestic opponents, but nonetheless, in a 
presidential race, which is by and large considered more important and for which the selection 
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hosting Jiang Zemin in late 1997) would probably not have been feasible for Clinton. This 
factor was presumably also considered by China and may be part of what is meant with 
statements such as “currently, the circumstances are particularly favorable towards us.” 
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helped. In 1998, the external propaganda sector conducted a campaign to “grasp 
the style of work and change the style of writing” (zhua zuofeng, gai wenfeng 抓
作风，改文风). External Propaganda Reference published a series of articles on 
how to adapt articles to the foreign target audience.
200
 One article argued that the 
new slogan for all external propaganda work should be “reinforce awareness of 
external propaganda [and] scale down the tone of external propaganda [in order to] 
increase the effectiveness of external propaganda.”201  
These articles addressed the problems external propaganda had suffered 
during the previous year. For the first time since 1989, authors began to directly 
articulate the idea that ideological content needed to be de-emphasized in order to 
make external propaganda more effective. Zhai Shuyao 翟树耀, a high-ranking 
journalist at Xinhua and professor at Xiamen University,
202
 recalled that during 
the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 ideological content in China’s external 
propaganda, such as statements that Vietnam did not care about internationalism, 
made Western audiences think that this was simply a conflict between two 
socialist countries that was none of their concern. Later, when China changed 
strategies and reported on the suffering of ethnic Chinese at the hands of 
Vietnamese, it got empathy and support from the international community.
203
 
Whether or not an article used the word socialism, he argued, said nothing about 
whether the article would have the intended effect or even about whether the 
stance it portrayed was correct. Instead, the crucial criterion should be whether the 
essence (shizhi 实质) of its content and its spirit were beneficial to projecting a 
correct image of China or creating a favorable international public opinion 
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environment.
204
 In this particular case, the distinction between appearance and 
essence in the CPC’s ideology provided a useful basis to argue for moving away 
from the focus on the appearance, namely individual words and formulations 
prescribed by the CPD, and moving towards articles which chose a different style 
and terminology, but supported China’s and the CPC’s stance in essence. Of 
course, this was very similar to what external propaganda veterans had already 
argued during the 1980s, but after the ideological backlash of 1989, it took nine 
years before a thaw in the overall political climate permitted such arguments again. 
In line with the policy to adapt better to foreigners and get rid of any 
“propaganda flavor,” in 1998, the CPD changed its English name to Central 
Publicity Department
205
 and mandated that xuanchuan no longer be translated as 
“propaganda” but as “publicity” when publishing or broadcasting in English. This 
was accompanied by a number of articles explaining the difference between 
propaganda and xuanchuan.
206
 The underlying idea was not new. An article in 
External Reporting Reference from issue 18, 1982 had explained the negative 
connotations of the term propaganda,
207
 but it had taken another fifteen years to 
translate this knowledge into an actual policy. External propaganda veteran Shen 
Suru 沈苏儒  (cf. chapter 3.2), who had supported using other terms than 
propaganda much earlier,
208
 explained that “there is no equivalent word in English 
for how we currently understand and use xuanchuan.”209  
The policy to translate propaganda as publicity is not enforced strictly. In 
some cases, xuanchuan (the activity) is still translated as propaganda, even when 
the CPD is referred to as the Publicity Department.
210
 Likewise, there are 
instances in which the term propaganda, probably accidentally, is applied to 
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“public education campaigns”; for example, one article in the China Daily from 
2009 speaks of “traffic safety propaganda.”211 Some uses of “propaganda” instead 
of “publicity” are probably intended (for instance when speaking about the 
Cultural Revolution), whereas others seem accidental (“traffic safety propaganda” 
or referring to xuanchuanbu below the provincial level as “propaganda 
departments”), and first and foremost show the difficulties with implementing 
even the most straightforward directives. 
At the same time, there was another initiative to grasp the “laws” according 
to which external propaganda functioned
212
 and to build external propaganda 
theory. In March 1998, OEP/SCIO organized a Symposium on External 
Propaganda Theory (Duiwai xuanchuan lilun yantaohui 对外宣传理论研讨
会).213 A year later, China began to set up numerous research centers devoted to 
external propaganda work and international communication, such as the 
International Communication Center (Duiwai chuanbo zhongxin 对外传播中心) 
at Qinghua University and the School for International Communication at Beijing 
Broadcasting Institute (Beijing guangbo xueyuan Guoji chuanbo xueyuan 北京广
播学院国际传播学院 ). 214  Coming up with a distinct theory of external 
propaganda was most likely seen as a way to justify and institutionalize the 
deviance of external propaganda work from domestic propaganda work. The year 
1998 provided a climate in which it was possible to argue for many reforms that 
had been taboo earlier, but being able to point to scientific laws would help 
enshrine the changes even after the next ideological backlash.  
In 1998, the slogan of “holding up both internal and external [propaganda]” 
was revived again.
215
 Plans approved by the PBSC in early 1995
216
 of turning 
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Xinhua into a news agency whose position was commensurate with China’s 
international standing and that would be able to influence world public opinion 
were picked up again.
217
  
In this period, China also began to seriously address the problem of slow 
reporting in case of sudden events that had been pointed out as an area for 
improvement in 1996 to prevent Western media from exploiting any incidents.
218
 
In early 1998, Xinhua established a LSG for Guiding the Reporting of Sudden 
Events (Xinhuashe tufa shijian zhihui lingdao xiaozu 新华社突发事件指挥领导
小组).219  An article in External Propaganda Reference declared proudly that 
Xinhua’s releases on a number of sudden events in 1998 had made their way into 
Western mainstream media either directly or indirectly and had destroyed Western 
media’s bias that “Chinese officials and media always maintain silence in case of 
sudden events.”220 An article in External Propaganda Reference cited the positive 
reactions Xinhua got from foreign media after reporting sudden events.
221
 
However, Xinhua distinguished strictly between natural disasters, which were 
now allowed to be covered directly and “political” (zhengzhixing 政治性) events 
which needed to be controlled strictly (congyan 从严).222 
The most important development that influenced how the debate on 
external propaganda was to continue over the following years was the issue of 
China’s ascendancy to a power of global importance. Better external propaganda 
was needed as all eyes were on China.
223
 The timing was informed by a number of 
factors. First, there was an overall climate of triumph in China after the handover 
of Hong Kong and the relatively successful weathering of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1998. Another important factor was the U.S.’ planning its grand strategy 
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for the 21
st
 century in the last few years of the Clinton Administration. As will be 
seen below, the plans China devised were as much based on as they were a reply 
to the United States’ strategic plans for the new century. The beginning of a new 
century was also linked to the much anticipated rise of China. By the mid-1990s, 
China had been gripped by the first waves of nationalism, clearly supported by the 
CPC, but also beginning to take on a dynamic of its own. An article in External 
Propaganda Reference from 1997 noted that “this ‘turn of the century’ is 
generally considered to be a new important starting point in the history of human 
development.”224 Historically, it stated, new superpowers had always entered the 
world stage at the turn of a century.
225
 According to the same article, China was 
“generally expected” (bei pubian renwei 被普遍认为) to become not only a 
strong country in the Asia-Pacific region (Yatai diqu qiangguo 亚太地区强国), 
but also a globally strong country (shijie qiangguo 世界强国) within the first 
twenty to thirty years of the new century.
226
 In 1997, a front page article in the 
People’s Daily for the first time used the phrase “the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese people” in the title as a new goal that the CPC would continue to struggle 
for.
227
 Thus, by 1997, the CPC had officially announced its historic mission to 
lead the Chinese people to renewed greatness. Over the next few years and into 
the new century, the question of external propaganda was to be increasingly tied 
to China’s rise and its new status as a strong country that needed a sufficiently 
strong voice in the international arena. 
 
6.5 1999: Preparing for the New Century 
In the last few months of 1998, tensions between China and the United 
States rose again and led to a powerful backlash against the upbeat rhetoric of the 
years 1997 and 1998 that had been based on the notion that the world welcomed 
China’s return. The new round of conflict had a number of reasons, including 
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Congressional elections in the U.S. and accusations against China of having 
committed nuclear espionage.
228
 In this atmosphere of conflict and confrontation, 
the focus why China needed external propaganda work was shifted again, but the 
sector’s position was strengthened rather than weakened as Chinese officials 
warned of a new Cold War –a war of ideas– between China and the United States.  
1999 was an important year for both domestic and international 
propaganda work because of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC 
and the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown. On February 26, 1999, 
Jiang Zemin delivered an “important speech” at the (by then) annual conference 
on external propaganda work, published as a front-page “important news” 
(yaowen 要闻) article in the People’s Daily that summed up and confirmed the 
master text on external propaganda that had emerged over the course of the 1990s 
and set the policy line for the future.
229
 Many of the points were taken from the 
1996 agenda and will therefore not be revisited here. The speech mostly cemented 
the changes in how foreign propaganda was portrayed that had emerged one by 
one between 1994 and 1999, introduced a few new points, and signalled that 
foreign propaganda work had become part of China’s long term economic and 
diplomatic strategy. Thus, Jiang Zemin’s speech was another upgrade in the 
importance of external propaganda work. At the time, China also made 
preparations for the Tenth five-year-plan (2001-2005), and Jiang’s speech should 
also be interpreted as guidance and support for the plans ahead.  
Both the proactive and the reactive rationale for external propaganda were 
highlighted: Given the recent deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, the rhetoric was, 
again, much harsher than it had been for most of 1997 and 1998. Jiang reiterated 
that “the policy nature and political nature of external propaganda are strong, and 
when national sovereignty, national interests, or national dignity are involved, 
[China has] to adhere to principles.”230 At the same time, external propaganda was 
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confirmed as a work of great strategic importance, as China needed a good 
international environment in order to realize its grand cross-century goals.  
The summary line of the People’s Daily article on Jiang’s speech asked 
propaganda cadres “to form a powerful propaganda and public opinion force 
commensurate with China’s status and prestige on the global stage in order to 
better serve the country’s reforms and opening policies as well as its 
modernization.”231 This was not the first time that the element of prestige was 
mentioned in the foreign propaganda discourse, but the first time that successful 
foreign propaganda as a marker of great power status was presented in a front-
page People’s Daily article.232  
In addition to summing up both points in “crisis mode” and in “regular 
mode” that had emerged over the course of the 1990s, the speech incorporated 
two new aspects for the first time that were to gain in importance in the next few 
years: First, using the Internet as a medium for external propaganda and second, 
the issue of “cultural security.” 
 
The Internet 
The speech was the first on external propaganda publicized in the People’s 
Daily to address the emergence of new media, most importantly the Internet. At 
this point in time, China had been using the Internet for its external propaganda 
for a number of years. In 1995, the China Daily had been one of the first Chinese 
media, and the first national-level medium, to create an online presence. Within a 
short period of time, several other media targeting foreigners went online before 
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the Internet was even opened to the Chinese public.
233
 China was first formally 
connected to the Internet in the first half of 1994. In 1996, it officially became 
open to the general public.
234
  
The Internet is considered one of China’s most important external 
propaganda channels. One Chinese author even argues that the development of the 
Internet in China was to a large extent driven by China’s need to establish new 
foreign propaganda media.
235
 While the government recognized the inherent 
dangers to regime stability, it was convinced that it could manage the Internet and 
use it for its own purpose.
236
 Considering that the China Daily was the first 
Chinese newspaper to launch an online edition in 1995 before the Internet was 
even opened to the general public, and considering the speed with which 
subsequent English versions of other websites were set up, external propaganda 
may actually have been a very important factor. This view is also supported by the 
fact that OFP/SCIO (not CDP) has the overall coordinating and policy making 
responsibility for web-based news media.
237
 In May 1997, OEP/SCIO released a 
circular on the use of the Internet for external news propaganda.
238
 An article in 
External Propaganda Reference from early 1998 also called the Internet the 
“fourth front to enter Western mainstream society” (jinru Xifang zhuliu shehui de 
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di si tiao zhanxian 进入西方主流社会的第四条战线).239 Initially, all news had 
to be posted online through a “central external propaganda platform.” A year later, 
this proved inefficient, and units with permission to go online were allowed to 
apply for their own domain name.
240
 
What is noteworthy, especially if contrasted with today’s speeches that 
always speak of both challenges and opportunities, is the stress on the positive 
aspects and the need to actively use the new technology to innovate the means of 
external propaganda. Initially, because with regard to new technology, Chinese 
media did not lag behind as much, the Internet and other new technologies and 
channels were viewed as a chance to crank up China’s voice that needed to be 
fully exploited. Moreover, the Internet allowed China to reduce costly print 
publications
241
 at a time when the country still sought to cut costs, despite the 
rhetorical commitment to external propaganda. For instance, by 2001, the 
Japanese, French, German, and Spanish editions of the Beijing Review all 
discontinued their print versions and moved online so that only the English 
version remained in print.
242
  
One article argued that the Internet brought new opportunities for China to 
improve its image in the world and counter the bad influence of traditional 
Western media, which were monopolizing the media market: First, the Internet 
had the characteristic of equality (pingdengxing 平等性 ): In principle, each 
computer could establish a connection with other computers and exchange 
information. Second, it had the characteristic of interactiveness (jiaohuxing 交互
性). In traditional media, the flow was unidirectional from the sender to the 
receiver. On the Internet, the information flow went both ways. Internet users 
could distribute content as well and could choose what type of content they liked. 
This change in communications relations (chuanbo guanxi de bianhua 传播关系
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的变化) provided China with an opportunity to improve its image. Third, the 
Internet had the characteristic of being direct (zhijiexing 直接性). Traditional 
media and traditional professional media personnel no longer served as a 
“gatekeeper” on the Internet; content could directly reach the target audience.243 
Fourth, internet news could be large in volume and were convenient (wangluo 
chuanbo xinxi rongliang da qie fangbian kuaijie 网络传播信息容量大且方便快
捷).244 There was unlimited space in a way that was completely incomparable to 
traditional media. Fifth, the Internet had the characteristic of being global 
(quanqiuxing 全球性), providing China with a direct connection to foreigners. 245  
Thus, the arguments offered by the author why the Internet was good for China’s 
image were not unlike those made by those who predicted the Internet would 
cause the CPC to fall. 
In the year 2000, the Party Center designated the first five “central key news 
websites” (zhongyang zhongdian xinwen wangzhan 中央重点新闻网站 ): 
China.org.cn (Zhongguowang 中国网), People’s Daily Online (Renminwang 人民
网), Xinhuanet (Xinhuawang 新华网), CRI Online (Zhongguo guoji guangbo 
diantai wang 中国国际广播电台网), and China Daily Online (Zhongguo ribao 
wang 中国日报网).246 The fact that three of these were almost exclusively meant 
for external propaganda and the other two were linked to the most important 
media of the Party-state and also had some external propaganda responsibilities 
shows that at this point in time the Internet was still largely seen in connection 
with external propaganda. Later, CCTV.com, China Youth Online (Zhongguo 
qingnian bao 中国青年报), China Economic Net, and China Taiwan Net were 
added. Each administrative jurisdiction below the central level also has one or 
more key news websites,
247
 most of which were established between 2001 and 
2002.
248
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Finally, after an initial period of enthusiasm, external propaganda cadres 
began to highlight that the U.S. hoped to use the Internet as a fourth channel to 
“infiltrate” China.249 Thus, the guiding slogan for how to deal with the Internet 
became “grasp development with one hand and control with the other” (yi shou 
zhua fazhan, yi shou zhua guanli 一手抓发展，一手抓管理).250 
 
Cultural Security 
The transcript of Jiang Zemin’s speech was also the first time that the term 
“cultural security” was mentioned in the People’s Daily.251  Around this time, 
Chinese analysts began to lament that China lagged behind in the cultural arena 
and was therefore swamped by cultural products that were dumped on the country 
by Western powers taking advantage of being more developed than China.
252
 This 
concern was related to the overall nervousness about conditions China might be 
forced to fulfill to join the WTO. The emerging cultural security debate at the end 
of the 1990s and in the early 2000s was still closely tied to the post-1989 
discourse of cultural infiltration, but also linked up with discourses on cultural 
hegemony or imperialism debated in other countries at the time.  
Part of the reason for the upgrade in importance of culture, according to 
Chinese observers, was that over the course of the 1990s, other countries had 
adapted their cultural propaganda policy and paid more attention to cultural 
activities.
253
 This referred to a wave of “cultural protectionism” starting in 1993, 
when France succeeded in integrating its policy of “cultural exception” (exception 
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culturelle) into the GATT.
254
 In the second half of the 1990s, Canada revised its 
foreign policy and gave culture a prominent role.
255
 Moreover, according to one 
Chinese author, around 1999, a number of non-Western countries (such as 
Singapore, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, India) began to propagate their own culture 
through radio broadcasts in order to counter Western distortions of their culture.
256
 
An article in External Propaganda Reference also mentioned that the British 
Council (Yingguo wenhua weiyuanhui 英国文化委员会) had adapted its cultural 
propaganda strategy in late 1998 and included China as one of the eight countries 
it wanted to target most intensely.
257
  
The cultural security project also had a domestic dimension aimed at 
buttressing the Party at home: At the time, China had launched what it called 
“reform of the cultural system” (wenhua tizhi gaige 文化体制改革), in analogy to 
the “reform of the economic system” (jingji tizhi gaige 经济体制改革).258 The 
idea behind the reform package was similar to and in a sense a continuation of the 
media reforms started in 1992: It was supposed to turn cultural units such as 
theatres and art troupes into enterprises that would generate revenue for local 
governments. This was intended as a means to reassert Party-control over the 
cultural sector by combating private cultural enterprises (operating in a legal gray 
zone) that had sprung up and were much more competitive than Party-owned 
cultural units.
259
 Thus, at the end of the 20
th
 century, China had begun to make its 
own cultural sector more competitive, both to re-assert control and pre-empt 
unwanted influences at home and to have a basis to spread Chinese culture abroad.  
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China could link its cultural security project to similar initiatives ongoing 
in francophone countries, but for its overall external propaganda concept, pointing 
to other countries as a justification was not as easy. Despite creating new 
propaganda channels targeting China and other countries in Asia, the U.S. had 
significantly reduced its propaganda budget after the end of the Cold War. In late 
1998, the Clinton Administration embarked on a more drastic reform course by 
submitting a roadmap for dissolving the USIA and merging most staff into newly 
created structures within the Department of State, a plan that was completed by 
October 1999. Although Chinese politicians had no interest in highlighting the 
reduction of America’s propaganda budget, quite a few people in China were 
aware of the cuts and the restructuring. For instance, shortly after Jiang Zemin’s 
speech, Yang Zhengquan杨正泉, a vice head of OEP/SCIO, wrote an article in 
which he criticized the belief of “some people” (youren renwei 有人认为) that 
because external propaganda was a product of the Cold War, it would gradually 
disappear now that this confrontation was over.
260
 First, external propaganda, 
which, as Yang explained, was called “external communication” in the West, was 
a normal and widespread activity that became increasingly important for states. 
Second, although the Cold War was over, the “Cold War mentality” remained,261 
and therefore, China had to continue to fight a “propaganda war” against hostile 
forces.
262
 After the U.S. had accused China of nuclear espionage, the argument 
that the U.S. was looking for a new enemy to replace the S.U. and had chosen 
China became relatively popular among Chinese officials and academics and 
could thus easily be used to justify the continued need for external propaganda. 
According to one former OEP/SCIO official, two new “Cold Wars” had been 
started in the 1990s: one targeting the global south and the Third World and 
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another targeting Socialism.
263
 In fact, he argued, the West was even fighting a 
“smokeless third world war” (my emphasis) against China.264  
Despite the fact that the dissolution of the USIA was a reduction in 
propaganda capacities, the restructuring resulted in a number of reports in 
Western media that China could point to in order to argue that the U.S. was, in 
fact, expanding its external propaganda capacities. In March 1999, the NATO 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) launched its offensive in the Kosovo conflict. 
Subsequently, on April 30, 1999, Clinton signed the Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 68 that ordered the establishment of an “International Public 
Information (IPI) Core Group” 265  for propaganda targeted at foreign publics, 
primarily meant to accompany the war in Kosovo at the time but probably also as 
a permanent institution. The Directive supposedly replaced Reagan’s National 
Security Decision Directive from 1983 and remains classified and thus 
inaccessible.
266
 However, China was aware of and reported on the IPI Core Group 
(Guoji gonggong xinxi xiaozu 国际公共信息小组).267  
As is well known, the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia was bombed by 
NATO during the conflict in what the Chinese government claimed was an 
intentional attack.
268
 Thus, while China had opposed the war before, after the 
bombing its coverage in the Western media became a focal point in the Chinese 
                                                          
263
 Sha Qiguang 沙奇光, “Dui shiji chu guoji yulun xingshi ji yingdui cuoshi de ji dian sikao” 对
世纪初国际舆论形式及应对措施的几点思考 [Reflections on form of international public 
opinion and response measures in the beginning of the century], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 
12 (2000): 9. 
264
 “西方国家正在打一场没有硝烟的第三次世界大战” Sha Qiguang, “Dui shiji chu guoji yulun 
xingshi ji yingdui cuoshi de ji dian sikao,” 9. 
265
 The IPI core group was chaired by the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
and included officials from the Departments of Defense, State, Justicy, Commerce and 
Treasury as well as from the CIA and the FBI. Cf. “International Public Information (IPI) 
Presidential Decision Directive PDD 68, 30 April 1999,” 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm, accessed November 28, 2012.  
266
 Cf. ibid.  
267
 E.g. Yi Xianfei 易先飞, “Tigao waixuan xiaoguo bixu jiaqiang zhenduixing” 提高外宣效果必
须加强针对性, Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 5 (2001): 36. According to this article, the core 
group was formally constituted on October 1, 1999. 
268
 Jessica Chen Weiss, based on an interview with a scholar from an influential research 
institution in Shanghai, explained that China provided aid to Serbia through its embassy, a fact 
which China of course could not highlight in its public denunciations, but which provided a 
motive for an intentional bombing in the eyes of Chinese observers. Jessica Chen Weiss, 
“Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” International 
Organization 67, no. 1 (2013):19.  
344 
 
debate to illustrate how biased Western media were,
269
 but also (and often 
simultaneously) to analyze how a successful international propaganda campaign 
could be organized. External Propaganda Reference reported on the “smokeless 
war” waged by CNN and the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) during the 
war in Kosovo.
270
 Like the Gulf War in the early 1990s, Chinese observers noted, 
actual violence in the war in Kosovo was preceded by a media attack.
271
 Thus, the 
end of the 20
th
 century brought with it another crisis that illustrated, in China’s 
eyes, the importance of a good external propaganda machinery in order to be 
perceived as legitimate in the international community and be able to act in one’s 
interest. 
 
6.6 2000 to 2002 
Particularly in the years 1999 and 2000, from the Chinese perspective, at 
least in official rhetoric, the West was caught in its Cold War mentality and 
needed an external enemy for domestic and international political gain.
272
 Chinese 
fears of “Westernization” were fuelled by discussions revolving around the notion 
of a “democratic peace,” which were relatively widespread around the turn of the 
century. The idea that a democratic China which could become part of a “a U.S.-
led international order of democratic states” would be in America’s strategic 
interest was frequently expressed in the writings produced in U.S. think tanks at 
the turn of the century
273
 and continues to be expressed until today.
274
 Particularly 
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around the turn of the century, when external propaganda cadres wanted to paint a 
gloomy picture of a new Cold War targeting China, the theory of the democratic 
peace served as proof.
275
  
After a series of low points in 1999 and 2000, Sino-U.S. relations changed 
for the better in 2001. With the beginning of the War on Terror, China no longer 
perceived itself as the main (potential) enemy of the U.S., which Huntington in his 
Clash of Civilizations had predicted to either emerge from the Arab world or from 
Confucian China. Some trade sanctions on China were lifted in early 2001, before 
China formally joined the WTO in November. Overall, during the Bush 
presidency, Sino-US relations improved considerably from a Chinese perspective, 
as the U.S. needed to rely on China for issues such as the Six Party Talks. At the 
same time, China continued to prepare for its WTO entry. In 2000, the country 
launched its “going out project” (zou chuqu gongcheng 走出去工程) and set in 
place a large number of new regulations guiding and monitoring outward Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI).
276
 China has also provided financial benefits and 
incentives to companies “going out.” 277  Chinese investments abroad were 
strengthened through an increasing number of free trade agreements. Nevertheless, 
both sudden events and long-term developments in Sino-U.S. relations continued 
to impact at least the external propaganda rhetoric, as they influence the overall 
political climate and what is permissible to say publically.  
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At the beginning of each year, cadres met in Beijing for the annual 
external propaganda conference. The conference for the year 2000 took place 
January 24 to 25.
278
 It highlighted the need to implement the “spirit” of Jiang 
Zemin’s speech from 1999.279 Thus, the basic framework remained largely the 
same and OEP/SCIO continued to ask cadres to adapt the principles and policies 
prescribed by the Center to local conditions. Foci were international news 
reporting and further development of the Internet as a channel for external 
propaganda.
280
 Locales were also asked to finally institute proper external 
propaganda structures and invest in this important work.
281
 The year 2001 marked 
the beginning of the 10
th
 five-year-plan. Among others, OEP/SCIO issued a five-
year-plan for the training of external propaganda cadres between 2001 and 
2005.
282
 The 2002 conference was dominated by the successful bid for the 2008 
Olympics, which served as a further impetus to improve foreign propaganda 
work.
283
 However, between Jiang Zemin’s speech in 1999 and 2002, there were 
no major changes in the propaganda concept or overall policy that were presented 
publically. Instead, a large number of concrete policies were devised and 
implemented after external propaganda had received a booster in 1999. More 
importantly, after issues of content and style had been addressed in 1998, by 2000, 
people involved in external propaganda work began to suggest more substantial 
changes that would not only allow external propaganda to deviate from domestic 
propaganda practice, but to actually become more independent from the domestic 
propaganda apparatus or even from the CPC as a whole.  
The “struggle over international public opinion” (guoji yulun douzheng 国
际舆论斗争) against hostile forces remained at the forefront. 2000 was a tense 
year in terms of Cross-Strait relations. In March 2000, Chen Shui-bian 陈水扁 
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was elected in Taiwan, despite attempts from the Chinese side to intimidate 
Taiwanese voters. In May 2001, OEP/SCIO and the Taiwan Affairs Council 
(Zhongtaiban 中台办) jointly convened a conference on propaganda work aimed 
at Taiwan
284
 and established a joint system (lianxi huiyi zhidu 联席会议制度) to 
coordinate online propaganda on Taiwan-related issues.
285
 In 2000, China also 
began publishing an annual report on the U.S. human rights record, as a 
“counterattack against America’s attack on China’s human rights situation.”286 
The homogenization of the tone in U.S. media in the aftermath of 9/11 was used 
by China again to demonstrate both the hypocrisy of Western press freedom and 
to study how the U.S. government exerted control over the media.
287
 While this 
was mainly meant as a justification of media control in China, as an attack on the 
U.S. and as a demonstration that there was no such thing as “absolute press 
freedom,” there is a chance that studies of U.S. media were also used by some to 
point towards an alternative model to the Party press, a topic which was pushed in 
the external propaganda sector at the time, as will be seen below.  
The “going out” slogan was also extended to a number of external 
propaganda projects, including large-scale translations of Chinese books to 
promote them abroad. The “project to support the export of Chinese books” 
(Zhongguo tushu zouchuqu gongcheng 中国图书走出去工程) was launched in 
2002
288
 as part of the “going out” policies announced in 2000 after a debate on the 
asymmetry between cultural imports and cultural exports in and out of China 
largely stipulated by the WTO accession protocol. The “going out” slogan could 
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also refer to the policy of requiring OEP/SCIO and its local equivalents to be 
trained to go abroad and conduct cultural exchange activities.
289
  
Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” was, of course, also applied to the 
external propaganda sector. The request to “implement the important thought of 
the ‘Three Represents’” in external propaganda work could mean a number of 
things, but one important interpretation was that the external propaganda sector 
needed to develop a business mentality, do better research on which products were 
well-received abroad and to avoid wasting money on material that missed its 
target audience.
290
 The report on the 2002 conference in the People’s Daily added 
a remark that Chinese foreign propaganda needed to strengthen its “service 
mentality” (fuwu yishi 服务意识), one of the many ideas that was slipped into the 
external propaganda discourse when the “Three Represents” were discussed. 
Another outgrowth of both the “Three Represents” slogan and the preparation for 
the Olympics was the “[let it be] bright under the lamp” (deng xia liang 灯下亮) 
project to ensure that foreigners visiting China were exposed to external 
propaganda material.
291
 The project was in the period of research and preparation 
in 2002, set to be implemented on a larger scale in 2003. The background behind 
the project was that many places produced brochures and other products and sent 
them abroad, but found that they did not reach their target audience, namely 
mainstream society. External propaganda was supposed to be made more efficient 
and less wasteful by focusing on the foreigners most easily reachable, those 
currently located in China. Zhao Qizheng noted that at airports and hotels, etc. 
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there was very little material. He also pointed out that many famous large hotels in 
Beijing did not have CCTV-4 and CCTV-9 in their program.
292
  
 
 Finally, some external propaganda workers and experts tried to give the 
sector more independence. Under the arrangement of the 1990s, China’s external 
propaganda forces were scattered, which subordinated them to the domestic 
propaganda bureaucracy and ultimately weakened them.
293
 Many external 
propaganda media units received their funding through super-ordinate media units 
whose main responsibility was to organize content aimed at Chinese audiences. 
This made external propaganda media overly dependent on domestic media and 
was pointed out as a severe systemic flaw by cadres engaged in external 
propaganda on multiple occasions.
294
 
In September 2000, CCTV’s English language broadcasts got their own 
channel in the form of CCTV-9.
295
 In the run-up to this change, an article 
published in External Propaganda Reference in early 2000 criticized the 
separation of television and radio external propaganda.
296
 By spreading the forces 
out over two different units, namely CRI and CCTV’s Overseas Center (Haiwai 
zhongxin 海外中心 ), external propaganda was weakened. The problems the 
author identified can be divided into three types: first, the problems caused by the 
Overseas Center’s dependence on CCTV, second, the problems caused by 
handling radio and television external propaganda separately, and third, problems 
caused by keeping both units dependent on state funding. With regard to the first, 
placing the Overseas Center within CCTV and thus subjecting it to the overall 
planning of CCTV rather than giving it more independence meant that its interests 
were constantly outweighed by the interests of domestic propaganda. One 
consequence of this was that the slogans and methods of domestic propaganda 
were applied to external propaganda.
297
 Because the Overseas Center depended on 
allocated funds taken out of the domestic propaganda budget, its independence 
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was compromised and occasionally, it suffered budget cuts. Moreover, because 
external propaganda was under a domestic propaganda unit, it did not occupy an 
influential position within the Chinese bureaucracy, and thus, talented people on a 
career track were more likely to want to work in domestic propaganda.
298
  
Second, by keeping radio and television external propaganda separate, 
cooperation between the two became more difficult. Because the Overseas Center 
had the ambition to become a real external propaganda unit, it had become like a 
“small TV station within a station” (tainei de xiaotai 台内的小台) and ate up 
huge sums of money. However, the cap on the number of people to be employed 
regularly (bianzhi 编制) led to a vicious circle. As the number of people was 
limited, jobs needed to be outsourced to temporary personnel paid out of 
production budgets. Obviously, temporary personnel were not as qualified; 
because of inefficiency, more people needed to be hired. As more people were 
employed, each salary became lower; with lower salaries, it became even more 
difficult to hire qualified people. Thus, the downward spiral had begun and, in 
addition, all money was pumped into staff and little was left for actual production. 
This problem could be somewhat remedied by joining radio and television 
targeted at foreigners because CRI had accumulated rich experience over the years, 
had built a qualified staff over the course of several decades, and also had a lot of 
staff stationed overseas. In many ways, there were similarities between the 
production of TV and radio external propaganda. Thus, by combining the two, 
television would be enabled to tap into CRI’s resources and use their personnel 
rather than having to hire unqualified temporary workers.
299
 At the same time, TV 
programs could be reused on the radio, saving further radio production costs.
300
  
Again, foreign experience was cited to back up the demand: Studies of the 
development of radio and television propaganda abroad, argued the author of the 
article, had proven that in order to a achieve a take-off, radio and television 
needed to be combined.
 301
 Here, the most important model was most likely the 
U.S. In 1990, the Bureau of Broadcasting had been established within the USIA to 
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consolidate its radio and TV broadcasting, most importantly bringing together 
Worldnet TV and VOA. 
Third, with regard to state funding, there was the problem that allocated 
money was not spent responsibly or reasonably, as the channel would not receive 
fewer funds if it mismanaged its finances, and thus, money ended up being wasted. 
This, according to the author, was a problem that could not be addressed 
fundamentally through “education” or better management.302 More importantly, 
however, there was the issue of credibility with state-funded media abroad. As 
long as a station was government-funded, it came across as a propaganda tool to 
foreign audiences.
303
 The overall goal thus had to be be for external propaganda to 
be able to sustain itself rather than depend on increasing handouts from the 
domestic propaganda sector.  
The link between credibility and Party ownership of the media was also 
taken up by several others in the early 21st century. The timing was no 
coincidence: The “Three Represents” had allowed entrepreneurs to join the Party 
and had given private business more legitimacy. In addition, China was looking to 
restructure its media sector in anticipation of the WTO entry. In 2001, Wu Zheng 
吴征 (Bruno Wu), founder of the Sun Media Group, Ltd. (Yangguang meiti jituan 
阳光媒体集团)304 called for the capitalization (chanyehua 产业化) of Chinese 
media. His goal was to weaken the monopoly of state media and their power to 
suppress private or semi-private media. While he admitted that China would have 
to continue to rely on state media for its international communication, it should 
also rely on conglomerates, like a Chinese BBC or CNN.
305
 The government 
needed to create a number of big media conglomerates and then encourage them 
to “go out.”306 In the same book, Wu argued that China should primarily focus on 
its image as a “developing country making constant progress” and de-emphasize 
“socialist China.”307 This, according to Wu, was necessary for two reasons: First, 
because China should focus on one strong message (developing China) rather than 
                                                          
302
 Ibid., 23.  
303
 Ibid. 
304See “Yangguang meiti jituan jianjie” 阳光媒体集团简介 [Brief introduction to China Sun 
Media Group], http://www.chinasunmedia.com/html/2013/summarize_0125/6.html, accessed 
February 7, 2013. The media group has no relation to the British tabloid The Sun.  
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 Wu Zheng, Zhongguo de daguo diwei yu guoji chuanbo zhanlüe, 113.  
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equally stressing different aspects of China’s image, and, second, because too 
much ideological content, which inevitably came with the focus on socialism, 
caused foreigners to reject Chinese external propaganda.  
As will become clear in the next part, by the early 21st century, the tone of 
the debate on external propaganda had taken yet another turn, and different kinds 
of strategic adaptations in order to raise the credibility of China’s media were 
again on the table.  
 
6.7 Conclusions 
At the beginning of the 1990s, a number of new targets and means of 
external propaganda were defined, some of which remained valid for the rest of 
the Jiang era whereas others changed or were supplemented as China began to 
make long-term plans again. During the 1990s, Chinese media were expected to 
“enter mainstream Western society” and to create a favorable public opinion 
environment for China’s continued economic reforms. The most important 
changes during the period 1990 to 1994 were institutionalizing press conferences 
and the release of white books at OEP/SCIO. At the time, the newly founded 
institution did not do much else and largely dealt with imminent problems. The 
overall change from reactive to proactive policy in the field of propaganda was 
reflected in external propaganda work. After 1994, the CPC began to think about 
what it wanted and could achieve through external propaganda in the long run. 
Towards the end of the century, external propaganda, moreover, came to be 
thought of as an important instrument in what was presented as a long-term new 
“Cold War” against China.  
In the time after 1989 external propaganda work was both strengthened 
and weakened: On the one hand, the sector had clearly regained in importance. A 
new small group was formed in order to deal with the negative fallout of the 
Tiananmen crackdown and facilitate China’s diplomatic reintegration into the 
world, and various new initiatives were launched. On the other hand, however, 
domestic propaganda was unequivocally redefined as vital for the survival of the 
CPC, thus cementing and expanding domestic propaganda’s institutional upgrade 
of 1987. External propaganda would not become an independent field, but a 
subfield of domestic propaganda. The fact that domestic propaganda set the 
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agenda showed in various ways. From the point of view of periodization, if for 
domestic propaganda the key years were 1992 and 1994, for external propaganda 
they were 1994 (key conference) and 1996 (cementing the new macro plans with 
internal PBSC approval). From the point of view of the CPC, domestic 
propaganda was clearly a more imminent security concern, and the fact that 
external propaganda often adapted the overall direction and policy slogans from 
the domestic propaganda sector meant that the latter determined the debate. Of 
course, domestic propaganda units were also incentivized to make their reporting 
more palatable, but domestically, different media with different functions were 
involved, many with their own motivations to become more appealing to readers. 
For external propaganda, the main groups were concentrated at the Center, close 
to the Party, most obliged to present the point of view of the CPC and least 
incentivized to go against the rules.  
Moreover, the events of 1989 clearly brought back polemical tit-for-tat 
struggle against hostile forces. Policy documents show that the CPC was aware 
that its overreactions often had unintended consequences by drawing attention to 
“hostile forces.” Quite a few people in the external propaganda sector were also 
aware that such responses, far from elevating China’s standing in the eyes of 
foreigners, actually diminished it, but in crisis mode, the value that China needed 
to be principled (jiang yuanze 讲原则) trumped other considerations. The overall 
political climate thus often dictated a martial tone in China’s external propaganda. 
The affirmation of external propaganda as an important task in early 1996 did not 
lead to an overall toning down of “crisis mode” rhetoric. On the contrary; Xinhua 
releases instead indicate that as China became more confident it had weathered 
the worst crises, the CPC’s rhetoric towards the outside world became more 
martial again.  
Throughout all of the 1990s, except for a brief period in parts of 1997 and 
1998, the discourse centered on ideological struggle dominated or at least 
influenced all topics that could be discussed. Particularly the year 1998 showed 
that with enough political will, the aggressive tone adopted in “high politics” 
mode could be limited to a minimum. As Zhao Qizheng took over and the Party 
Center as a whole had a strong interest in holding its conversations in an 
“apolitical” manner, there was room for pushing a number of changes that went 
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against established domestic propaganda principles, practices, and norms. 
Nonetheless, in many ways, the optimism of this time came back with a 
vengeance in 1999, when the theme to remain vigilant in the face of hostile forces’ 
continued ambitions to weaken or even destroy China returned. Although this 
theme has since been stressed to different degrees at different points in time and in 
different contexts, it has not been challenged. For all intents and purposes, the 
CPC still sees itself in the same situation as in 1989, with the only difference that 
the power balance between the two dialectic poles (China versus hostile forces) 
has shifted significantly in China’s favor. Whether or not individual members of 
the CPC believe that the West wages a new Cold War against China is irrelevant. 
In 1999, external propaganda was publicly affirmed by Jiang, ending the 
1990s with a strong endorsement of external propaganda work from the highest 
levels that translated into a number of new policies in the first few years of the 
millennium. At the same time, with the beginning debate on China’s rise, the 
focus of the external propaganda debate shifted again. In the 21
st
 century, the 
search of the CPC for legitimacy and international standing became one of the 
most important domestic factors impacting policy making in a number of arenas. 
Especially after 2002, regaining great power status became an increasingly 
important topic. Although there were no public redefinitions of external 
propaganda between 1999 and 2002, and Jiang Zemin’s speech remained the main 
point of reference for all authors discussing external propaganda work, internally, 
external propaganda began to be linked to China’s rise both in a negative and in a 
positive sense. As will be seen below, many of the slogans used in the 1990s as 
well as their underlying policies were recycled in the 21
st
 century. By then, the 
CPC had reframed external propaganda as a security issue and thus theoretically 
had the political will to back significant external propaganda reforms. These 
changes will be the topic of the final part of this dissertation. 
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7 External Propaganda as a Security Issue: Reasons and 
Consequences 
 
“If [Western hostile forces’] scheme to destroy China’s image succeeds, this will turn 
China into an international pariah whose cause is perceived as unjust. If, furthermore, 
they even succeed in ‘containing China’s development’ and cause China to have no 
power, the Chinese people will not be able to take their destiny into their own hands 
and will inevitably be bound to repeat the history of national humiliation.”
 1
 
 
In 2001, Sha Qiguang 沙奇光, the former head of the Research Bureau of 
the Central Office of External Propaganda, published a series of articles in 
External Propaganda Reference in which he explained the “China threat theory” 
to the journal’s readers, i.e. what China considers to be the intentional spreading 
of fear about China by Western hostile forces in order to disrupt China’s ascent. 
Sha finished his series on a dramatic note with the quote above: Unless China 
succeeded in protecting its image against the attacks of Western enemies, it was 
doomed to repeat its history of humiliation. The term Sha used to describe the 
likelihood of adverse consequences –biran 必然– added to the urgency: Failure to 
improve external propaganda and stop hostile forces’ smears would inevitably, 
according to the objective laws of the universe, lead to more humiliation of the 
Chinese people.  
After the importance of external propaganda had been affirmed several 
times over the course of the 1990s, Sha’s comments show that at the beginning of 
the 21st century, the conversation on external propaganda had been taken to a new 
level. A former external propaganda official, Sha clearly had an interest in 
exaggerating rather than understating the importance of protecting China’s image. 
By late 2003, however, Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 also declared external propaganda to be 
                                                          
1
 Chinese quote: “如果它们破坏中国国际形象地图谋得逞，便会使中国在世人心目中变成一
个“无理无义”的国家， 在世界上“失道寡助”；如果再能“遏制中国的发展”，使它没有实
力，中国人民就会难以掌握自己的命运，必然要重蹈民族遭受耻辱的历史。  ” Sha 
Qiguang 沙奇光, “Dui Xifang meiti sanbu ‘Zhongguo weixielun’ de pingxi (xia)” 对西方媒体
散布“中国威胁论”的评析（下） [A critical analysis of Western media's spreading of the 
‘China threat theory’ (part three of three)], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao 对外宣传参考 [External 
propaganda reference], no. 6 (2001): 9. 
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a matter of China’s national security and domestic stability, 2  confirming that 
external propaganda had, in fact, taken on an unprecedented role in China’s plans 
for the 21
st
 century and had been linked to the fate of the nation and the Party. 
The last part of the dissertation will analyze why and how external 
propaganda has come to play such an important role in the realization of China’s 
strategic goals, how the upgrade has been reflected in actual initiatives, and will 
explain both successes and limitations in adapting China’s external propaganda 
apparatus. This first chapter of the last part will begin by providing the necessary 
background on China’s goals for the 21st century and the Communist Party of 
China’s (CPC) official evaluation of the international environment in which it has 
to operate. It will then explain the official role external propaganda occupies in 
this grand scheme of things as well as how the upgrade in importance came about 
and was presented publically in 2003 and 2004. Finally, I will give an overview of 
subsequent developments, which should be seen as the outcome of the theoretical 
and rhetorical elevation of external propaganda. In sum, this chapter seeks to 
answer two questions: Why was external propaganda defined as a matter of 
national security and social stability, and what consequences did this have? The 
chapter will show that external propaganda work has a number of interrelated 
functions in the CPC’s plan for China’s future, but that perhaps the most 
important, ultimately justifying the upgrade, was the project to preemptively shift 
the power balance in what China calls the “international public opinion 
environment.” Thus, external propaganda, among other things, can be interpreted 
as the most proactive step of the CPC in securing its power base in China, both 
against potential foreign and domestic challenges. 
 
7.1 The International Situation  
In order to understand China’s take on external propaganda and why it is 
important, it is crucial to know its official stance on the international environment 
in which it has to work. This provides the basics for its external propaganda 
strategy: It defines who is friend and who is foe, what the most pressing 
challenges to China’s development are, and how China can go about solving them. 
                                                          
2
 Yang Guoren 杨国仁 and Ding Wenkui 丁文奎, “Fuwu da waixuan - 2005 nian yuandan xianci” 
服务大外宣－2005年元旦献辞 [Serving big external propaganda - 2005 new year’s message], 
Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 1 (2005): 1-5.  
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As explained above, these kinds of evaluations are based on an ideological matrix 
that weaves together older principles of Marxism-Leninism, their Chinese 
adaptations, and a large number of bits and pieces discussed by scholars and 
policy-makers abroad. 
Although the international situation can, under normal circumstances 
(pubian 普遍), only play a secondary role in Chinese affairs and, as an external 
factor, can influence and restrict, but not determine the existence and development 
of China and Chinese society,
3
 it is the largest unit of analysis in the universe of 
dialectic materialism and historical materialism and thus the ultimate “overall unit” 
(zhengti 整体 ) whose correct understanding is the key to understanding 
everything else in the world. More importantly, with the integration of the idea of 
globalization into the CPC’s official ideology, the CPC has formally 
acknowledged that China and the world have become more intertwined, 
increasing the number of instances where “external” factors can influence 
domestic affairs. Consequently, correctly understanding the world is a high 
priority in the CPC’s ideological universe. This analysis is based on the 
assumption that the CPC as a Communist Party has an authoritative evaluation of 
reality, which formally serves as the basis for policy making.  
With the principal contradiction no longer declared and basic world 
contradictions de-emphasized, the most general unit in objective reality that needs 
to be evaluated is called xingshi 形势 , which can be forcibly translated as 
“situation,” or “circumstances” when such a translation is mandated, but which is 
actually difficult to render in a single term. Xingshi is defined as “the ‘current 
state’ (zhuangkuang 状况) and ‘trend’ (qushi 趋势) of the development and 
change of a thing.”4 In other words, an evaluation of the xingshi is supposed to 
provide both an abstract snapshot of the current situation the world finds itself in 
                                                          
3
 Based on the premise (expressed by Mao) that external factors can only exert influence by going 
through internal factors. Cf. entry “Neiyin yu waiyin” 内因与外因  [Internal factors and 
external factors] in Zhexue da cidian, Zhongguo zhexue shi juan bianji weiyuanhui 《哲学大
辞典・中国哲学史卷》编辑委员会编 [Editorial committee for the Dictionary of philosophy, 
Volume on the history of Chinese philosophy], ed., Zhexue da cidian, Makesi zhuyi zhexue juan 
哲学大辞典，马克思主义哲学卷 [Dictionary of philosophy, volume on Marxist philosophy] 
(Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 1990), 113. 
4
 Entry “Xingshi” 形势  [Situation] in Xinhua cidian 新华词典  [New China dictionary], ed. 
Shangwu yinshuguan cishu yanjiu zhongxin 商务印书馆辞书硏究中心 [Research center for 
dictionaries of the Commercial Press] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2001), 1100.  
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and, as things constantly change, assess the direction in which it is moving.
5
 The 
normative statements (master text building blocks) made about the xingshi in 
official texts are often very general, which makes some decoding of what is 
actually meant and against what background a statement was formed helpful. 
According to the official evaluation, there were three major changes in the 
overall world situation since the beginning of the post-Mao period. The first, and 
most important, was the breaking apart of the bipolar world order and the 
beginning of a transition (or trend, qushi) towards a multi-polar world order, 
which is still continuing today. The second, less dramatic but still important, was 
the post-9/11 readjustment undertaken by the United States (U.S.) of its national 
interests and global presence (seen as an attempt by the U.S. to push the world 
further in the direction of unipolarity), which became visible around 2002.
6
 The 
third major change was the reshuffling of the global economic order following the 
2008 financial crisis, which sped up the trend of multi-polarization, as it 
weakened the U.S. economy and consequently made the U.S. push for a uni-polar 
world more difficult while at the same time strengthening China in relative terms.
7
  
                                                          
5
 According to a more concrete explanation for propaganda workers by Ding Guan’gen, the 
Politburo member heading the Propaganda and Thought Work LSG between 1992 and 2002, 
the xingshi basically subsume everything: “geographic situation, military situation, power 
balance, achievements, problems, internal factors, the development of things.” The term 
xingshi can be divided into its two constituent characters, xing and shi. Xing refers to xingxiang 
形象, or xingti 形体, that which is real, which can be seen and can be touched, i.e. things that 
can be experienced through sensory perception. Shi 势, on the other hand, designates that 
which has not yet materialized, but which can already be felt or, rather, estimated. Through 
properly seeing the xing, it becomes possible to correctly estimate (guji 估计) the shi. In this 
division, shi are consequently associated with theoretical understanding (lixing renshi 理性认
识), of which only the CPC is capable. Once xing and shi are clear, the direction of work 
(gongzuo fangxiang 工作方向), responsibilities (renwu 任务), and policy measures (duice 对
策 and cuoshi 措施) can, in theory, be easily defined. Cf. Dai Zhou 戴舟, Dang de jianshe yu 
xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo 党的建设与宣传思想工作 [Party-building and propaganda and 
thought work] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1995), 298.  
6
 According to one assessment, namely Sa Benwang萨本望, “Dui 2002 nian guoji xingshi de ji 
dian qianjian” 对 2002年国际形势的几点浅见 [Some humble opinions on the international 
situation in 2002], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 1 (2003): 44. An assessment from 2003 
stated that, unlike the changes in early 1990s, the U.S.’s post-9/11 readjustment of its global 
strategy did not cause any major changes in the “world situation” (Cf. “Hunan shengwei 
fushuji Wen Xuande tan kaichuang waixuan xin geju” 湖南省委副书记文选德谈开创外宣新
格局 [Deputy party secretary of Hunan province Wen Xuande speaks about how to create a 
new external propaganda pattern], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 7 (2003): 1).  
7
 For instance, one article remarks that European contries continue to ask China for help even three 
years after the crisis, thus contributing to continued multipolarization. Pei Guangjiang 裴广江 
et al., “Women, chumo shijie“ 我们，触摸世界 [Us, touching the world], Renmin ribao, 
December 29, 2011, 23. Also see Ye Zicheng, “Further Thoughts on the Life Expectancy of 
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In the following, I will briefly distinguish between different segments of 
the master text on the international situation currently forming the official basis 
for Party policy and articulated in speeches and other official texts on a regular 
basis. In addition, I will explain the implications each theme has for Chinese 
policy. The master text on the world situation is flexible to a degree, depending on 
which target audience is addressed and which policy is to be defended, but this is 
done primarily by emphasizing or de-emphasizing particular building blocks. It is 
thus also a typical “consensus text” that accommodates different positions within 
the Party and material that can be used in the two basic modes of conversation, i.e. 
that focused on harmony cooperation and that focused on struggle and 
confrontation.  
 
Theme I: The International Situation is complicated and volatile 
The current overall assessment consists of two parts, most likely intended, 
among other things, as a justification for why certain core categories important 
during the Mao period and the 1980s are no longer officially defined by the CPC, 
namely, first, the principal world contradiction, and, second, the world pattern: 
First, “the international situation is complex” (guoji xingshi cuozong fuza 国际形
势错综复杂)8 and, second, “the current world is undergoing broad and profound 
changes” (dangjin shijie zhengzai fasheng guangfan er shenke de bianhua 当今世
界正在发生广泛而深刻的变化).9 The precise formulation is not as important in 
this case as in many others. While the outcome of the change is clearly defined in 
official discourse (the world is constantly developing towards multipolarity),
10
 the 
                                                                                                                                                               
U.S. Hegemony,” in Inside China’s Grand Strategy: The Perspective from the People’s 
Republic (University Press of Kentucky, 2010), xi-xii.  
8
 42 hits between 1991 and 2011 in the People’s Daily database (plus 3 from before 1991). E.g. 
Benkan pinglunyuan 本报评论员 [Commentator from this paper], “Shenru xuexi Hu Jintao 
zongshuji zai Zhongyang dangxia zhongyao jiang hua zhi qi” 深入学习胡锦涛总书记在中央
党校重要讲话之七 [Seventh instalment of in-depth study of General Secretary Hu Jintao’s 
important speech at the Central Party School], Renmin Ribao 人民日报 [People’s Daily], 
August 13, 2007, 1. 
9
 59 hits between 2000 and 2011 in the People’s Daily database. E.g. Dai Bingguo 戴秉国, 
“Jianchi heping fazhan daolu” 坚持和平发展道路  [Adhere to the road of peaceful 
development], Renmin ribao, December 13, 2010, 6.; Zheng Jian 郑剑, “Chuangzao huihuang 
yongbao mengxiang” 创造辉煌 拥抱梦想 [Create brilliance; embrace the dream], Renmin 
ribao, January 2, 2008, 7. 
10
 See for example Benkan pinglunyuan, “Shenru xuexi Hu Jintao zongshuji zai Zhongyang 
dangxia zhongyao jiang hua zhi qi.” 
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time frame is not, and neither is the length and gravity of temporary setbacks. The 
main implication of this statement for China is that the country needs to be 
flexible and “go with the times” (yu shi jujin 与时俱进)11 so that it can quickly 
adapt to new situations and seize every opportunity to strengthen itself.  
 
Theme II: There is a trend toward multi-polarization and economic 
globalization 
 Owing to the consensus that in the current world there is no stable world 
pattern comparable to the bipolar Yalta System, general trends are important. 
Trends designate the overall direction into which the development of a thing is 
moving in the long run, usually amongst setbacks. In the current situation, there 
are two general trends, both of which are officially defined as inevitable, one that 
sums up the development of the political world order, namely multipolarization 
(shijie duojihua 世界多极化), and one that refers to the development of the 
economic world order, namely economic globalization (jingji quanqiuhua 经济全
球化).  
As explained above (chapter 4.1), in the CPC’s official evaluation of 
international politics, the U.S. tries to push the world towards unipolarity, whereas 
China works towards multipolarization, the “correct” direction of historical 
development.
12
 The statement that there is a trend towards multipolarization does 
two things: First, it affirms that the world continues to move in a direction that is 
favorable towards China and, second, it affirms that the CPC continues to be on 
the right side of history and –as opposed to the United States– pursues a path that 
takes human history to a new level. This does not mean, however, that China can 
                                                          
11
 The slogan “go with the times” was introduced by Jiang Zemin in 2000 and 2001, among others 
to justify his “three represents.” The slogan is considered Jiang Zemin’s contribution to Party 
theory alongside Mao's “liberate the mind” (jiefang sixiang 解放思想) and Deng's “seek truth 
from facts” (shi shi qiu shi 实事求是). Cf. “Jiang Zemin tongzhi shouxian tichu yu shi jujin, ta 
yu jiefang sixiang, shishi qiushi shi tongyi xulie de kexue gainian” 江泽民同志首先提出与时
俱进，它与解放思想、实事求是是同一序列的科学概念 [Jiang Zemin first raises going 
with the times; this is a scientific concept of the same order of emancipating the mind and 
seeking truth from facts], People’s Daily Online, 
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/1022/c350532-19344793.html, accessed February 21, 2013.  
12
 For instance, voices from the American media pushing the “China threat theory” are called 
“voices going against the historical tide” (ni lishi chaoliu de zaoyin逆历史潮流的嗓音). Sha 
Qiguang 沙奇光, “Dui Xifang meiti sanbu ‘Zhongguo weixielun’ de pingxi (shang)” 对西方媒
体散布“中国威胁论”的评析（上） [A critical analysis of Western media’s spreading of the 
‘China threat theory’ (part one of three)], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 4 (2001): 5. 
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simply sit back and watch history take the right turn, as the actions the country 
and its people take can speed up or slow down the trend. The most important 
implication for China is that precisely because there is no absolutely stable world 
order, all countries are trying to advance as much as possible to maximize their 
interests and get as big as possible of a share of the future power pie. 
Economic globalization is considered a new stage in the 
internationalization of economic relations. Although it is an objective trend, it is 
happening while the old international economic order has not yet fundamentally 
changed; the biggest profiteers of economic globalization are therefore the 
developed countries. For this reason, economic globalization is a double-edged 
sword. Since globalization is an inevitable trend, however, China must be a part 
and cannot simply shut itself off from the rest of the world. Thus, China’s 
participation in the world economy can no longer be questioned; all that is up for 
debate is the degree of participation. A third trend, which is not officially called a 
trend but is always mentioned directly after multipolarization and globalization, is 
the “scientific and technological revolution.”13 This means that China is under 
enormous pressure to keep up or even place itself ahead of the rest of the world. 
Finally, one vital implication of the changes in the fields of the economy as well 
as science and technology for China is increased interdependence. Each country is 
engaged in cooperation and competition for its own interests, but while doing so, 
countries have to take into account the fact that simply weakening another power 
by all means possible will not necessarily and directly increase one’s own power 
and strength. Despite taking interdependence into account, China continues to see 
itself in a situation of fierce international competition. In the mid-1990s, China 
had declared that the main focus of this competition was the economy. By the 21st 
century, the economy was still considered important, but now the CPC also 
focuses on competition in other aspects of each country’s “comprehensive powers” 
(zonghe guoli 综合国力). 
 
                                                          
13
 E.g. “Hu Jintao: Zhuazhu xin yi lun shijie keji geming zhanlue jiyu cong gongye daguo xiang 
gongye qiangguo zhuanbian” 胡锦涛：抓住新一轮世界科技革命战略机遇 从工业大国向工
业强国转变 [Seize the new round of strategic opportunities in the world revolution of science 
and technology; turn (China) from a major industrial country into an industrial power], 
Dongfang zaobao 东方早报  [Oriental Morning Post], May 30, 2012, available online at 
http://epaper.dfdaily.com/dfzb/html/2012-05/30/content_628167.htm, accessed March 2, 2013. 
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Theme III: Peace and Development Remain the Themes and the Trend of the 
Times 
 When Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 spoke of peace and development in 1985, he 
actually referred to two different though related things.
14
 First, he defined peace 
and development as the two main problems humanity was faced with that needed 
to be solved and that therefore China, too, should focus on. At the same time, 
however, Deng Xiaoping wanted to reduce the military budget and had to offer an 
ideological justification why it was safe for China to do so against the backdrop of 
an established ideological consensus that for as long as imperialism existed, war 
was inevitable. Therefore, he also re-evaluated objective reality and argued that 
peace and developments were the trends of the time, i.e. a direction into which 
the world was moving. So, on the one hand, peace and development are issues that 
need to be tackled, which is why they are problems (or the themes of the times); 
on the other hand, the overall climate today, as opposed to during the Cold War is 
more favorable towards peace and development, which constitute the direction 
into which the world will inevitably keep moving, thus making them the main 
trend. These two sides of the coin have survived in the present master text in the 
form of two dictums: 
1. Peace and development are still the main themes (zhuti 主题) of the 
present era, i.e. the two remain the most important problems in the world.
15
 The 
                                                          
14
 A number of articles indicate that “peace and development” as themes, trends, and 
characteristics are frequently confused. See for example Chen Yue 陈岳, “Ruhe renshi shidai 
tezheng he shijie zhuti” 如何认识时代特征和世界主题  [How to understand the 
characteristics of the times and world themes], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi 世界经济与政治 
[Economy and politics of the world], no. 2 (2002), 
http://www.irchina.org/xueren/china/view.asp?id=329, accessed July 30, 2011.  
15
 和平与发展是当代世界的主题 was first mentioned in the People’s Daily in Zhao Ziyang’s 
report to the 1987 Party Congress. In the immediate aftermath of 1989, the slogan was initially 
used to explain why China had let its guard down towards “peaceful evolution” after having 
lived in peace for a while. Cf. Jie Xi 解犀 and Shi Lu 施路, “Pingbao ‘beiwanglu’ – Jian da 
‘jieyan budui bu rushing shiufou hui fasheng fan geming baoluan’ deng yiwen” 平暴“备忘
录”——兼答“戒严部队不入城是否会发生反革命暴乱”等疑问 [“Memorandum” of quelling 
the riots – Plus answers to questions such as “If the martial law troops had not entered the city, 
could anti-revolutionary riots have happened”], Renmin ribao, July 26, 1989, 1. Less than a 
month later, however, it was again used in the regular manner, asserting that the international 
situation had not undergone any major changes. See Li Peng’s analysis of guoji xingshi as cited 
in Chen Yun 陈芸 and Yang Guojun 杨国钧, “Li Peng zongli zai guowuyuan quanti huiyi 
shang shuo nian nei jingji gongzuo zhongdian reng shi san jian shi jixu wending wujia, 
zhengqu nongye hao shoucheng, huanjie zong gonggei zong xuqiu maodun Guowuyuan 
jueding zuzhi qicao san nian Zhili zhengdun jihua mingque san nian hou mubiao” 李鹏总理在
国务院全体会议上说 年内经济工作重点仍是三件事 继续稳定物价，争取农业好收成，
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current themes (i.e. problems) of the times, peace and development, are 
complementary. Peace is a prerequisite (qianti tiaojian 前 提 条 件 ) for 
development, and developing the economy is an important basis for maintaining 
world peace. The main obstacles in the way of realizing peace and development 
are “hegemonism and power politics,” though “unstable and unpredictable factors” 
can also be listed as the main threat whenever China wants to de-emphasize the 
theme of confrontation with the U.S. The implication for China is that it has to 
officially work towards making a contribution to peace and development of the 
world through both its domestic and foreign policy by developing China and by 
fighting against hegemonism, which is officially seen as the source of most 
conflicts. Thus, striving for peace not only implies that China has to avoid conflict, 
but also that it has to counter hegemonism and power politics, which at times can 
mean becoming more assertive or even getting into confrontations. This, however, 
excludes military confrontations, which are to be avoided at –almost– all costs.16 
2. Peace and development are the characteristics (tezheng 特征) and 
trends (qushi) of the era. This formulation refers not to subjective goals, but to 
objective reality: In comparison to earlier times, the world is much more focused 
on working towards peace and development; there is no imminent threat of a war. 
This theme is today often expressed in the formulation “peace, development, and 
cooperation are irresistible trends of the times.”17 The addition of cooperation to 
                                                                                                                                                               
缓解总供给总需求矛盾 国务院决定组织起草三年治理整顿计划明确三年后目标 [Premier 
Li Peng said in the plenary meeting of the State Council that the economic priorities for the 
year are still three things: to continue to stabilize prices, to strive for a good harvest in 
agriculture, and to ease the contradiction between aggregate supply and aggregate demand; the 
State Council decided to organize the drafting of a three-year rectification plan and to define 
the goals for after three years], Renmin ribao, August 16, 1989, 1. In the early 1990s Chinese 
officials also used it to stress that the end of the Cold War had not resolved the problems of 
peace and development. Cf. Dai Zhou, Dang de jianshe yu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 100. 
The normative statement “peace and development are the main themes of the times” began to 
appear in the RMRB in the mid- to late 1990s in the formulation “peace and development are 
still the main themes of the times”. This statement was made by Jiang Zemin at the 49th 
anniversary of the founding of the PRC (cf. Benkan jizhe 本刊记者  [Reporter from this 
journal], “Wang Wei guanyu dangqian duiwai xuanchuan sikao” 王微关于当前对外宣传思考 
[Wang Wei’s thoughts on current external propaganda], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 1 
(1990): 7. Also see the full text “China’s Peaceful Development (Road)” from 2005 and 2011. 
16
 The exception is, of course, a declaration of Taiwanese independence.  
17
 “和平、发展、合作是不可阻挡的世界潮流” E.g. in Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi国务院
新闻办公室 [State Council Information Office], “Zhongguo de heping fazhan” 中国的和平发
展 [China’s peaceful development], Website of the Chinese government, September 6, 2011, 
available online at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-09/06/content_1941204.htm, accessed 
February 12, 2013. 
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the master text was not yet there in Jiang Zemin’s 江泽民 report at the 16th Party 
Congress, but was highlighted by Hu Jintao in his report at the 17
th
 Party 
Congress in 2007. It is part of a new master text on China’s “peaceful 
development” that will be addressed again below. The affirmation of peace, 
development and cooperation as the trends or characteristics of the present era is 
primarily meant to confirm China’s current line of peaceful development as 
correct and to emphasize that China needs to continue on this path.  
 
Theme IVa: Hegemonism and Power Politics Continue to Exist (Competition 
and confrontation) 
Hegemonism (baquan zhuyi 霸权主义) and power politics (qiangquan 
zhengzhi 强权政治 ) are most often defined as the two main threats to 
international security and to world peace and the two greatest obstacles to solving 
the problems standing in the way of peace and development. They are usually 
juxtaposed to peace and development through the term tongshi 同时  (while, 
meanwhile).
18
 This theme is basically a watered-down version of the previously 
dominant evaluation that for as long as imperialism exists, war is inevitable: 
Hegemonism has replaced imperialism; it no longer makes peace impossible, but 
it does threaten the peaceful coexistence of nations in the world. The complaint 
about hegemonism mainly refers to the United States’ ambitions for global 
hegemony. This evaluation of the world is reflected in China’s principle (fangzhen 
方 针 ) to oppose hegemonism and power politics and to work towards 
strengthening the trend of multi-polarization. The theme of hegemonism and 
power politics, which should be considered the more dominant evaluation of the 
main threats, thus highlights China’s competition with the U.S. By contrast, the 
second threat to peace and development, which is less orthodox and established 
but cited increasingly often, highlights China’s need and willingness to work with 
the U.S. and other countries to combat common threats:  
 
                                                          
18
 E.g. Guo Jiping 国纪平, “Gongtong weihu shijie heping wending” 共同维护世界和平稳定 
[Jointly safeguard world peace and stability], Renmin Ribao, December 6, 2007, 3; Dai Zhou, 
Dang de jianshe yu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 100; Sha Qiguang 沙奇光, “Dui shiji chu 
guoji yulun xingshi ji yingdui cuoshi de ji dian sikao” 对世纪初国际舆论形式及应对措施的
几点思考 [Reflections on form of international public opinion and response measures in the 
beginning of the century], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 12 (2000): 9.  
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Theme IVb: Unstable and Unpredictable Factors are on the Rise (Cooperation) 
The stress on “unstable and unpredictable factors” and non-traditional 
security problems in the international environment affecting international security 
is the second opposite to the trend of peace and development that is linked with a 
while/meanwhile (tongshi) alternatively to “hegemonism and power politics.” 
Between the two options, this one is clearly less confrontational towards the U.S. 
and is used most often on occasions in which China is cooperating with the U.S. 
(at least formally) against a third party.
19
 This theme is also generally more likely 
to be stressed in texts aimed at the international community or specific regions 
whenever the main theme is cooperation.
20
 The main characteristic of non-
traditional security problems (terrorism, but also others, such as cybercrime, 
environmental degradation, refugees, etc.) is that they are transnational problems 
and require cooperation.
21
  
 
In sum, China finds itself in a world that is complicated and has no clearly 
identifiable power pattern. With the political world order moving towards 
multipolarity, competition is fierce as all countries try to grab as big a chunk of 
the power pie as possible. While doing so, however, they are constrained by 
interdependence, the fact that their interests have become entangled with other 
countries’ interests. The position that the overall evaluation of the current world is 
supposed to buttress is that China is facing a “window of opportunity” to develop 
itself and, in fact, has to do so if it wants to survive politically, but that this cannot 
be a smooth enterprise all the way. China needs to be prepared to deal both with 
long-term problems and with difficulties that might arise unexpectedly.  
                                                          
19
 Such as the Six Party Talks or other Non-Proliferation Issues. E.g. “Statement by Head of the 
Chinese Delegation Mr. Zhang Yan in the General Debate at the 2005 NPT Review 
Conference” New York, May 3, 2005, http://www.china-
un.org/eng/chinaandun/disarmament_armscontrol/npt/t194106.htm, accessed October 11, 2011.  
20
 E.g. “Guanyu jiaqiang fei chuantong anquan lingyu hezuo de Zhongfang lichang” 关于加强非
传统安全领域合作的中方立场文件 [About documents on strengthening China’s position on 
cooperation in the field of non-traditional security], Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/tytj_611312/zcwj_611316/t4547.shtml, 
accessed February 14, 2013; Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, “Tuidong gongtong fazhan, gongjian hexie 
yazhou – zai Bo’ao yazhou luntan 2011 nian nianhui kaibushi shang de yanjiang” 推动共同发
展 共建和谐亚洲——在博鳌亚洲论坛二〇一一年年会开幕式上的演讲  [Promoting 
common development and building a harmonious Asia - Speech at the opening ceremony of 
the annual meeting of the Boao Forum for Asia 2011], Renmin ribao, April 16, 2011, 1. 
21
 See for example Gu Ping 古平, “Lun guoji jushi de ji ge tedian” 论国际局势的几个特点 [On a 
few characteristics of the international situation], Renmin ribao, April 3, 2002, 3.  
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7.2 The CPC’s Goals in the 21st Century 
According to its own official definition, the CPC does not have any 
interests of its own other than to serve the people and the greater public good 
(gong 公).22 However, in order to be able to do so, it needs to stay in power. In 
2004, the CPC for the first time admitted that its own status as Party in power was 
not secure and embarked on a major project exploring how it could strengthen its 
own power base (zhizheng jichu 执政基础). The Party issued a document in 
which it admitted publically that, although its rule was a “historical choice and the 
choice of the people”23 its ruling position was neither inherent nor guaranteed.24  
China as a nation, in turn, officially pursues three main, interlinked goals 
that derive from the “three grand tasks of the 1980s”: development, unification, 
and protecting world peace. All three “grand tasks” are mutually connected, and 
are linked to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese people” (Zhonghua minzu 
weida fuxing 中华民族伟大复兴): In order to achieve rejuvenation, China needs 
to be strengthened as a country (qiang guo 强国) and the Chinese people need to 
become rich (fu min 富民 ). The first is achieved through reunification and 
increasing China’s international influence, the second is primarily realized 
through development.  
The first is economic development, the “core responsibility” (zhongxin 
renwu 中心任务) derived from the principal contradiction in Chinese society (cf. 
chapter 4.1) and reaffirmed as the “top priority” (di yi yaowu 第一要务) of the 
Party at the 16
th
 Party Congress in 2002.
25
 For obvious reasons, detailed plans 
                                                          
22
 The slogan summing this up is 立党为公、执政为民. See for example Qiu Zhaomin 邱兆敏, 
“Dui woguo zhengfu xinwen fabu gongzuo de sikao” 对我国政府新闻发布工作的思考 
[Thoughts on the news release work of the Chinese government], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, 
no. 2 (2004): 21. 
23
 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de jueding (quanwen)” 
中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定（全文）  [Decision of the CPC Central 
Committee on strengthening the building of the Party’s ability to rule (full text)], passed 
September 19, 2004 at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16
th
 Central Committee, 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2004/Sep/668376.htm, accessed November 19, 2012. 
24
 Cf. Heike Holbig  and Bruce Gilley. “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China,” Politics and Policy 38, 
no. 3 (2010): 397. 
25
 See Qin Xuan 秦宣, “Fazhan shi zhizheng xingguo de di yi yaowu (zhuti yuedu)” 发展是执政
兴国的第一要务（主题阅读）[Development is the top priority in governing and rejuvenating 
(reading of the main topics [of the Party Congress])], originally published in Renmin wenzhai 
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regarding China’s future development strategy and concrete goals are guarded, 
even for domestic development. Nonetheless, it is possible to gather some 
information on China’s ambitions and plans for the future. The current goal for 
2020 is to build a “moderately prosperous society of a higher level” (geng gao 
shuiping de xiaokang shehui 更高水平的小康社会). Deng Xiaoping had first 
articulated a three-step-plan (san bu zou 三步走) for China’s development in 
1987.
26
 In 1991, a research team comprising cadres from 12 different central units 
was tasked with determining measurable targets or basic standards (jiben 
biaozhun 基本标准) to be fulfilled in order to be able to speak of a “moderately 
prosperous society” (xiaokang shehui 小康社会). At the 15th Party Congress in 
1997, Jiang Zemin defined a new three-step-plan for the 21
st
 century: The first 
step would be to double the Gross National Product (GNP) between 2001 and 
2010. The second and the third step are not defined in precise terms (at least not in 
openly available sources), but take the 100
th
 anniversary of the founding of the 
CPC (2021) and the 100
th
 anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) (2049) as benchmarks.
27
 
Under the Hu-Wen leadership, the concrete goals were adapted and 
corrected a number of times. At the 2004 Bo’ao Forum (Bo’ao luntan 博鳌论坛), 
an economic forum launched by China as an alternative to Davos in 2001,
28
 Hu 
                                                                                                                                                               
人 民 文 摘 [People’s digest], no. 11, 2002, available on People’s Daily Online, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper2086/7638/730508.html, accessed February 12, 2013. 
26
 In 1980, China’s annual per capita income had been at $250. The first step was to double it over 
the course of the 1980s to $500. The second step would be to double it again and reach $1000 
by the end of the 20th century (which would mean entry into a moderately well-off society for 
China). The third step was to double the per capita income twice to $4000 until 2030 or 2050. 
Cf. “San bu zou de fazhan zhanlüe mubiao” 三步走的发展战略目标  [The strategic 
development goals of going in three steps], in Deng Xiaoping lilun xiao cidian 邓小平理论小
辞 典  [Dictionary of Deng Xiaoping theory], Xinhuanet, August 20, 2004. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/28/content_2148526_11.htm, accessed June 12, 
2012.  
27
 See Wu Guoyou 武国友, “Jiang Zemin ‘xiao san bu zou’ zhanlue sixiang guanyu fazhan de silu 
ji qi lilun jiazhi” 江泽民‘小三步走’战略也思想关于发展的思路及其理论价值  [Jiang 
Zemin’s ‘little three step plan’ on the thinking on development and its theoretical value], 
Beijing jiaotong daxue xuebao  北京交通大学学报（社会科学版）  [Journal of Beijing 
Jiaotong University (Social Sciences Edition)] 10, no. 3 (2011). 
28
 Cf. Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s Soft 
Power,” EAST ASIA 23, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 31. In the China Daily, the Bo’ao Forum for Asia 
is described as a “non-government and non-profit international organization” whose aim is to 
bring about economic exchange and cooperation between Asian countries, and between Asia 
and the world. It organizes annual conferences that take place in Bo’ao, Hainan.  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/11/content_433151.htm, accessed 
24.08.2007. 
370 
 
Jintao announced that China would achieve a per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of $3,000 by 2020. This goal was referred to as “building a well-off 
society in an all-round way” (quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui全面建设小康社
会)29 at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. At the 30th anniversary of the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Committee on December 28, 2008, after 
China had reached this goal twelve years ahead of schedule, Hu Jintao announced 
China’s new development goals for both centenaries:30 by 2021 (2020), China was 
to have achieved a moderately prosperous society of a higher level (geng gao 
shuiping de xiaokang shehui 更高水平的小康社会), and by 2049 (2050), China 
should have basically realized modernization (jiben shang shixian xiandaihua 基
本上实现现代化).31 Wen Jiabao 温家宝 explained at a press conference in 2010 
that this only referred to a “developed country of medium level” (zhongdeng fada 
de guojia 中等发达的国家). Because of unequal development, it would take at 
least another one hundred years for China to have “truly achieved 
modernization.”32  
The second goal is national unification, with the main focus, of course, on 
Taiwan, but also including Hong Kong and Macao and potential hot spots such as 
Tibet and Xinjiang, where national unity needs to be maintained.  
 Unification, seen as another vital step in turning China into a “strong 
country,” similarly lacks a clearly defined timetable, despite the fact that officially, 
China still seeks a “final solution” (zuizhong jiejue 最终解决) to the Taiwan 
problem.
33
 While the PRC under Jiang Zemin still considered –though ultimately 
                                                          
29
 “China’s per capita GDP to hit US$3,000 in 2020,” Website of China Daily, April 24, 2004, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-04/24/content_326000.htm, accessed 
September 8, 2011.  
30
 I.e. the Hundredth anniversary of the founding of the CPC in 2021 and of the founding of the 
PRC in 2049.  
31
 “Hu Jintao zhichu jian dang bai nian he chengli bai nian Zhongguo fazhan mubiao” 胡锦涛指出
建党百年和成立百年中国发展目标 [Hu Jintao indicates targets for China’s development by 
the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Party and the 100th anniversary of the founding of 
the PRC], December 28, 2008, http://news.sohu.com/20081218/n261288431.shtml, accessed 
October 10, 2011.  
32
 Cf. “Wen Jiabao: Zhongguo zhenzheng shixian xiandaihua hai yao shangbai nian shenzhi geng 
chang” 温家宝:中国真正实现现代化还要上百年甚至更长 [Wen Jiabao: It will take at least 
another hundred years or even longer until China has truly realized modernization], website of 
China Daily, March 14, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/2010qglianghui/2010-
03/14/content_9587744.htm, accessed December 11, 2012.  
33
 Cf. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju 中共中央宣传部干部局 [Cadre Bureau of the 
Central Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee], ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan 
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rejected– a timetable for unification with Taiwan, the Hu-Wen leadership has 
moved away from the idea and instead focused on deterrence combined with 
strengthening cross-strait ties.
34
 
The first “grand task” of the 1980s, which is now usually listed last, 
namely “opposing hegemony and protecting world peace,” also still features 
prominently in contemporary Chinese visions of the world. The link between 
China’s rise or rejuvenation and world peace is frequently confirmed in the 
rhetoric of Chinese politicians. For instance, the White Paper on China’s Peaceful 
Development Road from 2005 states: “China has promoted world peace with its 
own development and made contributions to the progress of mankind.”35  The 
logic behind this statement, a form of antithesis to the “democratic peace” under 
U.S. hegemony, is usually excluded from texts primarily targeting foreigners: 
When one country or a few countries rule the world, there can be no peaceful 
environment. Multipolarization, by contrast, limits hegemonism and power 
politics and thus contributes to peace.
36
 Therefore, today, protecting world peace 
is largely fulfilled by developing China, thus making it grow stronger and 
allowing it to become a counterweight against U.S. attempts to strengthen 
unipolarity, but also by China taking on a more active role in the world, with the 
same underlying goal of countering hegemonism. This task is most directly 
concerned with China’s role in the world, its legitimacy and standing on the 
international stage, and its “normative” power as a voice that others listen to and 
that has the ability to shape international norms. Becoming a “strong country,” i.e. 
one that can stand up internationally, is clearly a key ingredient in the “great 
rejuvenation,” but one that is difficult to define because it is difficult to develop 
                                                                                                                                                               
sixiang gongzuo 新时期宣传思想工作 [Propaganda and thought work in the new period] 
(Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 2006), 197.  
34
 During Chen Shui-bian’s presidency only with the opposition and businesspeople; since Ma 
Ying-jeou came to power also more directly with the Taiwanese government itself.  
35
 State Council Information Office, “China’s Peaceful Development Road,” (以自身的发展促进
世界的和平与发展), Zheng Bijian speech on China’s peaceful rise from November 3, 2003: 
争取和平的国际环境来发展自己，又以自身的发展来维护世界和平; Wen Jiabao press 
conference March 2004, one of five key points: 第一，中国的崛起就是要充分利用世界和平
的大好时机，努力发展和壮大自己。同时又以自己的发展，维护世界和平. 
36
 Cf. Zeng Jianhui曾建徽, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei: Zeng Jianhui lun duiwai xuanchuan 融冰
架桥 ,突围 :曾建徽论对外宣传  [Melting the ice, building bridges, breaking out of the 
encirclement: Zeng Jianhui on external propaganda] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 
2006), vol.1, 104.  
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indicators to measure international influence,
37
 as a country’s international 
standing and influence are to a large extent subjective.  
The CPC’s goals with regard to China’s international status and influence 
(what is formally referred to as “opposing hegemony and protecting world peace”) 
have, understandably, not been authoritatively defined in public, other than the 
ritualistic affirmation that China “does not seek hegemony.” As indicated above, 
China’s return to what is seen as its rightful place in the current world order has 
been a hot topic in semi-official circles. The early 21
st
 century witnessed a 
vigorous debate on the correct relationship between “keeping a low profile” 
(taoguang yanghui 韬光养晦 ) in international relations and becoming more 
assertive or “making a contribution” (yousuo zuowei 有所作为).38 It is beyond 
doubt that China plans to take up a more assertive role in international relations 
than it has done in the past, but the details and timetable are unclear and subject to 
discussion. In this field, first, there are presumably different opinion within the 
Party itself, and second, the CPC has to tread carefully, as it wants to convince 
foreigners on the one hand that its main priority is domestic and that therefore 
China does not pose a threat to the current world order while on the other hand 
catering to nationalists at home who want to see a more assertive China.
39
  
To sum up, the CPC’s goals during the Hu-Wen era can be divided into 
four main quests: first, buttressing its own power base (zhizheng jichu 执政基础) 
in the country, second, finding the right balance for domestic development, third, 
                                                          
37
 In 2007, a member of the National Development and Reform Commission declared that in 2005, 
China had already fulfilled 46% of the responsibilities is needed to fulfill to realize the “great 
rejuvenation.” By 2010, it had fulfilled 62%. Cf. “‘Zhonghua minzu fuxing zhishu’ yanjiuzhe: 
mei hua guojia yi fen qian” “中华民族复兴指数”研究者：没花国家一分钱 [Researcher of 
the “Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation Index”: It did not cost the country a penny], Nanfang 
Daily Online, August 16, 2012, http://opinion.nfdaily.cn/content/2012-
08/06/content_52298179.htm, accessed January 11, 2013. These numbers were naturally 
criticized as arbitrary by others. Cf. “Zhonghua minzu fuxing zhi shi yige yonglai guwu 
minzhong the zhengzhi kouhao”中华民族复兴只是一个用来鼓舞民众的政治口号  [The 
Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation is only a political slogan for inspiring the people], Nanfang 
Daily Online, August 6, 2012, originally published on Guangmingwang, 
http://opinion.nfdaily.cn/content/2012-08/06/content_52302083.htm, accessed January 11, 
2013. 
38
 For more information, see for example Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Foreign Policy as a Rising 
Power in the Early Twenty-First Century: The Struggle between Taoguangyanhui and 
Assertiveness”" in China's Soft Power and International Relations, eds. Hongyi Lai and Yiyi 
Lu (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 191-211. 
39
 For several of the dilemmas that the CPC faces in navigating domestic and foreign concerns 
(and that are usually also the subject of internal dispute), see Susan Shirk, China: Fragile 
Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
373 
 
deterring Taiwan independence, and fourth, securing a higher international status 
and more international influence for China. These four fields are linked to each 
other and, taken together, can be summed up as creating a powerful and 
internationally respected China under well-established CPC leadership.  
 
7.3 The Need for Domestic Propaganda in the 21st Century 
Propaganda and thought work, according to a handbook from 2006, has “a 
particularly important position and function” (teshu zhongyao de diwei he 
zuoyong 特殊重要的地位和作用) for the work of the Party.40 In the current time, 
the influence of propaganda and public opinion (xuanchuan yulun 宣传舆论) is 
continuously growing, and thus, whether or not the Party can get this work right 
matters to whether China's modernization enterprise can succeed (guanxi shiye 
xing shuai 关系事业兴衰) as much as to whether the Party can maintain its ruling 
position (guanxi dang de zhizheng diwei 关系党的执政地位).41 This is not mere 
lipservice but is deeply ingrained in the thinking of the CPC and reflected in 
corresponding social and political institutions, which have been further reinforced 
in the Hu-Wen era. Rather than declining, propaganda and thought work has 
become even more important than in the 1990s. China’s “risky” and 
unprecedented development goals have provided an important ideological 
justification for the existence of propaganda and thought work since the 1990s, 
both to prevent or mitigate social conflicts and to mobilize the population to take 
part in the endeavor. In the beginning of the 21
st
 century, the rhetoric on both risk 
and opportunity of the new period of development and the consequent need to 
correctly guide and control the population became even louder.  
According to the report of the 16
th
 Party Congress in 2002, the first 20 
years of the 21
st
 century are a “period of important strategic opportunities” 
(zhongyao zhanlüe jiyu qi重要战略机遇期)42 for China to get closer towards its 
goals and become more competitive. Importantly, the period of important strategic 
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 Cf. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju, ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 
2006, 1. 
41
 Cf. Ibid., 2. 
42
 “Jiang Zemin zai dang de shiliu da shang suo zuo de baogao” 江泽民在党的十六大上所作的
报告  [Jiang Zemin’s report at the 16th Party Congress], Xinhuanet, November 17, 2002, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-11/17/content_632260.htm, accessed February 16, 
2013. 
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opportunities requires a lot of agency from all people involved in China’s 
development as the period between 2000 and 2020 is defined as a time in which 
China will regress if it does not progress (bu jin er tui 不进而退). This dictum 
threatens relative, not absolute regress; China would still advance, but if it 
advances less than other countries, relatively speaking it would fall behind.
43
 Thus, 
the Chinese population needs to be motivated through propaganda and thought 
work more urgently than ever. 
From the perspective of modernization theory, which Chinese cadres have 
studied diligently, a more serious problem awaited China in the 21
st
 century, 
namely the ugly counter-part of the period of important strategic opportunities, the 
“period in which social contradictions are particularly pronounced” (shehui 
maodun tuxianqi 社会矛盾凸显期).44 Chinese texts often stress that the country 
finds itself in a “period of (social) transition”45 (shehui zhuanxingqi 社会转型期). 
This idea was integrated into the official discourse universe under the influence of 
Western modernization theory, which China had kept an eye on during the Mao 
period,
46
 but which became really influential only in the 1980s.
47
 The period of 
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 Wang Qingdong 王庆东, “Zhongguo heping jueqi mianlin de tiaozhan” 中国和平崛起面临的
挑战 [The challenges China’s peaceful rise faces], Neibu canyue 内部参阅 [Internal reference 
readings], no. 20 (2004): 22-26. Also Cf. Jiang Zemin’s report at the 16th Party Congress: 
“Competition in overall national strength is becoming increasingly fierce. Given this pressing 
situation, we must move forward, or we will fall behind.” 
44
 See for example “1000 Meiyuan yihou: Zengzhang haishi shuaitui” 1000美元之后：增长还是
衰退  [After 1000 Dollars: Growth or recession], originally published in Zhongguo jingji 
zhoukan 中国经济周刊 [China Economic Weekly], no. 13, 2004, available on People’s Daily 
Online, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper1631/11856/1068626.html, accessed February 14, 
2013. 
45
 The current period is a period of social transition (shehui zhuanxingqi 社会转型期). Transition 
refers to 1. the transition from planned economy to market economy, 2. The transition from a 
rural society to an urban society, 3. The transition from an industrial society to an information 
society, and 4. The transition from a poor to a rich society. 
46
 China was familiar with the most important works of modernization theory during the Mao 
period. For example, Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 1960) was translated by the Research Center for International Relations (Guoji 
guanxi yanjiusuo 国际关系研究所) and published internally in 1962. Luosituo罗斯托 (Guoji 
guanxi yanjiusuo bianyishi 国际关系研究所编译室, transl.), Jingji chengzhang de jieduan: fei 
gongchandang xuanyan, Neibu duwu 经济成长的阶段： 非共产党宣言, 内部读物 [Stages of 
economic growth: A non-communist manifesto. Internal Readings], (Beijing: Commercial 
Press, 1962). In a “brief critique” (jianping 简评), Rostow is introduced as an economist 
attached to the contemporary American ruling clique and one of the most important advisors to 
the Kennedy administration. This critique, among other points, accused Rostow of “taking a 
few random, external phenomena” (yixie ouran de, biaomian de xianxiang一些偶然的，表面
的现象) to explain the process of development of society. Li Zongzheng李宗正, “Jianping 
Luosituo ‘Jingji chengzhang de jieduan’” 简评罗斯托 ‘经济成长的阶段 ’[Comment on 
Rostow’s “Stages of economic growth”] in Luosituo, Jingji chengzhang de jieduan, 1-7. The 
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transition is a problem for the CPC because, as an article in Internal Reference 
Readings (Neibu canyue 内部参阅)48 explains, “countries in social transition are 
always faced with a weakening of the power base.”49 This can in some cases even 
lead to a collapse of political power (as happened to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe at the end of the Cold War); in other cases, problems can be averted 
through reform and adaptation.
50
  
The article identifies four main factors through which the power base is 
weakened in countries in transition: 1. New aspirations of the population for 
freedom, democracy, justice, etc.; 2. the regime cannot deliver the economic 
growth expected by the population based on the fast growth in the initial period; 3. 
the emergence of conflicts of interests and disadvantages sections of the 
population; and 4. the fact that the old political, economic and value system has 
already been weakened while the new has not yet been fully consolidated.
51
 The 
formulation “countries in social transition” is usually reserved to refer to 
“developing countries on their way to modernity.” 52  The 2006 edition of 
Propaganda and Thought Work in the New Period defines under which conditions 
problems are most likely to occur: 
 
“The development process of many countries shows that the period while per capita 
GDP is between $1000 and $3000 is both a period of opportunities for development 
and a period in which contradictions are particularly distinct.”
53
 
                                                                                                                                                               
book is published in Chinese as “negative teaching material” (fanmian jiaocai 反面教材) so as 
to enable Chinese to understand and criticize Rostow’s reactionary theory. Li Zongzheng, 
“Jianping Luosituo,” in Luosituo, Jingji chengzhang de jieduan, 7. 
47
 Cf. Gao Like, “China’s Social Transformation and Two Types of Modernity,” in Culture and 
Social Transformations in Reform Era China, ed. Tian Yu Cao, Xueping Zhong, and Kebin 
Liao (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 378-379. 
48
 Internal Reference Readings is an internal journal edited by the People’s Daily Agency. It is 
classified as secret (mimi 秘密). It can be read by leading cadres at “deputy office” level (fu 
chu ji 副处级) or above.  
49
 Chinese quote: “社会转型中的国家往往出现执政基础削弱得问题.” Xiao Chunbai 肖纯柏., 
“Gonggu Zhongguo gongchandang de zhizheng jichu” 巩固中国共产党的执政基础 
[Consolidating the basis of the CPC’s rule], Neibu canyue, no. 25 (2007): 3. The author has 
also written another article on a similar topic: “Guowai butong zhengdang zhizheng linian zhi 
bijiao” 国外不同政党执政理念之比较 [Comparison of the ruling philosophy of different 
parties abroad], Neibu canyue, no. 11 (2007): 10-20.  
50
 Xiao Chunbai, “Gugong Zhongguo gongchandang de zhizheng jichu,” 3. 
51
 Ibid., 4.  
52
 Ibid.  
53
Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju, ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 2006, 
129. Xiao Chunbai (“Gonggu Zhongguo gongchandang de zhizheng jichu,”) also cites example 
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The idea of a transition zone between $1000 and $3000 is taken from 
Samuel Huntington’s 1991 work The Third Wave,54 which was published openly 
in Chinese translation in 1998.
55
 Since then more recent scholarship on the same 
topic has been discussed in China.
56
 Here, it becomes apparent that the Central 
Propaganda Department (CPD) has adopted at least part of modernization theory, 
presenting the $1000-$3000 rule if not as an objective law then at least as 
empirical knowledge. Given that even the CPD (which is usually fairly 
conservative in adopting new concepts before they have been properly translated 
into Marxist code) used these numbers, it is reasonable to assume that the 
existence of a $1000-$3000 risk zone was widely accepted at the time and a 
source of genuine concern within the CPC.  
In 2003, China announced that its per capita GDP was higher than $1,000 
for the first time in China’s history,57 three years behind the schedule initially 
envisioned by Deng Xiaoping in 1987. The idea that China was now at risk of 
social chaos more than ever triggered a number of policy adaptations that became 
                                                                                                                                                               
of Latin American countries that encountered political unrest when they were between a per 
capita GDP of $1000 and $3000 -political unrest that finally toppled the rulers.  
54
 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 63. Huntington’s point was that with a per capita GDP 
of between $1000 and $3000, the people of a country were most likely to kick out their 
dictators and adopt democracy if other conditions were favorable. If they were not, the result 
might simply be social upheaval and violence. 
55
 Samuel Huntington, Di san bo:20 shiji houqi minzhuhua de langchao第三波 : 20世纪后期民
主化浪潮 [Chinese translation of The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century], transl. Li Junning刘军宁 (Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian shudian, 1998).  
56
 For instance Adam Przeworski’s analysis of the relationship between political regimes and 
economic development. Cf. Adam Przeworski, “Democracy and Economic Development.” 
Przeworki’s name is transliterated into Chinese as Yadang Zhuowoersiji 亚当·卓沃尔斯基. 
His work is extremely popular at Chinese party schools. Rudolf Wagner, personal 
communication. 
57
 See for instance the debate about what to do after China had entered the “sensitive development 
period” (fazhan de min’gan qi 发展的敏感期) in 2003. “1000 Meiyuan yihou: Zengzhang 
haishi shuai tui.” Also see Li Xiaojia 李小佳, “Jiefang ribao: Kuayue renjun GDP 1000-3000 
Meiyuan zhi kan – Hu Shoujun jiaoshou tan ruhe tuijin jingji shehui de xietiao fazhan” 解放日
报：跨越人均 GDP1000-3000美元之坎 ———胡守钧教授谈如何推进经济社会的协调发
展 [Liberation Daily: Overpassing the mark of the GDP per capita of 1000-3000 U.S. Dollars – 
Professor Hu Shoujun on how to promote the coordinated development of economy and 
society], People’s Daily Online, December 27, 2004, 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40551/3081605.html, accessed February 14, 2013. Later, it 
was declared that China had actually reached $3000 before 2003. Cf. “Wu nian zhang liang bei: 
Zhongguo renjun GDP po 3000 Meiyuan” 五年涨两倍 中国人均 GDP破 3000美元 [China’s 
per capita GDP doubled in five years, breaking 3,000 U.S. Dollars], Huanqiu shibao 环球时报 
[Global times], website of the Global Times, March 9, 2009, 
http://finance.huanqiu.com/roll/2009-03/397089.html, accessed February 14, 2013. 
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the hallmark of the Fourth Generation leadership. At the Third Plenary Session of 
the 16
th
 CPC Central Committee in 2003, the idea of the “five co-ordinates” (wu 
ge tongchou 五个统筹) was added to the agenda of “building a well-off society in 
an all-round way.”58 Likewise, the timing of the introduction of one of the key 
slogans of the Hu-Wen era, the “harmonious society” in 2004 59  as well as 
increased concern about Party legitimacy in the same year are no coincidence, but 
accompanied the entry into the “high risk” period in 2003.  
As mentioned above, China first reached a per capita GDP of $3,000 in 
2008,
60
 leveraging itself out of Huntington’s risk zone twelve years ahead of 
schedule. However, with China’s GDP growing faster than officially estimated, 
the $1000-$3000 zone was further reassessed (if it was ever taken at absolute face 
value in the first place), and Hu Jintao soon declared that China continued to find 
itself in the “period of important strategic opportunities” as much as in the “period 
in which social contradictions are particularly pronounced” (Zhongguo jixu chuzai 
zhongyao zhanlüe jiyu qi he shehui maodun tuxian qi 中国继续处在重要战略机
遇期和社会矛盾凸显期).61 Currently, according to the official analysis, not GDP 
but uneven development is the greatest problem, as it is the main cause of 
conflicts of interest. In addition to reform measures introduced by the Fourth 
Generation leadership that are aimed at reducing the various divides in Chinese 
society, propaganda and thought work, through a number of different techniques, 
are also meant to mitigate the negative side effects of the current transition and the 
social and economic inequality it produces.  
While the main obstacles to realizing China’s goals are at home, the 
country is faced with external enemies that are very good at infiltrating China and 
disrupting the country from within as much as at isolating China internationally. 
Both in the overall battle of unipolarity versus multipolarity and specifically on 
the “public opinion front,” China is faced with the “international anti-China forces” 
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 The five coordinates refer to the coordination (i.e. balancing development) between urban and 
rural areas, between different regions of the country, between the economy and society, 
between man and nature, and between domestic reform and opening up to the outside world. 
59
 For the policy of establishing a harmonious society, see Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, China in 
Search of a Harmonious Society (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008). 
60
 Cf. “Wu nian zhang liang bei: Zhongguo renjun GDP po 3000 Meiyuan.”  
61
 Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, “Zhongguo jixu chuzai zhanlüe jiyu qi he maodun tuxian qi” 中国继续处在
战略机遇期和矛盾凸显期 [China continues to be in a period of strategic opportunities and 
prominent contradictions], January 1, 2010, China News Online, 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2010/01-01/2050420.shtml, accessed February 14, 2013. 
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(guoji fan Hua shili 国际反华势力 ), a usually unspecified enemy that has 
replaced the former “international reactionary forces” (guoji fandong shili 国际反
动势力) in official rhetoric (cf. Graph 6.I in chapter 6.4) and whose goal is to 
prevent China from growing stronger. Here, the official evaluation of the 
international situation is important: China finds itself in a world that is 
increasingly globalizing economically, thus producing more interdependencies, 
and that is, politically, i.e. in terms of the global power balance, continuously 
(though amongst setbacks) moving towards multipolarity. Since economic 
globalization is an inevitable trend, China has to participate and deal with the 
adverse consequences that opening the country brings along.  
One big challenge of opening the country and making China dependent on 
the outside world is the fact that the “international public opinion environment” 
(guoji yulun huanjing 国际舆论环境) is turned against China. Integrating China 
more closely with the rest of the world gives “hostile forces” power as it becomes 
easier for them to infiltrate Chinese society and because the country depends on 
other countries, which hostile forces can try to turn against China, thus disrupting 
its development and its security. At home, China can counter hostile propaganda 
both through its own propaganda, through censorship, and by erecting borders to 
prevent certain information flows. Internationally, China can try to counter the 
hostile forces through external propaganda. In the 21
st
 century, however, as 
censorship has become more difficult and interdependency has increased, China 
felt it had to become more proactive in changing the power balance in the public 
opinion environment.  
In sum, domestic propaganda continues to be justified by internal changes 
and by external threats. As China finds itself in a key period of development as 
much as in a risk zone for social chaos, domestic propaganda has gained even 
further in importance. The notion of the “international public opinion environment” 
combined with the overall principle of becoming more proactive already provides 
a clue as to why external propaganda, too, was upgraded in the 21
st
 century. 
However, the package of reasons for why China and the CPC need external 
propaganda is complex, and the different reasons will be analyzed in the next two 
sections.  
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7.4 Factors Leading to the Upgrade in the 21st Century 
External propaganda had been on the CPC’s agenda for several decades, so 
why did the redefinition and upgrade of the sector happen during the first few 
years of the 21
st
 century? As with most other changes in the field of external 
propaganda, a number of domestic and international developments coincided. 
These can be sorted into four categories: First, there was China’s debate about its 
return to great power status and the possible impediments that might thwart this 
plan. Second, there was the renewed importance attached to propaganda targeted 
at foreigners in the U.S. after 9/11. Third, there was the issue of increased 
interdependency as an inevitable trend which the CPC could not counteract 
through blockades and other forms of restrictions forever and therefore needed to 
face more proactively. Finally, there was the issue of securing the CPC’s ruling 
position.   
 
China’s Rise 
The first factor preceded the 21
st
 century: In the second half of the 1990s, 
China had begun to debate its “rise” in public, both in order to nurture nationalism 
and because the West, too, anticipated and talked about China’s rise. At the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century, especially after 2002, regaining great power status 
became both a very real possibility and a necessity if the CPC wanted to remain in 
power, forcing the Party to contemplate possible impediments in rather concrete 
terms and plan ahead accordingly. The rise and fall of other countries served as 
both positive and negative examples. As early as in the year 2000, the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) had established a special research group 
studying the topic “The rise and fall of the CPSu and the rise and fall of the 
S.U.”62 The CPC’s active interest in the ascendancy and fall of countries on the 
international stage was also demonstrated, for instance, on November 24, 2003, 
when the Politburo studied the rise of the great powers since the 15
th
 century at a 
collective study session.
63
 The most important problems standing in the way of 
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 Li Shenming 李慎明 et al, “Sugong wangdang lishi jingyan jiaoxun” 苏共亡党历史经验教训 
[Lessons learned from the history of the fall of the Soviet Communist Party], 
http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class14/200804/36170.html, accessed June 3, 2011. 
63
 “Zhongguo ‘heping jueqi’ zhong zai lishixing chuangxin” 中国“和平崛起”重在历史性创新 
[The importance of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ lies in historical innovation], originally published in 
Guoji Xianqu Daobao [Parallel English title: International Herald Leader], available online at 
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China’s rise were, officially, its development issues at home. However, a peaceful 
international environment –both in China’s immediate neighborhood and on a 
global scale– was identified as a precondition for continued development.  
Both in the region and on a larger global scale, China has feared being 
isolated. These fears were exacerbated between 2000 and 2003 in the period 
immediately preceding the upgrade in importance of external propaganda. In the 
early 21
st
 century, the debate on China’s rise coincided with new concrete 
concerns about China’s regional security. As is well-known, China has long been 
worried about the U.S. military presence in Japan. With Chen Shui-bian’s 陈水扁 
election, the PRC felt it was taken away further from both reunification and a 
secure regional environment in which it had a sufficient number of allies in the 
region. After 9/11, the U.S. expanded its military cooperation with the 
Philippines.
64
 Afghanistan also shares a small border with China, and the Chinese 
government was not happy with the U.S. fighting a war in country bordering 
China.
65
 In addition, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan allowed the U.S. to station 
troops on their soil, creating more U.S. bases in China’s immediate vicinity.66 
Theories such as the China threat theory, it was feared, would additionally lead 
neighboring countries to balance against China or at least welcome a greater U.S. 
presence in Asia.
67
 Thus, the changes in America’s Asian presence at the time and 
the fear of being encircled contributed to the urgency of the debate on China’s 
regional security environment in the years 2000 to 2004.  
In terms of global concerns, China also found reason to worry. In 2002 and 
2003, it began to observe renewed “anti-China sentiments” in the U.S. press and 
therefore felt that it needed to become more proactive in order not to fall victim to 
the battle over international public opinion that was conducted against it. The 
economic recession of 2002 had again led to an intensified debate in the West 
                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.jkpx.net/sina/show.asp?url=NewsNews/c/2004-01-05/11352550115.shtml, 
accessed March 1, 2013. 
64
 Cf. Robert S. Ross, Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power and Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 75.  
65
 Cf. Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” in Afghanistan 
Revisited, ed. Cary Gladstone (New York: Nova Publishers, 2001), 16. 
66
 Suisheng Zhao, China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century: Domestic And International 
Conditions (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 240.  
67
 Cf. Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “China’s Regional Strategy,” in Power Shift: China and 
Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 
50-51.  
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about the threat China posed to the economy.
68
 The spreading of the China threat 
theory both in the West and in developing countries could cause other 
governments to take up measures to contain China or have other adverse effects 
on China’s economic development. Likewise, the series of “Color 
Revolutions”during the first half of the 2000s kept alive the theme of the West 
trying to “split and Westernize” all non-Western states that were not 
democracies.
69
 
 
The U.S. Debate 
These heightened concerns and the belief in a new Cold War against China 
that had already formed at the turn of the century met the U.S. debate on public 
diplomacy and soft power after 9/11. The upgrade in importance of U.S. 
propaganda (both image and perception management) towards foreign target 
audiences impacted China in two ways: First, there were the academic debates 
over public diplomacy and soft power, and second there were institutional 
rearrangements reported in the U.S. media and subsequently also translated into 
Chinese. The Chinese debate on soft power has been relatively well covered in 
secondary literature.
70
 Here, I will only briefly explain how the U.S. debate 
contributed to the inclusion of propaganda power in China’s comprehensive 
powers.  
First, the idea that soft power was a part of a nation’s comprehensive 
powers was largely derived from U.S. discussions in the early 21
st
 century. 
Whereas “public diplomacy” had been weakened in the United States over the 
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 For instance, Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley stated in October 2002 that China’s export-
based economy made global deflation (quanqiu tongsuo 全球通缩) worse. Although Roach 
later elaborated on this statement in an article and stated that China was a scapegoat, this set off 
another wave of bashing China for its export-driven economy  in the Western media, according 
to an article in Duiwai xuanchuan cankao. Cf. Zhou Zongmin 周宗敏 and Xu Xingtang 徐兴
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economy to counter the ‘China economy threat theory’], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no 2 
(2003): 6-7.  
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 Cf. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 2008), 87-92.  
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Lexington Books, 2009), 21-43. 
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course of the 1990s despite the “Eastward expansion” of U.S. propaganda that 
was highlighted in China, after 9/11, it became an important concern again. This 
manifested itself both in a renewed debate on America’s public diplomacy as well 
as its “soft power” and in new institutions and initiatives. Thus, after almost a 
decade in which the CPC had maintained that the West plotted to use propaganda 
to defeat the rest of the world but had very few hard figures to back this up, the 
new development provided it with massive direct proof that the West paid 
attention to propaganda.  
As is well-known, the term “soft power” was coined by Joseph Nye in his 
1990 Bound to Lead as one explanation why the United States would not decline 
as other superpowers had previously done. When the concept was revived in the 
early 2000s, Nye proceeded from a sense of crisis, not triumph. Both The Paradox 
of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (2002) 
and Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004) bemoaned what 
he perceived as the lack of attention paid to soft power in U.S. politics.  
Unsurprisingly, the Chinese reflection of the debates in the 1990s and 21
st
 
century were also quite different. Soft power had already been briefly discussed in 
China in the 1990s, mainly as a U.S. ploy to ideologically infiltrate China. There 
are three different terms to translate soft power: ruan liliang 软力量 (the term 
used in the Chinese translation of Bound to Lead), ruan quanli 软权力 (the term 
first used in the People’s Daily), and the term most commonly used today both in 
official speeches and the academic discourse, ruan shili. The first uses of one of 
the three translations, in the People’s Daily, can be traced back to 1993, when it 
was mentioned as a new concept introduced at a research retreat on international 
problems.
71
 Other than that, most of the times that any the translations of “soft 
power” were mentioned in the People’s Daily before the 21st century was to 
describe the new national strategy of the U.S. or other Western countries to 
ideologically infiltrate weaker countries. The second mention of “soft power,” for 
instance, was in a review and critical evaluation of Huntington’s Clash of 
                                                          
71
 Xu Wen许文, “Jianli Woguo de guoji guanxi lilun” 建立我国的国际关系理论 [Establishment 
of China's international relations theory], Renmin ribao, August 19, 1993, 7. The term also first 
appeared in the academic debate in 1993. Cf. Mingjiang Li, ibid. 
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Civilizations published in 1994,
72
 and this was the most important context for 
“soft power” in the People’s Daily during the next few years.73 By 2004, on the 
other hand, the People’s Daily frequently discussed the concept as a new security 
concept, both in the U.S. context and in more general terms.
74
 In the current 
competition over each nation’s place in the new and currently still forming world 
order, each major power also took soft power into account to strengthen its own 
position.
75
 Chinese authors also point out that since 9/11, countries around the 
world have put improving their international image on the government agenda.
76
 
Second, new institutions and practices in the U.S., likewise, significantly 
influenced the direction that the Chinese external propaganda debate took. The 
changes to U.S. public diplomacy structures were reported in Western media and 
thus naturally made their way to China through the steady flow of translations 
from the Western press into Chinese. After 9/11, the United States’ external 
propaganda bureaucracy underwent several institutional changes. Immediately 
after 9/11, the United States tasked the Rendon Group, a public relations firm that 
had been contracted to improve the U.S. image abroad earlier, with launching a 
press initiative to manage the news.
77
 In late October 2001, the Office of Strategic 
Influence was founded.
78
 In July 2002, the White House Office of Global 
                                                          
72
 “亨廷顿的观点， 已构成一些西方大国新的国家战略中“软实力”政策的理论基础” Li 
Xiaobing 李小兵, “ Lengzhan hou de wenming zhanlue: Hengtingdun de ‘wenming chongtu 
lun’ pingjie”冷战之后的文明战略——亨廷顿的“文明冲突论”评介[A cultural strategy for 
after the Cold War: A review-cum-evaluation of Huntington’s ‘theory of the clash of cultures’], 
Renmin ribao, June 29, 1994, 5.  
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 See for instance Yuan Zhibing 袁智兵, “Xin ganshe zhuyi ‘xin’ zai nali” 新干涉主义“新”在哪
里 [What is ‘new’ about new interventionism], Renmin ribao, July 29, 1999, 6; Qi Zhi 岂之, 
“Jingji quanqiuhua yu Zhongguo wenhua” 经济全球化与中国文化 [Economic globalization 
and Chinese culture], Renmin ribao, November 30, 2000, 11. 
74
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Renmin ribao, February 13, 2004, 13.  
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 Ibid.  
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 “Xuyan” 序言 [Preface] in Li Zhi 李智, Guoji zhengzhi chuanbo: Kongzhi yu xiaoguo 国际政
治传播：控制与效果[Parallel English title: International Political Communication: Control 
and Effects] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2007): 1. 
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 Cf. Ltc Susan L. Gough, The Evolution of Strategic Influence (Carlisle barracks, Pennsylvania: 
U.S. Army War College), 29, available online at www.fas.org/irp/eprint/gough.pdf, accessed 
November 11, 2012. 
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 It was officially closed in February 2002 shortly after its existence and its plans to engage in 
black propaganda were reported in the media, although Donald Rumsfeld claimed that its 
activities were continued. Cf. “Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability En Route to Chile,” 
November 18, 2002, U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Public Affairs) News Transcript, 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3296, accessed November 
11, 2012.  
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Communications (OGC) was founded to improve the United States’ image by 
“countering propaganda and disinformation” and by “[helping] our government 
inform audiences about positive news stories,”79 i.e. by propaganda and counter-
propaganda, or what would be referred to as “positive propaganda” and as 
“struggle over global public opinion” in China. It was equipped with a $200 
million budget to coordinate U.S. external propaganda and officially started 
operating in January 2003,
80
 shortly before the beginning of the Iraq War. The 
new institutional structure was reported on in the journal External Propaganda 
Reference in May 2003
81
 as well as in other publications around the same time.
82
 
It is quite possible that the experimentation with various cross-departmental 
bodies and the creation of the White House OGC additionally impressed the need 
to improve its own external propaganda structures on the CPC and the Chinese 
government.  
 
Interdependence and the WTO Accession 
Worries about changes in China’s own media environment were also a 
strong factor in pushing China towards more proactive measures. First, after 
initial enthusiasm about the uses the Internet could be put to for spreading China’s 
external propaganda, by the turn of the century, the attitude of the CPC towards 
the new medium had become more mixed. The Internet was deemed to have made 
China clearly more vulnerable towards attacks by hostile countries.
83
 Both in the 
run up to and in the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
accession in November 2001, China debated ways to protect itself against global 
media encroaching on China and “cultural imperialism.” While the WTO was 
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 “White House Office of Global Communications,” The White House Archive, President George 
W. Bush, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ogc/aboutogc.html, accessed June 22, 
2012.  
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 Jiang Fei and Huang Kuo, “Transnational Media Corporations and National Culture as a 
Security Concern in China,” in Vida Bajc, ed., Security and Everyday Life (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 216.  
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 E.g. Guo Ke 郭可, Xinwen chuanboxue yanjiusheng hexin kecheng xilie jiaocai: Chuanboxue 
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series for Journalism and Communication graduate students: Introduction to International 
Communication] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2004), 7. Also see Liao Hongbin廖宏斌, 
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 For arguments at the turn of the century, see for example Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 1 
(2001): 4. 
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seen as another “front” (zhendi 阵地) for China’s external propaganda work,84 the 
conditions tied to the accession were seen as an opportunity for the West to use its 
soft power to impact China.
85
  
While the accession protocol limited the potential impact of both cultural 
products and media through protective measures –the number of movies allowed 
to be imported per year was initially only increased from ten to twenty
86– the 
sense of crisis about such a stark asymmetry in cultural and media power between 
China and the West in an increasingly globalizing and technologically advancing 
world continued. Protective measures were a useful instrument during the period 
of transition, but ultimately would not shield China forever. More proactive steps 
were deemed necessary, both domestically and internationally.  
 
Regime Stability and the Shift towards Qualitative Targets 
From a domestic perspective, the upgrade of external propaganda also 
came at a time when the CPC had formally acknowledged the problem of 
maintaining its own legitimacy in the country. In official rhetoric, continued Party 
rule is a precondition for China’s domestic and international success. Unofficially, 
by contrast, the CPC is well aware that failure to deliver on domestic development 
or raising China’s status might sooner or later endanger its ruling position. From 
the perspective of regime security, the three official goals have, in turn, been 
linked to legitimacy at home and are thus considered a “guarantee” (baozheng 保
证) for continued CPC rule. The debate how to secure the CPC’s power basis 
shifted China’s focus from numerical hard targets towards soft, qualitative targets. 
Notably, the changes accompany demands for a more assertive China from parts 
of the domestic public as well as the (temporary) Chinese Diaspora, i.e. Chinese 
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exchange students in Western countries. Previous studies have examined to what 
extent Chinese nationalism has influenced China’s international behavior, largely 
focusing on short-term outbursts.
87
 With the new focus on regime stability, long-
term concerns about improving China’s standing so as to fulfill Chinese 
expectations have become more important. 
 
7.5 The Functions of External Propaganda in the Early 21st Century 
By the early 21
st
 century, an impressive number of reasons for why China 
needed external propaganda had accumulated as a result of the experiences of the 
past decades. Some of these reasons had existed for quite some time, while others 
were relatively new or given new meaning and significance. In order to 
understand why the CPC began to consider external propaganda as part of its 
overall long term strategy, this sub-chapter examines what the functions of 
external propaganda are in the official universe of the CPC. Like for domestic 
propaganda, the roles and functions of external propaganda can be divided into 
“positive” or proactive and “negative” or reactive. The first refers to times when 
China simply sends it message and what it wants to talk about to pursue its goals. 
The second signifies instances in which China is forced to react to outside “attacks” 
of various sorts.   
In the 21
st
 century, previous rationales for external propaganda remained 
relevant. To briefly revise the basics, helping China realize its strategic goals is 
the most general “positive” role of external propaganda that is achieved through 
both proactive and reactive measure. In 1980, the External Propaganda Small 
Group’s (EPSG) first Opinion defined the “fundamental responsibility” of 
external propaganda as “to serve the general line and the external line of the 
party.”88 The general line refers to the basic principles and policies from which 
the concrete agenda of the Party derives; thus, serving the general line means 
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 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004), Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatic 
Foreign Policy Behavior,” in Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, ed. 
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 Cf. “Duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu guanyu gaijin he jiaqiang duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo de yijian” 
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387 
 
helping the Party propel the course of history in the right direction. Currently, the 
goals the CPC needs to pursue to achieve this are the three large aims outlined 
above. Thus, the most important function of external propaganda has been to help 
the Party realize its official strategic goals, namely development, unification (or 
deterring independence of Taiwan), and “protecting world peace,” i.e. supporting 
China’s rise or rejuvenation.  
First and most pragmatically, external propaganda has functioned as the 
vanguard (xiandao 先导) of opening up by attracting both foreign investment and 
foreign expertise to speed up China’s (economic) development. 89  This was 
considered the most important function of external propaganda during most of the 
1980s. External propaganda was not only useful for short-term campaigns but also 
for creating the right climate for China’s development in the long run, as China 
needs not only a favorable domestic public opinion environment, but also a 
favorable international public opinion environment.
90
 For instance, Zhao Qizheng 
赵启正 argued in 2004 that the trust the international committee had in a country 
determined the conditions for entry into the WTO, making it easier for some 
countries than for others to join.
91
 
Second, external propaganda’s function has been to “oppose ‘Taiwan 
independence’ and promote unification” 92  by countering hostile forces and 
sending reassuring messages. Although the basic outset was completely different, 
proponents of external propaganda argued that because external propaganda had 
played such an important role in the return of Hong Kong and Macao, it would 
also play a vital part in finally bringing Taiwan home.
93
 Both functions (aiding 
development and aiding reunification) can be employed in short term initiatives, 
e.g. in order to attract particular foreign expertise for a particular project, or to 
reply to a specific attack on China. The long-term purpose of external propaganda 
                                                          
89
 E.g. Zeng Jianhui, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei, vol.1, 109.  
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 Zhao Qizheng 赵启正, “Nuli jianshe youliyu woguo de guoji yulun huanjing” 努力建设有利于
我国的国际舆论环境  [Make efforts to build a favorable international public opinion 
environment], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 6 (2004): 2. 
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 Cf. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju, ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 
2006, 189.  
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 See for example Yang Jinzhou 杨金洲 and Yang Guoren 杨国仁, “Xingshi, renwu, tiaozhan, 
jiyu – xie zai xin shiji kaiyuan zhi ji” 形势·任务·挑战·机遇——写在新世纪开元之际 [The 
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in these two regards is to “create a favorable international public opinion 
environment for fully building a moderately well-off society and for realizing 
national unification.”94  
 The third main strategic goal of the PRC, “protecting world peace and 
promoting common development,”95 is the highest goal that would result from 
China’s succeeding in all other areas. It needs to be remembered that China’s 
main contribution to a more peaceful world with less hegemonism is the 
strengthening of its own comprehensive powers which enables it to provide a 
counter balance to the U.S. ambitions for unipolarity and its tendency to engage in 
“power politics.” While some texts are explicit about the fact that the first 
consideration in all external propaganda work always needs to be the national 
interest, statements such as that external propaganda “protects world peace”96 are 
not just empty rhetoric. Propaganda protects world peace by strengthening China, 
thus contributing to a multipolar world order, which, according to Chinese 
analysts, is conducive to peace.  
Since 2004, these basic positive goals have been expressed in the formula 
“three serves” (san ge fuwu 三个服务): External propaganda needs to serve 
reform and opening as well as modernization, it needs to serve national unification, 
and it needs to serve “China’s overall strategic objectives in its foreign policy as 
well as safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.”97 The 
grouping of different goals in the last of the “three serves” again confirms the 
assumed link between world peace and a successful Chinese foreign policy that 
makes China more assertive and influential. From the perspective of the “great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese people”, a louder voice and a better image are both a 
means to help China develop and an end in itself because it means China already 
has more international influence.  
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In the 21
st
 century, three important official additions to these “traditional” 
functions of external propaganda were made, one tied to a positive, proactive goal 
and two to China’s ability to protect itself against attempts from hostile forces to 
“infiltrate” it and encircle it in Asia as well as isolate it more widely on the 
international stage. Particularly the two “reactive” functions are concerned with 
immediate security concerns. First, external propaganda was linked to China’s 
national security, second, it was tied to domestic social stability, and third, the 
country’s “propaganda capacities” (xuanchuan shili 宣传实力 ) and its “soft 
power” (ruanshili 软实力) was declared a part of China’s comprehensive powers 
without which China would not be able to rise and remain competitive in the 
forest of nations. These three motivations have been alluded to in Mingjiang Li’s 
discussion of the concept of soft power in China, based on the explications of 
Chinese academics.
98
 The way external propaganda is talked about in official 
speeches and handbooks confirms that these three reasons are not confined to the 
academic debate on soft power, but have also been formally embraced by the 
Party leadership for reframing its external propaganda policy.
99
 In addition to 
these three, external propaganda was also indirectly tied to the Party’s legitimacy 
and its survival in China, although this link remains much sketchier than is the 
case for domestic propaganda. Each of these four points is worth explaining in 
more detail in order to understand why external propaganda was upgraded in 
importance in the early 21
st
 century. 
The link between external propaganda and both national security and 
social stability largely grew out of the debate around the turn of the century that 
hostile forces wanted to “Westernize” (Xihua 西化) and “split” (fenhua 分化) 
China. The ultimate goal behind preventing China from rising is to push the world 
away from multipolarity and closer towards a unipolar moment with the U.S. as 
the only hegemonic superpower, i.e. said “U.S.-led international order of 
democratic states”100 advocated by proponents of the democratic peace. In this 
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context, the ancient Chinese conception of the world in terms of concentric circles 
has been used to explain the goal of the U.S.: It wants to create a world with itself 
as the only superpower in the center, with Western Europe and Japan in the 
middle, and with the rest of the world in the periphery.
101
 This is not spelled out in 
official government texts, but is indirectly present in the theme “Hegemonism and 
power politics continue to exist.” 
On the public opinion front (yulun zhanxian 舆论战线), the situation is 
particularly dire, much more so than on the economic front, because the West 
continues to monopolize the overwhelming majority of “public opinion tools” 
(yulun gongju 舆论工具) and has them at its disposal to, first, smother China’s 
voice, and, second, to spread lies about China to stir up trouble in the short run 
and to tarnish its image in the long run.
102
 To resist these specific attempts and 
fight back became the most important meaning attached to the phrase “engaging 
in the struggle over international public opinion.” Since the 1990s, there have 
been ritualistic affirmations that in the current times, the “struggle over 
international public opinion” is not abating but becoming fiercer by the day.103 
Initially intended as a rebuke against those arguing that with the end of the Cold 
War the age of propaganda had also come to an end, the line continues to be used 
until today, often when there is renewed conflict after a brief thaw and therefore 
the need to counter more optimistic voices.  
Tying external propaganda to national security appears to be primarily due 
to concrete geostrategic concerns about China’s neighborhood in Asia, i.e. its 
immediate security environment, although other security concerns also play a role. 
Throughout the 1990s and continuing into the 21
st
 century, China has worried 
about U.S. attempts to isolate and encircle it in Asia. After settling its border 
conflicts in the 1990s, China continued to show its cooperative side as much as 
possible, became more actively involved in multilateral pacts and even began to 
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exhibit more regional leadership.
104
 In its larger concerns about (regional) security, 
China also began to take the “international public opinion environment” into 
consideration.
105
  
This opinion environment is characterized by China with the phrase “Xi 
qiang wo ruo” 西强我弱 – the West is strong; China is weak. The main problem 
is that under these circumstances, Western media get to create China’s image.106 
A country’s image has been described as a precious resource and as an 
“exceptionally important intangible capital” (ji qi zhongyao de wuxing zichan 极
其重要的无形资产)107 that has tremendous consequences for how China can 
conduct its international relations. If other countries do not trust China, this has 
adverse affects on its possibilities for international cooperation and could make 
others want to balance against China. In 2001, Sha Qiguang explained that the 
greatest danger of the China threat theory was that it was used to “poison” China’s 
neighborhood in Asia by vilifying the country (chouhua Zhongguo de xingxiang, 
jieci “duhua”  hongguo de zhoubian huanjing 丑化中国的形象，借此“毒化”中
国的周边环境 ). 108  Thus, hostile forces have been trying to turn China’s 
neighboring countries against China, in some cases quite successfully.
109
 Here, the 
continuation of more traditional framings of the relationship between “the people” 
and scheming elites (“the enemies of the people”) surfaces again. Neighboring 
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countries as well as other developing countries lack the West’s ill will, but also 
have no agency; they simply become pawns in the West’s schemes, much like the 
people in China can be manipulated by hostile forces.
110
 Of course, use of the 
media to slander China is not the only channel through which hostile forces attack 
China, but it has been evaluated as an extremely important one in which China is 
much weaker than on most other fronts. Chinese politicians have been 
maintaining that China needs a favorable international public opinion environment 
to realize its strategic goals since the 1990s, but the concern about China’s 
neighborhood turned what was previously a debate about “favorable conditions” 
into a much more immediate security concern. Thus, it is imperative to regain 
control over China’s international image so that the country’s security 
environment can be improved. This includes both short term initiatives, in which 
China reacts to specific attacks, and a long time project of improving China’s 
image and shifting the balance of power in the “international public opinion 
environment.” While China obviously will not rely on propaganda alone to make 
its neighborhood safe, external propaganda has been reframed as a matter of 
national security because of these considerations. 
The reason why external propaganda was linked to social stability is, 
likewise, related to the struggle against hostile forces, this time at a front where 
the CPC is even more vulnerable: at home. The fact that “the West is strong and 
China is weak” in the “international public opinion environment” is becoming 
extremely problematic for China, as Hu Jintao explained in a speech in 2008 
while inspecting the People’s Daily, because in the current period “exchange of, 
integration of, and confrontation between ideologies and cultures are becoming 
more frequent.”111 While the CPC can work against hostile forces’ attempts to 
infiltrate China through censorship regimes and other restrictions to a certain 
degree, it seems to admit that it is fighting a losing battle against what the Party 
itself sees as an “inevitable trend”, namely that of the world growing ever closer 
together, inevitably leading to more flows of information between different 
countries that will be impossible to block completely. Thus, after turning domestic 
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propaganda into a matter of life and death for the Party in the aftermath of 1989, 
increasing China’s influence on the “international public opinion front” is seen as 
a more proactive step to pre-empt unwanted information from having an impact in 
China.  
This is confirmed by the fact that external propaganda has been described 
as “being at the forefront of the [struggle] against ‘peaceful evolution,’” 112 
indicating a domestic dimension to China’s external propaganda project by 
discrediting the message of hostile forces before they even reach China. If “hostile 
forces” have the upper hand in the media environment more “hostile” messages 
will get into the country, just like as long as they control the main share of the 
international public opinion environment, they will potentially enjoy a larger 
degree of credibility in China. This is true despite the fact that Chinese authorities 
have succeeded in mobilizing relatively large numbers of people against Western 
media whenever nationalist questions are at stake.  
The CPC realizes that it will not be able to replace Western media 
conglomerates with its own media overnight. Nonetheless, it hopes to be able to 
mitigate the constant and intensifying threat of information flows into China while 
being both isolated and weak on the “public opinion front” through a long term 
shift of “propaganda forces” (xuanchuan liliang 宣传力量) in the international 
media environment. Until then, short term initiatives, such as selectively rebuking 
Western media or attacks by “hostile forces” through other channels are 
presumably also meant to protect social stability. 
 
Finally, external propaganda was also declared to be part of China’s 
comprehensive powers.
113
 Cai Mingzhao蔡名照, one of the deputy directors of 
Office of External Propaganda (Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai xuanchuan 
bangongshi 中共对外宣传办公室 , OEP)/ State Council Information Office 
(Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 国务院新闻办公室, SCIO) from 2001 to 2009, 
explained that a country that had weak external propaganda capacities could not 
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prevail in the international competition, could not become a rich and strong 
country, and could not establish itself in the world’s “forest of nations” (shijie 
minzu zhi lin 世界民族之林 ). 114  The relationship between soft power or 
propaganda power and comprehensive power was not entirely uncontested. Quite 
a few voices argued that economic strength remained the determining factor: As 
China became more economically influential its voice would naturally become 
stronger.
115
 Thus, on the one hand, some believed that China’s voice depended on 
its economic strength. On the other hand, the imbalance between China’s 
economic power and both its voice and image was noted.
116
 In the end, the 
position that China needed to become more proactive in raising its own voice won. 
After all, China’s economic strength was often used to slander the country, and 
this was a serious impediment to China’s ability to continue to strengthen itself.  
By the time the handbook Propaganda and Thought Work in the New 
Period was published in 2006, the issue had been settled: The text states that 
“external propaganda powers/capabilities are an important component of China’s 
comprehensive powers.” 117  In order to assert itself in the global competition 
between nation-states, China did not only need economic strength as a basis (zuo 
jichu 作基础), but also “public opinion forces” (yulun liliang 舆论力量) as a 
“guarantee” (zuo baozheng 作保证). Thus, by raising the international influence 
of China’s external propaganda, China’s competitiveness is strengthened.118 This 
means that while of course, economic development continues to be the most 
important factor in determining China’s overall national strength, without the 
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“guarantee” of a sufficiently strong voice that matches China’s economic strength, 
the country was very vulnerable. 
The inclusion of propaganda power into China’s comprehensive powers is, 
of course, also linked to the question of national security and social stability. 
Being able to counter such attacks made China more likely to survive and more 
competitive as well. However, by including external propaganda forces in China’s 
comprehensive forces, it was also tied to China’s aspirations to rise and become a 
strong country (qiang guo 强国) again. The ability to establish one’s point of view 
on the international stage became an indicator –albeit a fuzzy one– to measure the 
country’s international clout and its international standing. After China had 
successfully established itself as an economic giant, it now needed to develop a 
voice and an image that could both match its status and help further elevate it. In 
sum, “a rising world power requires a correspondingly strong propaganda and 
public opinion force.”119 This theme had already been implied in Jiang Zemin’s 
speech from 1999 and became continually stronger over the next few years.  
Thus, external propaganda was not only tied to national security and social 
stability (i.e. a negative goal: preventing foreigners from splitting and 
Westernizing China by causing domestic problems), but also turned into a vital 
ingredient to realize China’s ambitions to become a power to be reckoned with on 
the global stage (i.e. a positive goal). The latter, in turn, had two dimensions: First, 
the idea that external propaganda is, in fact, vital for China to survive the 
competition against other countries, and, second, the notion of prestige or of 
working towards the goal of creating a “strong country” that the CPC had 
promised the Chinese people. In sum, external propaganda power was seen as an 
actual power without which China could not realize its rise, but also as a marker 
of status, which became increasingly important for CPC legitimacy.  
This leads to the last issue, namely the manifold ways in which external 
propaganda can help ensure regime security in the eyes of the CPC. The first way 
in which external propaganda is useful in the eyes of the CPC is direct promotion 
of the Party to foreign audiences. Why propagating the Party is vital becomes 
clear when looking at U.S. strategic interests with regard to China, or at least what 
China believes those to be. With the opening of its economy to foreign businesses, 
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China has created powerful stakeholders abroad in the continued stability and 
economic growth of the country, and the CPC is quite aware of that. It knows that 
countries such as the U.S. do not have an actual interest in seriously disrupting 
economic growth in China, from which the West profits too much to want to 
seriously sabotage it. At the same time, a relatively strong faction in the U.S. 
believes that a stable and democratic China would be even more desirable, as it 
could prevent security competition. Thus, one of the goals of Chinese external 
propaganda, much like in the domestic realm, is to establish an image of a stable 
China because of the CPC. One author argued that whether or not external 
propaganda succeeded “directly influenced the image of the Party’s rule abroad” 
(zhijie yingxiang dang de duiwai de zhizheng xingxiang 直接影响党的对外的执
政形象).120 Promoting the CPC to foreigners is a hard sell, and in the 21st century, 
the Party went back and forth on how much to stress the role of the CPC and 
socialist ideology in texts targeting foreigners, as I will explain below in chapter 
7.7. 
Second, if the aspirations of the Chinese people for “national rejuvenation” 
and a powerful country were not fulfilled on all fronts, this would impact the 
CPC’s standing in China. A louder voice and a better image in the international 
sphere are both a means to an end – helping China’s economy to grow and 
promoting reunification – and an end in itself: Creating an internationally 
influential strong country. From the perspective of the CPC, both are means to the 
same end, namely showing the Chinese people that the CPC can deliver what it 
has promised and lead the Chinese people to renewed greatness and high 
international regard. 
Importantly, however, unlike domestic propaganda and thought work, 
external propaganda has not (yet) openly been directly linked to regime security 
by tying it to the “ruling position” (zhizheng diwei 执政地位) of the Party, and 
rhetoric as much as actual institutions make it abundantly clear that external 
propaganda continues to be considered less important than domestic 
propaganda.
121
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In sum, the role of external propaganda as defined in the early 21
st
 century 
can be expressed at different levels. At the most abstract level, its role is to 
support the general line of the CPC and China’s strategic goals by creating a 
‘favorable international public opinion environment.’ This is done by creating a 
favorable image of China and the CPC in the eyes of foreigners and by gradually 
shifting the balance of power in the field of international propaganda and public 
opinion. Here, China’s propaganda forces (xuanchuan liliang 宣传力量 ) are 
considered part of China’s comprehensive powers. This implies that having a 
sufficient voice on the international stage is no longer seen as means to be able to 
pursue specific policies. Shifting the power balance in the field of “public opinion” 
is a way to make China more competitive in the long run. Moreover, although this 
is not spelled out, as the Chinese people increasingly care about China’s image 
abroad and its ability to set international agendas, having normative power has 
also become a means to ensure continued legitimacy at home.  
As in the 1990s, external propaganda has two dimensions: “Positive 
propaganda,” i.e. spreading China’s message, and the “international public 
opinion struggle,” i.e. countering information spread by the “anti-China forces.” 
Countering these hostile forces is vital because they are able to disrupt China’s 
relations with other countries, particularly in Asia, preventing both business 
opportunities and support for China’s policies in international organizations or 
other platforms in which China depends on the support of other countries.
122
 This 
is the national security dimension of external propaganda. Finally, it appears that 
raising China’s voice on the international stage and making it more competitive 
vis-à-vis hostile forces is ultimately also intended as a means to prevent the latter 
from spreading its message inside China, first by discrediting their message, thus 
stopping it from being spread, and, in the long run, by replacing Western media as 
the most dominant and most credible source of information in the international 
media environment. This is why external propaganda matters to social stability.   
 
                                                          
122
 Cf. Ma Hongwei, “Wang shang suzao Zhongguo guoji xingxiang,” 24; Sha Qiguang, “Dui 
Xifang meiti sanbu ‘Zhongguo weixielun’ de pingxi (shang),” 5.  
398 
 
7.6 The Key Period 2003-2004 
Three nationwide external propaganda conferences took place in 2003 and 
2004 over a period of 16 months: one in January 2003, one in December 2003, 
and one in April 2004. At the first conference, external propaganda cadres 
presented a reformed external propaganda package of activities and impressed the 
need to better adapt to the foreign target audiences. At the second conference in 
December, Hu Jintao gave a speech in which he upgraded the importance of 
external propaganda, explaining that it was relevant for national security and 
social stability. The third conference a few months later was used to present a new 
central circular on external propaganda work and to introduce the agenda and 
goals for external propaganda work until 2020.  
The national external propaganda work conference for the year 2003, 
which happened in Beijing over three days from January 9 to 11,
123
 presented all 
the new measures that had been developed and refined over the past four years 
(1999-2002), both before and after public diplomacy had re-gained in importance 
in the U.S. The conference was presided over by Zhao Qizheng and attended by 
Liu Yunshan 刘云山  and Li Changchun 李长春 , who each delivered an 
“important speech.”124 The report on the 2003 conference on external propaganda 
as published in the People’s Daily paraded the largest number of new ideas thus 
far and made the scope of what is defined as duiwai xuanchuan considerably more 
congruent with what is widely discussed in the U.S. under the term “public 
diplomacy.” The main topic of discussion at the conference was “analyze the 
international public opinion situation, and research countermeasures and 
initiatives to respond to new situations, new problems, and new challenges.”125 
The necessary adaptations China needed to make to its overall strategy had been 
discussed in External Propaganda Reference quite frequently over the course of 
2002,
126
 and by 2003, China was ready to discuss how to adapt to the changed 
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global situation and power balance after 9/11 at the official external propaganda 
conference. However while a large number of changes were presented, higher 
level cadres were also still collecting material and information to be included in 
the new policy document that was to be released a year later. 
In his speech, Li Changchun, the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) 
member in charge of Propaganda and Thought Work during the Hu-Wen era, 
presented the overall goal for the coming period, namely to be able to 
significantly strengthen China’s “external propaganda powers” (duiwai 
xuanchuan shili 对外宣传实力) within a relatively short amount of time, increase 
China’s influence in mainstream Western society, achieve a relatively large 
improvement of China’s position in the international public opinion struggle, and 
thus taking the first step in building an “external propaganda pattern” (duiwai 
xuanchuan geju 对 外 宣 传 格 局 ) that was commensurate with China’s 
international standing. 
There are several points to note. First, the speech marked the inclusion of 
“propaganda power” into China’s comprehensive powers. Prior to the reignited 
debate about public diplomacy and soft power in the U.S., China had not directly 
conceived of successful propaganda or cultural appeal as part of a nation’s 
comprehensive powers. Second, like in the 1990s, entering mainstream Western 
society was still the most important goal. Being successful in other regions was 
important as well, but the standard by which success or failure was to be decided 
was China’s position in the West, excluding sections of society that were already 
sympathetic (and were not considered mainstream). In a sense, “hostile forces” 
were to be confronted on their own “home fronts.” Third, this was to be achieved 
within a relatively short period of time, a pronouncement stressing both the 
urgency of the problem China faced and the resolve to take up the measures 
needed.  
This was to be done by broadening the means and channels for external 
propaganda work and by “vigorously promoting the reform of the external 
propaganda system and the innovation of approaches.”127 While this was again a 
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spin-off of “system reforms” (tizhi gaige 体制改革) in other areas, the next few 
years showed that China was serious about instituting larger changes both to the 
methods with which external propaganda was conducted and to the way in which 
the work as a whole was organized and coordinated. Both points were addressed 
at the conference: 
First, the message that Li Changchun sent was for propaganda cadres to 
think outside the box and use any channels possible to propagate China. China 
should strengthen its cultural exchanges and, more importantly, link the fields of 
external propaganda and cultural exchange. Likewise, China must draw both on 
the “going out” (zou chuqu 走出去) and the “inviting in” (qing jinlai 请进来, or 
yin jinlai 引进来) strategies to deal with foreign media and foreign journalists. 
While both slogans, as briefly indicated above (cf. chapter 6.6), have many 
different meanings within the external propaganda sector, here it refers to China 
sending journalists abroad and seeking cooperation with foreign media abroad 
while at the same time trying to accommodate and provide services to foreign 
media and journalists as much as possible in China in order to gain their favor in 
return.   
Second, China must reform its external propaganda system, a point that 
later became the first of three goals until 2020 and that will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. For sub-central external propaganda, Li Changchun had 
three demands: to establish a mechanism to coordinate work between different 
units (tongchou xietiao jizhi 统筹协调机制), second to establish and improve the 
press release mechanism (xinwen fabu jizhi 新闻发布机制), and third, to establish 
a mechanism to better coordinate work in case of sudden events that would enable 
China to react faster (yingdui tufa shijian gaoxiao de xinwen xuanchuan xietiao 
jizhi 应对突发事件高效的新闻宣传协调机制) so that China would no longer be 
in a defensive and reactive position.
128
  
This implies an additional problem the Center was faced with in its 
external propaganda reform at this particular juncture. The CPC had realized –at 
least in theory– that it needed to react quickly to sudden events in order to make 
Chinese media competitive. Most natural disasters had been allowed to be 
reported since 1998. But in order to do this, China depended on local branches of 
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its central media as well as on local governments and their external propaganda 
structures. Particularly the latter did not have an interest in reporting sudden 
events that would make it look bad in the eyes of the central government. Since 
the beginning of the post-Mao period, the Center had launched several campaigns 
to teach local governments to stop “reporting only the good things and not the bad” 
(bao xi bu bao you 报喜不报忧) in internal reports.129 The SARS debacle that 
followed later that year proved that failure to report did not only harm the image 
of Chinese media, but the image of the Chinese government and the CPC as a 
whole. 
 
Overcoming ideological inhibitions in order to be able to make strategic 
adaptations to China’s external propaganda were again high on the agenda, both at 
the macro level determining how the sector should be organized and at the micro 
level with regard to work style (zuofeng 作风) and writing style (wenfeng 文风). 
Li Changchun emphasized the need to innovate on the basis of existing experience 
and to let China’s external propaganda “emancipate the mind, seek truth from 
facts, and go with the times” (jiefang sixiang, shishi qiu shi, yu shi ju jin 解放思
想、实事求是、与时俱进).130 For external propaganda work, to “go with the 
times” described practices that conflicted with the “traditional” understanding of 
propaganda in the CPC, but that would significantly increase the acceptance of 
Chinese media coverage in the eyes of foreigners. For instance, one point raised in 
an article discussing the slogan “going with the times” as it applied to external 
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propaganda was “to dare to report negative issues in order to raise the image and 
credibility of China’s public opinion.”131  
The range of issues subsumed under this slogan at the time became clear in 
a speech by Li Bing 李冰, who was a vice head of OEP/SCIO between 1994 and 
late 2008. Li addressed six relationships between two dialectical opposites 
respectively that China needed to get right. All of the six tackled issues that 
external propaganda experts had pointed out since the 1980s, that had become 
taboo in public after 1989 and that now needed to be addressed if China wanted to 
succeed in increasing its influence in Western mainstream society:  
First, China needed to get the relationship between Chinese ideology and 
Western ideology right. While external propaganda work needed to pay attention 
to ideology, it could not afford to be bogged down by it, for instance by choosing 
cooperation partners on the basis of ideological criteria.
132
 Moreover, Chinese 
external propaganda cadres were quite aware of the negative connotations that 
Communism evoked in the West, which meant that not only hostile forces but also 
ordinary people were difficult to win over.
133
  
Second, while China needed to hold on to its own understanding of the 
press, it also could not entirely disregard the Western understanding of the press. 
It was necessary to understand what the West was interested in, to learn how to 
“package” China’s message so that it would be accepted, and to look for common 
ground with regard to the senders’ and the receivers’ values.134  
Third, China needed to get right the relationship between saying what 
China wanted to say (yi wo wei zhu 以我为主) and “respecting the audience” 
(zunzhong shouzhong 尊重受众, also referred to as you di fang shi 有地放矢 
elsewhere). This meant that China should send its message, but should make sure 
it was sent in a way that the target audience would accept. This required 
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 Benkan teyue jizhe: “Tixian shidaixing, bawo guilüxing, fuyu chuangzaoxing: Ji 2003 nian 
quanguo waixuan gongzuo huiyi,” 3.  
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knowledge about the “cultural background” (wenhua beijing 文化背景) and the 
“psychological characteristics” (xinli tedian 心理特点) of the audience; in short, 
China needed to pay attention to the “art of propaganda” (xuanchuan yishu 宣传
艺术).135 Taken together, points one, two, and three also advocated getting rid of 
the overly strong focus on ideological matters that had dominated the external 
propaganda conception during the 1990s. While external propaganda should not 
entirely abandon socialism, it was not supposed to directly propagate it, either. 
Fourth, China needed to find the right balance between reporting China’s 
successes and reporting China’s problems. Here, Li argued against the idea that 
“relying mainly on positive propaganda” meant to avoid reporting problems. 
Facing problems, he argued, would not inevitably lead to negative consequences, 
but showed that China had confidence.
136
  
Fifth, China needed to balance official voices and popular (minjian 民间) 
voices. By this, he mainly meant that China needed to become better at integrating 
the voices of “experts” and “scholars” into its overall external propaganda effort. 
If those experts expressed the position of the government in their own words, they 
would be much more effective than a press release from the government. In short, 
official voices and popular voices could mutually supplement one another and 
thus increase the effectiveness of the message.
137
 However, such statements also 
fit into the overall call for privatizing the media. External propaganda had served 
as an argument for further privatization of the media before, and in early 2004, Li 
Xiguang, who was by then director of the Center for International Communication 
at Qinghua University (Qinghua daxue guoji chuanbo yanjiu zhongxin 清华大学
国际传播研究中心), argued that if China wanted to compete with Western 
(particularly U.S. media), it would need its own unofficial, diverse (duoyuan 多元) 
media with transnational capital.
138
 With this new media system, China could also 
push new content, new styles, and new forms of language.
139
 Li Xiguang 李希光, 
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as briefly indicated above, is not only an academic, but also a close advisor of 
OEP/SCIO, who studied in China’s earliest journalism programs in the 1980s, 
together with people such as Wang Chen 王晨, who became head of OEP/SCIO 
in 2008.
140
 
Sixths, China needed to get the relationship between social benefits and 
economic benefits right.
141
 This, first, meant that the sector needed to use money 
more effectively and be gradually led into the mechanisms of the market, 
presumably with the goal that external propaganda might eventually become 
financially independent, an idea that had been advocated by since the early 21st 
century (cf. chapter 6.6). Second, it also meant that China’s media and other 
organizations involved in external propaganda should avoid presenting themselves 
as government organs when dealing with foreigners and rather appear with their 
“business face” (yi shangye mianmao chuxian 以商业面貌出现), particularly 
when cooperating with foreigners.
142
  
In sum, Li Bing presented six ways to improve the effectiveness of 
external propaganda that had been largely neglected during the 1990s, or rather 
been eclipsed in importance by the need to be principled, but that now needed to 
be addressed to allow Chinese external propaganda work to actually have some 
effect. In each case, he addressed the merit of the “principled” position that had 
dominated in the 1990s while at the same time arguing that adopting the new 
methods did not mean giving up principles but only meant being strategic while 
maintaining the essence of China’s message and purpose. An important external 
propaganda principle that sums up this approach is called “round outside, square 
within” (wai yuan nei fang 外圆内方),143 which can be interpreted, at the most 
basic level, to mean “appear relaxed to the outside world, but follow strict rules 
internally”’ Thus, by following this principle, external propaganda workers could 
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 E.g. Zhou Zongmin 周宗敏, “Yong ‘shijie yuyan’ tong haiwai shouzhong ‘zhijie duihua’ – yu 
guonei fenshe jizhe Yingwen baodao peixunban xueyuan zuotan” 用‘世界语言’同海外受众
‘直接对话’——与国内分社记者英文报道培训班学员座谈 [Using the ‘world language’ for 
‘direct dialogue’ with overseas audiences - seminar with the participants of the english 
reporting traning of the reporters of domestic branches], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 10 
(2004): 16; Benkan teyue jizhe, “Tixian shidaixing, bawo guilüxing, fuyu chuangzaoxing: Ji 
2003 nian quanguo waixuan gongzuo huiyi,” 3. 
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make strategic adaptations on the outside, while observing a strict protocol on the 
inside. 
 
Over the course of 2003, several events confirmed the urgency of the need 
to improve external propaganda in the eyes of decision-makers. First, China 
studied the use of the mass media before and during the Iraq War and determined 
that Saddam Hussein’s regime had not only suffered a military loss, but also a 
devastating defeat in the war over international public opinion (presumably 
referring to the ability of the U.S. government to convince the Western public of 
the existence of weapons of mass destruction).
144
 Although China’s situation was 
not comparable to that of Iraq and the need to counter the “China threat theory” 
had been discussed earlier, the fact that China felt it had just witnessed the fall of 
the Iraqi regime among other things due to international public opinion increased 
the pressure and served as another powerful argument for proponents of a stronger 
external propaganda force.  
Second, after the SARS outbreak, by April and May 2003, the Chinese 
government was heavily criticized for concealing information. Western media 
also began to frame the episode as a severe legitimacy crisis for China’s political 
system.
145
 The CPC evidently took these interpretations seriously. The legitimacy 
crisis, which had a strong domestic and less pronounced but still important 
international dimension, set in motion both debates and reforms.
146
 Most 
importantly, from an external propaganda perspective, was the reinforced 
perceived need to be able to “guide international public opinion” (yindao guoji 
yulun 引导国际舆论) and the subsequent resolve to establish a proper press 
release and spokesperson system (xinwen fabu zhidu 新闻发布制度 ).147  The 
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Party-state’s transparency efforts were not only geared towards international 
observers but were also intended to raise the legitimacy of the CPC and the 
national government at home.
148
 The main professed purpose of the press 
conference system is to show the government and Party as open and transparent, 
both in China and abroad.
149
 Thus, as usual, the rationale for the measure had both 
to do with domestic and with international problems. 
Later in 2003, the way external propaganda was talked about clearly 
showed that it had been upgraded in importance. At the propaganda and thought 
work conference in late 2003,
150
 Hu Jintao gave a speech, stressing that not only 
was external propaganda important for creating a favorable public opinion 
environment and establishing a good image for China, it also mattered to national 
security and stability (guojia anquan he wending 国家安全和稳定). The details 
of what Hu said on external propaganda were not reported publically.
151
 
Nonetheless, this signified, for the first time, the reframing of foreign propaganda 
from being simply of “strategic importance” (however interpreted) to being of 
imminent significance for regime security and continued CPC rule in official 
discourse for the reasons explained above.  
 
The following months were a time of experimentation and contestations 
over the road that China was to take in terms of its self-presentation. Around the 
same time that the upgrade of external propaganda was formalized, the Fourth 
Generation Leadership tested another slogan and theory: “China’s peaceful rise.” 
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innovation], Website of OEP/SCIO, July 5, 2011. 
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The term “peaceful rise” was first introduced by Zheng Bijian 郑必坚 at a session 
of the Bo’ao Forum for Asia on November 3, 2003.  
Although Zheng has been presented as an advisor to the Chinese 
government or as a “leading intellectual,”152 he had been active as a leading cadre 
in the propaganda and thought work sector during the Jiang Zemin era as de-facto 
head of the Central Propaganda Department between 1992 and 1997 and later as 
vice president of the Central Party School between 1997 and 2002. By 2003, 
when he presented the peaceful rise theory, he had retired from his official Party 
functions, become a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) and served as chairman of the China Reform Forum.
153
 
According to an article in the Journal of the Party School of the Central 
Committee of the CPC, Zheng developed the theory after a memo from Hu Jintao 
in January 2003, requesting that “‘research on the question of China’s peaceful 
rise be launched.’”154 In December 2003, the concept was officially taken up by 
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.
155
 By spring 2004, “peaceful rise” seemed to be on its 
way to becoming a key concept of the Fourth Generation Leadership. The decisive 
change came about on April 24, when Hu Jintao ignored the term heping jueqi 和
平崛起 completely during a much awaited keynote address delivered at the Bo’ao 
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Premier Wen Jiabao: ‘Turning Your Eyes to China,’” website of Harvard University, 
December 10, 2003, http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/12.11/10-wenspeech.html, 
accessed February 18, 2013). Hu Jintao used the term at a speech at the 110
th
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Mao Zedong’s birth on December 26 in front of a domestic audience which included his 
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Forum for Asia, instead reviving the considerably older expressions “peaceful 
development” (heping fazhan 和平发展) and “peace and development” (heping 
yu fazhan 和平与发展 ). The basic themes constituting China’s “peaceful 
development” largely remained the same.156 
Thus, the idea of China’s peaceful rise was devised on the basis of existing 
discussions over the course of 2003, between the introduction of new ideas and 
the rhetorical upgrade of external propaganda. It was then tested for several 
months and ultimately rejected around the time that China formalized its new 
external propaganda policy and its plans until 2020.  
It should not go unmentioned that there were externally visible signs at the 
time that the CPD had come under attack internally. The department is 
anecdotally known to be unpopular with other departments for its neglect to 
coordinate with them before releasing certain statements that are then mistaken for 
the official government position.
157
 In April 2004 the essay “Crusade against the 
CPD” (Taofa Zhongxuanbu 讨伐中宣部) written by Jiao Guobiao 焦国标, then 
assistant professor of Journalism at Peking University, was published on the 
Internet and caused a stir in China. Among other things, the essay criticized the 
CPD for ruining the image of the Party and the country.
158
 According to Jiao, he 
had written the article between late 2003 and spring 2004 for internal circulation 
only, but someone had put it online after he had sent it to friends for feedback. 
Jiao was never criticized directly, but harassed through constant calls on his cell 
phone. He was eventually fired indirectly in spring 2005.
159
 At the time, there 
were speculations that someone more powerful was behind the article. Although 
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Jiao has always maintained that he wrote the article himself, it is testimony to a 
larger debate behind the scenes, in which at least one of his colleagues wanted to 
test the reaction to the article in public. 
 
The second external propaganda conference within a few months was held 
in Beijing from April 20 to 21, briefly before the Bo’ao Forum. This time, the 
People’s Daily publically reported Li Changchun’s statement that external 
propaganda should “focus on safeguarding state security and stability” (zhuoyan 
yu weihu guojia anquan he wending 着眼于维护国家安全和稳定) as one of 
three foci of external propaganda work.
160
 At the conference, Central Circular 
[2004] no. 10, called the Center’s Opinion on how to Strengthen and Improve 
External Propaganda Work under the New Situation (Zhonggong zhongyang 
guanyu jiaqiang he gaijin xin xingshi xia duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo de yijian 中
共中央关于加强和改进新形势下对外宣传工作的意见) was discussed and 
circulated among participants.
161
 This “Opinion” was presented as a “milestone” 
(lichengpai 里程碑) in the development of Chinese external propaganda.162 The 
full text is not publically available. As has been common in the past, it probably 
contains different building blocks that can support both the agendas of those that 
want to reform the external propaganda apparatus further along the lines of 
Western models and those that argue the CPC needs to refrain from certain steps 
to remain true to itself. Excerpts from the circular available in public stress the 
urgency of the reform agenda and the need to adopt a format of external 
propaganda that foreigners are familiar with and can accept.
163
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The Opinion explained that strengthening and improving external 
propaganda work constituted an important step for China to be able to “become 
more proactive in the complex and fierce international struggle” (shi woguo zai 
fuza jilie de guoji douzheng zhong yingde zhudong de xuyao 是我国在复杂激烈
的国际斗争中赢得主动的需要 ) and to protect national security (shi weihu 
guojia anquan de xuyao 是维护国家安全的需要).164  One structural measure 
prescribed by the document and aimed at making China more proactive after the 
lessons of the SARS episode was the establishment of a three-tiered news release 
system that involved OEP/SCIO, all ministerial bodies of the State Council and all 
provincial-level governments.
165
 Attempts to create such a system had been 
launched first in 1983 following the initiative of the first EPSG and again in 1993 
under OEP/SCIO, but neither had succeeded in establishing a regular system 
respected abroad. The attempt in 2004 was geared toward providing better 
training to spokespeople, and making the system more authoritative, regularized 
and institutionalized.
166
 Unlike previous attempts, it was strongly aimed at getting 
the provinces involved. The idea to include lower levels of government in 
organized news presentation to the outside world had already been raised in 2003, 
but the SARS crisis had made the establishment of a spokesperson system more 
urgent.
167
  
At the micro level or in terms of qualitative work, the document 
highlighted the principle of “distinguishing between internal and external” in 
order to increase the effectiveness of Chinese external propaganda.
168
 In public 
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texts, this requirement is usually presented as a part of the “three closenesses” of 
external propaganda” (waixuan san ge tiejin 外宣三个贴进 ): External 
propaganda should be close to the reality of China’s development, close to the 
demands what foreign audiences would like to know, and close to the (ideological) 
thinking habits of foreigners,
169
 a twist on the “three closenesses” in the overall 
(quanju) domestic context, introduced as a hallmark of the new fourth generation 
leadership in 2002 to diminish the distance between the Party and the masses.
170
  
Participants of the conference were also briefed on and discussed mid-
range plans and goals for China’s external propaganda, i.e. the plans for the next 
fifteen years.
171
 These plans, just like China’s overall development plans, were 
presented in the form of a “three step” timetable (san bu zou 三步走).172 The first 
step, which was to be completed within about two years, consists of building an 
“all-dimensional, multitiered and wide-ranging big external propaganda pattern” 
(quan fangwei, duo cengci,  uan lingyu de “da waixuan” geju 全方位，多层次，
宽领域的“大外宣”格局),173 which involves more departments as well as larger 
sections of the population in the external propaganda effort while ensuring 
efficiency through proper coordination mechanisms.
174
 The second step, which 
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1987 to describe China’s overall development strategy towards a higher per capita income in 
three big steps. 
173
 The text provides more details what this means: 第一步,从现在起,用两年左右时间,理顺关系,
健全机构,拓展外宣渠道,强化手段建设,建立起中央统一领导,外宣办协调指导,各地方、各
部门以及驻外使领馆和对外新闻单位相互配合,建立运行有序的体制和机制,形成全方位、
多层次、宽领域的“大外宣”格局. Cf. “Quansheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi tichu: 
jianli da waixuan geju kaichuang waixuan gongzuo xin jumian,” 7. 
174
 Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju, ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 2006, 
199-200. 
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was to take about five years, consists of turning Xinhua 新华, China Central 
Television (CCTV), China Radio International (CRI), the China Daily, the 
People’s Daily Overseas Edition (Renmin ribao haiwai ban 人民日报海外版) as 
well as the key websites into internationally competitive and influential media 
groups so that the position of China’s media in international communication 
would be elevated and China’s influence on international public opinion would be 
increased.
175
 The third step, which will take about another ten years is to have 
achieved an international public opinion patterned that is relatively favorable to 
China and to have an external propaganda force commensurate with China’s 
status.
176
  
This is, of course, not very concrete, but it means that China’s efforts are 
expected to pay off by the year 2020. Thus, the setting up of the “big external 
propaganda pattern” was supposed to be completed by circa 2006; China was to 
set up globally operating media between 2006 and 2010, and by 2020, tangible 
results of the efforts should have manifested. This timetableis supported by a 
report on the 2007 external propaganda conference, which states that since the 
beginning of 2006, local and other sub-central units have begun implementing the 
center’s directives.177 Implementing the plan locally usually means coming up 
                                                          
175第二步,从现在起,用五年左右时间,以一社(新华社)、二台(中央电视台、中国国际广播电
台)、两报(中国日报、人民日报海外版)和重点网站为主体,形成具有国际竞争力和影响力
的媒体集团,使我国媒体在国际传媒界的地位有所提高,在国际舆论中的影响力有所提高. 
“Quansheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi tichu: jianli da waixuan geju kaichuang waixuan 
gongzuo xin jumian,” 7. 
176第三步，再用十年左右时间，使我国对外宣传实力进一步增强，使我国在国际舆论格局
中占据较为有利的位置，形成同我国国际地位相适应的较强的对外宣传力量 . 
“Quansheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi tichu: jianli da waixuan geju kaichuang waixuan 
gongzuo xin jumian,” 7. The three step plan is also mentioned in John Jirik’s dissertation on 
news making at CCTV-9, although Jirik links it to the “going out” strategy of 2001 rather than 
presenting it as a development plan for the entire external propaganda sector. Jirik’s source is 
“Zhang, Changming. (2004). Speech to the jury of the 2003 Rainbow Awards. Weihai, 
Shandong Province.” Cf. John Jirik, “Making News in the People’s Republic of China: The 
Case of CCTV-9” (PhD dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 2008), 28 and 659.  
177“去年以来，在以胡锦涛同志为总书记的党中央领导下，各地各有关部门认真贯彻中央部
署” “Liu Yunshan zai quanguo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang qiangdiao jinjin 
zhuazhu youli qiji jiji kaizhan duiwai xuanchuan chongfen zhanshi wo guo wenming 
gongzheng minzhu jinbu xingxiang” 刘云山在全国对外宣传工作会议上强调 紧紧抓住有
利契机 积极开展对外宣传充分展示我国文明公正民主进步形象 [Liu Yunshan emphasizes 
at the nationwide conference for external propaganda work: Firmly grasp the favorable 
moment to proactively engage in external propaganda work and fully project the image of a 
China that is civilized, just, democratic, and progressive], Renmin ribao, January 22, 2007, 2. 
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with concrete local targets for each policy/slogan, which also appears to have 
happened in this case.
178
  
A lot of the ideas in the plan, such as the big external propaganda pattern, 
had already been included in the previous long-term plan from early 1996. 
Likewise, many of the debates on how to improve external propaganda work 
following the upgrade in 2004 were reminiscent of earlier discussions. However, 
owing to the new urgency attached to external propaganda because of its newly 
declared link to national security and social stability, this time, massive reforms 
followed. 
Around the time of the conference, the Center created the External 
Propaganda Work Leading Small Group (EPWLSG, Zhongyang duiwai 
xuanchuan gongzuo lingdao xiaozu 中央对外宣传工作领导小组), led by then 
CPD director and Politburo member Liu Yunshan, with Zhao Qizheng as vice 
director.
179
 This placed the group directly under the Politburo. However, the 
creation of the EPWLSG also unequivocally placed the external propaganda 
sector under the authority of the CPD.  
The arrangement was replicated at some lower levels; for instance, Xinhua 
created an External Propaganda Work Leading Small Group (Waixuan gongzuo 
lingdao xiaozu 外宣工作领导小组), headed by Xinhua’s de facto editor-in-chief 
                                                          
178
 In Yunnan’s external propaganda work, the san bu zou strategy is a three step plan towards 
establishing a “big external propaganda pattern” (da waixuan geju 大外宣格局). “Yunnan 
tichu ‘san bu zou’ jianli da waixuan geju” 云南提出“三步走”建立大外宣格局 [Yunnan 
comes up with three-step-plan to build a big external propaganda pattern], January 11, 2006. 
Originally published in Chuncheng evening news. 
http://www.woxie.com/article/list.asp?id=2554, accessed June 11, 2012 via Google cache. In 
Fujian, establishing a quan fangwei, duo cengci, kuan lingyu de da waixuan geju is only the 
first of three steps intended to take about two years. “福建省确定新阶段外宣工作三步走目
标，将用两年时间形成全方位、多层次、宽领域的大外宣格局，用 5 年时间打造在全国
外宣工作中具有重要作用的媒体，用 10 年时间形成在海外有较大影响力的外宣力量。” 
Cf. “Fujian sheng waixuan gongzuo queding san bu zou mubiao” 福建省外宣工作确定三步
走目标 [External propaganda work of Fujian province lays down goals for three-step-plan], 
http://www.dss.gov.cn/Article_Print.asp?ArticleID=167130, accessed June 11, 2012. No date 
of publication is provided. 
179
 Cf. Zhou Zongmin, “Yong ‘shijie yuyan’ tong haiwai shouzhong ‘zhijie duihua’ – yu guonei 
fenshe jizhe Yingwen baodao peixunban xueyuan zuotan,” 10. Also see “Xinhuashe juxing 
jinian Yingyu duiwai xinwen kaibo liushi zhounian zuotanhui” 新华社举行纪念英语对外新
闻开播六十周年座谈会 [Xinhua news agency holds symposium to commemorate the 60th 
anniversary of external news dissemination], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 10 (2004): 1 and 6.  
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so that the status of external propaganda work within the agency would be 
strengthened.
180
  
Thus, to sum up the decisive period between 2003 and 2004, the latest 
developments in the external propaganda sector were first presented at the 2003 
external propaganda conference. Later that year, external propaganda was 
formally upgraded through Hu Jintao’s remark. The full external propaganda 
program until the year 2020
181
 was then presented to conference participants at the 
external propaganda conference in April 2004.  
 
 
7.7 Since 2004: External Propaganda Takes Off? 
After the upgrade, there were a large number of concrete developments, 
some of which had been planned for longer periods of time. For instance, China 
founded its first Confucius Institutes. In late 2004, Fudan University in Shanghai 
launched a new program to train international public relations professionals that 
could work at governments.
182
 Also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
established a Division for public diplomacy.
183
 Over the next few years, China 
embarked on three major projects: First, raising China’s soft power, second, 
improving the spokesperson system, and third, creating strong global media 
controlled by China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
180
 Zhou Zongmin, “Yong ‘shijie yuyan’ tong haiwai shouzhong ‘zhijie duihua’ – yu guonei fenshe 
jizhe Yingwen baodao peixunban xueyuan zuotan,” 10.  
181
 This macro mid-range program was not the same as the concrete external propaganda plans for 
the five year period 2006 to 2010, which were presented and discussed separately at the 
external propaganda conference for the year 2006 in December 2005.  
182 “Zhengfu guoji gongguan de duice” 政府国际公关的对策  [Countermeasures in the 
international public relations of governments]. April 17, 2010, website of the Public Relations 
department of Shanghai International Studies University, 
http://pr.shisu.edu.cn/s/19/t/38/0b/18/info2840.htm, accessed February 3, 2013. 
183
 Cf. Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” ANNALS of the 
American Academy, no. 616 (2008):260. 
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Raising China’s Cultural Soft Power 
The external propaganda conference in July 2005 was dedicated to the 
various cultural propaganda activities that China was experimenting with.
184
 At 
this conference, Zhao Qizheng announced that he would soon take up another 
position at the CPPCC, where his work would also be connected to external 
propaganda.
185
 In August 2005, at age 65, the official age limit for leading cadres 
at ministerial level, he was replaced by Cai Wu, who had served as deputy 
director of the International Department at the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (IDCPC) since 1997. His replacement was part of a 
miniature rearrangement of leadership positions before the Fifth Plenary Session 
of the 16
th
 CC in October 2005 and had been planned for quite a while.
186
 Under 
Cai Wu 蔡武, who later became Minister of Culture in 2008, a large number of 
new concrete developments had to do with the goal of raising China’s cultural 
influence. However, this was most likely not the result of the change in personnel, 
but planned in advance: Zhao Qizheng, who was by then on the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the CPPCC, also played a key role in pushing cultural soft power. 
In March 2006, he raised the issue of “cultural soft power” and “cultural external 
communication” at the annual CPPCC session. Culture was an important 
component of the comprehensive power of a nation and was thus tied to the future 
and fate of the country and the Chinese people.
187
 He summarized:  
                                                          
184
 Cf. “Liu Yunshan zai quanguo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang qiangdiao, jiashen 
liaojie, kuoda jiaoliu, tuidong hezuo, nuli yingzao lianghao de guoji yulun huanjing“ “Liu 
Yunshan zai quanguo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang qiangdiao jiashen liaojie kuoda 
jiaoliu tuidong hezuo nuli yingzao lianghao de guoji yulun huanjing” 刘云山在全国对外宣传
工作会议上强调 加深了解 扩大交流 推动合作 努力营造良好的国际舆论环境 [Liu 
Yunshan emphasizes at the nationwide conference for external propaganda work: Deepen our 
understanding, expand exchange, promote cooperation and make efforts to create a favorable 
international public opinion environment], Renmin ribao, July 21, 2005, 4.  
185
Tan Zhen 谭震 and Lei Xiangqing 雷向晴, “Quan fangwei, duo cengci, kuan lingyu -- 2005 
nian quanguo waixuan gongzuo huiyi da yinxiang” 全方位、多层次、宽领域——2005年全
国外宣工作会议大印象 [All-dimensional, multitiered and wide-ranging – Impressions from 
the nation work meeting for external propaganda], Duiwai da chuanbo, no. 8 (2005):n.p. 
186
 Cf. “Wu sheng liu bu wei renshi tiaozheng Zhao Qizheng xieren Cai Wu jiebang guoxinban” 五
省六部委人事调整 赵启正卸任蔡武接棒国新办 [Personnel changes in five provinces and 
six departments and commissions; Zhao Qizheng retires; Cai Wu succeeds him in the State 
Council Information Office]. September 8, 2005. 
http://news.163.com/05/0908/11/1T4GSK480001124T.html, accessed February 3, 2013.  
187我们要充分认识到文化对一个民族和一个国家未来命运的基础、支柱和关键作用 Zhao 
Qizheng 赵启正, “Jianyan xiance gongshang guoshi – Quanguo zhengxie shi jie si ci huiyi 
dahui fayan zhaibian (er) Zhongguo yao dui shijie wenhua zuochu jiaoda gongxian” 建言献策 
共商国是——全国政协十届四次会议大会发言摘编（二） 中国要对世界文化做出较大
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“If China wants to become a strong Socialist country, it needs to reinforce its politics, its 
economy, and its culture at the same time. [...] Only when we have cultural security can 
we speak about value security and ideological security. The rejuvenation and export of 
culture need to be integrated into the national development strategies.”188 
 
Shortly after, the number of conferences on China’s soft power increased 
markedly. In August 2006, the Foreign Languages Publication and Distribution 
Office’s (Zhongguo waiwen chuban faxing shiye ju 中国外文出版发行事业局, 
short, Waiwenju 外文局, FLO) Center for International Communication Studies 
organized a forum on “Cross-cultural communication and building soft power.”189 
In July 2007, the CPPCC convened a conference on “Building Chinese Soft 
Power.” 190  This already indicates that despite the talk of “cultural security,” 
China’s cultural strategy was no longer seen as purely defensive and designed to 
pre-empt cultural infiltration of China by the West. Groups within the CPC 
genuinely believes that American pop culture poses a threat to China’s national 
security through subtle infusion of U.S. values into Chinese society and therefore 
feel that because the Party cannot stop the world from growing closer together, it 
has to counter it in a more proactive way than simply by erecting barriers blocking 
trade and flow of information. Instead, similar to its plans to weaken hostile forces’ 
ability to give China any troubles by shifting the power balance in the field of 
public opinion, China wanted to bring its culture more proactively to the world. 
After cultural security became a renewed focus of attention in 2005 and 
2006, the drive to export Chinese culture gained traction. In January 2006, the 
Office of External Propaganda (Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai xuanchuan 
                                                                                                                                                               
贡献 [Offering advice and suggestions; discussing the affairs of the state together – Excerpts 
from speeches at the Fourth Session of the tenth National Committee of the CPPCC (two): 
China needs to make a greater contribution to world culture], Renmin ribao, March 10, 2006, 7.  
188
 Ibid. 
189
 “Yantaohui” 研讨会  [Forum], http://www.soic.china.cn/2009-06/30/content_2992540.htm, 
accessed January 18, 2013.  
190
 Cf. Pan Yue 潘跃, “Weirao ‘Yi wenhua jianshe wei zhuyao neirong de guojia ruan shili jianshe’ 
wenti jianyan xiance - quanguo Zhengxie zhaokai zhuanti xieshang hui - Jia Qinglin chuxi bing 
jianghua - Liu Yunshan Chen Zhili daohui tingqu yijian bing jianghua” 围绕“以文化建设为主
要内容的国家软实力建设”问题建言献策 全国政协召开专题协商会 贾庆林出席并讲
话 刘云山陈至立到会听取意见并讲话  [Suggestions and ideas around the question of 
“cultural construction as the main content of the national construction of soft power” - National 
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference holds a thematic 
consultation - Jia Qinglin attended and gave a speech- Liu Yunshan and Chen Zhili listened to 
opinions and gave speeches], Renmin ribao, July 25, 2007, 1. 
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bangongshi 中共对外宣传办公室, OEP) and the General Administration of Press 
and Publication (Xinwen chuban zongshu 新闻出版总署, GAPP) established a 
small group for the plan. The groupwas responsible for policy deliberation as 
much as policy implementation and has its office in the China National 
Publications Import and Export Corporation. Initially, the small group combined 
cadres from 20 different units, later expanded to 33.
191
 By early 2007, China 
announced its “Greater China Library” project in which it would translate and 
publish books written throughout China’s “5000 years of history.”192  
The cultural soft power debate also included how to “brand” China as a 
nation. In 2006, vice president of the Shanghai Public Relations Association Wu 
Youfu 吴友富 suggested to replace the dragon as China’s national symbol with 
the panda.
193
 Around the same time, as an alternative option, Chinese scholars 
vividly debated the option of changing the official translation of the Chinese term 
long 龙 into English by using transliteration (the most popular option being loong) 
rather than dragon, an approximate translation with very different connotations 
tarnishing China’s image.194  
At the 17
th
 Party Congress in fall 2007, Hu Jintao called for China to “raise 
its cultural soft power” (tisheng guojia wenhua ruanshili 提升国家文化软实力) 
                                                          
191
 Cf. “Zhongguo tushu duiwai tuiguang jihua” 中国图书对外推广计划  [Plan to promote 
Chinese books abroad], Baidu Encyclopedia, http://baike.baidu.com/view/1257512.htm, 
accessed September 20, 2012. Also Cf. “Zhongguo wenhua zhuzuo fanyi chuban gongzuo 
kaishi quanmian shishi” 中国文化著作翻译出版工程开始全面实施 [The work to translate 
and publish works of Chinese culture has begun to be fully implemented], originally published 
in the People’s Daily,  ShowChina.org, March 30, 2009, 
http://www.showchina.org/zixun/200903/t288270.htm, accessed March 1, 2013. 
192
 Cf. Xiaoling Zhang, “From ‘foreign propaganda’ to ‘international communication’: China’s 
Promotion of Soft Power in the Age of Information and Communication Technologies,” in 
Xiaoling Zhang and Yongnian Zheng, eds., China’s Information and Communications 
Technology: Revolution, Social Changes and State Responses (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 105. 
193
 Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” 258.  
194
 See for example “Miandui shijie - Zhongguo long danfu bu qi guojia xingxiang?” 面对世界 中
国龙担负不起国家形象? [Facing the world - Can the Chinese dragon not afford to be the 
national image?], December 5, 2006, Xinhuawnet, originally from Zhongguo Qingnianbao 中
国 青 年 报  [China youth journal], http://news3.xinhuanet.com/edu/2006-
12/05/content_5435164.htm, accessed October 14, 2012; “Xuezhe huxu long ying yi ming 
fangqi Dragon gaiyong Loong” 学者呼吁龙英译名放弃 Dragon 改用 Loong [Scholars call 
for a change of the English translation of ‘long’ to ‘Loong’ instead of ‘Dragon’], December 8, 
2006, Xinhuanet, http://news3.xinhuanet.com/edu/2006-12/08/content_5453441.htm, accessed 
October 14, 2012.  
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in his work report.
195
 Use of the term “soft power” in such a prominent place 
signaled that the CPC had fully embraced the concept and made it part of its 
overall plans. “The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” Hu’s report declared, 
“will definitely be accompanied by the thriving of Chinese culture.”196 The notion 
of cultural soft power as explained by Hu was not entirely new, but rather the 
outcome of a longer debate on cultural security that had been reaffirmed and 
propelled by the wave of popularity of the concept of soft power in the U.S.  
Propagating China’s culture is both a means and an end. It is a means 
because it is a particularly apt vehicle (zaiti 载体) to gain goodwill and improve 
China’s image. There are several advantages to cultural diplomacy from the 
Chinese perspective. Most importantly, Chinese culture and the Chinese language 
are seen as a rare opportunity for effective external propaganda: It is a field that 
China wants to talk about and that foreigners are interested in.
197
 While cultural 
propaganda is often politically motivated, its political purpose is not usually 
immediately apparent. In this field, it is easier for China to make compromises 
and present information in a way that foreigners can easily accept and digest. 
Culture can be used to include (rongna 容纳) messages about Chinese politics, 
the economy or society
198
 without “forcing them on people” (qiangjia yu ren 强加
于人 ). In addition to this functional aspect, there is also a more intrinsic 
motivation behind “projecting the profound charm of Chinese culture and 
promoting the outstanding culture of the Chinese people.”199 Part of the “great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese people” is international recognition by other countries 
of China’s civilizational achievements, a motive that already drove some of the 
earliest external propaganda in the 1920s (cf. Chapter 2). Again, from the 
perspective of the CPC, this is not merely an issue of prestige and gaining 
                                                          
195
 “Hu Jintai zai Dang de shiqi das hang de baogao, Qi: Tuidong shehui zhuyi wenhua da fazhan 
fanrong” 胡锦涛在党的十七大上的报告 , 七、推动社会主义文化大发展大繁荣  [Hu 
Jintao’s report on the congress of the party, seven: promoting the development and prosperity 
of socialist culture], Xinhuanet, October 24, 2007, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6938568_6.htm, accessed January 
14, 2013.  
196
 Ibid.  
197
 Thus combining “what China wants the world to know” (yi wo wei zhu 以我为主) with both 
content that foreigners are interested in and a format that is more easily accepted than most 
political issues (you di fang shi 有的放矢). 
198
 Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju, ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 2006, 
188.  
199
 “展示中华文化博大精深的魅力，弘扬中华民族优秀文化”, ibid.  
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international standing, but also one of regime stability by delivering on the 
promise to bring the Chinese people to renewed greatness.  
However, Hu Jintao’s call for soft power was also a call to refocus on 
socialist ideology. His following explanations in the work report showed that 
cultural soft power encompassed more than the establishment of Confucius 
Institutes, organizing cultural years or exporting more Chinese books in 
translation. A rejuvenation of socialist culture was included in the project. The 
first issue Hu addressed was the need to “build a system of socialist core values 
and raise the attractiveness and cohesiveness of socialist ideology.”200  
An earlier article in Internal Reference Readings (Neibu canyue 内部参阅) 
had explained that China’s Socialist core values should be the most important 
source of the country’s soft power. 201  This was one of the first signs that 
Socialism and other ideological issues had made their way back into external 
propaganda. It must be assumed that Chinese cadres in the external propaganda 
sector are aware of the drawbacks of leaving the zone of what is acceptable to 
foreign target audiences. Nonetheless, different target groups have different 
ranges of what can be accepted and is perceived as congruent with one’s own 
point of view; therefore, with the Internet, this poses a problem in any case. Under 
these circumstances, an ideological and rhetorical compass ensured a degree of 
consistency. 
In June 2007, the Center for International Communication Studies
202
 
convened a forum called “Values, Communication, National Image” (jiazhiguan – 
chuanbo – guojia xingxiang 价值观 •传播 •国家形象 ), which addressed the 
relationship between a country’s core values and its national image and discussed 
how to realize the Center’s recent request to “explain China’s socialist core values 
to foreigners in a way that would be well-received” (You zhenduixing de duiwai 
                                                          
200
 建设社会主义核心价值体系，增强社会主义意识形态的吸引力和凝聚力  “Hu Jintai zai 
Dang de shiqi das hang de baogao, Qi: Tuidong shehui zhuyi wenhua da fazhan fanrong.”  
201
 Ao Daiya 敖带芽. “Shehui zhuyi jiazhiguan shi woguo guojia ruanshili de hexin” 社会主义价
值观是我国国家软实力的核心 [The socialist value system is the core of China’s soft power], 
Neibu canyue, no. 30 (2006): 3-12. Things the author of the article considers part of a country’s 
soft power include: “社会制度的科学性、核心价值观念的吸引力、发展模式的可持续性、
基本路线和发展战略的执行性、国民的凝聚力、民族的创造力、文化的感召力、危难时
期的动员力及在国际 事务当中的影响力。” 
202
 The Center belongs to the Foreign Languages Office, which is, in turn, led by OEP/SCIO (cf. 
chapter 8.1).  
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shuoming wo shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi 有针对性地对外说明我社会主义核心
价值体系).203 
In 2008, as China celebrated the 30
th
 anniversary of the beginning of the 
Opening and Reform policies, external propaganda was asked to propagate both 
China’s concrete achievements as well as the “Chinese model of development” 
(Zhongguo shi fazhan 中国式发展). 204 This marked the beginning of the effort to 
push Chinese values more to the forefront of external propaganda that has been 
continued since.
205
 “Big events” (重大事件 zhongda shijian) have been seen as a 
particularly apt vehicle for such campaigns since the coverage of the Hong Kong 
handover was evaluated as very successful and a “breakthrough point” in 1997. 
More importantly, the financial crisis had raised significant doubts about the way 
the U.S. and world economy functioned among large sections of the American 
and broader international public. This was perceived by China as an opportunity 
to present its own experience as a more solid model. The aftermath of the 
financial crisis also created new social forces, such as the Occupy Movement, 
which attacked the capitalist system as it currently exists in the U.S. and were thus 
potential allies for China. 
Thus, one important part of the renewed focus on ideology is propagating 
the “China model.” China’s development model, termed the “Beijing Consensus” 
by Joshua Cooper Ramo,
206
 has potential appeal among developing countries with 
authoritarian regimes for its ability to produce economic growth without changing 
the political system.
207
 While the Beijing consensus is discussed in academic 
circles and publications such as the People’s Daily, the Chinese government has 
been careful not to embrace the term officially.
208
 Although the CPC has officially 
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stated that its model cannot simply be transferred to other countries –a statement 
that is in line with its own principle of selective appropriation– it is of course 
interested in convincing others of the legitimacy of its approach. Articles on 
external propaganda work have “suggested” emphasizing aspects of the 
superiority of the Chinese system, such as the ability to centralize forces and react 
quickly, to China’s neighboring countries.209 
There are conferences, and roundtables which China organizes. While the 
spotlight is usually on large-scale international events, like the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics or the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai, for which China applied almost a 
decade earlier to international committees, the country has also become more 
proactive in organizing and hosting smaller international conferences of various 
kinds in recent years. Recently, the Confucius Institute announced plans to give 
out scholarships to China scholars in order to nurture a “new generation of 
sinologists.”210 
 
The Spokesperson System 
One important means to improve interaction with foreign media has been 
the widespread institution of the spokesperson and press release system. As 
indicated above, this effort had been launched by the EPSG in 1983, but never 
implemented on a large scale. In 2006, the State Council circulated Document no. 
19 on the improving and strengthening of the government spokesperson system, 
which was supplemented by concrete plans outlined in opinions and work plans 
from OEP/SCIO.
211
  
The current spokesperson system has three layers (cengci 层 次 ): 
OEP/SCIO, the central departments and national ministries, and administrative 
units of provincial level (i.e. provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities 
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under direct control of the Center).
212
 While the focus was first on the state 
ministries, the Party’s departments were included later after the need to improve 
the image of the CPC and the need to present it as transparent had come to the 
forefront.
213
 In a surprising move, even the CPD implemented the spokesperson 
system in early 2010;
214
 however, it has not been used much, and the CPD still 
does not have its own online presence. In addition to functioning as the central 
node, OEP/SCIO began organizing classes to train spokespeople. Locales were 
encouraged to send delegations abroad to understand how the spokesperson 
system was organized and implemented in other countries.
215
  
In preparation for the Olympics, China announced in 2008 that it would 
ease restrictions on foreign journalists in China. The Lhasa incident again showed 
the necessity of properly providing journalists access to material and firsthand 
experience in order to have a chance to influence coverage. The spokesperson 
system was discussed at the 2009 external propaganda conference.
216
 In 2010, 
OEP/SCIO, moreover, got a new bureau in charge of handling foreign journalists 
stationed in China.
217
 
From the external propaganda perspective, the reform is clearly intended 
to teach the Party-state “international norms” how to deal with foreign media. An 
article by Zhao Qizheng explained that press conferences were quite common 
(tongxing 通行) in other countries, particularly in the developed world.218 The 
need for more and better press conferences was also again justified by pointing to 
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the world’s interest in China.219 Zhao explained that “no country that wants to 
create a favorable international public opinion environment can only rely on its 
own media.”220  The U.S. Office of Global Communications (Meiguo quanqiu 
chuanbo bangongshi 美国全球传播办公室), stated Zhao, openly admitted that it 
tried to influence foreign media and journalists so that they would report 
favorably to America.
221
 Moreover, Zhao learned in Japan that foreign journalists 
rarely used reports from Japanese journalists, which was why press conferences 
were important.
222
 As the goal was to enter Western mainstream society and 
China’s media were currently not yet able to do so, the spokesperson system was 
a good alternative. 
One main problem with the news release system was that spokespeople 
were not sure how to treat foreign journalists. Zhao Qizheng explained that it was 
important to treat them neither as students nor as subordinates and to know that 
they were neither friend nor enemy. Instead, they are “challengers” (tiaozhanzhe 
挑战者 ), hoping for spokespeople to slip up and provide information not 
authorized for release.
223
 This required a professional and calm response. Zhao 
encouraged spokespeople to admit when they did not know an answer or were not 
authorized to disclose it, as lying or providing confusing answers would only hurt 
the authoritativeness of China’s spokesperson system.224 Likewise, Zhao advised 
to keep answers as brief as possible, as those provided the least room for 
challenges in follow-up questions. According to Chinese studies, White House 
spokespeople spent an average of 40 seconds to answer each questions.
225
 
News releases, he summarizes, can take various forms: interviews with 
single journalists, interviews with several journalists at the same time, providing 
answers over the phone or convening a briefing (chuifenghui 吹风会): 
 
“Briefings provide reporters with background information on a certain issue for 
reference purposes. Generally, reporters may not name the speaker. If someone 
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violates the agreement, he will not be invited to come next time, and that will be a 
great loss for him.”
226
 
 
This demonstrates Zhao Qizheng’s familiarity with certain forms of access 
journalism and anonymous statements to the press, an important strategy of 
various players in the U.S. and other Western governments of dealing with the 
media. Thus, another important system to establish aside from the press release 
system was a system to liaise with foreign journalists stationed in Beijing (yu zhu 
Jing wai jizhe lianyi zhidu 与驻京外记者联谊制度).227 Both press conferences 
and leaks to selected journalists are seen as soft ways of managing the press by 
setting the media agenda on the one hand and by giving special access to those 
favorable to one’s own point of view and thus implicitly suppressing other voices 
on the other.
228
  
It is difficult to say with certainty who supports which position within the 
Party-state, but it is reasonable to assume that quite a few people within the 
external propaganda system would ultimately want for China to switch to a 
similar system of managing the media. However, with an established system of 
control of the media with the domestic propaganda apparatus at the top that wields 
both tremendous power and has a stake in defending it as well as with politicians 
that still have to be familiarized with this way of managing the media, China is 
very far away from relying primarily on these soft channels of managing the 
media by means of granting priority access to favorable voices. Currently, what 
China attempts is to set some of the media agenda through press conferences on 
the one hand while maintaining strong mechanisms of control and censorship on 
the other. As for granting priority access, the CPC and Chinese government 
appear to have focused on individual authors thus far rather than on journalists 
and media.  
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Raising China’s Voice 
First steps to strengthen China’s media were taken almost immediately 
after announcing the three-step-plan: CCTV-9 received its first major makeover 
and rebranding as an international news channel in 2004. In order to reflect the 
change, the channel changed its slogan from “CCTV International, your window 
on China” to “CCTV International, your window on China and the world.”229 In 
the same year, CCTV hired Edwin Maher as its first Caucasian news anchor.
230
 
The channel was equipped with a new studio and underwent a number of changes 
in terms of personnel and programs.
231
 While the English language program is 
supposed to function as the “trailblazer” (literally “dragon head,” longtou 龙头), 
CCTV also launched new channels in other languages. Briefly after the first 
announcement that China planned to create global media players, CCTV 
established a Spanish and French channel in October 2004. In October 2007, 
CCTV turned its French and Spanish channel into two separate 24 hour channels, 
CCTV-Français and CCTV-Español. Despite some progress, some of the reforms 
were partially cosmetic rather than substantial. For instance, CCTV’s shift in 2004 
from an overall channel featuring cultural programs to a news channel was largely 
rhetorical and most of the feature programs remained.
232
 Thus, implementation of 
the high goals set in 2004 faced quite a few difficulties. The project to create more 
influential media was given a new impetus in 2008. 
At the Third Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Party Congress in late 
2008, the CPC declared its intent to further increase its ‘international 
communication capabilities’ (guoji chuanbo nengli 国际传播能力).233 The idea 
was linked to the 2004 decision to create a set of “world class media” (guoji yi liu 
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meiti 国际一流媒体), the second step on China’s overall “three-point-plan’”for 
the external propaganda sector at the Central level that is supposed to be 
completed by 2020. While the term “international communication capabilities” 
was new, the justification was the same as for external propaganda’s macro 
development plan: China needed these media in order to match its economic and 
social development and its international status.
234
  
However, this announcement also came after a series of crises over the 
course of 2008 had demonstrated the urgency of creating Chinese media players 
and had led to an intensification of the debate how to crank up China’s voice, 
contributed to the decision to go ahead with the plan to create recognizable 
powerful Chinese media players operating on a global scale and defending China's 
image and interest worldwide. Thus, the events of 2008 added much needed 
resolve and resulted in faster and more effective changes than any of the previous 
reforms had. The developments of 2008 can be divided into two different 
categories: sudden events and disappointment about the lack of the Olympics to 
improve China's image, which proved the urgency of creating strong Chinese 
media players in the eyes of policy makers and the financial crisis in fall, which 
presented itself as a rare opportunity in the eyes of the Party.  
First, the year 2008 had a number of large-scale events whose presentation 
to the outside world China had planned for a long time. The most important event, 
which has also been covered extensively from a propaganda perspective, was the 
Beijing Olympics.
235
 This was seen by China as an opportunity to present itself to 
the world and also, in a sense, be rehabilitated in international society. However, 
the Olympics did not have the image-boosting effects that China may have hoped 
for. Early on, during the Darfur crisis, human rights groups had called for a 
boycott of the Olympics. As the Olympics drew closer, more protests followed, 
including the disruption of the Olympic torch relay and an alternative torch relay 
organized by Tibet support groups. In September 2008, less than two weeks after 
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the Beijing Olympics had ended, the Center for International Communication 
Studies held a conference on external communication in the “Post-Olympic Age,” 
discussing the long term effects of the Olympics on China’s image and external 
propaganda as well as on the challenges that lay ahead.
236
 
2008 is also known among Chinese analysts as a year with an 
extraordinary number of sudden events that China had to react to. Most 
importantly, protests erupted in Lhasa in March. In response, Chinese authorities 
cut Internet and mobile network connections in the area and expelled foreign 
journalists. The failure to spin international media during the crisis in Lhasa 
caused debate and provided an opportunity for those who argued in favor of 
radically changing how China dealt with these events. The Lhasa coverage and the 
failure to spin international public opinion served as yet another wakeup call that 
China needed to change its approach. An article on the website of OEP/SCIO (not 
attributed to any author in particular) published a year after the incident and by the 
time China had already decided to expand its global media, summed up the 
lessons and made suggestions what China needed to change, including relaxing 
strict control over coverage and allowing ordinary Chinese to participate more.
237
 
In March 2008, after less than three years in office, Cai Wu was formerly 
replaced by Wang Chen as new director of OEP/SCIO, while Cai Wu became 
China’s minister of culture during the annual session of the National People’s 
Congress (NPC). This came in the wake of the crisis of the Lhasa riots, but it was 
part of an overall adjustment of leadership positions at the NPC
238
 and so close to 
the events that it should be assumed that the failure to properly “guide 
international public opinion” did not have anything to do with it.239 Wang Chen 
had briefly acted as deputy director of CPD in 2000 and 2001, and acted first as 
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editor-in-chief (2001-2002) and later as president (2002-2008) of the People’s 
Daily.
240
 Since he took up his post at OEP/SCIO, he has also concurrently acted as 
a deputy director of CPD again. 
Two months after protests broke out in Lhasa, Sichuan was hit by the 
second most deadly earthquake in PRC history with almost 70,000 estimated dead. 
The handling of the response was portrayed as a propaganda success, both 
domestically and internationally.
241
 Shortly before the Olympics, infants began to 
fall sick and die from tainted milk powder produced by the dairy giant Sanlu 三鹿, 
but the scandal was suppressed until after the Olympics to avoid any negative 
coverage.
242
 This demonstrated, yet again, that the suppression of news could 
seriously harm China’s image. Thus, the triumph of the relatively effective 
coverage in a type of event that had long been on the list of sudden events to cover 
swiftly was overshadowed by the failure to report in a more sensitive man-made 
scandal.  
Aside from both sudden and big events, there was another important factor 
that contributed to the timing of the massive media revamp starting in 2009. The 
Financial Crisis of 2008 and 2009 made China more confident about its rightful 
role as a big power in international politics.
243
 There is little doubt that China 
interpreted this crisis that also affected media as a “rare window of opportunity.” 
The financial crisis was seen as a perfect time for Chinese media to catch up.
244
 
Although the expansion of China’s media had been planned in advance, the rapid 
moves following in early 2009 should also be interpreted as a policy 
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accompanying this strengthened self-confidence and as “seizing the opportunity” 
(zhuazhu jiyu 抓住机遇).  
All of this added to the resolve to take more drastic steps. After the 
announcement at the Third Plenary Session, China proceeded very quickly and 
earmarked at least 45 billion Yuan for the expansion of its global media leaked to 
the South China Morning Post (SCMP). These subsidies allowed Chinese media 
to grow in the midst of a global recession. Concretely, according to a Taiwanese 
intelligence report, the investment initially reported in the SCMP was intended for  
 
1. Establishing CCTV in Arabic and Russian,  
2. Increasing the number of Xinhua branches abroad from 102 to 180,  
3. Establishing a 24 hour news channel (a task that was delegated to Xinhua, not 
CCTV),
245
 and  
4. Expanding Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), an alternative that CCTV had been 
actively pursuing since 2006.
246
  
 
Since many more changes have been implemented since 2009 that most 
likely cost much more than 45 billion Yuan, it should be assumed that the amount 
leaked to the SCMP was only a part of the money that has actually been invested 
since early 2009.  
The need to build up China’s media dominated external propaganda work 
during the next few years. At the external propaganda conference in early 2009, 
building influential media players naturally featured prominently. Wang Chen, the 
new head of OEP/SCIO since April 2008, ordered participants to focus on 
“building first class international media in many languages, with a broad audience, 
large content volume and strong influence, covering the entire globe” and 
“establishing a modern communication system with wide reach and advanced 
technology” in order to become a communication power worthy of China’s 
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international status and the level of its economic and social development.
247
 In 
2010, the focus continued to be on increasing China’s international voice. At the 
2010 external propaganda conference, the two linked slogans “grasping the right 
to speak” (zhangwo huayuquan 掌握话语权) and “gaining the right to direct” 
(yingde zhudaoquan 赢得主导权), which had been discussed in policy circles and 
academia since 2007, were added.
248
 The two are both part of the goal to increase 
China’s voice in shaping global public opinion. “Grasping the right to speak” 
means being able to set the media agenda, both through quantitative measures 
such as controlling more news resources and qualitative means, such as raising 
one’s credibility with the audience. “Gaining the right to direct” refers to the goal 
of escaping the role of passive responder to Western accusations, being forced to 
refute rather than being able to set the media agenda. Chinese media need to be 
the first to report an incident due to the belief that the first to report gets to 
determine the overall framework through which audiences will interpret any 
follow-up reports.
249
 In 2011, when Wang Chen outlined the tasks China'’ 
external propaganda work needed to fulfill in the future, he stressed the need to be 
fully informed about international public opinion regarding China, continuously 
increase the effectiveness and influence of external propaganda in order to “grasp 
the right to speak and gain the right to direct.” This means being keenly aware of 
the international opinion and communications situation, analyzing the 
characteristics and regularities of high points and low points in international 
public opinion regarding China, and dealing with them properly and calmly. 
 
The “Project to increase China’s international communication capacities” 
(Zhongguo zengqiang guoji chuanbo nengli jianshe gongcheng 中国增强国际传
播能力建设工程 ), as it is referred to internally, 250  is not just limited to 
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 “Quanguo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi zhaokai bushu jinnian waixuan gongzuo,” 4. 
248“Quanguo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi bushu jinnian waixuan gongzuo gengjia jishi youli 
xiang shijie chuanbo Zhongguo shengyin” 全国对外宣传工作会议部署今年外宣工作 更加
及时有力向世界传播中国声音 [The nationwide conference for external propaganda work 
gives orders for this year’s external propaganda work: Transmit China’s voice to the world in a 
more timely and forceful way], Renmin ribao, January 6, 2010, 1.  
249
 This line of argumentation, which also frequently refers to “the images in people’s mind” 
probably first entered China through Lippmann’s work, although the latter’s basic argument (of 
pre-existing stereotypes that shape how any new information is interpreted) has been altered 
since then in China. 
250
 Interview with Chinese communication studies expert (II), Beijing, April 2011.  
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investments into the media directly. In 2003, OEP/SCIO found that China had far 
too few people qualified to do external propaganda.
251
 By 2009, the CPD and the 
Ministry of Education devised and established a new master’s degree in order to 
educate a new generation of “talent” (rencai 人才) with good command of a 
foreign language (most importantly English, but also other European languages) 
and familiar with the rules of international communication.
252
  
New programs were set up at five universities: Qinghua University 
(Qinghua daxue 清华大学 ), People’s University (Renmin daxue 人民大学 ), 
Fudan University (Fudan daxue 复旦大学), Communication University of China 
(Zhongguo chuanmei daxue 中国传媒大学 ), and at Beijing Foreign Studies 
University (Beijing waiguoyu daxue 北京外国语大学, BFSU).253 In addition to 
language and communication skills, the new master’s program also includes 
classes on politics (zhengzhi jiaoyu 政治教育 ) and on China’s “national 
circumstances” (guoqing 国情). For the latter, students had the opportunity to 
attend lectures by high officials, such as vice ministers or vice department heads 
from CPD, OEP/SCIO and various other ministries.
254
 Students in these programs 
have the opportunity to do internships at Chinese media targeted at foreigners, 
paid for by the CPD, as well as very well-paid field trips.
255
 
In 2010 and 2011, some doubts appeared. After two years, CPD and the 
Ministry of Education re-evaluated their program and concluded that they were 
currently training more people than they would need. In response, the programs at 
Fudan University and BFSU stopped accepting new students in 2011, although 
authorities left open the possibility of reopening the programs at a later point in 
time. However, by the end of the year, at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 
                                                          
251
 “Xinhuashe juxing jinian Yingyu duiwai xinwen kaibo liushi zhounian zuotanhui” 新华社举行
纪念英语对外新闻开播六十周年座谈会  [Xinhua News Agency holds seminar to 
commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the beginning of the broadcasting of English foreign 
news], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 10 (2004): 8. 
252
 Interview with Chinese communication studies expert (II), Beijing, April 2011.  
253
 Ibid. Although the details are slightly different, this seems to be the same program referenced in 
Sunny Lee, “China grooms new breed of journalists,” Asia Times, September 4, 2009, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KI04Ad01.html, accessed February 14, 2013. 
254
 Interview with Chinese communication studies expert (II), Beijing, April 2011. Initially, these 
lectures took place twice or thrice per year at each university. After the number of universities 
involved was reduced in 2011, the format of lectures by high officials in Beijing was changed 
to joint lectures at Communication University of China. While working at the National Library 
in Beijing, a student in one of these programs also told me about an upcoming lecture at the 
Communication University. 
255
 Interview with Chinese communication studies expert, Beijing, April 2011.  
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Seventeenth Central Committee in late 2011, the Party passed a resolution in 
which pledged to speed up its plans to create globally influential media,
256
 thus 
strongly reaffirming the project.  
 
 There is a faction of people in the Chinese external propaganda debate that 
maintains that the problem Chinese media face is first and foremost a hardware 
issue. Western news agencies and media conglomerates control the lion share of 
global information flows, and if China were to control a larger portion, its 
influence over global public opinion would rise automatically.
257
 Thus, the 
solution to China’s lack of mass media related soft power is simply to give media 
more money so that they can expand.  
The quantitative expansion, including some structural changes, soon 
became highly visible. In July and September 2009, CCTV launched its 
international Arabic and Russian channels respectively.
258
 In April 2010, CCTV-9 
(a.k.a. CCTV International) was renamed CCTV News and now broadcasts 24 
hours per day.
259
 In November 2010, CCTV announced that it was recruiting 
foreign anchors for a new phase of the re-launch of CCTV News.
260
 It appears that 
this time, CCTV primarily aims to cover developments in China and Asia in order 
to “establish itself as the best English news channel in Asia.”261 During this shift, 
CCTV again employed foreign advisors, among others veteran journalist Jim 
                                                          
256
 See “Weishenme yao jiakuai goujian xiandai chuanbo tixi?” 为什么要加快构建现代传播体系？ 
[Why should the construction of a modern communication system be accelerated?], Xinhuanet, 
December 16, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-12/16/c_111249092.htm, 
accessed January 13, 2013.  
257
 E.g. Ma Hongwei, “Wang shang suzao Zhongguo guoji xingxiang,” 24.  
258
 Cf. “Zhongyang dianshitai Alaboyu guoji pindao 7 yue 25 ri kaibo” 中央电视台阿拉伯语国际
频道 7月 25日开播 [CCTV’s international Arabic channel begins broadcasting on July 25], 
Wesbite of CCTV. July 24, 2009, http://news.cctv.com/china/20090724/103396.shtml, 
accessed October 6, 2012, and “Zhongyang dianshitai Eyu guoji pindao jianjie” 中央电视台俄
语国际频道简介 [Brief introduction to CCTV’s international Russian channel], Website of 
CCTV, September 9, 2009, http://russian.cctv.com/20090909/107305.shtml, accessed October 
6, 2012.  
259
 Cf. “CCTV News, Your Link to Asia,” website of CCTV (“CNTV”), April 26, 2010, 
http://english.cntv.cn/20100426/104481.shtml, accessed October 5, 2012. CCTV-9, in turn, 
was refashioned as two documentary channels, one broadcasting in Chinese and the other in 
English. The two channels are known as CCTV-Jilu CCTV 纪录 and CCTV-Jilu (Yingyu) 
CCTV 纪录（英语） . Cf. “CCTV 9 Documentary,” website of CCTV (“CNTV”), 
http://cctv.cntv.cn/documentary/, accessed November 10, 2012.  
260
 Cf. “CCTV News begins recruiting new anchors,” website of CCTV (“CNTV”), November 11, 
2010, http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20101111/105851.shtml, accessed November 
10, 2012.  
261
 Ibid. 
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Laurie, who had opened the first news bureau for American Broadcasting 
Company (ABC) in China.  
China has also opted for more media “localization” (meiti bentuhua 媒体
本土化). While it once denounced the strategy of “localization” pursued by 
foreign media organizations in China,
262
 it now seeks to implement the bentuhua 
strategy itself.
263
 For this, media have been encouraged to produce more regional 
editions and open additional branches abroad directly producing the content. In 
January 2012, CCTV opened its first overseas news production center, CCTV 
Africa (非洲分台), in Nairobi, Kenya,264 where CRI had also opened its first FM 
radio station in 2006.
265
 In February, CCTV America (Meiguo fenshe 美洲分台), 
based in Washington, followed suit.
266
 The production center has reporting teams 
for the U.S. and for South America.
267
 The China Daily, too, has created new 
regional editorial branches (fenshe 分社) abroad producing and distributing their 
own regional editions of the paper. As of date (early 2013), the China Daily has a 
U.S. edition (re-launched in 2009), a weekly European edition (since early 2011), 
a China edition, a weekly Asia-Pacific edition, which supplements the Hong Kong 
edition of the paper launched in 1997, and a weekly Africa edition (since 
December 2012).
268
 In addition to the editorial departments, it has also registered 
companies abroad that are responsible for commercial aspects and marketing of 
the papers as well as for conducting audience surveys to get more systematic 
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 “Zhao Qizheng zhuren shuo, waixuan gongzuo de zhongdian shi zai guoji yulun zhong biaoda 
Zhongguo de shengyin,” 3. Speech by Zhao Qizheng, delivered while inspecting Guangdong’s 
external propaganda work.  
263
 Cf Zhuo Peirong 卓培荣, Chuanmei fazhan yu weilai guihua: 2005nian Xinhuashe xinwen 
xueshu nianhui lunwenxuan 传媒发展与未来规划: 2005 年新华社新闻学术年会论文选 
[Development of the media and plans for the future: papers from Xinhua News Agency’s 
annual academic conference on press (work)] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2007), 18.  
264
 The article describes this as an important step in the creation of first rate international media 
(guoji yiliu meiti 国际一流媒体). Cf. “Zhongyang dianshitai shou ge haiwai fentai zai Feizhou 
Keniya kaibo” 中央电视台首个海外分台在非洲肯尼亚开播  [CCTV’s first overseas 
production center begins broadcasting in Kenya, Africa], January 12, 2012, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-01-12/080623787759.shtml, accessed October 6, 2012.  
265
 Cf. “Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai” 中 国 国 际 广 播 电 台 [(China Radio International], 
Website of China Radio International, http://gb.cri.cn/cri/gk.htm, accessed October 7, 2012.  
266
 Cf. “About CCTV America,” Website of CCTV (“CNTV”), 
http://cctv.cntv.cn/lm/cctvamerica/01/index.shtml, accessed October 6, 2012.  
267
 Cf. ibid.  
268
 Cf. Harry Verhoeven and Iginio Gagliardone, “Opinion: China’s Positive Spin on Africa,” 
website of CNN, December 19, 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/18/opinion/china-media-
africa-verhoeven-gagliardone/index.html, accessed December 29, 2012.  
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feedback.
269
 As China's national news agency, Xinhua has, of course, long had 
branches and headquarters in other countries, but it has further increased its 
visibility: In 2011, Xinhua opened a newsroom in New York City
270
 and placed an 
ad with the Xinhua logo amongst the billboards of Times Square.
271
 Even the 
journals of China’s FLO have established overseas branches: The Beijing Review 
now has a branch in the U.S., China Pictorial has a branch in Moscow, and China 
Today has a Middle East branch in Cairo and a South American branch in Mexico 
City.
272
 
There has also been a trend towards having more than one of each types of 
media. In April 2009, the Huanqiu shibao 环球时报 (Global Times), which is part 
of the People’s Daily group and has been published in Chinese since 1993,273 got 
an English version, the Global Times, thus creating a second national level 
English language newspaper alongside the China Daily.
274
 In 2010, Xinhua 
launched its own television channel, CNC World (2010).
275
  
In addition to the expansion of traditional media, China has also made 
more use of the Internet. In late December 2009, China Network Television 
(CNTV), a “national web-based TV broadcaster,” was launched.276 In January 
2011, CRI established the China International Broadcasting Network (CIBN, 中
国国际广播电视网络台), which, aside from strengthening CRI’s online presence 
is also a part of the effort to turn CRI from a traditional medium relying on radio 
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 Cf. Huang Jingwei 黄静玮 Xu Xiaodan 徐小丹, “Chuangxin duiwai chuanbo fangshi fangfa” 
创新对外传播方式方法 [Innovative ways and means of external communication], Duiwai 
chuanbo, no. 1 (2012): 14.  
270 “Xinhua opens new office in NYC’s Times Square,” Xinhuanet, May 20, 2011. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/business/2011-05/20/c_13884252.htm, accessed June 
27, 2012.  
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 Cf. “Xinhua Takes on Times Square,” website (blog section) of the Wall Street Journal, August 
2, 2011. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/08/02/xinhua-takes-on-times-square/, 
accessed June 27, 2012.  
272
 Cf. “Zhongguo waiwen chuban faxing shiyeju zuzhi jiegou” 中国外文出版发行事业局组织结
构  [Organizational structure of China foreign languages publishing and distribution 
administration], website of the FLO (“CIPG”), http://www.cipg.org.cn/jjgl/zzjg/, accessed 
January 18, 2013.  
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 Originally under the name Huanqiu wencui 环球文萃 
274
 Its establishment was financed through the large subsidy first reported in the South China 
Morning Post in January 2009.  
275
 “Xinhua launches CNC World English channel,” Xinhuanet, July 1, 2010, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-07/01/c_13378575.htm, accessed June 27, 
2012.  
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 Cf. “CNTV Profile.” Website of CNTV (CCTV’s IPTV service), June 9, 2010, 
http://english.cntv.cn/20100609/102812.shtml, accessed October 5, 2012.  
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broadcasts towards a player offering multimedia content (Tuijin Zhongugo guoji 
guangbo diantai jiakuai shixian you chuantong danyi meiti xiang guangbo dianshi 
zonghe meiti zhuanxing 推进中国国际广播电台加快实现由传统单一媒体向广
播电视综合媒体转型).277  
Although China’s use of social media has been more cautious, there has 
been some development in this area as well. In 2010, the CPC launched an 
initiative that required local governments to use social media, most importantly 
the micro-blogging service Weibo 微博, China’s equivalent of Twitter.278 The 
project was implemented nationwide in 2011. This was partially in reaction to 
foreign governments’ external propaganda initiatives in China. Around 2010, the 
country noticed an increase in accounts from foreign embassies on Chinese 
microblogs so as to be able to directly communicate with and influence Chinese 
publics
279
 and subsequently declared that China needed to “proactively ‘occupy’ 
micro-blogs.”280   
Aside from “defending” itself against foreign encroachment into its own 
territory, the PRC has also begun to use social media such as Facebook, Twitter, 
and Youtube more proactively. The China Daily has two different accounts on 
Twitter, one for its U.S.
281
 and one for its European edition.
282
 CCTV only has an 
account for CCTV Africa.
283
 Jinmin chūgoku, the Japanese version of People’s 
China that continued after the English version was closed down, also has a Twitter 
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 “Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai (China Radio International).”  
278
 Weibo is a service offered by the online media company Sina (Xinlang 新浪). Translated 
directly, Weibo simply means ‘micro-blog.’  
279
 Deng Jianguo 邓建国, “Guankui waiguo zai Hua zhengwu weibo” 管窥外国在华政务微博 
[Glimpse of a foreign government microblogging in China], Duiwai chuanbo, no. 5 (2012): 54-
55; Xiang Debao 相德宝 and Zhang Lu 张璐, “Minjian zi meiti de duiwai chuanbo celüe” 民
间子媒体的对外传播策略 [The foreign communication strategy of social media], Duiwai 
chuanbo, no. 3, (2012): 22. 
280
 “积极‘占领’微博阵地: 王晨还特别提到，党的宣传部门应该担负起宣传党的方针政策、
澄清谣言的任务，基层宣传部门要积极用好微博这个平台和窗口，积极‘占领’微博阵地，
发展健康向上的网络文化。” “Wang Chen tan wenhua quangguo jianshe zhichu zhengfu 
guanyuan yao zhongshi weibo zuoyong” 王晨谈文化强国建设 指出政府官员要重视微博作
用 [Wang Chen talks about about building a cultural power, pointing out that government 
officials need to pay attention to the use of microblogs], People’s Daily Online. November 2, 
2011, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49165/16106610.html, accessed September 21, 
2012.  
281
 https://twitter.com/ChinaDailyUSA, accessed March 1, 2013.  
282
 https://twitter.com/ChinaDailyEU, accessed March 1, 2013. 
283
 https://twitter.com/cctvnewsafrica, accessed March 1, 2013. Another account that uses the 
CCTV logo and that was very active until April 2010, CCTV Breaking News, appears to be no 
longer active.  
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account.
284
 On Facebook, China Daily maintains two active pages: China Daily 
USA
285
 and China Daily Asia Pacific.
286
 CNTV, the online TV service of CCTV 
has a Youtube account for its Chinese programs.
287
 CCTV-9 has two channels on 
Youtube: the Documentary Channel (since August 2011)
288
 and the Travelogue 
Channel (since February 2009).
289
 In addition, it should also be noted that the 
PRC monitors activity on social media websites that are blocked, certainly in 
exceptional circumstances during or after “high politics” events and possibly even 
on a more regular basis.
290
 One article has also argued that China needs to 
establish a first class English-language social media platform (Guoji yiliu zi meiti 
国际一流子媒体).291 
Such plans appear very ambitious, particularly in light of the fact that the 
presence of Chinese media on Western social media is still very timid. Neither the 
State Council Information Office nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two 
main press release outlets, have accounts on Twitter. By contrast, most U.S. and 
British government departments and individual spokespeople have separate 
Twitter accounts,
292
 and countries such as India and South Korea have also 
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 https://www.facebook.com/ChinaDailyUSA?ref=ts, accessed January 21, 2013.  
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 https://www.facebook.com/ChinaDailyAPAC?ref=ts, accessed March 1, 2013. This page 
replaced the page of the China Daily Hong Kong Edition in late 2011 (see 
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289
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account that Youtube is blocked in China and that regular users accessing the video platform 
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addresses. Hence, these 251 views all came from Chinese IP addresses that had clearance to 
access sites otherwise blocked in China. China Digital Times compiled a list of tweets from 
new Twitter accounts opposing the “Jasmine Revolution.” This is a rare occurrence, however, 
as usually the Chinese-language Twitter-scape is clearly dominated by “dissidents” and human 
rights lawyers or activists. See “Remarkable Quotes from the Fifty Cent Party: Anti-Jasmine 
Revolution Tweets,” China Digital Times, February 28 2011, 
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messages/, accessed November 11, 2012.  
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(https://twitter.com/FBIPressOffice).  
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followed suit.
293
 Given that the plans to boost China’s social media presence are 
very recent (2011), it is likely that Chinese government organs and media will at 
least try to use social media more aggressively soon. However, in this area, China 
is weighed down by the fact that major social media like Facebook, Youtube, and 
Twitter are categorically blocked in China. If the Chinese Party-state were to 
make them a cornerstone of its external propaganda, it would likely draw attention 
to this double-standard. Creating China’s own English language social media 
platform would avoid such problems, but it is unlikely that outside of China, 
where the Party-state can protect its own players from foreign competition such a 
project would become serious competition to any of the established players. 
In sum, overall, all Chinese media designated for global expansion have 
attempted to reform themselves in several regards: First, they have strengthened 
their English versions, as these are intended to lead the way (known as Yingyu wei 
longtou 英语为龙头). Second, they have launched editions and programs in new 
languages, although the number of languages covered by each media unit varies 
greatly. Third, as part of the “localization policy,” media have established regional 
headquarters and branches which directly produce and distribute content abroad. 
Fourth, there is a change from reliance on one traditional channel (such as radio, 
television, or print material) towards each media unit offering multimedia content. 
The trend towards multimedia content has the side-effect –presumably intended– 
of creating several players in each field. This creates both actual competition and 
an impression of plurality. Fifth, each media unit has tried to find new channels 
for distributing its content through technological innovation and use of various 
online platforms.  
 
With the renewed focus on legitimacy and ideological security, the CPC is 
currently working on further enshrining the ideas and principles behind Chinese 
Marxist theory in a way that is comprehensible both to ordinary Chinese people 
and to foreigners. In 2011 and 2012, the CPC started a public debate about the 
need to create a “discourse system with Chinese characteristics” (Zhongguo tese 
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huayu tixi 中国特色话语体系)294  that would allow the country to accurately 
articulate the Chinese experience, China’s development plans, and its contribution 
to the world rather than constantly being forced into the “Western discourse 
system” and being evaluated by the latter’s standards. The idea is familiar from 
China’s attempt to create a Chinese understanding of human rights, but is more 
encompassing. The core of this system would be Marxist principles and the 
Chinese contribution to theory based on Chinese experience, but it would be 
continuously updated and supplemented with elements from abroad and new 
findings made in China.
295
 This discourse system needed to fulfill two 
requirements: It needed to be unique to China, yet enable the country to 
communicate with the rest of the world. 
While China’s interaction with the world is considered an important reason 
for the need to develop a unique Chinese discourse system, the project has various 
domestic dimensions, such as getting rid of antiquated concepts, slogans, and 
formulations in the Chinese Marxist discourse universe that no longer have any 
connection with reality and therefore diminish the legitimacy of the Party.
296
 
Nonetheless, building this discourse system is one of the goals for China’s 
external propaganda work over the next five to ten years. According to an article 
by Wang Chen, composed for the celebration of the 90
th
 anniversary of the CPC, 
“building a discourse system that enables international dialogue yet is unique to 
China should be the focus and a [potential] breakthrough for external propaganda 
work under the new circumstances.”297 The functions (gongneng 功能) of the 
                                                          
294“Discourse systems are the external forms of expression of ideological-theoretical systems and 
knowledge system,” one article explains, or, in other words, they are terms that need to 
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October 30, 2012, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/1030/c40531-19430985.html, accessed 
November 15, 2012. 
296
 One author notes that particularly the language of the far “left”is no longer applicable to 
Chinese realities (特别是极“左”的语言不适用). Cf. Yao Huan, “Goujian zhizhengdang lilun 
xin de huayu tixi.”  
297
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Website of OEP/SCIO, originally published in Qiushi 求实 [Seeking truth], republished online 
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discourse system are to “accurately, in-depth, and vividly reflect the Chinese 
practice and the Chinese way, to answer China’s problems based on Chinese 
practice, to establish a favorable image of China, to enhance China’s soft power, 
and to contribute new ideas and new wisdom to the world.”298 Thus, it is both 
intended to help China solve its own problems more effectively by staying close 
to Chinese realities and to increase China’s image and soft power by allowing 
China to present its theoretical innovations to the rest of the world. 
One article explains that China’s international voice (huayuquan 话语权), 
which forms an important part of China’s soft power, on the one hand depends on 
China’s comprehensive power (meaning the more power it amasses, the more 
likely other countries will be to listen to China), but, on the other hand, also on the 
appeal and influence of of its discourse system to the outside world.
299
 Thus, 
making sure that Party ideology is up-to-date and that it can be properly explained 
through a coherent “discourse system” is seen as important not only for domestic 
but also for international legitimacy and success of the Party. 
In September 2012, the CPD and the OEP held an opening ceremony for a 
major research project commissioned by the National Social Science Foundation 
(Guojia sheke jijin zhongda weituo xiangmu 国家社科基金重大委托项目) on the 
values and ideals of China’s path of development and how to propagate them 
internationally.
300
 One of the topics for the annual session of the Seminar on 
International Communication, to be held in August 2013, is “Political 
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立良好国家形象，增强国家软实力，向世界贡献新理念新智慧，是中国特色话语体系的
功能定位” Du Feijin, “Jiji goujian Zhongguo tese huayu tixi.”  
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 Cf. Ibid. 
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 “Zhongguo fazhan daolu zhong de jiazhi linian ji guoji chuanbo yanjiu”《中国发展道路中的
价值理念及国际传播研究》. According to the report on the website of Shanghai Jiaotong 
University, this project received the highest funds handed out by the National Social Science 
Foundation to date. Cf. “Hu Wei danren Guojia sheke jijin zhongda keti shouxi zhuanjia” 胡伟
担任国家社科基金重大委托课题首席专家  [Hu Wei serrves as principal expert of the 
commissioned subject of the National Social Science Foundation], Website of Shanghai 
Jiaotong University, November 16, 2012, http://news.sjtu.edu.cn/info/1002/130738.htm, 
accessed November 28, 2012.  
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Communication and Discourse Systems” (zhengzhi chuanbo yu huayu tixi 政治传
播与话语体系).301 
The idea behind promoting Chinese core values and a Chinese discourse 
system is not as antiquated as it sounds and has been linked to genuine external 
propaganda concerns by researchers. Qinghua professor Shi Anbin 史安斌 
explains that because external propaganda has primarily supported China’s 
domestic and foreign policies for a long time, this has created the impression that 
China has no values to export and that the external propaganda enterprise’s only 
mission is to serve its Realist policy. The U.S. by contrast, stresses Realism in its 
diplomacy, but still uses its external propaganda apparatus to sell its core values, 
such as democracy and human rights. China lacked this type “ideational 
diplomacy” (guannian waijiao 观念外交). The slogans China has promoted thus 
far, such as the “harmonious world” and the “scientific development outlook” 
have either been misunderstood or unpopular abroad. In the future, China’s 
external propaganda apparatus needed to be permitted to gain some independence 
from China’s policies and be permitted to propagate China’s values.302 
The CPC has, in fact, tried to occupy a more prominent spot in the overall 
image the world has of China. In July 2011, for the 90
th
 anniversary of the 
founding of the CPC, the New World Press published Why and How the CPC 
Works in China – A Loo  at What’s Behind the Achievements of the Communist 
Party of China, sponsored by the National Publication Foundation.
303
 In thirteen 
chapters, the book provides the CPC’s official answer to large and small questions 
ranging from “How did the CPC remain in power when the Eastern Bloc 
Communist Parties fell?” (Chapter 4) to “How could the CPC conduct the 
earthquake relief work effectively and host the Beijing Olympic Games 
successfully?” (Chapter 12). Although this did not always succeed,304 the authors 
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 See “Di san jie quanguo duiwai chuanbo lilun yantaohui zhengwen tongzhi” 第三届全国对外
传播理论研讨会征文通知 [Call for papers for the third National External Communications 
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302
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celüe” 未来 5-10年我国对外传播面临的挑战与创新策略 [Challenges faced by our external 
communication and innovation strategy for the next 5 to 10 years], Duiwai chuanbo, no. 9 
(2012): 36.  
303
 Xie Chuntao, ed., Why and How the CPC Works in China – A Loo  at What’s Behind the 
Achievements of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: New World Press, 2011).  
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 There are a few sentences such as “The aim of the CPC is to serve the people wholeheartedly” 
and “By employing Eastern wisdom, respecting reality and forging ahead with bold reforms, 
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of the texts clearly tried to adopt an easily understandable, semi-colloquial writing 
style suited to the tastes of English native speakers.
305
 In 2007, the CPC had first 
sent “Friendship Delegations” (Zhonggong youhao daibiaotuan 中共友好代表团) 
to socialist countries to explain the “spirit” of the 17th Party Congress. In 2012, for 
the 18
th
 Party Congress, by contrast, delegations organized by the IDCPC were 
also sent to non-socialist countries.
306
 Six different teams were dispatched, the 
first covering Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia, the second covering 
the European mainland, the third South Asia, the fourth to the United States, the 
fifth Africa, and the sixth Central and Eastern Europe.
307
  
 
Becoming Competitive in the War over Opinion? 
As China’s perceived influence in international affairs is increasing, the 
country is progressively portrayed in the U.S. as a rising superpower and the 
Unites States’ strongest competitor for global power. At the same time, China is 
also beginning to be held up as a potential reference model for the United States in 
a number of areas touching control over information flows, with varying success. 
In 2010, when U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman referred to China to defend his 
“Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act” (better known as the “Kill 
Switch Bill” in popular discourse) on CNN, he was met with ridicule and scorn 
for what was perceived as a very unfortunate choice of reference model.
308
 
However, particularly in the realm of external propaganda and the management of 
information flows in other areas, increasingly common attempts to paint China as 
                                                                                                                                                               
China expands the role of the market without ignoring the determining values of planning” 
(101),  
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 The book was proofread by Paul White, a British national who has been working in China as an 
English polisher since 1984 and received a friendship award from the Chinese government. See 
Long Weiwei, “Chapter 13: Living by the Pen for 24 Years,” Yang Yaohua, transl., in 
Dreaming Big in China, eds. Lu Yang et al., transl. Yang Yaohua (Beijing: New World Press, 
2009), available online at http://www.nwp.cn/book/567.shtml, accessed January 15, 2013.  
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 See “Zhonggong pai duo pi ‘shiba da jingshen jiedu tuan’ fu Fei shehui zhuyi guojia” 中共派
多批“十八大精神解读团”赴非社会主义国家  [CPC sends out several “Groups for the 
interpretation of the spirit of the 18th Party Congress” to African socialist countries], originally 
published in Nanfang dushi bao 南方都市报 [Southern metropolis daily], December 31, 2012, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-12-31/043925931032.shtml, accessed January 15, 2013. 
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 See “Zhonggong pai duo pi ‘shiba da jingshen jiedu tuan’ fu Fei shehui zhuyi guojia.” 
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 Lieberman’s words were “Right now, China, the government, can disconnect parts of its 
Internet in a case of war. We need to have that here, too.” For the video and some reactions, 
see for example “Lieberman Says U.S. Needs Chinese Style Internet Kill Switch” June 21, 
2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c74G9jhWOqk, accessed September 12, 2012.  
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a potential model in the media and when arguing against cuts in the U.S. budget 
for public diplomacy have been met with much less resistance.  
In 2009, in an article discussing the expansion of China’s foreign language 
media, Gordon Chang, a veteran critic of the PRC, casually asked: “Shouldn’t we 
be blocking Chinese state media in the U.S.?”309 Given that China jammed U.S. 
state media, such as the VOA or Radio Free Asia (RFA) and restricted private 
media companies such as CNN, the United States should retaliate in kind or 
demand reciprocity.
310
 China, Chang argued, “does not have a First Amendment 
right to disseminate propaganda in the United States.”311 While the article was 
neither widely distributed nor caused a large stir,
312
 since then, three U.S. 
Republican Congressmen have introduced the “Chinese Media Reciprocity Act of 
2011,” which demands parity in visas issued to journalists of state media.313 If 
enacted, China would have 30 days to pull out all but two of its approximately 
650 media staff currently in the U.S. on journalist visas.
314
 While it seems highly 
unlikely that the Act would pass, the fact that such media restrictions seek to 
replicate the Chinese model, which is otherwise decried as highly oppressive, 
demonstrates the country’s new status as primary competitor and therefore 
potential model in the eyes of many U.S. politicians.  
The U.S. has even responded to China’s Confucius Institutes by providing 
funding for the Creation of “American Cultural Centers” in a form of cooperation 
between U.S. colleges and Chinese universities. The first pilot project was started 
in 2010 and additional universities received start-up funds of $100,000 each in 
2011 and 2012.
315
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Chinese State Media Advantage in the U.S.,” September 13, 2011, 
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 See Elizabeth Redden, “U.S. Answer to Confucius Institutes,” November 2, 2012, 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/11/02/colleges-open-state-department-funded-
american-cultural-centers-china, accessed February 7, 2013. 
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Unsurprisingly, the U.S. Department of State has highlighted Chinese 
competition to the U.S. in the field of influence over global public opinion, 
sometimes during times when budget negotiations all but mandated the need to 
paint the image of a looming threat but also on a more regular basis. A report 
prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings commented on 
Chinese measures to spread its own message as much as on its attempts to block 
America’s voice in China.316 In 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton then 
declared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States 
currently found itself “in an information war” and was “losing that war” against 
Aljazeera, Russia Today, CCTV and other foreign or alternative media sources.
317
 
Clinton’s testimony was accompanied by statements in the media from the 
Director of the Center of Public Diplomacy at USC, Philip Seib, that “[u]nlike the 
United States, China takes these matters seriously and has designed an approach 
to public diplomacy that is well-funded, imaginative, and fully integrated within 
its overall foreign policy.”318 Seib warned that, 
 
“Congress should heed Secretary Clinton’s warning and not relegate U.S. public 
diplomacy to a nickel-and-dime sideshow. In budgeters’ worldview, public 
diplomacy might not be as sexy as weapons systems, but it is absolutely essential if 
the information war and the larger battle for influence are to be won.”
319
 
 
Concern about Chinese attempts to influence U.S. opinion is not entirely 
limited to times of budget negotiations, however. During a talk at the U.S. 
Institute of Peace, Tara Sonenshine, the current Under Secretary for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, also highlighted the competition against China, 
particularly stressing the paid supplements to the Washington Post and New York 
                                                          
316
 Cf. “Executive Summary,” in Another U.S. Deficit – China and America – Public Diplomacy in 
the Age of the Internet (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 4-6. Available 
online at http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/diplomacy/ChinaInternet.pdf, accessed 
November 1, 2012.  
317
 Cf. Joby Warrick, “Clinton: U.S. losing global public-relations battle - to ‘Baywatch’ and 
wrestling,” website of the Washington Post, March 3, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/02/AR2011030206898.html, 
accessed February 18, 2013. 
318
 Philip Seib, “Secretary Clinton and the Information War,” March 6, 2011, Huffington Post, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-seib/secretary-clinton-and-the_b_832008.html, accessed 
November 1, 2012.  
319
 Seib, “Secretary Clinton and the Information War.”  
444 
 
Times, the Confucius Institutes, and CCTV’s new Washington studio. 320 
Exacerbating the concern is the fact that China's external propaganda expansion 
comes at a time when the West perceives itself to be in crisis and most media 
organizations are still struggling to adapt to the challenges posed by the Internet. 
The 2008 financial crisis worsened both the actual problems and the sentiment of 
decline.  
In this atmosphere, concern over China’s “soft power” has grown further, 
although the first wave of alarmist studies is being countered by studies putting 
China’s soft power successes into perspective and arguing that the country is far 
from being able to “charm the world into submission.” One author has argued that 
the U.S. discourse on China’s soft power is much more about American soft 
power than it is about China’s.321 Joseph Nye who has weighed in on Chinese soft 
power on multiple occasions, changed his stance a number of times: In 2004, he 
paid hardly any attention to China, whereas a year later, by 2005, he sounded 
almost alarmist.
322
 When he commented on Chinese soft power between 2010 and 
2012, however, he was doubtful that China could develop proper soft power 
resources under its current political and media system.
323
 
The evaluation in China itself is by and large more critical, even in official 
speeches. Despite all the current successes, the official evaluation of the 
international public opinion environment is that the situation that the West is 
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strong and China is weak has “not yet fundamentally changed.”324 Academics 
continue to point out problems, from the technical, such as translation errors, to 
the more fundamental, such as that Westerners will not accept Chinese state media 
or that the CPC needs to include more private groups. In 2009, the Center for 
International Communication Studies convened a conference on “Building a 
system to assess the effects of external communication” (Duiwai chuanbo xiaoguo 
pinggu tixi jianshe 对外传播效果评估体系建设).325 Since then, researchers have 
tried to develop standards how to measure the effectiveness of waixuan.
326
 The 
results of such analyses thus far have made many Chinese observers pessimistic 
about the prospects of being able to enter Western mainstream society and have 
led to calls to change the overall strategy and goal,
327
 but also to further calls to 
change the Chinese media system and journalistic practices. Some observers even 
question the usefulness of the external propaganda enterprise per se, arguing that 
China would do better to concentrate fully on its interests and simply disregard 
international public opinion.
328
 Thus, while the CPC continues to embrace 
external propaganda work, many are skeptical. 
 
7.8 Conclusions  
In the early 21
st
 century, simultaneous developments in different areas 
coincided and resulted in the increased importance of external propaganda in the 
eyes of the CPC. The overall climate at the turn of the century in which China 
made long term plans and prepared for its rise set the stage. With the WTO 
ascension, a final affirmation that China could not shut itself off from the rest of 
the world, the CPC was compelled to think about how to deal with the 
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consequences of continued globalization. The U.S. debate after 9/11 provided 
rhetorical material for expanding the notion of power and framing external 
propaganda work both as a part of China’s comprehensive power and as a matter 
of national security. These points were added to and strengthened previous 
arguments about a new Cold War against China. With regard to the latter, external 
propaganda came to be seen as a proactive strategy in the “struggle over global 
opinion” that could shift the balance in the international public opinion 
environment in China’s favor and thus help contribute to China’s social stability. 
All of these considerations resulted in an upgrade of external propaganda work, 
which in turn set in motion a large number of new activities and reforms that have 
attracted widespread attention and led to China being portrayed as a formidable 
competitor in the field of external propaganda. The fact that the massive number 
of new initiatives was preceded by a rhetorical upgrade confirms that rhetorical 
changes can predict actual changes in policy and that therefore, it makes sense to 
analyze how a particular work sector is framed in the speeches of top politicians.   
With the upgrade, by demonstrating the political will to back external 
propaganda and explicitly addressing a number of long-standing problems at the 
same time, China potentially took an important step towards solving long-
standing problems of the external propaganda sector. The results of the upgrade 
were clearly visible and caught widespread attention, but opinions whether or not 
the new measures are effective are highly divided. If there were a clear division 
between U.S. voices, presenting China’s external propaganda as a powerful new 
menace, and Chinese voices, continuing to point out inadequacies, the 
disagreement might be dismissed as the outcome of different national agendas and 
alarmism on both sides. However, the picture is much more nuanced. In addition, 
despite the upgrade, the conflict between domestic and external propaganda has 
not been solved; on the contrary: Domestic propaganda was also elevated again 
amidst concerns over regime security in the “period of transition” and not only 
eclipsed external propaganda in importance, but was actually put in charge of the 
new EPWLSG. Thus, the question how and to what extent China has been able to 
deal with institutional problems remains as relevant as ever.  
The last two chapters of this dissertation are intended to provide some 
preliminary answers to this question and are broadly informed by the first two 
steps of the three step plan introduced in 2004. Chapter 8 will explain the 
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institutional set up of the external propaganda sector (step one: creating a big 
external propaganda pattern), and Chapter 9 will analyze the dilemma Chinese 
media face as they try to make a name for themselves abroad while at the same 
time continuing to function according to the rules of the Chinese media sector 
(step 2: creating first rate global media). While obviously I will be unable to 
provide a definite answer to the question whether China will have improved its 
external propaganda capacities significantly by 2020 (step 3), I will look at the 
institutional structures and practices within initiatives that the CPC has launched 
in order to cope with a situation in which it is constrained both internally by the 
rules of its own bureaucracy and externally by a high degree of suspicion and 
scrutiny from foreign governments.  
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8 “Big External Propaganda”: Scope and Coordination 
In December 2005, the Office of External Propaganda (OEP) convened a 
nationwide conference in which it discussed the first step of the three step plan 
from 2004: the creation of a “big external propaganda pattern” involving the 
entire country and providing coordination mechanisms to minimize conflicts and 
overlap. A common theme stressed in debates on the “superiority of the socialist 
system” in China is that socialist regimes have the ability to bundle different 
resources and coordinate the work of different bureaucracies and groups.
1
 
However, precisely this ability seems to have been missing in the external 
propaganda sector. At least one existing study suggests that the current set-up of 
the external propaganda apparatus is problematic, both for “forming a joint force” 
(xingcheng heli 形成合力) and for reforming individual units’ structure and work 
practices.
2
 The coordination between different bureaucratic organizations has 
likewise been an issue of discontent among Chinese commentators, who speak of 
“departmentalism” (benwei zhuyi 本位主义) within the overall bureaucracy. 3 
Before the establishment of the External Propaganda Work Leading Small Group 
(EPWLSG), lack of leadership and coordination was highlighted as a major flaw 
of Chinese external propaganda, particularly if compared to the supposedly much 
more centralized external propaganda structures of other countries such as the 
United States (U.S.).
4
  
As China has tried to further expand its external propaganda apparatus 
since 2004, who is involved and how the sector is organized to coordinate the 
increasing number of departments and local governments is an important question 
that has only been addressed superficially in existing literature on Chinese 
external propaganda. Some information is available in the secondary literature on 
the present institutional set-up of the external propaganda bureaucracy, especially 
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on the ministerial level body in charge of coordinating the work: the OEP, also 
known as the State Council Information Office (SCIO).
5
 However, the picture that 
emerges when piecing together information on the external propaganda 
bureaucracy from various accounts in existing secondary literature is 
contradictory.
6
 These contradictions are largely due to the fact that Chinese 
sources provide conflicting or incomplete information, owing to the secrecy of 
some of the bodies involved as well as the fact that a number of organizations can 
act under different names. While not all questions about the external propaganda 
sector can be settled, it is possible to paint a relatively clear picture of the current 
organizational structure as well as organizations and people involved. 
 As early as during the 1980s, external propaganda leaders stressed that 
their work “had to rely on the entire Party,”7 although at the time, China clearly 
did not have suitable mechanisms to put this ideal into practice. The slogan “big 
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Speech given on November 26, 1986 at the first nationwide external propaganda conference in 
Beijing, Website of the China Society for Human Rights Studies, 
http://www.humanrights.cn/cn/zt/tbbd/fyjd70n/03/t20070110_198142.htm, accessed October 
27, 2012.  
450 
 
external propaganda” was first proposed as a solution to this problem during the 
1990s. It surfaced as early as in 1992 in internal documents,
8
 and by 1996, 
“building a big external propaganda pattern” and “joining up forces” were already 
listed as two of external propaganda’s goals for the next five-year-period and 
discussed in public.
9
 The basic idea behind it at the time was how to harness 
different forces in society, most importantly the provinces, in order to integrate 
them into the larger project of improving China’s image, coordinated by the 
Center.
10
 After the EPWLSG came into existence in 2004, the “big external 
propaganda structure” made a comeback as the first goal that was to be realized 
within two to three years.  
The full slogan used since 2004 to refer to the ideal that China’s external 
propaganda sector should aim for is “all-dimensional, multi-tiered and wide-
ranging big external propaganda pattern” (quan fangwei, duo cengci, kuan lingyu 
da waixuan geju 全方位、多层次、宽领域大外宣格局). The slogan derives 
from “all-dimensional, multi-tiered and wide-ranging opening pattern” (quan 
fangwei, duo cengci, kuan lingyu de duiwai kaifang geju 全方位、多层次、宽领
域的对外开放格局).11 Again, the meaning of the slogan is flexible and set by 
different departments and locales according to their needs and policy aims. In the 
                                                          
8
 “Gao Changli tongzhi zai shengwei waixuan xiaozu huiyi shang de jianghua” 高昌礼同志在省
委外宣小组会议上的讲话 [Comrade Gao Changli’s speech at the meeting of the Provincial 
Party Committee’s External Propaganda Small Group], November 24, 1992, in Shandongsheng 
duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian 山东省对外宣传工作文件资料 汇编, eds. 
Shandong shengwei duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi 山东省委对外宣传办公室  [Office of 
External Propaganda of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee] and Shandongsheng 
renmin zhengfu xinwen bangongshi 山东人民政府新闻办公室 [Information Office of the 
People’s Government of Shandong Province] (Jinan: Shandong youyi chubanshe, 1999),  vol. 1, 
154-155. 
9
 Zeng Jianhui曾建徽, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei: Zeng Jianhui lun duiwai xuanchuan 融冰架桥,
突围:曾建徽论对外宣传 [Melting the ice, building bridges, breaking out of the encirclement: 
Zeng Jianhui on external propaganda] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2006), vol. 1, 
125. 
10
 During the second half of the 1990s, a number of articles addressed primarily what it meant at 
the local level. One article from 1999 indicates that during the 1990s, the slogan could also be 
interpreted to refer to a well-coordinated effort to involve the entire population in external 
propaganda work. Since the West was stronger than China (Xi qiang wo ruo 西强我弱) and it 
was impossible for China to outspend it on the propaganda front, the author argued at the time, 
it had to take advantage of its large population, and mobilize a “people’s war,” just like the 
CPC had done, according to Party historiography, before the founding of the PRC. Wang 
Jianquan, “Jianli da waixuan geju,” 23. 
11
 After the 15th Party Congress in 1997, Chinese analysts began discussing in public how to 
perfect (wanshan 完善 ) China’s “all-dimensional, multi-tiered and wide-ranging opening 
pattern.”  
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“big opening pattern,” all-dimensional (quan fangwei 全方位) can refer to the 
fact that China is open to different types of countries, not only to developed 
countries (although these are the primary focus given their advanced technology, 
rich experience, capital, and people), but also to developing countries, and the 
countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
12
 Multi-tiered (duo 
cengci 多层次) refers, among other things, to different degrees of openness in 
different parts of the country,
13
 while wide-ranging (kuan lingyu 宽领域) refers to 
the openness to several different markets and the number of different strategies 
used.
14
 Transferred to external propaganda, all-dimensional, among others, refers 
to the fact that China targets different countries and key regions.
15
 Likewise, it can 
mean that different units are involved, that different areas (politics, economy, 
culture, etc.) are covered,
16
 and that both official and different popular voices 
should participate. Multi-tiered in its general meaning most likely refers to the fact 
that media offered in different languages can be at different stages of development 
(with English usually as the most advanced), and that while everyone needs to be 
involved, different departments and locales will naturally be at different stages. 
Wide-ranging refers to using all kinds of different channels and means to reach 
the target audience and get China’s message across.17  
The “big external propaganda pattern” encompasses various measures that 
the Center has tried to implement for some time. Building a big external 
propaganda pattern (occasionally referred to as “building the big new external 
                                                          
12
 Cf. Ren Zhiyong 任志勇, “Quan fangwei, duo cengci, kuan lingyu de duiwai kaifang geju” 全方
位、多层次、宽领域的对外开放格局  [All-dimensional, multi-tiered, wide-ranging big 
external propaganda pattern], December 9, 2005, Changchun Radio & TV University/ 
Changchun guangbo dianshi daxue, 
http://open.ccrtvu.com/file_post/display/read.php?FileID=12317 , accessed June 12, 2012.  
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Cf. Tan Zhen 谭震 and Lei Xiangqing 雷向晴, “Quan fangwei, duo cengci, kuan lingyu -- 2005 
nian quanguo waixuan gongzuo huiyi da yinxiang” 全方位、多层次、宽领域——位、多层
年全国外宣工作会议大印象 [All-dimensional, multitiered and wide-ranging ovincial party 
committee propaganda department. 会 ternal propaganda], Duiwai da chuanbo, no. 8 (2005) 
[no page numbers]. 
16
 Cf. ibid. 
17
 Cf. “Liu Yunshan zai quanguo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang qiangdiao jiashen liaojie 
kuoda jiaoliu tuidong hezuo nuli yingzao lianghao de guoji yulun huanjing” 刘云山在全国对
外宣传工作会议上强调 加深了解 扩大交流 推动合作 努力营造良好的国际舆论环
境 [Liu Yunshan emphasizes at the nationwide conference for external propaganda work: 
Deepen our understanding, expand exchange, promote cooperation and make efforts to create a 
favorable international public opinion environment], Renmin ribao, July 21, 2005, 4. 
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propaganda pattern”) is primarily about getting more players involved while at the 
same time establishing mechanisms for coordination and cooperation between 
units, and consequently less competition. Big external propaganda pattern means 
three main things: 
First, provinces need to be tied into the system and are then, in turn, 
responsible for establishing proper institutional structures and coordinating 
external propaganda work at lower levels. The main responsibility of locales is to 
serve reform and opening by promoting themselves abroad and attracting 
investment and opportunities for cooperation and exchange. In addition, in the 
case of a sudden event, the Center needs to be able to rely on them in the struggle 
against hostile forces’ attempts to smear China.18 
Second, central departments and ministries need to develop an “external 
propaganda consciousness” (waixuan yishi 外宣意识), i.e. they need to realize 
that they represent China to the outside world and that their behavior can affect 
China’s standing. Each of them will have its unique responsibility and, through 
close cooperation, all departments will “form a joint force.”19 Overseas embassies 
are particularly important in this scheme because they are familiar with the 
circumstances in the countries that they are in and have access to the local 
population and the media. 
Third, the population has to be trained to develop an “external propaganda 
consciousness.” The Chinese people need to be trained to protect China’s image 
through their behavior.
20
 This was to be achieved through education campaigns 
teaching civilized behavior and through more patriotic education. The main target 
was to be young people so that from a young age, they had a strong national 
consciousness and would naturally try to protect China’s image.21 In addition to 
education campaigns creating “civilized” and “patriotic” Chinese, China had also 
begun to think about how to integrate more organized “popular” activities into its 
overall external propaganda program. 
                                                          
18
 Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju 中共中央宣传部干部局 [Cadre Bureau of the 
Central Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee], ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan 
sixiang gongzuo 新时期宣传思想工作 [Propaganda and thought work in the new period] 
(Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 2006), 200.  
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
453 
 
Establishing a “big external propaganda pattern” is also meant to allow 
China to organize multi-tiered external propaganda campaigns similar to how it 
sees the United States’ propaganda targeted at China. Chinese observers have long 
been in awe of what they consider the U.S. aptness to let “multiple players sing 
the same tune.”22 By this they mean that different players take on different roles, 
criticizing China with different degrees of intensity while pursuing the same goal 
of weakening the country: When attacking China, one author explained, the U.S. 
president criticized least, congressmen’s voices were a little louder, the press 
criticized even louder, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) criticized 
most fiercely.
23
 This creates an impression of plurality where there actually is 
none. More importantly, perhaps, it allows the executive to appear restrained and 
to claim helplessness in the face of opposition from the public and from Congress. 
As early as in 1979, when the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act 
briefly after the executive had established official relations with the PRC, China 
complained about what it saw as a duplicitous tactic. In the 1990s and in the 21
st
 
century, while the Communist Party of China (CPC) recognized the existence of 
different interests within U.S. society, similar arguments were made:  
 
“The U.S. Congress and the media always act in harmony, considering themselves to 
represent the will of the people and public opinion. They play the bad cop, 
threatening China with a big stick, thus allowing Clinton to play the good cop 
[seemingly] dedicated to engagement.”
24
 
 
By the early 21
st
 century, China decided it needed a similar arrangement if 
it wanted to succeed in the battle over international public opinion. According to 
an experienced (lao yi bei 老一辈) external propaganda worker, China should 
                                                          
22
 Liu Yaming 刘雅鸣 and Li Pei 李珮, “Quanqiu chuanbo shidai wo guo duiwai xuanchuan xin 
chulu (er) – Di yi shijian fachu shengyin waixuan bixu xian fa zhi ren” 全球传播时代我国对
外宣传新出路（二）——第一次发出声音外宣必须先发制人 [A new way out for China’s 
external propaganda in the era of global communication– Starting with the first sound external 
propaganda needs to gain the upper hand by releasing news first], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao
对外宣传参考 [External propaganda reference], no. 12 (2003): 18. 
23
 Ibid.  
24
 “Ruhe suzao 21 shiji Zhongguo de guoji xingxiang (shang) - Liu Kang yu Li Xiguang de duitan” 
如何塑造２１世纪中国的国际形象（上）——刘康与李希光的对谈  [How to create 
China’s image in the 21st century (part one) – A dialogue between Liu Kang and Li Xiguang]. 
Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 3 (2000): 14. Chinese quote: “美国的国会和媒体一向配合默
契，均以民意和社会舆论代表自居，所以扮演对中国挥舞大棒的黑脸角色，让克林顿去
唱昌接触的白脸。” 
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establish a multi-dimensional external propaganda structure (waixuan de liti 
jiegou 外宣的立体结构) like the United States. China’s external propaganda 
should be like a fleet in a battle, with a common strategy and a flagship, but with 
each battleship having its own tasks.
25
 Thus, the goal of the “big external 
propaganda” policy is also to be able to assign different roles to different players 
in concrete conflicts. 
This chapter introduces which organizations and groups are involved in 
China’s extended or “big” external propaganda work, how they coordinate their 
work, and to what extent popular initiatives have been integrated into the overall 
strategy and scope of measures. I will begin by introducing the tasks of the most 
important bureaucratic structure in the system: the OEP/SCIO and then proceed 
according to the three main measures encompassed in the big external propaganda 
pattern, first discussing the role and integration of the provinces, second, 
analyzing the horizontal coordination of external propaganda work among central 
departments and units, and finally examining the inclusion of different groups 
outside of the Party-state before summing up the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current arrangement in the conclusion.  
 
8.1 The External Propaganda Office/State Council Information 
Office 
The most important bureaucratic organization in the external propaganda 
sector is the OEP introduced above in chapter 6, a Party organization disguised as 
a government agency. The OEP continues to have ministerial rank. The director 
and the four deputy directors of OEP/SCIO are appointed through the central 
nomenklatura (cf. chapter 4.2). Bureau heads are not officially appointed by the 
Center, but need to be reported. At lower ranks, employees are recruited through 
competitive exams.
26
 In addition to regular employees, OEP/SCIO has also 
                                                          
25
 Liu Yaming and Li Pei, “Quanqiu chuanbo shidai woguo duiwai xuanchuan xin chulu (er),” 18.  
26
 Cf. “2012 nian guojia gongwuyuan zhaokao Zhongyang duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi zhiwei 
liebiao” 2012年国家公务员招考中央对外宣传办公室职位列表 [Listing of positions in the 
state civil service to be recruited for the Central Office of External Propaganda], 
http://v.htexam.com/htzwlib/a/36.html, accessed September 19, 2012. 
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formally had Advisory Groups of Experts (zixun zhuanjia zu 咨询专家组) since 
at least 2001.
27
 
Aside from Leading Small Groups (LSG) and the Central Propaganda 
Department (CPD), whose relationships with OEP/SCIO will be addressed below, 
the only other institution above the OEP is the Central Committee and its leading 
board, the Politburo.
28
 Not much is known about the interaction between OEP and 
the Party Center. Since 1990, the OEP has been an institution directly subordinate 
to the Central Committee. That means it can communicate directly with the 
Central Committee and send documents to its General Office (Zhonggong 
zhongyang bangongting 中共中央办公厅) for approval. Once approved, the 
OEP’s “Opinions” will be “passed on” (zhuanfa 转发) by the General Office. The 
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) also hears reports (tingqu huibao 听取汇
报) from OEP’s leadership and gives broad “instructions” (pishi 批示) on how 
external propaganda work should be done, leaving the OEP leadership to come up 
with concrete measures to translate the PBSC’s suggestions into practice.29 Like 
other organizations, OEP/SCIO produces annual work reports. Again, top cadres 
will leave written instructions (pishi) on such reports that indicate the overall 
direction.
30
   
OEP has a website under its nameplate State Council Information Office 
with the address www.scio.gov.cn, where it provides information about its 
institutional set up, its main activities, as well as resources, such as full texts of 
the government white papers that it has published. Notably, however, the web site 
is only available in Chinese and does not function as a propaganda platform, but 
as a place to publicize its own activities and provide resources for those interested 
in external propaganda work. 
                                                          
27
 Cf. “Li Xiguang Biography,” 
https://apps.cndls.georgetown.edu/projects/uschina/items/show/512, accessed February 7, 2013.  
28
 The State Council presumably has no direct authority over OEP/SCIO, as it is administratively 
clearly a part of the Party bureaucracy, not the State.  
29
 Cf. Zeng, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei, vol. 1, 120. 
30
 The pishi left on the 2005 work report was “围绕大局和重要题材, 准确发布信息, 正面引导舆 
论; 树立良好形象, 积极扩大影响。” Cited in Wang Hongjiang 王宏江 and Guo Qing 郭晴, 
“Zhongda guoji saishi zhengfu yulun yindao moshi chuangxin yanjiu – Yi Beijing Aoyunhui 
wei li” 重大国际赛事政府舆论引导模式创新研究——以北京奥运会为例 [Research on 
innovation of the mode of the government guiding public opinion on major international 
(sports) competitions - the Beijing Olympic Games as an example], Chengdu tiyu xueyuan 
xuebao 成都体育学院学报  [Journal of Chengdu Institute of Physical Education] 35, no. 12 
(2009): 4.  
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Besides a secretariat in charge of coordinating policy between the central 
and local levels, as well as a personnel department that manages and organizes 
training for cadres at OEP as well as for outsiders, the OEP had seven bureaus (ju 
局 ) for several years, expanded to nine in 2010. Each bureau is, in turn, 
subdivided into different departments (chu 处),31 which are, however, not listed 
on the SCIO website and are only occasionally mentioned in news reports.
32
 An 
outline of the bureaus and what they do already covers a large part of the OEP’s 
current responsibilities: 
The First Bureau could be called the (domestic) news bureau. It is in 
charge of press conferences regarding domestic news, regulates how important 
domestic events are reported abroad, writes White Papers and further develops 
and promotes Chinese media outlets’ reporting targeted at foreigners.33 The First 
Bureau also organizes briefings for Chinese media, often in cooperation with 
other departments, to direct their coverage of specific topics.
34
 News reports 
further show that it has also helped to organize conferences for state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) intending to expand abroad (zou chuqu 走出去).35  
                                                          
31
 Such as propaganda departments xuanchuanchu, press departments xinwenchu, etc.  
32
 Therefore, the exact number of departments at each bureau is unclear.  
33 “Jigou shezhi” 机 构 设 置  [Institutional set-up], Website of OEP/SCIO, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/, accessed September 7, 2012. For restriction to domestic news, 
also see Du Shengcong 杜圣聪, Liang an zhenxiang mima: Zhongong dui Tai xuanchuan de 
zhengce, zuowei yu tujing 两岸真相密码：中共对台宣传的政策，作为与途径 作为与途径 
[Password to the truth between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait: Policies, practices and 
approaches of CPC propaganda targeted at Taiwan] (Taibei: Xiuwei zixun keji gufen youxian 
gongsi , 2008), 105.  
34
 E.g. “‘2012 nian Zhongguo Tu’erqi yisilan wenhua zhan yan’ huodong meiti chuifenghui zai 
Jing zhaokai” 2012中国·土耳其伊斯兰文化展演”活动媒体吹风会在京召开 [“2012 China-
Turkey Islamic Cultural Expo and Performances” media briefing held in Beijing], August 22, 
2012, http://www.chinaislam.net.cn/cms/zjjy/yjdt/wenhuajiaoliu/2012zhongguo-
tuerqiyisilanwenhuazhanyan/201208/30-2965.html, accessed September 7, 2012.  
35 Cf. “‘Zou chuqu’ guoyou qiye waixuan gongzuo zuotanhui zai Zhongguo Youse Kuangye Jituan 
juxing” “走出去”国有企业外宣工作座谈会在中国有色矿业集团举行 [External propaganda 
work conference for state-owned enterprises ‘going out’ held at China Nonferrous Metal 
Mining Group], May 5, 2010, http://www.metalchina.com/members/news.php?id=431255, 
accessed August 23, 2010. For a different event also see “Zhongyang waixuanban yi ju he 
Guoziwei xuanchuanju lianhe juban qiye pinpai yu weiji chuanbo gaoji yantaoban” 中央外宣
办一局和国资委宣传局联合举办企业品牌与危机传播高级研讨班 [First Bureau of OEP 
and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission jointly organize the 
advanced seminar on corporate brands and crisis communication], website of the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, September 22, 2009. 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n259730/n264168/6654480.html, accessed August 23, 
2010.  
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The Second Bureau is in charge of OEP/SCIO’s “international public 
relations” (guoji gonggong guanxi 国际公共关系), which mainly means that it is 
responsible for exchange and cooperation with foreign media and other 
institutions. It organizes conferences centred on the topic of media co-operation 
(for instance with Latin American or African countries) and also meets with 
foreign media CEO, though OEP’s head, Wang Chen 王晨, will usually also be 
present personally when meeting important “press dignitaries.” 36  It organizes 
media forums, such as the Sino-French Media Forum,
37
 the China-Arab States 
Press Cooperation Forum,
38
 the Sino-Korean Media Dialogue,
39
 etc. The Second 
Bureau is also involved in seminars for foreign government officials, journalists 
and other media personnel that China has been offering and that will be addressed 
again in more detail in Chapter 9.4.
40
  
                                                          
36 
Jiang Weiqiang江伟强, head of the Office, was also present when Wang Chen met with Rupert 
Murdoch Cf. “Wang Chen huijian Meiguo xinwen jituan zongcai Moduoke” 王晨会见美国新
闻集团总裁默多克 [Wang Chen meets with Murdoch, president of a U.S. news conglomerate], 
People’s Daily Online, October 11, 2009, 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/10173125.html, accessed August 23, 2010. More 
recently, Wang Chen and the director and deputy director of the second bureau met with a 
representative of Thompson-Reuter (“Wang Chen zhuren huijian Tangsen Lutou jituan 
Zhongguo quzhuxi Shijinde xiansheng yi xing” 王晨主任会见汤森路透集团中国区主席史进
德先生一行 [Wang Chen meets the chairman of the China section of Thomson-Reuters Group, 
David Schlesinger], website of OEP/SCIO, May 4, 2012, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/zygy/wangchen/hd/201205/t1153723.htm, accessed September 
20, 2012) and Time-Warner. (Cf. “Wang Chen huijian Shidai Huana gongsi quanqiu gonggong 
zhengce zhixing fuzongcai Meikerui” 王晨会见时代华纳公司全球公共政策执行副总裁梅
可睿  [Wang Chen meets with executive vice president of Time Warner, Carol Melton], 
website of OEP/SCIO, September 19, 2012, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/zygy/wangchen/hd/201209/t1220683.htm, accessed September 
20, 2012).  
37
 “Guoxinban erju juzhang Jiang Weiqiang zhuchi luntan kaimushi” 国新办二局局长江伟强主
持论坛开幕式 [Head of the Second Bureau of the State Council Information Office presides 
over the opening ceremony of the forum], Website of OEP/SCIO, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/dtzt/70/8/201202/t1100799.htm , accessed September 7, 2012.  
38
 See for example “Guoxinban juxing di san jie Zhong A xinwen hezuo luntan huanying 
zhaodaihui” 国新办举行第三届中阿新闻合作论坛欢迎招待会 [State Council Information 
Office holds reception for the third forum for press cooperation between China and the Arab 
countries], Website of OEP/SCIO, April 24, 2012, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/dtzt/73/5/201204/t1148837.htm, accessed September 20, 2012.  
39
 The website for the Dialogue is http://www.scio.gov.cn/zt2009/zhlt/index.htm, accessed 
September 20, 2012.  
40
 Cf. “Di jiu qi Feizhou guojia xinwen guanyuan he jizhe yanxiuban zai Jing kaiban” 第九期非洲
国家新闻官员和记者研修班在京开班 第九期非洲国家新闻官员和记者研修班在京开班 
[Ninth African countries press officials and reporters seminar starts in Beijing], July 18, 2012, 
Website of OEP/SCIO, http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/dtzt/82/4/201207/t1190188.htm, accessed 
September 20, 2012. Seminars for foreigners to learn from China are of course not limited to 
the media.  
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The Third Bureau is responsible for waixuan 外宣 books, films, TV 
programs, and comprehensive exchange activities.
41
 It is thus in charge of 
initiatives that need to be prepared ahead of time instead of those where 
OEP/SCIO has to react swiftly. It is the main organizer of exchange activities 
such as “Experience China” (Ganzhi Zhongguo 感知中国)42 and various China-
themed “cultural years”43 and “cultural weeks”44 in different countries. Moreover, 
it is actively involved in the “Going Out Project” of the Chinese book industry 
(Zhongguo tushu zou chuqu gongcheng 中国图书走出去工程 ) launched in 
2002.
45
 In early 2006, OEP and the General Administration of Press and 
Publication (GAPP) formed a Small Group for the “Plan to Promote Chinese 
Books Abroad,” which includes cadres from the Third Bureau.46 Presumably, the 
Third Bureau also cooperates with or drafts instructions for the Foreign Language 
Office (FLO), which publishes magazines such as the Beijing Review and China 
Today and is led by OEP/SCIO.  
`The Fourth Bureau functions as OEP/SCIO’s “research bureau.” It does 
the research underlying policies, plans, and concrete means how to introduce 
China abroad and also analyzes global public opinion. As it mainly works in the 
second row, it has a very low visibility on the Internet compared to most of the 
                                                          
41
 Zonghe 综合 , i.e. overall or comprehensive, is an established category in the Chinese 
bureaucracy and is the opposite of specialized (zhuanye 专业). Media are also categorized 
according to this criterion. In this context, it means that the activities are not limited to a 
specific field or are clearly the responsibility of a specialized department, such as the Ministry 
of Commerce or the Ministry of Culture. 
42
 E.g. in Mexico in July and August 2007, in Israel in September and October 2009, and in Japan 
in June and July 2012, etc. 
43
 Such as the Cultural Year of China in Italy that started October 2010. 2006 was the Cultural 
Year of Italy in China. “Yidali Zhongguo wenhuanian kaimu, liang guo wenhua jialiu xie xin 
pian zhang” 意大利中国文化年开幕 两国文化交流谱写新篇章 [Year of China in Italy opens, 
writes a new chapter in the two countries' cultural exchanges], Website of OEP/SCIO, October 
21, 2010, http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/wh/13/4/201010/t786470.htm, accessed September 20, 
2012. 
44
 Such as the week of Tibetan Culture (which actually lasted ten days) in Madrid 2010, organized 
jointly with the government of Tibet Autonomous Region and the Chinese embassy to Spain. 
Cf. “2010 Zhongguo Xizang wenhuazhou” 2010·中国西藏文化周 [Cultural week of China’s 
Tibet], Website of OEP/SCIO November 14, 2010, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/wh/14/6/201011/t803908.htm, accessed September 20, 2012. 
45 Cf. Zhang He 张贺, “Rang shijie yuedu Zhongguo - zhanwang Zhongguo tushu ‘zou chuqu’” 
让世界阅读中国——展望中国图书“走出去” [Let the world read China – prospects for 
China’s books “going out”], Renmin ribao, May 20, 2006, 5. 
46
 Cf. “Guoxinban sanju fujuzhang Wu Wei zuo 2009 niandu gongzuo baodao” 国新办三局副局
长吴伟做 2009 年度工作报告 [The deputy head of the third bureau of the State Council 
Information Office delivers work report for 2009], Website of OEP/SCIO, March 25, 2010, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/dtzt/22/6/201003/t585724.htm, accessed September 20, 2012.  
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other offices, but its task to understand foreign public opinion about China has 
continually grown in importance in recent years. 
The Fifth Bureau makes plans for Internet development, and pushes 
forward the development of news websites, including but not limited to those 
originally set up to target foreigners. It also organizes training classes for Chinese 
Internet administrators,
47
 and its Cadres participate in Internet-related 
international seminars or roundtables, such as the training classes for African 
government spokespeople and journalists or the Internet Roundtable for 
Developing Countries (Xinxing guojia hulianwang yuanzhuo huiyi 新兴国家互联
网圆桌会议) in 2012.48 Despite the fact that it is located within OEP/SCIO, the 
Fifth Bureau’s primary concern is domestic.  
The Sixth Bureau guides the work of local Information Offices
49
 and is 
responsible for providing services to reporters from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Macao visiting the mainland. It also meets with media representatives from the 
regions
50
 and gets involved when Chinese media cooperate with media from Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, or Macao.
51
  
                                                          
47
 E.g. “Wuju zhidao de wangluo bianji peixunban zai Renda Xinwen xueyuan kaiban”五局指导
的网络编辑培训班在人大新闻学院开班 [Training class for internet editors guided by the 
Fifth Bureau takes place at the Journalism School of People’s University], Website of 
OEP/SCIO, August 24, 2006, http://www.scio.gov.cn/gzdt/ldhd/gnhd/200608/t99687.htm, 
accessed September 21, 2012. 
48
 “Wang Chen huijian canjia Xinxing guojia hulianwang yuanzhuo huiyi” 王晨会见参加新兴国
家互联网圆桌会议的各代表团长  [Wang Chen meets participants of roundtable on the 
internet in emerging countries], Website of OEP/SCIO, September 18, 2012, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/201209/t1219483.htm, accessed September 21, 2012.  
49
 However, representatives from other offices also participate in conferences or other events at the 
local level. 
50
 E.g. “Wang Zhongwei fuzhuren huijian Jingbao zhixing shezhang Yu Xinying” 王仲伟副主任
会见《镜报》执行社长徐新英 [Deputy director Wang Zhongwei meets executive president 
of the Jingbao Xu Xinying], Website of OEP/SCIO, July 27, 2012, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/201207/t1195063.htm, accessed September 21, 2012. 
Depending on the importance, either on their own or accompanying the director or one of the 
deputy directors of OEP/SCIO.  
51
 See for example “‘Wuzhou’ yu Xianggang TVB hezuo 7nian 10 shenshi jiemu shixian duoguo 
luodi” '五洲'与香港 TVB 合作 7 年 10 省市节目实现多国落地 [Wuzhou and Hong Kong 
TVB have cooperated for seven years; programs from ten provinces and municipalities have 
‘landed’ in multiple countries], Website of OEP/SCIO, September 18, 2012, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zhzc/3/2/201209/t1219429.htm, accessed September 21, 2012. 
Previously, representatives of the Sixth Office have at times also been present when the 
director met with Japanese media people. However, this looks like a temporary phenomenon 
under Cai Wu. (E.g. “Guowuyuan xinwenban zhuren Cai Wu zai Beijing huijian Riben JC 
keren” 国务院新闻办主任蔡武在北京会见日本 JC客人 [Cai Wu, director of the SCIO, met 
with guests from Japan JC guests in Beijing], website of OEP/SCIO, July 26, 2007, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/nd/2007/200905/t309804.htm, accessed September 21, 2012.) 
460 
 
The Seventh Bureau is dedicated to researching and promoting China’s 
human rights activities, and has more recently also been entrusted with managing 
and regulating the presentation of Tibet to foreigners.
52
 Through the Seventh 
Bureau, OEP/SCIO is also involved in human rights dialogues with foreign 
countries.
53
 The volume Organizational History of the CPC indicates, however, 
that the Seventh Office exists mainly to give a platform to the Research Council 
for Human Rights (cf. chapter 6.2) as well as to the Foundation for Developing 
Human Rights.
54
 It is probably correct to assume that there is a significant degree 
of overlap between these organizations and the Seventh Bureau and that therefore, 
if not the same, they are at least very closely linked. The most likely scenario is 
that various organizations related to human rights issues and Tibet affairs have an 
office stationed within the Seventh Bureau. With the emphasis on ideological 
security, developing and defending a Chinese concept of human rights has gained 
further importance and thus, external propaganda work focused on human rights 
and Tibet has also experienced an upgrade. For instance, in early 2012, the former 
head of the Tibet Party Committee’s Propaganda Department became one of the 
deputy heads of OEP/SCIO.
55
  
A reform, probably from late 2009,
56
 created two additional bureaus: the 
Eighth Bureau, responsible for managing and approving the work of foreign 
                                                          
52
 “Jigou shezhi.” The exact time when this change took place is unclear, but it must have been 
some time between the early and mid-2000s. 
53
 See for instance this report about a human rights dialogue with the German Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation in Chengde: “Cui Yuying fuzhuren chuxi di shi jie Zhong De renquan yantaohui 
bing zhi ci” 崔玉英副主任出席第十届中德人权研讨会并致辞 [Deputy director Cui Yuying 
attends the Tenth Sino-German Symposium on Human Rights and delivers speech], Website of 
OEP/SCIO, September 19, 2012. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/201209/t1219741.htm, 
accessed September 19, 2012.  
54
 Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang 
zuzhishi ziliao, vol. 7, 243. Zuzhishi ziliao explicitly excludes the Seventh Office when listing 
OEP’s fixed number of employees (bianzhi 编制).  
55
 Cf. “Cui Yuying” 崔 玉 英  [Cui Yuying], website of OEP/SCIO, January 4, 2012, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/zygy/cyy/jl/201201/t1076179.htm, accessed October 20, 2012.  
56 
The news of the restructuring of OFP/SCIO was released on April 20, 2010 through Taiwanese 
and Hong Kong media. Of the two new offices, the 9
th
 Office is clearly more explosive and 
controversial, both in China and abroad, and has attracted at least a moderate amount of 
attention on Chinese language online media of various origins, including, of course, U.S. 
external propaganda initiatives targeted at China (For instance, Radio Free Asia reported about 
it on its Chinese language website (Cf. “Guoxinban chengli jiu ju” 国新办成立九局 [The State 
Council Information Office establishes a Ninth Bureau], Website of Radio Free Asia, April 19, 
2012, http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/Xinwen/3-04192010121035.html, accessed September 3, 
2010). 
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media stationed in China,
57
 and the Ninth Bureau, specifically created for 
managing social online networks (shejiaoxing wangzhan 社交性网站) and Web 
2.0 applications, i.e. websites with large amounts of user-generated content, such 
as micro-blogs, blogs, BBS, social networks, etc. Thus oversight of the Internet 
was divided between the 5
th
 Office, which continues to be in charge of managing 
news websites, and the newly created 9
th
 Office.  
In 2011, media reported that management of the Internet (i.e. the tasks of 
the Fifth and the Ninth Bureau) had been taken out of OEP/SCIO and made the 
responsibility of the newly created State Internet Information Office (SIIO).
58
 The 
rearrangements did bring some changes in personnel, but the self-introduction of 
the office published on the SCIO website confirms that the State Internet 
Information Office is simply another nameplate for OEP/SCIO for when it acts in 
its capacity to regulate the Internet.
59
 Through its nameplate SIIO, OEP/SCIO is 
now responsible for the legal framework for the Internet, for guiding and 
coordinating other departments’ management of Internet content, for day-to-day 
administration of the online news sector, for guiding the work of other 
departments in regulating anything pertaining to and expanding the cultural 
industry on the Internet, for the construction of key news websites, for organizing 
and coordinating online propaganda work, for dealing with illegal websites in 
accordance with the law, for guiding the registration of websites and distribution 
of IP addresses, and for guiding the work of local Internet-related departments 
within its areas of responsibility.
60
  
                                                          
57
 Most likely the outcome of the new arrangements tested in the run-up to the Olympics.  
58 Cf. Michael Wines, “China creates new agency for patrolling the internet,” New York Times 
online. May 4, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/world/asia/05china.html?_r=1, 
accessed May 7, 2011.  
59
 Cf. “Ben ban jiben qingkuang” 本办基本情况 [Basic information about this Office], Website of 
OEP/SCIO, http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/xwbjs/200905/t306817.htm, accessed September 20, 
2012. The nameplate arrangement was also already stressed when the establishment of the 
office was first reported on the SCIO website. Cf. “2011年 5月 4日国家互联网信息办公室
挂牌成立，我国互联网信息服务和管理工作进入了一个新的阶段。” “Wang Chen: jiji 
zhudong xiang shijie shuoming Zhongguo”王晨：积极主动向世界说明中国 [Wang Chen: 
Positively and proactively explain China to the world], Website of OEP/SCIO, January 18, 
2012, http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/zygy/wangchen/jh/201201/t1085178.htm, accessed 
September 7, 2012. The Office is headed by Wang Chen, with Qian Xiaoqian acting as deputy 
director. “China sets up State Internet Information Office,” Website of China Daily, May 4, 
2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-05/04/content_12440782.htm, accessed 
August 9, 2012.  
60
 “Ben ban jiben qingkuang.”  
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In addition, OEP/SCIO has a number of adjunct units that are not listed in 
the official institutional structure on its website, but whose affiliation with OEP is 
not denied. For instance, one affiliated unit of OEP is the “Cadre Training Center 
of the Information Office of the State Council” (Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 
ganbu peixun zhongxin 国务院新闻办公室干部培训中心), which organizes 
training classes in China and abroad for external propaganda cadres,
61
 and is also 
actively involved in offering seminars to journalists and politicians in non-
Western countries.
62
  
The most important unit under the leadership of OEP/SCIO is the Foreign 
Languages Publication and Distribution Office (Zhongguo waiwen chuban faxing 
shiye ju 中国外文出版发行事业局, short, Waiwenju 外文局 FLO), a unit with 
vice-ministerial rank also known as the China International Publishing Group (中
国国际出版集团, CIPG), its “commercial face.”63 FLO/CIGP has a Department 
                                                          
61
 See for example a report on the first delegation sent abroad organized by OEP/SCIO in 2003. 
They were sent to England to see how the government controls the news. Cf. Miao Jianping 缪
建萍, “Dui Yingguo xinwen guanli he meiti xinwen jiazhiguan de sikao – Canjia fu Yingguo 
xinwen ji meiti yewu peixun yougan” 对英国新闻管理和媒体新闻价值观的思考——参加
赴英国新闻及媒体业务培训有感 [Reflection of British news management and media news 
values - impressions about participating in the British press and media business training], 
Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 4 (2004): 42.  
62
 See for example “Lamei guojia xinwen guanyuan he jizhe yanxiuban zai Jing kaiban” 拉美国家
新闻官员和记者研修班在京开班[Seminar for government officials and journalists from 
Latin American countries takes place in Beijing], Website of OEP/SCIO May 15, 2012, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/201205/t1157554.htm, accessed September 21, 2012. 
63
 The eventful history of the FLPO is well-documented. The first predecessor organization of the 
FLPO is considered to be the International News Bureau of the General Press Administration 
(GPrA) established in October 1949. In July 1952, the International News Bureau was 
officially turned into the Foreign Language Press (FLP) under the General Publication 
Administration (GPuA), and, in December 1954, when the GPuA was incorporated into the 
Ministry of Culture (MoC), the FLP was put under the authority of the MoC Publication 
Administration. In May 1963, it was re-established as a unit directly under the State Council 
(zhishu danwei) and named Waiwen chuban shiye faxing guanli ju 外文出版事业发行管理局 
(in official documents usually abbreviated as Waiwenju) [Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi 
ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, A1, 161]. In August 
1967, the “Foreign Language Office External Propaganda Newspaper Pool” (Waiwenju duiwai 
xuanchuan zhizhang zongku 外文局对外宣传纸张总库) was founded as a subordinate branch 
of the FLPO (ibid, A1, 558). In June 1968, the Foreign Language Office was put under military 
control (junshi guanzhi 军事管制). Between April 1970 and January 1972, when it was 
transferred to the International Liaison Department, FLPO was hosted (dai guan代管) by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ibid, A1, 558). According to an internal report, this reduced its 
effectiveness. In 1974, the ILD improved some of its difficulties, for instance by making sure 
that the FLO could hold regular briefing sessions with cadres from Xinhua. In 1979, the FLPO 
fought again for its status as an organ directly under the State Council (so it could receive a 
broader range of internal documents) and for being recognized as a news propaganda unit 
(xinwen xuanchuan danwei 新闻宣传单位) as this would facilitate its cooperation with many 
other units. In February 1982, as part of the administrative restructuring, the FLPO was merged 
463 
 
for International Cooperation (Guoji hezuo bu 国际合作部) and an extremely 
large number of subordinate units (jushu danwei 局属单位), including the three 
main foreign language journals Beijing Review, China Today, and Peoples China, 
these journals’ regional branches, and the Foreign Language Press. Moreover, the 
FLO also manages the Translators Association,
64
 which publishes lists of suitable 
translations for specific expressions on a regular basis.
65
 Finally, in 2004, the 
FLO’s Center for International Communication Studies (Duiwai chuanbo yanjiu 
zhongxin 对外传播研究中心) was founded, which publishes several journals and 
book series, analyzes public opinion about China abroad, conducts audience 
surveys to assess the effectiveness of external propaganda, and organizes annual 
conferences on topics related to external propaganda. It also subsumes the 
operational structure of the Translators Association of China.
66
 Since 2010, it has 
convened the National Seminar on the Theories of International Communication 
(Quanguo duiwai chuanbo lilun yantaohui 全国对外传播理论研讨会),67 which 
takes place every other year and invites cadres from the central departments and 
ministries, selected provincial external propaganda offices, and researchers from 
universities and think tanks, including academics from abroad.
68
 
                                                                                                                                                               
with several other organs into the new Ministry of Culture and became a unit led by MoC. In 
June 1982, the Translators Association was formed, hosted (daiwei guanli 代位管理) by FLPO. 
In December 1991, FLPO was taken out of the MoC and became an independent institution 
under the State Council managed (guikou guanli 归口管理) by the EPSG (ibid, A1, 558). 
64
 “Zhongguo fanyi xiehui jianjie”中国翻译协会简介  [Brief introduction to the Translators 
Association of China], Website of the Translators Association of China, http://www.tac-
online.org.cn/ch/tran/2009-09/27/content_3160548.htm. accessed August 22, 2012.  
65
 One of the Translators Association’s branches (fenzhi jigou 分支机构) is the Committee on 
Translation in International Communication (Duiwai chuanbo fanyi weiyuanhui 对外传播翻译
委员会 ), founded in 1991, with a secretary’s office as its permanent working body. Its 
members are comprised of people from the MFA, MoC, MOFCOM, IDCPC, the State Council 
Legislative Affairs Office, Xinhua, the Foreign Languages Office, the Translation and 
Compilation Bureau, the China Daily, CRI, and other “important experts from foreign affairs 
and foreign propaganda units.” “Fenzhi jigou jianjie” 分支机构简介  [Introduction to the 
branch offices], Translators Association of China, http://www.tac-online.org.cn/ch/tran/2009-
09/27/content_3160397.htm, accessed October 26, 2012. Below the Committee are two small 
groups: one for Chinese-English and one for Chinese-French translations. 
66
 “Zhongguo waiwenju duiwai chuanbo yanjiu zhongxin jianjie” 中国外文局对外传播研究中心
简介  [Brief Introduction to FLPO’s Center for International Communication Studies], 
http://www.soic.china.cn/2009-06/29/content_2989629.htm, accessed January 18, 2013.  
67
 See the seminars’s website: “Quanguo duiwai chuanbo lilun yanjiu yantaohui” 全国对外传播理
论 研 究 研 讨 会 [National Seminar on the theories of international communication], 
http://www.soic.china.cn/index.htm, accessed January 18, 2013. 
68
 Wang Mei 王眉, “Shijie xin geju xia de Zhongguo guoji chuanbo” 世界新格局下的中国国际
传播——全国第二届对外传播理论研讨会综述 [China’s international communication under 
new patterns of the world - summary of the Second National Symposium on external 
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In sum, OEP/SCIO and its subordinate units are responsible for much of 
the media-based external propaganda, for helping the government and the Party 
interact with the outside world, and have also been put in charge to coordinate a 
great deal of the cultural exchange activities.  
 
8.2 Vertical Coordination: OEP/SCIO and the Provinces 
When the External Propaganda Small Group (EPSG) was resurrected in 
1990, one idea behind it was that China needed an organization that could 
function as a link between the Center and the many organizations involved in 
external propaganda (cheng shang qi xia de jigou 承上启下的机构 ). 69  The 
interaction between OEP/SCIO and the Center has been briefly addressed above. 
This section will look at the involvement of provinces in China’s overall external 
propaganda project as well as at channels and mechanism of communication 
between OEP/SCIO and its local equivalents.  
Before the beginning of the reform and opening policies, locales rarely 
came in contact with foreigners, and when they did, they strictly followed 
instructions from the Center.
70
 When external propaganda structures began to be 
established at the provincial level in the early 1980s, this happened at a time when 
China was in the midst of reorganizing its bureaucratic structure from vertical 
command chains (yi tiao wei zhu 以条为主) towards horizontal command chains 
(yi kuai wei zhu 以块为主). During the 1980s, the EPSG had virtually no control 
over provincial external propaganda small groups or bureaus because of its 
uncertain status among the central departments. In the 1990s, this problem was 
remedied by giving the central external propaganda structure an office and a rank 
in the bureaucracy. However, it is important to point out that OEP/SCIO was not 
authorized to lead local or departmental external propaganda small groups or 
                                                                                                                                                               
communication], Duiwai chuanbo, no. 12 (2011): 26. For instance, in 2011, Zheng Yongnian, 
director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore participated and 
gave a speech on China's lack of ideational power. Cf. ibid, 27. 
69
 E.g. “Wang Wei zai Fujian tan pingbaohou de duiwai xuanchuan” 王微在福建谈平暴后的对外
宣传 [In Fujian, Wang Wei speaks about external propaganda after having quelled the riots], 
Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 1 (1990): 7.  
70
 Cf. “Zhang Wentian tongzhi guanyu jiaqiang duiwai xuanchuan de juti lingdao de yijian” 张闻
天同志关于加强对外宣传的具体领导意见  [Comrade Zhang Wentian’s Opinion about 
reinforcing the concrete leadership over external propaganda], April 9, 1958, MFA Archive, no. 
102-00074-02(1).  
465 
 
offices. In 1997, Zeng Jianhui 曾建徽 explicitly pointed out that OEP/SCIO did 
not have a direct leading relationship (chuizhi lingdao guanxi 垂直领导关系) 
with local external propaganda structures. These were led by party committees at 
the respective levels, and OEP/SCIO only professionally guided them (yewu 
zhidao 业务指导).71 Use of the word zhidao 指导 –to guide– on the current SCIO 
website when describing the relationship between the Central OEP and its local 
counterparts indicates that this is still the case.
72
 Thus, until today, it only 
professionally guides its local equivalents at the provincial level, which are 
instead led by the provincial party committees that they belong to.  
Giving a relatively high degree of independence to local external 
propaganda structures makes sense because conditions on the ground vary greatly, 
and locales know best what they need and want to propagate abroad in order to 
attract tourists or investment. Locales are also more familiar with existing 
connections with foreigners or particular resources they could put to use or seek to 
reinforce to attract tourism or foreign investment. The obvious downside is that 
this makes it more difficult for the Center to enforce policies against the will of 
locales.  
That said, policies can be enforced by going through the Central 
Committee, particularly if the Center itself attaches importance to an issue: After 
the elevation of external propaganda to the level of national security and social 
stability, the Center finally succeeded in establishing relatively reliable external 
propaganda structures in all provinces and below by defining external propaganda 
as one of the “core works” (zhongxin gongzuo 中心工作) of governments at all 
levels.
73
 Pressure from the Party Center, which has probably tied the fulfillment of 
external propaganda tasks to promotion and demotion of provincial leaders in 
some way, now ensures a relatively high degree of compliance with regard to 
basic structures. Thus, even if a particular province feels that external propaganda 
                                                          
71
 Cf. Zeng Jianhui, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei, vol. 2, 45.  
72
 The handbook Propaganda and Thought Work in the New Period, published in 2006, also 
explains that OEP only “guides and coordinates” (zhidao xietiao 指导协调) the external 
propaganda work of the central departments and the locales. Cf. Zhongxuanbu ganbuju, ed., 
Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, 2006, 198.  
73
 Cf. Shi Anbin 史安斌 , “Weilai 5-10 nian woguo duiwai chuanbo mianlin de tiaozhan yu 
chuangxin celue” 未来 5-10 年我国对外传播面临的挑战与创新策略 [Challenges faced by 
our external communication and innovation strategy for the next 5 to 10 years], Duiwai 
chuanbo, no. 9 (2012): 36. 
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is a waste of its money, it is highly unlikely that it will be able to opt out of the 
most basic policies. 
 
 Like OEP/SCIO, local external propaganda offices also present themselves 
under the name “Information Office” to the rest of the world,74 although in reports 
in Chinese on external propaganda at or below the provincial level, the “internal” 
name waixuanban 外宣办 is used much more often than at the central level.75 The 
internal set-up of provincial external propaganda offices does not precisely mirror 
the center.
76
 By and large, provincial external propaganda institutions have 
considerable overlaps, but exact local arrangements may differ, either because of 
different needs of the respective provincial party committee or because of the 
historical evolution of a particular local bureaucracy. The functions that all of 
them cover are introducing the locale outside its jurisdiction, press releases, and 
being able to host journalists from outside their jurisdiction.  
In 2004, Zhao Qizheng 赵启正 stressed that there was no single standard 
with which to assess each province’s external propaganda work because some had 
been engaged in external propaganda longer than others and each had its own 
                                                          
74
 Cf. Zeng Jianhui, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei, vol. 1, 45.  
75
 Presumably because foreigners pay less attention to local structures and language policies are 
less rigorously enforced. 
76For instance, according to its website, Shanghai’s external propaganda office has a Secretariat 
(Mishu chu 秘书处 ), an External Propaganda Department, which also acts as Liaison 
Department for Journalists (Duiwai xuanchuan chu 对外宣传处 [Jizhe lianluo chu 记者联络
处]), a Press Department (Xinwen fabu chu 新闻发布处), a Department for Developing the 
Sector (Shiye fazhan chu 事业发展处 ), a Research Office (Yanjiushi 研究室 ), and a 
Department for Online News Management (Wangluo xinwen guanli chu 网络新闻管理处). 
See “Neishe jigou he fuzeren” 内设机构及负责人[Internal set-up and people in charge], 
http://www.shio.gov.cn/shxwb/bbjs/nsjg/index.html, accessed September 21, 2012. 
Heilongjiang has already divided the Departments according to News Office (Xinwenban) and 
Internet Office (Wangluoban). The first has a Secretariat, an External News Department 
(Duiwai xinwen chu 对外新闻处), a Press Department, and an External Liaison Department 
(Duiwai lianluo chu 对外联络处). The latter has a Department for Managing the Internet 
(Wangguan chu 网管处), a Comments Department (Pinglun chu 评论处), and a Public 
Opinion Department (Yuqing chu 舆情处). Cf. “Sheng zhengfu xinwenban neishe jigou” 省政
府新闻办内设机构  [Internal institutions of the information office of the provincial 
government], http://www.hljio.gov.cn/web/zyzz.shtml, accessed September 21, 2012. Jilin’s 
External Propaganda Office has four Departments: The Comprehensive Propaganda 
Department (Zonghe xuanchuan chu 综合宣传处), the Department for Developing the Sector, 
the External Liaison Department, and the Press Department. Cf. “Neishe jigou”内设机构 
[Internal set-up], http://www.jlio.gov.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=57, 
accessed September 21, 2012. 
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resources and strengths.
77
 Provinces tend to be grouped into “coastal and 
developed” (yanhai jingji jiao fazhan sheng 沿海经济较发展省), “border regions” 
(bianjiang sheng 边疆省 ) and “inland provinces” (neilu sheng 内陆省 ). 78 
Different things are expected of them, first because their location and 
development level affects what role they can play in the overall scheme and 
second, because some provinces have had much more experience with external 
propaganda than others. This is one of the many meanings of the formulation 
“multi-leveled” (duo cengci 多层次): Different provinces will be at different 
stages of development of their external propaganda apparatus. As long as the basic 
requirements are fulfilled and provinces continue to improve their work, that is 
completely acceptable. It would be unfair to expect the same level of 
professionalism of Hebei 河北 as of provinces like Guangdong 广东 or Shandong 
山东, which have been engaged in external propaganda work at a relatively high 
level for several decades (cf. chapters 3 and 5).  
Many provincial and municipal governments have put up websites in 
English. As briefly mentioned above, the term xuanchuan is still often translated 
as propaganda on sub-central government websites (cf. chapter 6.4).
79
 This means 
that with the inclusion of locales, the Center potentially faces problems how to 
control the quality of material produced.   
Some of the more advanced provinces have their own media targeting 
overseas Chinese and foreigners. China’s border provinces have been in charge of 
organizing material for neighboring countries since the 1990s, when the country 
sought to improve its regional security through mending relations (cf. chapter 6). 
Shanghai is clearly the most advanced in term of media catering to international 
                                                          
77
 Cf. “Guowuyuan xinwenban zhuren Zhao Qizheng tan difang waixuan gongzuo” 国务院新闻办
主任赵启正谈地方外宣工作 [SCIO Director Zhao talks about local external propaganda 
work], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 3 (2004): 1. 
78
 Zhou Zongmin, 周宗敏, “Bufu zhongtuo, buru shiming, nuli yingzao lianghao guoji yulun 
huanjing - Quanguo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi zai Jing zhaokai” 不负重托，不辱使命， 
努力营造良好国际舆论环境——全国对外宣传工作会议在京召开  [Accept the great 
responsibilities, fulfill the mission, work hard to create a favorable international public opinion 
environment], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 1 (2004): 10-11.  
79
 See for example, “Emphasis on scientific outlook on development and advanced cultural 
industry,” Website of the People’s Government of Shaanxi Province, November 13, 2008, 
http://english.shaanxi.gov.cn/articleAboutgov/chinadoc/chinathree/governmentthree/200811/19
86_1.html, accessed February 1, 2013; “Qingdao propaganda department calls for the publicity 
of the spirit of 18th CPC National Congress,” website of the government of the city of Qingdao, 
November 21, 2012, http://english.qingdao.gov.cn/n2043295/n2048687/275206.html, accessed 
February 1, 2013.  
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audiences. It had English language content before CCTV started incorporating 
programs in English.
80
 In 2008, the Shanghai Media Group launched its 
International Channel Shanghai (ICS) with programs in English and Japanese.
81
  
Since 2011, Guangdong has had its own international channel, GDTV World, 
which “aims to become a world-class media with authority, public credibility and 
influence.” 82  The channel offers programs and news in both English and 
Chinese.
83
 Yunnan 云南 received permission to launch an international channel in 
December 2011 and plans to broadcast both in Chinese and English.
84
 However, 
until now, only a small minority of provinces have entered the field of providing 
media content in foreign languages.  
The number of provinces offering Chinese content targeted at overseas 
Chinese is larger, with coastal provinces again ahead of most others. Jiangsu’s 江
苏  international channel was launched in October 2004, 85  and Fujian’s 福建 
internationa channel Strait Satellite TV (Haixia weishi 海峡卫视) was started in 
January 2005.
86
 Shandong 山 东  has also had an international channel 
broadcasting in Chinese called Taishan TV (Taishan dianshitai 泰山电视台) 
since August 2005. Sichuan’s 四川 international channel started broadcasting in 
                                                          
80
 Cf. Guo Ke 郭可 , Dangdai duiwai chuanbo 当代对外传播  [Contemporary external 
communication] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2003), 49.  
81
 “About us,” http://www.icshanghai.com/en/ad/ics/2012-04-01/92.html, accessed January 16, 
2013.  
82
 “Guangdong TV America,” http://www.wcetvdigital.com/Ch31_4/Intro_1e.asp, accessed 
January 16, 2013.  
83
 The article reporting on the launching of the channel states that English programs make up the 
majority and Chinese programs only supplement them (Yingyu wei zhu, Hanyu wei fu 英语为
主，汉语为辅). “Guangdong dianshitai guoji pindao kaibo” 广东电视台国际频道开播 
[Launching of Guangdong Television International channel], May 16, 2011, 
http://nc.gdtv.cn/2011/0516/7484.shtml, accessed January 16, 2013. However, while the 
channel clearly has English programs, such as English news and a program called Facetime 
interviewing foreigners living in China, Chinese programs appear to make up the majority. Cf. 
Michael Michelini, “Trip to Guangzhou, TV Interview on GDTV Facetime,” March 16, 2012, 
http://blog.michaelmichelini.com/2012/03/guangzhou-facetime-interview.html, accessed 
January 16, 2013; “Consul General Guangzhou Interview by Face Time, GDTV World 
Channel,” May 8, 2012, http://guangzhou.nlconsulate.org/news/2012/05/consul-general-
guangzhou-interview-by-face-time-gdtv-world-channel.html, accessed January 16, 2013.  
84“Guangdian zongju pifu tongyi Yunnan guangbo dianshitai kaiban guoji pindao” 广电总局批复
同意云南广播电视台开办国际频道  [SARFT approves the launching of an international 
channel by Yunnan Radio and Television station], 
http://www.ynbtv.gov.cn/%E7%BB%BC%E5%90%88%E4%BF%A1%E6%81%AF/readinfo.
aspx?B1=5365, accessed January 17, 2013. 
85
 “Pindao jieshao” 频道介绍 [Introduction of the channel], http://www.jstv.com/n/gj/aboutus/, 
accessed January 17, 2013. 
86
 “Haixia weishi” 海峡卫视  [Strait Satellite TV], http://baike.baidu.com/view/853626.htm, 
accessed January 17, 2013. 
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February 2010.
87
 All of these provincial channels first need to be approved by the 
State Administration for Radio Film and Television (SARFT)
88
 and are usually 
under the leadership of the respective provincial propaganda department and the 
respective provincial Administration for Radio, Film and Television, but are part 
of and operated by larger media conglomerates.
89
  
 
In the mid-1990s, local external propaganda documents still explained that 
“central external propaganda has the responsibility to engage in the struggle over 
public opinion in line with China’s overall diplomacy, whereas local external 
propaganda mainly brings into play any advantages (youshi 优势) the locale might 
have in external propaganda in order to create a favorable external environment 
for local economic construction and societal development.”90 Since then, locales 
have been increasingly asked to develop an “awareness of the overall situation” 
(daju yishi大局意识) and to try to create a good name for China as a country 
rather than only trying to increase their own Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
91
 
This is so, first, because the Center wants to create a more diverse picture of 
China abroad, and in order to do that, it needs to rely on the provinces to 
contribute their share. Second, as explained above, provinces and locales at lower 
levels have become more important because of the renewed importance of sudden 
                                                          
87“Sichuan guangbo dianshitai guoji pindao zhengshi kaibo” 四川广播电视台国际频道正式开播 
[Official launch of the Sichuan TV and radio station international channel]. March 1, 2010, 
http://www.wccdaily.com.cn/epaper/hxdsb/html/2010-03/01/content_158330.htm, accessed 
January 17, 2013.  
88
 The SARFT is a ministerial level body under dual leadership of the State Council and the 
Central Propaganda Department and is in charge of administering and regulating the entire 
country’s broadcasting industry. Cf. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda 
and Thought Wor  in the People’s Republic of China (Lanham, MD: Rownman & Littlefield, 
2008), 17.  
89
 E.g. “Shandong dianshitai guoji pindao (Taishan dianshitai) jianjie” 山东电视台国际频道（泰
山电视台）简介 [Brief introduction of the international channel of the Shandong TV station 
(Taishan TV)], http://www.iqilu.com/html/haiwai/news/2012/0418/1194863.shtml, accessed 
January 16, 2013. 
90
 “Dong Fengji tongzhi zai shengwei duiwai xuanchuan lianxihui di si ci huiyi shang de jiang hua” 
董凤基同志在省委对外宣传联席会第四次会议上讲话 [Comrade Dong Fengji’s speech at 
the fourth meeting of the Joint Council for external propaganda of the provincial party 
committee], March 12, 1997, in Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao 
huibian 山东省对外宣传工作文件资料汇编, vol. 1, 108.  
91
 E.g. “Rang shijie liaojie Zhongguo rang Zhongguo liaojie shijie, quanguo duiwai xuanchuan 
gongzuo huiyi zai Jing juxing” 让世界了解中国 让中国了解世界 全国对外宣传工作会议
在京举行 李鹏致信会议 丁关根同与会者座谈 [Let the world understand China; let China 
understand the world. Nationwide conference for external propaganda work takes p;ace in 
Beijing; Li Peng sends a letter and Ding Guan’gen holds discussions with participants], 
Renmin ribao, February 21, 1998, 2.  
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events reporting and the Center itself is relatively helpless in this regard without 
the support of locales. 
Local and sectoral external propaganda offices need to fulfill two 
requirements, which potentially can cause conflict: First, they need to be in line 
with and support central policies (or other policies designed at a higher level in 
the case of sub-provincial waixuan), and second, they have to conduct activities in 
accordance with and serving local/sectoral needs
92
 and are obviously more likely 
to be guided by their own interest when deciding how to implement policies 
prescribed by the Center. The latter appears to be quite aware of the principal-
agent conflict it faces in the realm of external propaganda. In the past, it 
frequently urged locales to increase their external propaganda budgets, but also 
knew that locales felt reluctant to invest in their own publicity, as there was no 
immediate financial reward for them.
93
 Articles and documents on external 
propaganda therefore often stress that the results of external propaganda are long 
term and not immediately visible, in the hope that this will persuade locales not to 
give up if they cannot see immediate results.
94
 However, it seems unlikely that in 
the absence of changes in the actual incentive structure, these appeals will have 
much effect. 
An additional problem, particularly before the Center made external 
propaganda a high priority, was the fact that external propaganda expenses are 
paid out of local coffers. External propaganda expenses need to be included in the 
budget at the same administrative level at which it is organized.
95
 This makes 
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 Spelled out explicitly for instance in Tuo Jun 庹军 and Ma Qing 马清, “Dui gouzhu difang da 
waixuan xin geju de ji dian sikao” 对构筑地方打外宣新格局的基点思考 [A few thoughts on 
establishing a new big external propaganda pattern at the local level], Duiwai xuanchuan 
cankao no. 9 (2003): 25. 
93
 See for example Wang Wurong 王武荣, “Shuli xin guannian kaizhan quan fangwei duiwai 
xuanchuan” 树立新观念 开展全方位对外宣传 [Establish a new concept and engage in all-
dimensional external propaganda], Duiwai da chuanbo, no. 3 (1996): 38. 
94
 For instance, Huang Zecun writes: “在国外，西方大国大都以很大的投入，加大自己在海外
的音量，进而控制世界的舆论。这种投入的回报周期是渐进的，长期的，不可能立竿见
影，这是受新闻舆论规律决定的。” Huang Zecun 黄泽存, Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan 
lungao 新时期对外宣传论稿 [Preliminary discussions of external propaganda in the new 
period] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002), 265.  
95
 “要继续增加对外宣传事业的投入。各地应将外宣事业经费和基础建设投资列入地方财政
预算和基建投资计划，并随着经济的发展，使外宣事业经费逐年有所增加，以保证外宣
工作正常开展。” and “继续加大对外宣传事业发展的财力支持。市地、县（市、区）外
宣事业经费要列入同级财政预算，并根据形势发展的需要逐步有所递增。” Taken from 
“Shengwei bangongting, Shengzhengfu bangongting zhuanfa shengwei duiwai xuanchuan 
bangongshi, shengzhengfu xinwen bangongshi ‘Guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang xin xingshi xia 
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sense: If the local party committees and governments are the only ones that can 
issue binding orders to local external propaganda structures, it is unlikely that 
these activities would be funded by the Center.  
One example from Shandong shows that locales did plan how to make 
external propaganda pay for itself and thus make the sector less dependent on 
local budgets that were usually already strained to begin with. For instance, 
Shandong considered (and presumably implemented) hard numeric requirements 
which materials people sent abroad on an official function (gongpai chuguo 公派
出国 ) were required to buy and distribute abroad. Likewise, hotels housing 
foreigners were asked to increase the cost of their rooms so that they could put 
aside extra funds for external propaganda material.
96
  
The problem with external propaganda is how to measure “success” or 
simply fulfillment of requirements. The existing infrastructure of domestic 
propaganda work, on the one hand, makes it possible to set up structures quickly 
and, on the other hand, very difficult to ensure that these are not just superficial 
measures involved in ineffective activities that borrow too much from the 
domestic propaganda apparatus's way of operating. The Center has the possibility 
to request certain measures to be adopted, but it has few options to measure 
success qualitatively. Instead, it receives success reports from lower levels that 
measures have been successfully implemented. There has been a clear quantitative 
bias in the overall Chinese bureaucracy because numerical targets and quotas can 
be measured and are therefore used excessively to evaluate cadres’ success or 
failure and consequently decide on promotion or demotion.
97
 Obviously, sheer 
numbers of publications or activities, although used by locales in their reports to 
the center, are not a reliable indicator for successful external propaganda. They do 
                                                                                                                                                               
duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo de yijian’ de tongzhi,” Lubanfa 鲁办发  [1994] no. 7, in 
Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian (1992-1998) 山东省对外
宣传工作文件资料汇编 (1992-1998) [Document collection on Shandong Province’s external 
propaganda work (1992-1998)], eds. Shandong shengwei duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi 山东
省委对外宣传办公室  [Office of External Propaganda of the Shandong Provincial Party 
Committee] and Shandongsheng renmin zhengfu xinwen bangongshi山东人民政府新闻办公
室 [Information Office of the People’s Government of Shandong Province], 17.  
96
 “Shengwei duiwai xuanchuan lianxihui di san ci huiyi jiyao” 省委对外宣传联席会第三次会议
纪要, October 11, 1995, in Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian 
(1992-1998), vol. 1, 87. 
97
 Cf. Kevin J. O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” 
Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1999): 172-173.  
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not say anything about the quality or about how foreigners received particular 
products. Thus, as in all other sectors, locales are incentivized to stress quantity 
over quality in external propaganda work even when quality is clearly more 
important. The problem of how to reliably measure the success of propaganda 
does not only affect China and is vividly debated in the literature on the popular 
concept of “soft power.”98  For a country such as China, whose bias towards 
numeric targets is particularly strong and which only started very recently to 
combat this problem, this is a particularly tough challenge. 
 
Channels for Coordination 
Despite the fact that it cannot issue binding orders, OEP/SCIO works 
closely with its provincial and (less importantly) its departmental equivalents. 
Liaison work with external propaganda bureaus of lower ranks both within central 
departments and within provincial party committees is done by OEP’s Secretariat 
(Mishuju 秘书局).99 In addition, there are a number of other channels that are 
used:  
First, there are print publications to exchange experience and keep locales 
and individual departments up to date on the latest long-term developments and 
possible ways how to go about implementing policy. The most important is 
External Propaganda Newsletter (Duiwai xuanchuan tongxun 对外宣传通讯), 
the organ or mouthpiece (jiguan kanwu 机关刊物 ) of the Central Office of 
External Propaganda.
100
 OEP/SCIO also publishes the internal journal Cases of 
External Propaganda Work (Waixuan gongzuo anli 外宣工作案例 ), whose 
purpose is to circulate the work experience of individual units, locales or 
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 Although many people believe it is ultimately impossible to measure how propaganda initiatives 
translate into real “soft power.” 
99
 “Jigou shezhi.”  
100
 The journal is mentioned in Han Licheng 韩立成, “Shenru xuexi shiwu da jingshen buduan 
tigao waixuan gongzuo shuiping” 深入学习十五大精神 不断提高外宣工作水平 [Study the 
spirit of the 15th Party Congress in-depth in order to continuously raise the level of external 
propaganda work], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao no. 12 (1997): 3. Notes put online by sub-central 
party committees show that the journal continues to be published. E.g. 
http://www.hfweb.cn/Search.asp?Field=Keywords&Keyword=%BB%A5%C1%AA%CD%F8 
(accessed December 17, 2011) mentions an article placed in issue 4, 2011 of Duiwai 
xuanchuan tongxun. Often, locales release lists of articles they managed to place in central (or, 
in case of sub-provincial committees, provincial) level journals. 
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particular projects nationwide.
101
 Since the 1980s, provinces have also published 
their own journals on external propaganda in which directives or slogans from the 
Center are reprinted.
102
 
Second, there are regular meetings to “exchange experience” (jiaoliu 
jingyan 交流经验), discuss work and give the provinces direction and guidance 
for the focus of the work to be done in the next year.
103
 While before 1994, 
external propaganda conferences at the national level only occurred at irregular 
intervals, they have since become an established practice with one conference 
taking place usually at the beginning of each year.
104
 These are attended by cadres 
from external propaganda offices at the ministerial and provincial level who then, 
in turn, brief their own subordinates through conferences at the provincial level.
105
 
For the conference, OEP/SCIO usually prepares an “Opinion” outlining the tasks 
for the coming year that is then “discussed.”106 The sessions are also used to study 
important policy documents and speeches and deliver reports on local and sectoral 
work.
107
 In addition to the annual nationwide conference, OEP/SCIO organizes a 
number of conferences or seminars for external propaganda cadres (waixuan 
                                                          
101
 Cf. “Shanghai ribao wangzhan zou xiang shijie de shijian yu qishi” 上海日报网站走向世界的
实践与启示 [Practice and implications of the website of the Shanghai Daily going towards the 
world], Website of the Shanghai Newspapers Association. September 28, 2009, 
http://www.shsby.com/shbyxh/node7/userobject1ai222.html, accessed January 31, 2013.  
102
 For instance, in 1986, Hunan province launched its own External Propaganda Newsletter 
(Duiwai xuanchuan tongxun 对外宣传通讯), later renamed Hunan External Propaganda 
(Hunan waixuan 湖南外宣). See Hunansheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 湖南省地方志
编纂委员会编 [Local chronicle compilation committee of Hunan province], ed., Hunan Sheng 
Zhi: Minsu zhi 湖南省志: 民俗志 [Hunan provincial chronicles: Folk customs] (Beijing: 
Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2005), 309. 
103
 Whenever a new five-year-plan (now called guideline) starts, these conferences usually give an 
outlook on the plans for this longer period. 
104
 There have been some exceptions to this rule. For instance, in 2005, the first conference took 
place in July, with a second conference planning the work for 2006 in December.  
105
 See Shandong shengwei duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi 山东省委对外宣传办公室 [Office of 
External Propaganda of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee] and Shandongsheng 
renmin zhengfu xinwen bangongshi 山东人民政府新闻办公室 [Information Office of the 
People’s Government of Shandong Province],  eds., Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan 
gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian (1992-1998) 山东省人民政府新闻办公室, eds. 山东省对外
宣传工作文件资料汇编 (1992-1998) [Document collection on Shandong Province’s external 
propaganda work (1992-1998)] 2 vols. (Jinan: Shandong youyi chubanshe, 1999). 
106
 See for example Benkan jizhe 本刊记者, “Quanguo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi zai Jing 
juxing” 全国对外宣传工作会议在京举行 [Nationwide conference on external propaganda 
takes place in Beijing], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 3 (2000): 30-31. 
107
 For instance, in 2000, cadres from the MFA and the TAO did special reports, and Xinhua, the 
Guangming ribao, the China Daily, CRI, the offices of external propaganda from Beijing, 
Shanghai, Shandong and Yunnan as well as China’s embassy in France introduced some of 
their external propaganda work. Cf. Benkan jizhe, “Quanguo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi 
zai Jing juxing,” 30-31. 
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ganbu huiyi 外宣干部会议).108 Moreover, it holds more specific conferences, 
such as the National Conference on the Coordination of External Propaganda 
Work of Municipalities (Quanguo chengshi waixuan gongzuo xiezuo huiyi 全国
城市外宣工作协作会议),109  regional conferences,110  conferences on external 
propaganda theory, etc. These conferences do not necessarily have to take place 
on Chinese soil; for example in 1995, OEP/SCIO convened a conference in New 
York City to discuss its external propaganda plans for North America.
111
 Finally, 
just like the PBSC or the Politburo does for OEP/SCIO, cadres from OEP/SCIO 
also take work reports from (tingqu huibao 听取汇报) and inspect (kaocha 考
察)112 individual provincial external propaganda offices. In these cases, they will 
usually give some instructions, guidance, or assurances.  
Because of the relationship between different units that usually does not 
allow for direct orders, departments and units make contracts and agreements for 
cooperation with one another. This is often done by the Central external 
propaganda media or units directly, both for concrete projects and for overall 
cooperation frameworks (kuangjia 框架).113 The idea itself is not new: In the 
1990s, China Radio International (CRI) had a Chinese-language program called 
“Window on China” (Zhongguo zhi chuang 中国之窗 ), to which the radio 
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 Cf. “Guowuyuan xinwenban zhuren Zhao Qizheng tan difang waixuan gongzuo, ” 1.  
109“Quanguo chengshi waixuan hui re yi Jinzhou shiboyuan” 全国城市外宣会热议锦州世博园 
[Nationwide external propaganda conference for municipalities heatedly debates Jinzhou’s 
World Expo Garden], September 5, 2012, 
http://www.ln.gov.cn/zfxx/qsgd/yks_1/zh/201209/t20120905_942341.html, accessed 
September 7, 2012.  
110
 Such as external propaganda conferences for all provinces of the Northeast, etc.  
111
 Cf. Zeng Jianhui, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei, vol. 1, 107. 
112
 See for example “Wang Chen kaocha Chongqing waixuan gongzuo”王晨考察重庆外宣工作 
[Wang Chen inspects Chongqing's external propaganda work], Website of Chongqing morning 
news, December 7, 2011, http://www.cqcb.com/cbnews/cqnews/2011-12-07/483472.html, 
accessed February 28, 2013; “Zhongyang waixuanban zhuren Wang Chen diaoyan Xizang 
waixuan gongzuo” 中央外宣办主任王晨调研西藏外宣工作 [Director of OEP Wang Chen 
inspects Tibet’s external propaganda work], Website of OEP/SCIO, July 27, 2012, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/tt/tp/201207/t1195095.htm, accessed March 1, 2013. 
113
 “Zhongguo ribao she yu Zhonggong Hainan shengwei xuanchuanbu qianshu guoji chuanbo 
zhanlue hezuo kuangjia xieyi” 中国日报社与中共海南省委宣传部签署国际传播战略合作
框架协议  [China Daily signs strategic cooperation framework agreement on international 
communication with CPC Hainan Provincial Committee Propaganda Department], China 
Daily Online, October 25, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/2012-
10/25/content_15847279.htm, accessed January 12, 2013. 
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stations of different provinces contributed content.
114
 While such agreements have 
been ongoing since the 1990s, they have been accelerated since 2008 and 2009, 
when the Party Center pledged its resolve to increase China’s “international 
communication abilities” (guoji chuanbo nengli 国际传播能力), which will be 
discussed in Chapter 9. The China Daily recently signed multiple cooperation 
agreements with provincial propaganda departments or external propaganda 
offices.
115
 The Foreign Languages Office
116
 and Zhongxinshe 中新社117 have also 
signed cooperation agreements with locales. Contracts and partnership agreements 
also play a role in horizontal coordination between units and departments of lower 
rank at the central level. In October 2012, the FLO signed a strategic partnership 
and framework agreement with Qinghua University for research on external 
communication.
118
 
 This section has analyzed the channels of command and communication 
between OEP/SCIO and the Central Committee of the CPC as well as its local 
equivalents. While the Central Committee can obviously exercise relatively tight 
control over OEP/SCIO, the same cannot be said for OEP/SCIO’s relationship 
with external propaganda offices at the provincial level, as OEP/SCIO cannot 
issue binding orders to them. There are a number of mechanisms to coordinate 
                                                          
114
 Cf. Hu Jiangyin 胡江银, “Yanshen xiezuo wangluo banhao waixuan zhuanti” 延伸协作网络 
办好外宣专题 [Extend the network for cooperation to successfully do external propaganda on 
specific topics], Shengbing shijie声屏世界 [Parallel English title: Voice and Screen World] no. 
5, 1999, 10. Jiangxi contributed programs since the very beginning in May 1995 (ibid). The 
program was launched in 1995 (Cf. “Zhongguo zhi chuang jushou Lanzhou gongmou waixuan 
pinpai fazhan (shipin)”《中国之窗》聚首兰州 共谋外宣品牌发展(视频) [Window on China 
meets in Lanzhou to make plans for creating an external propaganda brand (video)], August 28, 
2012, http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2012/08/28/5951s3827413.htm, accessed October 7, 2012). 
115
 See for example “Zhongguo ribao she yu Zhonggong Hainan shengwei xuanchuanbu qianshu 
guoji chuanbo zhanlue hezuo kuangjia xieyi.”  This particular agreement included plans for a 
monthly Hainan edition of China Daily  (《中国日报·海南月刊》).  
116
 E.g. “Wo ju yu Zhongguo zuojia chuban jituan dashu zhanlue hezuo xieyi” 我局与中国作家出
版集团签署战略合作协议 [Our department signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the 
China Writers Publishing Group], May 22, 2012, 
http://www.cipg.org.cn/ywdt/gzxw/tpxw/201205/t20120522_42952.html, accessed January 12, 
2013.  
117
 See “Yunnan shengwei waixuanban yu Zhongguo xinwenshe dashu zhanlue hezuo xieyi” 云南
省委外宣办与中国新闻社签署战略合作协议 [Yunnan Provincial Party propaganda office 
signs a strategic cooperation agreement with the China News Agency], China Daily Online, 
November 27, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/yn/bwzg/2012-
11/27/content_15963762.htm, accessed January 12, 2013.  
118
 Tan Zhen 谭震, “Zhongguo waiwenju yu Qinghua daxue jiecheng ‘Duiwai chuanbo yanjiu 
zhanlue hezuo huoban’ guanxi” 中国外文局与清华大学结成“对外传播研究战略合作伙伴”
关系  [FLPO forms “external communication research strategic partner relationship” with 
Qinghua University], Duiwai chuanbo, no. 11 (2012): 34.  
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work between the Center and locales as well as departments, but also some 
financial conflicts of interest which are difficult for OEP/SCIO to resolve on its 
own. Thus, the external propaganda sector is prone to be affected by the principal-
agent conflict. The problem of units of equal rank having to cooperate with one 
another across different vertical and horizontal lines of division is now solved 
through the signing of contracts and framework agreements.
119
 
   
8.3 Horizontal Coordination: The EPWLSG and Division of Work   
From the Mao period, and in some cases dating back even further, China’s 
external propaganda apparatus has inherited a field of work that is located in 
between propaganda work and foreign affairs work and in which a large number 
of different departments are responsible for different areas of work: There are 
distinctions between news targeted at ethnic Chinese and news aimed at other 
foreigners, between international and domestic news, and between anything 
considered press and print work as opposed to radio and television, to list only a 
few examples. Thus, because of what is known in China as “management by 
gateway and division of work according to specialized sector” (guikou guanli, 
fengong fuze 归口管理，分工负责), even at the same administrative level, there 
is a large number of other units that external propaganda offices at all levels need 
to cooperate with on equal terms.  
 While the idea that different departments are responsible for different 
aspects of external propaganda work is in line with the “big external propaganda 
pattern,” there are problems that the current reform wave is supposed to address: 
First, these units need to coordinate their work, second, they need to be able to 
resolve conflicts of interest, and third, units whose primary concern is not external 
propaganda need to ensure they pay enough attention to external propaganda work. 
Since 2004, China has been handling this problem of cooperation between 
different units of largely equal rank the way it usually does: through a (leading) 
small group. Below, I will briefly illustrate the problems of the sector that needed 
to be solved and in many cases still continue to exist. 
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 As the overwhelming number of agreements has only been made recently, whether or not this is 
an effective way to coordinate work remains to be seen. 
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Division of Work 
First, the division of work is relatively complex and, like during the Mao 
period, involves a very large number of units. One example from Shandong 
during the 1990s illustrates how work is, ideally, divided in their province: The 
provincial External Propaganda Office/Information Office is responsible for 
“comprehensive” (zonghexing fangmian 综合性方面)120 external propaganda and 
anything related to news work (xinwen fangmian 新闻方面).121 This includes the 
organization of news conferences, except the ones regarding diplomacy and 
international events, which are organized by the provincial Foreign Affairs Office 
(FAO). The FAO is in charge of any external propaganda regarding foreign 
affairs, including anything about foreign affairs and propaganda targeted at 
foreign experts and exchange students based in Shandong. Developing, building 
and propagating the most important tourist destinations/scenic spots (canguandian 
参观点) is also up to the FAO in cooperation with other relevant units.122 Any 
external propaganda related to the economy and trade is the responsibility of the 
provincial Economic and Trade Commission (Jingmaowei 经贸委 ). This 
includes propaganda targeted at businesses and the most important clients 
stationed in Shandong and organizing propaganda to be carried out by Shandong 
businesses and businesspeople overseas.
123
 All external propaganda work related 
                                                          
120
 Comprehensive work includes implementing work and development guidelines and plans, 
researching and identifying issues concerning the entire province, important activities 
involving the outside world and opinions as well as statement for external propaganda in case 
of sudden events, all in coordination with the provincial FAO and other departments getting in 
contact with the outside world. It also includes the organization and production of important 
external propaganda materials, organizing and overseeing the production and distribution of 
waixuan products, and concretely organizing, promoting and coordinating the external 
propaganda work of provincial news and cultural departments and departments whose work 
involves the outside world. Cf. ““Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo shixing guikou guanli, 
fengong fuze zhidu de yijian” 关于对外宣工作实行归口管理、分工负责制度的意见 
[Opinion on implementing the system of management according to gateway and division of 
labor in external propaganda work], Tingzi 厅字 [1993] 22 hao 号 [Note from the General 
Office of the Shandong Provincial party Committee [1993] no. 22], in Shandongsheng duiwai 
xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian, vol. 1, 5.  
121
 With regard to news work, it is in charge of coordinating and hosting foreign journalists 
stationed in Beijing, foreign experts, foreign TV hosts, and journalists coming to Shandong to 
do interviews. It also manages news and propaganda when Shandong has any major economic 
activity and organizes any major articles published outside the mainland (jingwai 境外) by 
Shandong. When big events (jieqing huodong 节庆活动) occur in Shandong, it comes up with 
slogans and organizes journalists. “Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo shixing guikou guanli, 
fengong fuze zhidu de yijian,” 5.  
122
 “Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo shixing guikou guanli, fengong fuze zhidu de yijian,” 5.  
123
 Ibid., 5-6.  
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to overseas Chinese is done by the provincial Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 
tourism related waixuan is the responsibility of the provincial Tourism Bureau, 
and anything related to culture is handled by the provincial Department of 
Culture (Wenhuating 文化厅 ). Audio or audio-visual external propaganda 
products, joint film productions with foreigners, and the exchange of radio and 
TV programs are the responsibility of the provincial Department of Radio and 
Television. Matters related to education and science and technology are the 
responsibility of the two respective commissions for education and science and 
technology.
124
 Advertizing targeting foreigners is handled jointly by the External 
Propaganda Office, the provincial Council for Trade Promotion, and the 
Shandong International Trade Exhibition Company. Propaganda targeted at 
Taiwanese is handled by the provincial Taiwan Affairs Office.
125
  
Despite the careful outlining of different responsibilities under the guikou 
guanli system, there is naturally some overlap, which means redundancy and 
wasted resources. More critically, the work of different units might be in 
contradiction as different departments and units have different primary interests to 
pursue. This leads to the second problem. 
 
External Propaganda between Two Established Sectors of Work 
The involvement of so many different sectors means that a number of 
different bureaucracies that have traditionally been handled separately need to 
work together. Although departments from all kinds of fields are involved under 
the system of “sectoral management,” the two most important systems that 
external propaganda is a part of are Propaganda and Thought Work and Foreign 
Affairs Work, each of which is headed by a LSG at the very top. The 
programmatic statement that external propaganda forms an important part of both 
propaganda work and foreign affairs work continues to be stressed in speeches by 
China’s leaders until today. Before the creation of the EPWLSG, this meant that 
macro policy making was spread out primarily across two different systems 
(xitong 系统) formally handled separately in the policy process despite some 
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 “Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo shixing guikou guanli, fengong fuze zhidu de yijian,” 6.  
125
 The text adds, as usual, that strictly speaking, targeting Taiwanese is not external propaganda, 
but the two fields are closely linked “Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo shixing guikou 
guanli, fengong fuze zhidu de yijian,” 7.  
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overlap in departments and individuals involved at the very top: the foreign affairs 
system and the propaganda system. 
At the top of the foreign affairs bureaucracy is the PBSC member in charge 
of foreign affairs, who heads the Foreign Affairs LSG. Since 1998, this position 
has been held, ex officio, by the chairman of the CPC.
126
 The predecessor of the 
LSG on Foreign Affairs was one of the five initial small groups first officially 
established in 1958 as part of the aim to strengthen party supervision over the 
state. Disbanded during most of the Cultural Revolution, the LSG was re-
established in spring 1981.
127
 Under Jiang Zemin 江泽民 in 2000 it was decided 
that it would be merged with the newly created LSG on State Security in a “one 
organization with two nameplates” arrangement (yi ge jigou liang kuai paizi 一个
机构两块牌子).128 Units represented in the LSG are the Ministry of Defense, the 
Central Military Commission, the Ministry of Public Security, the Central Foreign 
Affairs Office, the International Liaison Department, OEP/SCIO, the Ministry of 
State Security, the Ministry of Commerce, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 
and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).129 The Executive Office of the LSG is 
the Central Foreign Affairs Office created in 1998.  
At the top of the propaganda xitong 系统130 is a member of the PBSC 
responsible for overseeing all propaganda and thought work.
131
 This person is 
currently Liu Yunshan 刘云山,132 who heads the Central LSG for Propaganda and 
Thought Work, the highest organization in the propaganda system, (re-) 
established as part of the bureaucratic streamlining of 1988.
133
 Unlike his 
                                                          
126
 At the time of its re-establishment, it was led by Vice-President Li Xiannian李先念. In March 
1988, the position was handed over to Premier Li Peng 李鹏. According to Miller, Jiang Zemin 
already headed the LSG in 1993 (Cf. Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading 
Small Groups.” China Leadership Monitor, no. 26, 2008, 1-21. Available online at 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM26AM.pdf, accessed August 12, 
2012, 9. 
127
 Cf. Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” 9. 
128
 Cf. ibid., 10. Miller’s info is based on Junzheng shequ, the military BBS mentioned above.  
129
 Cf. “Zhongyang lingdao xiaozu” 中央领导小组 [Central leading small groups], December 15, 
2011, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4ac8a6ac0102dwkx.html, accessed October 22, 2012.  
130
 A xitong, usually translated as “system,” refers to a “grouping of functionally related 
bureaucracies.” Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform 
(New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1995), 193.  
131
 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 9.  
132
 Liu Yunshan is ranked fifth in the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), which since the 
leadership transition in fall 2012 has had only seven members (instead of previously nine).  
133
 Cf. Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui, Zhongguo gongchandang 
zuzhishi ziliao, vol. 7, 230.  
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predecessor, Li Changchun 李长春 , who had no previous experience in 
propaganda work, Liu Yunshan headed the CPD before ascending to the PBSC. 
The task of the LSG for Propaganda and Thought Work is to devise the general 
direction of propaganda work and act as a coordinating body at the top level.
134
 
The LSG’s operating agency (banshi jigou 办事机构135) is its office (bangongshi 
办公室), which is stationed within the CPD.136  
The fact that external propaganda is stretched out between two well-
defined sectors entails two main problems: First, the interests of these two sectors 
may be in conflict. Second, external propaganda is not the main priority in either 
sector. This leads to the third problem: External propaganda continues to be 
subordinated to domestic propaganda work. 
 
 
                                                          
134
 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 10. The official task of LSG is to propose certain courses of 
action in their specific field to the PBSC, which has final decision making power, although 
recommendations are rarely refused (cf. Shaw Chong-hai 邵宗海, “Zhonggong zhongyang 
gongzuo lingdao xiaozu zuzhi dingwei” 中共中央工作领导小组组织定位 [The organization 
and position of leading small groups of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China],  website of National Chengchi University, www3.nccu.edu.tw/~chshaw/clg_staus.doc, 
accessed April 18, 2010, 4). Due to their sensitive nature, very little information is openly 
available about the work of Leading Small Groups. Much about what Shaw knows about the 
role of LSG, he found out through personal interviews with higher rank cadres. However, the 
people he interviewed did not give him a unanimous precise definition of what LSG do. Also 
see Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups.” 
135
 In late 1987, organs of the Central Committee were reorganized into three different categories: 
decision-making consulting bodies (juece zixun jigou 决策咨询机构 ), executive bodies 
(banshi jigou 办事机构), and service institutions (shiye jigou 事业机构). Lu Ning, “The 
Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party 
Departments,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Reform Era, ed. 
David Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 46. 
136
 “Zhongyang xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu (bangongshi) jigou shezhi” 中央宣传
思想工作领导小组（办公室）机构设置  [Institutional set-up of the (Offfice of the) 
Propaganda and Thought Work Leading Smal Group], January 20, 2010. 
http://hi.baidu.com/xztlsy/blog/item/c1afdd00a0aaa21a728b65ed.html, accessed March 13, 
2010. Link no longer valid; page on file with author. Also see “Zhongyang xuanchuan sixiang 
gongzuo lingdao xiaozu” 中央宣传思想工作领导小组 [The Propaganda and Thought Work 
Leading Smal Group], http://www.ourzg.com/bbs/htm_data/49/0804/18759.html, accessed 
July 25, 2010. Link no longer valid; page on file with author. Junzheng zaixian 
(http://www.ourzg.com) is a website based in Jiangsu that is specifically dedicated to analyzing 
military structures. The website does not give any information on its affiliation with any 
government or military unit, but the structure of the website and the sites it links to indicate a 
close co-operation. It has a bulletin board, in which users collect and discuss information 
(history, leadership, internal structure, etc.) on Party, State, and Military bodies. Although the 
reliability of the information cannot be guaranteed, where comparison with official sources is 
possible, these BBS entries usually display a surprising degree of accuracy. In this case, while 
the information cannot be corroborated independently, other (leading) small groups also have 
executive offices stationed in ministries and departments. 
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The Relationship between OEP and CPD 
The administrative body of the Central Propaganda and Thought Work 
Leading Small Group (PTWLSG) and the most important organization in the 
propaganda system is the CPD, which has been headed by Politburo member and 
former Party secretary of Sichuan, Liu Qibao 刘奇葆 , since the 18th Party 
Congress in fall 2012.
137
 Liu Qibao presumably also replaced Liu Yunshan as 
head of the EPWLSG. The central propaganda department is a leading department 
(lingdao bumen), meaning, among other things, that it can directly circulate 
documents (called Zhongxuanfa 中宣发) without having to go through the Central 
Committee. Much of its history has been covered in chapter three of Brady’s 
Marketing Dictatorship. What is important to note here is that its powers have 
been significantly upgraded since the post-Mao period and especially since 1992, 
when for the first time the head of CPD was listed before the head of the 
Organization Department on the Central nomenklatura.
138
 The Propaganda 
Department is replicated at all levels, both within the horizontal (kuai 块) and the 
vertical (tiao 条 ) grid, as all party committees have their own propaganda 
departments, which are led professionally by CPD (zai yewu shang gui kou guanli 
在业务上归口管理).139  
The exact relation between the CPD and the OEP is not publically 
available, although the special status of CPD compared to “lesser” departments 
such as OEP is confirmed in various places.
140
 A graphic in Brady’s Marketing 
Dictatorship implies that the two are in a guiding-guided relationship (rather than 
one of actual leadership).
141
 However, while links might have varied over the 
course of the history of OEP/SCIO, it is most likely led by CPD today. A good 
indicator for the relationship is, first, the official CPC position on how much to 
                                                          
137“Liu Qibao tongzhi jianli” 刘奇葆同志简历 [Vita of comrade Liu Qibao], People’s Daily 
Online, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64242/6835171.html, accessed February 10, 2013. 
138
 Cf. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 23. 
139
 Yongnian Zheng and Liang Fook Lye, “Re-making the Party’s Image: Challenges for the 
Propaganda Department,” in China into the Hu-Wen Era: Policy Initiatives and Challenges, 
eds. John Wong and Hongyi Lai (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006), 128.  
140
 E.g. in Hou Yingzhong 侯迎忠 and Guo Guanghua 郭光华. Duiwai baodao celüe yu jiqiao 对
外报道策略与技巧 [Strategies and skills of external reporting] (Beijing: Zhongguo chuanmei 
daxue chubanshe, 2008), 45 
141
 See Figure 2.1 China’s Domestic Propaganda System in Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 11. 
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distinguish between propaganda targeting Chinese and propaganda targeting 
foreigners and, second, the director of OEP/SCIO and his connections to CPD.  
The slogan that has been used to describe the Chinese policy of 
distinguishing between Chinese and foreign target audiences is nei wai you bie 内
外有别 – literally “differentiate between inside and outside.” While this continues 
to apply to the micro-level (specific formulations, angle of reporting, etc.), it no 
longer applies at the macro-level, that is, China cannot tell different target 
audiences different facts or try to keep reports that are generally publically 
available away from one particular target audience. 
The idea that in the current media environment, Chinese and foreign target 
audiences could no longer be clearly distinguished established itself in two steps, 
ironically beginning at the same time that the slogan nei wai you bie was first 
included in the official external propaganda policy in the mid-1990s.
142
 The first 
step was that people working for local media primarily intended for domestic 
consumption were asked to develop a “consciousness” or “awareness” for external 
propaganda (waixuan yishi 外宣意识) and the fact that their work could also be 
read by foreigners.
143
 The immediate background was the increased number of 
foreigners in China and the decreasing capacity to restrict their movement and 
their purchases. In 1995, for example, Zeng Jianhui, then director of the OEP, 
emphasized that domestic propaganda also had an impact abroad under the 
opening policies as journalists stationed in China could read them, and many 
publications were also distributed abroad.
144
 As the number of Chinese 
                                                          
142
 It was first listed as one of the ten principles of external propaganda work in a report delivered 
by external propaganda leaders to the Politburo Standing Committee 
143
 E.g. Xi Jinghua 席静华, “Duinei baodao ye ying qianghua waixuan yishi” 对内报道也应强化
外宣意识 [Domestic reporting also needs to strengthen its external propaganda consciousness], 
Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 8 (2002): 15-16. 
144
 Zeng, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei, vol. 1, 111. The change also showed up at the provincial level. 
At the meeting of the Shandong Joint Committee for External Propaganda in February 1995, 
shortly after the national conference, the head of the Shandong OEP first raised the notion 
(presumably picked up in Beijing in January) that with the continuous progress of means of 
communication, domestic propaganda and external propaganda could not be clearly separated 
any longer. By contrast, a meeting in March 1994 had still stressed the need to distinguish 
between Chinese and foreigners when reporting, and especially the need to keep certain details 
from foreigners or at least not to hype them. “Shengwei duiwai xuanchuan lianxihui di er ci 
huiyi jiyao” 省委对外宣传联席会第二次会议纪要 [Minutes of the second meeting of the 
Joint Committee for external propaganda of the provincial party committee], February 13, 1995, 
in Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian, vol. 1, 84. “Han Xikai 
tongzhi zai shengwei duiwai xuanchuan lianxihui di yi ci huiyishang de jianghua” 韩喜凯同志
在省委对外宣传联席会第一次会议上的讲话  [Comrade Han Xikai’s speech at the first 
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newspapers and journals with online presences increased, so did the necessity to 
remind media that they also had a foreign audience. The campaign to remind local 
media that foreigners read Chinese media grew stronger in the early 21
st
 century, 
as more and more local media went online.
145
  
The second step, which was never explained in as much detail in openly 
available material or material at a low classification range was the awareness that 
things published in media primarily targeting foreigners could have an impact 
among the Chinese public. The clear verdict in favor of closer coordination is 
relatively recent. At the 17
th
 Party Congress in October 2007, Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 
stressed the need to “coordinate the domestic and the international situation” 
(tongchou guonei guoji liang ge daju 统筹国内国际两个大局).146 In 2008 and 
2009, a few local Party committees highlighted the need for external propaganda 
to have “domestic propaganda awareness” (neixuan yishi 内宣意识 ). 147  The 
wording in both articles of this particular point is identical whereas the rest of the 
articles differ, indicating that the formulation is from an internal central document 
                                                                                                                                                               
meeting of the Joint Council for external propaganda of the provincial party committee], March 
24, 1994, in Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao huibian, vol. 1, 67. 
145
 For instance, one article identified four areas in domestic reporting –usually in local media– 
that had negative repercussions for China’s image abroad. First, maps or formulations were in 
conflict with core Chinese policies. For instance, some maps used in local media did not 
include the Diaoyutai or even Taiwan, or members of the WTO were referred to as “member 
countries” (inacceptable because Taiwan is a member). Second, media reported sensitive 
stories that were not suitable for public reporting even within China and that could be used 
against China by the international anti-China forces now that most material published in China 
could also be accessed abroad. The example given to illustrate this point was the report in the 
online edition of a local paper on the execution of a 19-year-old female drug dealer, including 
the detail that someone wanted to buy her organs after the execution. Third, local media should 
not report anything that could hurt China's relations with other countries. For instance, one 
paper had carried a photo of a soccer game between Iraq and Iran with the caption “Iran-Iraq 
War” (liang Yi zhanzheng 两伊战争). This was insensitive and could potentially hurt China's 
relations with the two countries. Fourth, there were cultural differences between East and West 
that needed to be taken into account. For instance, Chinese media should avoid the topic of 
eating dogs. The article also lists the example of a report on a teacher who, in order to be able 
to work undisturbed, locked her 5-year-old daughter in at home, where the girl had to starve. 
While in China this kind of dedication to one's work moved people, in the West the mother 
would have been arrested for child neglect, the article stated. Cf. Xi Jinghua, “Duinei baodao 
ye ying qianghua waixuan yishi,” 15-16.  
146
 See “Tongchou guonei guoji liang ge daju” 统筹国内国际两个大局 [Coordinate the overall 
situation in China and abroad], People’s Daily Online, November 14, 2007, 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/6528753.html, accessed March 3, 2013. 
147
 “Guanyu Jinkouhe qu waixuan gongzuo de chubu sikao” 关于金口河区外宣工作的初步思考
[Preliminary thoughts on the external propaganda work of Jinkouhe District], June 18, 2008, 
http://jkh.leshan.cn/djzc/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=602, accessed February 10, 2013; 
“Guanyu Kaiping waixuan gongzuo de sikao” 关于开平外宣工作的思考 [Thoughts on the 
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or speech communicated to lower levels.
148
 At the 2009 external propaganda 
conference, Wang Chen also for the first time added the new slogan to 
“coordinate the domestic and the international situation.” In July 2011, on the 
occasion of the 90
th
 birthday of the CPC, he published an article on the Party’s 
external propaganda work in which he explained the new principle more directly: 
“When we report domestically, we need to fully consider external public opinion 
effects, and when we do external reporting, we need to fully consider its influence 
on domestic social stability.”149 The need to further improve this coordination was 
also highlighted as one of external propaganda’s main goals for the twelfth five 
year period (2011-2015).
150
 
A look at the leadership situation suggests a period of relative 
independence of OEP/SCIO between 1998 and 2004 and confirms the recent 
change towards closer coordination with and dependence on CPD. Zhu Muzhi 朱
穆之, the first director of the EPSG, worked at CPD and was a member of the 
PTWLSG (one of the few people who survived the almost complete replacement 
of personnel in the propaganda system of 1989). When the EPSG was resurrected 
in 1990, it was explicitly put under the leadership of the PTWLSG.
151
 Zeng 
Jianhui, who headed OEP/SCIO between 1992 and 1998, had been engaged in 
foreign propaganda activities since the early Mao period, when he worked for the 
International Department of the General Press Administration, the English 
Department of Beijing Xinhua Radio, and Xinhua’s External Department. Having 
been deployed primarily in media units, he automatically had a very strong tie to 
the CPD, whose deputy director he became in 1988. Zhao Qizheng was the first 
director of OEP/SCIO without any relation to the CPD at all. 
                                                          
148
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The trend of independence was clearly reversed in 2004, when CPD 
director Liu Yunshan became head of the newly created EPWLSG. While this 
upgraded extermal propaganda by putting a politburo member in charge, it also 
tied the sector’s work more closely to the CPD. Cai Wu 蔡武 , who headed 
OEP/SCIO between 2005 and March 2008, had made his career in and been 
deputy director of the International Liaison Department before, but, like Zhao 
Qizheng, did not have any previous connection to CPD. It was perhaps for this 
reason that he was transferred to the Ministry of Culture after only a short time in 
office and replaced by former head of the People’s Daily, Wang Chen, who was 
made a deputy director of CPD in the same move. Such an arrangement of 
concurrent posts usually indicates a leading-led relationship. Thus, whatever the 
situation may have been in the past, by 2004, OEP entered an arrangement of both 
supervision of and closer co-operation with CPD. By 2008, under the new policy 
line to “coordinate the domestic and the international,” OEP had been placed 
under CPD leadership. 
The problem of a conceptual or institutional barrier between domestic and 
international public spheres in the absence of real barriers preventing the flow of 
information between the two has not only been a concern for China. In the 21
st
 
century, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which bars domestic media from using 
any content produced for propaganda purposes targeting foreign publics, has 
become an object of contention in the U.S.
152
 In 2011, the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Public Diplomacy and the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
identified the Act as an obstacle to U.S. public diplomacy. Recently, two U.S. 
Members of Congress have pushed legislation that would weaken the Smith-
Mundt ban on domestic propaganda.
153
 Thus, modernizing the national 
propaganda apparatus to better suit the needs of the present media and 
communication environment is not solely a Chinese concern. The difference is 
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that in China, the strong and well-established domestic propaganda apparatus has 
historically influenced propaganda targeted at foreigners in ways that have 
decreased the effectiveness of external propaganda. With the suspension of the 
principle of “distinguishing between internal and external,” the central domestic 
propaganda apparatus regains in influence over external propaganda. 
 
The External Propaganda Work Leading Small Group 
Before 2004, there was no leadership structure involving all departments 
in the field and trying to bridge the gap between the PTWLSG and the Foreign 
Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG). As pointed out above, in 1993, when the 
EPSG was transformed into the OEP, it is not unlikely that a small group for 
policy deliberation remained in the background; however, this was definitely not a 
leading small group and it therefore had limited power. After 2004, this was 
changed: The external propaganda sector now has its own LSG headed by a 
member of the Politburo (cf. chapter 7.6). 
Virtually nothing is known about how the EPWLSG works and who is 
represented in it. It is reasonable to assume that it fulfills the same function as 
other LSG in the system: It is supposed to prevent conflict between different units 
through coordination at the highest level and acts as de facto decision-maker for 
the PBSC. In terms of concrete routines, it makes sense to look at the work of 
provincial coordinating bodies in the external propaganda sector. For instance, the 
external propaganda small group of Shandong used its meetings to hear work 
reports from units responsible for external propaganda (waixuan zhuguan bumen 
外宣主管部门), to coordinate work, and to make decisions on important issues 
that exceeded the authority of the provincial OEP.
154
  
As opposed to other, more established LSG, for which more or less 
confirmed lists of members circulate,
155
 very little information is available on the 
EPWLSG. However, there are three points of reference that make it possible to 
reconstruct the approximate composition of the group: The composition of the 
two Central EPSGs in 1980 and 1990 respectively, detailed information about the 
composition of Shandong’s equivalent of the Central EPSG, and a few references 
to the Central EPWLSG after 2004 in high-ranking cadres’ biographies. 
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When the EPSG was first founded in 1980, it consisted of representatives 
from the CPD, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the International Liaison 
Department, the Central Investigation Department (a predecessor of the Ministry 
of State Security), the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group, the Ministry of 
Culture, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Office, the Hong Kong and Macao Office, Xinhua News Agency, the People’s 
Daily, the Broadcasting Bureau,
156
 the Foreign Languages Bureau, and the PLA 
General Political Office’s Propaganda Department.157 The resurrected EPSG in 
1990 included cadres from the PTWLSG, the CPD, the EPSG’s Executive Office, 
the MFA, the Ministry of Radio and Television, the People’s Daily, the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Office, and the Research Office of the State Council.
158
 Given 
that in the meantime, the Propaganda and Thought Work LSG had been founded, 
it makes sense that the new EPSG had fewer members. The composition of both 
groups mainly combined institutions from the propaganda bureaucracy and from 
the extended foreign affairs bureaucracy, including Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, 
and overseas Chinese affairs.  
However, while these are probably still the core members, it is quite likely 
that in order to accommodate more units touching on external propaganda under 
the guikou guanli system, the membership in the current LSG is broader. The 
cadre handbook Propaganda and Thought Work in the New Period lists the 
departments and work fields aside from propaganda and thought work related to 
external propaganda: Foreign Affairs, Trade, Science and Technology, Education, 
Culture, Press and Publication, Radio and Television, Tourism, Sports, Overseas 
Chinese Affairs, etc.
159
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A similar picture emerges when looking at Shandong’s external 
propaganda arrangement at the highest level. Huang Zecun 黄泽存 , deputy 
director Shandong Province’s Propaganda Department and director of Shandong’s 
Office of External Propaganda, states that provincial external propaganda small 
groups were usually made up of the cadre in the party committee responsible for 
(fenguan 分管) ideology, by the cadre in the government responsible for (zhuguan 
主管 ) foreign work (shewai gongzuo 涉外工作 ), and by the leaders of 
departments that came into contact with foreigners (shewai bumen 涉外部门).160 
To provide a better picture of a possible set-up of the waixuan small group in the 
1990s, I will briefly explain the arrangement implemented in Shandong in 1994. 
While this information from Shandong is most likely outdated, it comes from a 
reliable source and gives an approximate idea of an arrangement that is in 
accordance with the principle of “centralized management and division of work” 
that has been highlighted as an organizational principle for external propaganda 
work since the 1990s.  
Shandong had an external propaganda small group since 1980 and kept it 
even when its central equivalent was dissolved in 1988.
161
 In 1992, in response to 
Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, it reshuffled the members of the small group so 
that afterwards, it consisted of 27 cadres from departments having contact with the 
outside world (shewai bumen), departments from the news and cultural sector 
(xinwen wenhua bumen 新闻文化部门) and departments related to the economy 
and trade (jingmao bumen 经贸部门). Moreover, the small group got its own 
office, which turned it from a non-standing into a standing body, much like the 
resurrected EPSG at the central level.
162
 In March 1994, “in the spirit of” the 
national external propaganda conference earlier that year, Shandong furthermore 
established a Joint Committee for External Propaganda (Shengwei duiwai 
xuanchuan lianxihui 省委对外宣传联席会), a non-standing body, like a leading 
small group, led by one of the deputy secretaries of the Shandong provincial 
committee (Han Xikai 韩喜凯) and created with the intention to improve macro 
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management, macro decision-making and macro guidance of the sector.
163
 Cadres 
came from Shandong’s Provincial Propaganda Department, the Dazhong ribao 大
众日报,164 the province’s Office for Radio and TV, its General Administration for 
Publishing, its Office for Culture, its Foreign Affairs Office, its Commission for 
Commerce and Trade, its Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, its Taiwan Affairs 
Office, its Bureau for Tourism, its Commission for Education, its Commission for 
Science and Technology, its Department of Finance, and Shandong’s Office of 
External Propaganda. Each of these units was asked to name a cadre who would 
be in charge of external propaganda work and represent the unit in the advisory 
body.
165
 The group met at irregular intervals to hear reports (tingqu huibao 听取
汇报), do research, update one another on the current state of affairs in each unit, 
and to make decisions.
166
 These meetings also served as a way to brief cadres 
about the “spirit” of the national-level external propaganda conference and make 
plans how to translate it into policies in Shandong.
167
  
Thus, in Shandong, the advisory body on external propaganda (called Joint 
Committee instead of Small Group) largely also consisted of cadres from the 
propaganda and foreign affairs bureaucracy, but also organizations from the 
finance and trade sector and from research and education.  
At the time, in the 1990s, the Center was mainly concerned with 
improving China’s image and countering any bad press that China got from 
foreign media or governments. Thus, using external propaganda to attract foreign 
investment was mainly done by locales. However, in 2001 China launched the 
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“Going out” project and has since tried to create recognizable Chinese brands.168 
Therefore, it is quite likely that the Ministry of Commerce is also included in the 
Central EPWLSG. The same could be said for research and education at the 
central level, which has grown in importance in China’s presentation of itself 
abroad through the inclusion of Confucius Institutes in the extended external 
propaganda package. Nonetheless, the majority of units still come from the 
propaganda sector and the foreign affairs sector.  
In addition, since external propaganda has been declared a matter of 
national security and social stability, it is very likely that the Ministry of Public 
Security and the Ministry of State Security are also represented in the EPWLSG. 
The bibliographic entry on Yang Huanning杨焕宁 on Hudong 互动, one of the 
Chinese equivalents of Wikipedia, states that Yang, who was a vice minister in the 
Ministry of Public Security at the time and is considered an anti-terrorism expert, 
became a member of the Central External Propaganda LSG in May 2004.
169
 While 
this information cannot be corroborated through more official sources,
170
 Yang is 
also known for managing security at the Beijing Olympics 2008. 
Finally, more recently, the international image of China’s military has also 
become an issue. For instance, the image of the PLA was discussed at the 2011 
Seminar on International Communication organized by the FLO.
171
 In 2009, a 
volume published by the PLA Press on how to build a stronger army suggested 
that the military set up a structure to lead all external propaganda work to provide 
unified leadership for all the activities that were handled by different 
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organizations within the military at the time. In addition, the PLA should also 
nominate a leading cadre to join the EPWLSG.
172
 Given the recent surge in 
attention paid to PLA external propaganda work, it is quite likely that this 
suggestion was actually realized. 
Below, I have listed the potential members of the LSG and have indicated 
their rank and their specific responsibilities. 
 
Organization Rank Main Involvement in External 
Propaganda 
CPD Central Deputy 
level (2nd 
highest rank, 
equivalent to 
that of a 
Politburo 
member) 
Overall leadership over the propaganda 
sector, including external propaganda 
OEP/SCIO Ministerial 
(zhengbuji 正部
级) 
See 8.1 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Ministerial  State-to-state diplomacy; external 
propaganda and liaison activities through 
embassies, press release system for all 
news touching on China's foreign relations 
and international affairs, control of all 
international news. 
International 
Liaison 
Department 
Ministerial Party-to-Party diplomacy 
Xinhua Ministerial Official state news agency; domestic news 
releases targeted at foreigners, managed by 
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its External Department (Duiwaibu 对外
部), news releases on international affairs, 
managed by its International Department 
(Guojibu 国际部) 
People’s Daily Ministerial Represents the official position of the CPC 
and the Chinese government 
SARFT Ministerial Leadership over CCTV and China Radio 
International 
GAPP Ministerial Going out project for Chinese books 
CCTV Vice-ministerial 
(fubuji 副部级) 
Has various channels targeting foreigners, 
managed by the Overseas Center (Haiwai 
zhongxin 海外中心) 
CRI Vice-ministerial Foreign language broadcasts 
China Daily Vice-ministerial English language daily 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
Ministerial “Going out” project for Chinese companies 
Central Taiwan 
Affairs Office
173
 
Ministerial News and Press Conferences targeted at 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong and 
Macao Afairs 
Offic 
Ministerial Propaganda targeted at Hong Kong and 
Macao, management of journalists and 
media from Hong Kong and Macao 
stationed in China 
Overseas 
Chinese Affairs 
Office 
Ministerial Propaganda targeted at overseas Chinese, 
leadership of Zhongxinshe 中新社, liaison 
work with overseas Chinese news 
organizations and journalists 
Ministry of 
Culture 
Ministerial The Ministry’s External Cultural Liaison 
Bureau
174
 “guides and manages” foreign 
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exchange activities as well as cultural 
foreign propaganda 
Ministry of 
Education  
Ministerial Confucius Institutes; cooperation and 
exchange with foreign universities 
Ministry of State 
Security 
 Ministerial Participation in strategic plans for how to 
ensure a favorable international public 
opinion environment to enhance China's 
security 
Ministry of 
Public Security 
Ministerial Presumably: Disarming hostile messages 
that could cause social instability and 
ensuring that external propaganda 
messages do not counteract domestic 
stability 
Propaganda 
Department of 
the PLA General 
Political Office 
Ministerial Reporting of military news to foreigners 
Table 8.I: Potential Members of the External Propaganda LSG 
 
Despite the creation of the LSG, it is more than likely that not all problems 
have been solved. While no information about such high level conflicts is 
publicized, they certainly exist. First, there are numerous conflicts of interest in 
between these units. The LSG provides a platform to reach a consensus at the 
policy-making level, but it must be assumed that this is a cumbersome process and 
cannot eliminate all conflicts, even at the highest level. As policies are 
implemented at lower levels, problems are exacerbated. Second, while the 
existence of a leading small group since 2004 has likely strengthened the sector, 
the External Propaganda LSG is outranked by the PTWLSG and the FALSG, both 
of which are headed by PBSC members, the latter even by the Party Secretary 
himself.
175
 External propaganda itself is in all likelihood under the leadership of 
the CPD. Likewise, the examples of members outlined above suggest that cadres 
representing the interests of the domestic propaganda, foreign affairs and other 
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sectors may constitute a significant portion, possibly the majority, of members of 
the External Propaganda LSG. This problem at the highest level also manifests 
itself at lower levels with the units actually carrying out external propaganda work. 
This is a particular problem for external propaganda media units, as they receive 
their funding through super-ordinate media units whose main responsibility is to 
organize content aimed at Chinese audiences (cf. Chapter 6.6).  
To a large degree, the external propaganda sector simply faces the same 
problems as all other sectors within the Chinese bureaucracy. However, the fact 
that from the outset it is located between different sectors instead of being one of 
the more established bureaucracies appears to exacerbate the problems.  
 
8.4 “Multiple Players Singing the Same Tune” 
The limits that the issue of stake puts on the credibility of governments, 
parties, and interest group means that they are in constant need of more credible 
entities and individuals to speak on their behalf and fulfill certain functions that 
are difficult for governments to fulfill themselves. There has been a consensus that 
certain tasks in the propaganda spectrum can be much better achieved by non-
government actors. The CPC, too, has been quite aware of the possibilities of 
using popular voices, and scholarly articles continue to argue for the inclusion of 
more social forces.
176
 During the Mao period, however, the CPC exercised 
absolute organizational control over “popular” (minjian 民间 ) initiatives and 
social organizations (shetuan 社团). The question this opens up is therefore to 
what extent the Party has begun to genuinely include non-governmental entities in 
its overall external propaganda strategy. This does not necessarily refer to 
completely independent social organizations. For instance, NGOs still have to be 
sponsored by a government department. Nonetheless, there is a difference 
between departments and units that are directly under the Central Committee or at 
levels of the Party-state and organizations that are registered with the government 
and under a certain degree of government control, but not directly a part of the 
government itself and given some freedom to make independent decisions.  
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The inclusion of people’s voices today refers to several different strategies, 
some inspired by past practice and others adopted and modified from abroad: 
including “popular” organizations, “civilizing” citizens, outsourcing to 
corporations, increasing “external propaganda awareness” in ordinary Chinese, etc. 
Below, I will explain the different ways in which the Party-state has tried to 
integrate more non-official voices into its external propaganda project: Although 
foreigners are generally not included in explanations what the “big external 
propaganda” pattern encompasses, they also have a role in it as yet another voice 
that is potentially even more credible than Chinese popular organizations or 
corporations. They will therefore be included in this overview as well. I will show 
that while the CPC continues to be involved in nearly all “popular” initiatives, in 
many cases it has become better at macro-managing popular initiatives, 
encouraging different social forces without suffocating them through too much 
interference.    
 
A Parallel Institutional Structure for Public Diplomacy 
In the academic debate in China, public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao 公
共外交) is often used as a synonym or euphemism for external propaganda. In the 
Chinese bureaucracy, however, public diplomacy structures are separated from 
external propaganda structures and form a separate system. Public diplomacy is 
organized not by the OEP, but by the MFA and the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an advisory body consisting of representatives 
of all political parties in China. 
The MFA was the first department displaying an interest in the concept of 
public diplomacy since around 2004. One Chinese scholar reports that he was 
invited to give the first lecture in a series of talks on public diplomacy organized 
by the Department of Policy Planning and the Propaganda Department of the 
MFA.
177
 That year, the Press Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
established a Public Diplomacy Branch (Gonggong waijiao chu 公共外交处). 
This, according to one article, marked the beginning of the inclusion of non-
governmental forces into China’s overall external propaganda project.178  
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At the 2009 CPPCC annual session, one of the delegates, director of the 
China People’s Friendship Association, Chen Haosu 陈 昊 苏 , reportedly 
recommended that China establish an institutional structure to coordinate public 
diplomacy (jianli tongyi de gonggong waijiao lingdao jigou 建立统一的公共外
交领导机构). 179 In July 2009, at the Eleventh Diplomatic Envoys Meeting (Zhu 
wai shijie huiyi 驻外使节会议), Hu Jintao stressed the importance of public 
diplomacy for China’s image and as an objective re quirement to perfect China’s 
diplomacy under the new situation.
180
  
In 2011, Shanghai (February)
181
 and Guangdong (December)
182
 were the 
first two cities to establish “Public Diplomacy Associations” (Gonggong waijiao 
xiehui 公共外交协会) run not by the provincial party committees, but by the 
respective political consultative conferences.
183
 The first Public Diplomacy 
Association at municipal level was established in Wenzhou in May 2012.
184
 After 
these test cases were implemented at provincial and at municipal level and 
apparently evaluated as successful, the national-level China Public Diplomacy 
Association (Zhongguo gonggong waijiao xiehui 中国公共外交协会 ) was 
established in late December 2012.
185
 It is headed by former foreign minister Li 
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 “Chen Haosu weiyuan: dali jiaqiang gonggong waijiao“ 陈昊苏委员——大力加强公共外交 
[Committee member Chen Haosu - vigorously strengthen public diplomacy],.Renmin ribao. 
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2011, Nanfangwang, http://gd.nfdaily.cn/bl/content/2011-12/26/content_35586091.htm, 
accessed August 12, 2012.  
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公共外交协会在温州成立  [China’s first municipal public diplomacy association was 
established in Wenzhou], People’s Daily Online, May 18, 2012, 
http://wz.people.com.cn/n/2012/0518/c139013-17051616.html, accessed August 12, 2012.  
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杨洁篪部长在中国公共外交协会成立大会上的讲话 [Minister Yang Jiechi’s speech at the 
inaugural meeting of the China Public Diplomacy Association], website of the MFA, 
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Zhaoxing 李肇星. Li was educated at Beijing Foreign Studies University (Beijing 
waiguoyu daxue 北京外国语大学 , BFSU) and served as one of the earliest 
spokespeople of the MFA when the spokesperson system was first implemented. 
At the national level, public diplomacy is not handled by the CPPCC, but is 
affiliated with the MFA. At this point in time, it is unclear whether this was 
planned from the beginning or whether initially the CPPCC was to be responsible 
but was cut off.  
Both public diplomacy structures and other “popular” initiatives rely a lot 
on retired senior officials. Zhu Muzhi became head of the Association for External 
Cultural Exchange (Duiwai wenhua jiaoliu xiehui 对外文化交流协会). Zeng 
Jianhui headed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress 
after retiring from OEP/SCIO. More recently China has tried to establish an 
alternative waixuan structure affiliated with the CPPCC. It is therefore no co-
incidence that several high ranking cadres previously dedicated to external 
propaganda work, such as Zhao Qizheng and Zheng Bijian 郑必坚 , took on 
important positions in the CPPCC after retiring from their official Party posts. 
 
Integrating Universities: The Case of Confucius Institutes 
One initiative linked to the debates on China’s cultural soft power is the 
well-known and by now relatively well-studied establishment of Confucius 
Institutes worldwide.
186
 The headquarters of China’s Confucius Institutes is at the 
Hanban汉办, the executive office (banshi jigou 办事机构), founded in 2002, of 
the LSG for the International Promotion of the Chinese Language (Zhongguo 
guojia Hanyu guoji tuiguang lingdao xiaozu 中国国家汉语国际推广领导小
组),187 founded as the Leading Small Group for Teaching Chinese Abroad (Guojia 
duiwai Hanyu jiaoxue lingdao xiaozu 国家对外汉语教学领导小组) under the 
leadership of the Ministry of Education in 1987, when China first contemplated 
integrating Chinese language teaching into its overall external propaganda 
strategy (cf. chapter 5.4). Two years after the Hanban was created in 2002, in 
                                                                                                                                                               
December 31, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/chn/gnss/t1002005.htm, accessed 
January 15, 2013. 
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2004, the first Confucius Institute was established in Seoul. In 2006, China 
announced it planned to have established 100 Confucius Institutes by the end of 
the year and 1000 by the benchmark year 2020.
188
 By 2010, 322 Confucius 
Institutes and 369 Confucius Classrooms had been established in 96 different 
countries.
189
 
Confucius Institutes are established as joint-ventures between a Chinese 
and a foreign institution, with start-up capital for the first three years provided by 
the Hanban. It should be mentioned that Confucius Institutes have come under 
attack as a waste of money in China itself.
190
 Thus, relaxation of control over 
external propaganda measures has also been associated with loss of control over 
the agenda. 
 
Integrating Non-Governmental Organizations 
There have been a number of test cases with non-governmental initiatives. 
One example is the Confucius Peace Prize, established in 2010 as a Chinese 
alternative to the Nobel Peace Prize in order to counter the award of the Nobel 
award given to Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波. The idea allegedly came from a comment 
published by the Global Times and was then realized by the Chinese Local Art 
Association, a “popular” organization (shetuan 社团) registered at the national 
level and supervised (zhuguan 主管) by the Ministry of Culture (MoC).191  
The first award was given to Lien Chan 连战, leader of the Taiwanese 
opposition under Chen Shui-bian 陈水扁 , for his contribution to closer ties 
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between Taiwan and the mainland.
192
 Lien Chan himself claimed he had never 
heard of the prize and did not come to Beijing to receive the award money.
193
 
Before the award of the second prize, the MoC disassociated itself from the first 
prize in 2010 and announced its intention to prevent the handing out of the second 
prize by the Chinese Local Art Association in an official decision (jueding 决
定 ). 194  Instead, however, the China International Peace Research Center was 
founded in Hong Kong and a new committee was set up which handed the prize to 
Vladimir Putin and openly praised him, among other things, for his crackdown in 
Chechnya,
195
 in an awkward attempt to establish alternative “Chinese” ideas of 
how to maintain unity and therefore peace. For obvious reasons, the choice and its 
justification were again met with ridicule.
196
 In 2012, the China International 
Peace Research Center announced its intention to award another Confucius Peace 
Prize. The decision was publicized through an article by a journalist from the 
Global Times published on the online presence of the People’s Daily 
(Renminwang 人民网), which clearly noted that the MoC had nothing to do with 
the prize.
197
 
What appears to have happened in the case of the Confucius Peace Prize is 
that this was one of the many test cases of the policy of relinquishing control in 
which the Chinese Party-state tries to include non-governmental organizations in 
its overall public diplomacy scheme, and that it did not go as planned. This is so 
because unlike the Confucius Institutes, which ostensibly focus on apolitical 
cultural issues and teaching the Chinese language, the Confucius Peace Prize 
entered a highly charged arena of contentious political issues, a field in which the 
Party-state still tries to maintain tight control, particularly when it cannot fully 
disassociate itself from the popular organization in charge, as was clearly the case 
with the Chinese Local Art Association. An article in the Global Times notes that 
the prize was ridiculed, that the selection process was not transparent enough and 
commented that “if the organizers of the Confucius Peace Prize really want to 
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make it a time-honored and influential prize, they need to first work hard to avoid 
it being seen purely as a politicized move.”198  
At the same time, the Prize is allowed to continue –there is no doubt that 
the Chinese government would be able to shut it down if it were determined to do 
so and had a clear consensus on the issue– so long as it is clear that this is not an 
official government initiative and not conducted through an organization 
registered in China, which always need government sponsorship to be legally 
registered. In fact, while there are most likely different opinions on the award 
within the Chinese government, it provides an opportunity to present a plurality of 
opinions and strategic criticism (xiao ma da bangmang 小骂大帮忙) from China 
on the topic itself through comments in media such as the Global Times while at 
the same time demonstrating several things: first, China tolerates different voices 
within the population, second, China’s official opposition to the Nobel Peace 
Prize handed to Liu Xiaobo is accompanied by outrage in the Chinese population, 
and third, compared to these nationalist groups, the Chinese government itself is 
very moderate and restrained. 
 
Integrating State-Owned and Private Companies 
There are several ways that companies have been integrated into China’s 
external propaganda strategy: First, they have acted as “commercial faces” of 
government projects, and second, some tasks have actually been outsourced. 
Finally, by improving the image of Chinese products, China also hopes to be able 
to improve its overall image.
199
 
First, the Party-state has interacted with foreign partners through 
companies, for instance in the cultural sector. In 2004, the “reform of the cultural 
system” first launched in the late 1990s, was implemented on a wider scale. The 
Central Propaganda Department established the Cultural Reform Office (Wenhua 
tizhi gaige bangongshi 文化体制改革办公室) as a new internal structure.200 This 
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was the beginning of the commercialization of central level cultural units in order 
to make them more competitive and thus reassert Party control over the cultural 
sector.
201
 Although the move was driven largely by domestic needs, improving 
China’s image abroad was certainly also a factor. In April 2004, the Beijing New 
Impression Culture Development Co., Ltd. (Beijing Xin yingxiang wenhua fazhan 
youxian gongsi 北京新影响文化发展有限公司) was founded in order to present 
China to the outside world both on behalf of the Central government, provincial 
governments, and “social organizations” (shehui tuanti 社会团体 ). 202  For 
example, the company is in charge of the concrete organization of the project 
“Experience China” (Ganzhi Zhongguo 感知中国), a series of short-term cultural 
activities, usually lasting one or two weeks, organized abroad by OEP/SCIO since 
1999 in different countries.
203
 Thus, the reform of the cultural system also helps 
China to “show the commercial face” rather than the government face to the 
outside world.   
Second, “in line with international standards,” as one article explains,204 
Chinese external propaganda departments increasingly rely on PR firms and 
advertizing companies. In 2011, OEP/SCIO tasked an advertizing company with 
creating a 30 second ad promoting China that was played on Times Square. The 
Party-state had only subsidized the production; the rest was done by the private 
company.
205
 Cities such as Shanghai and Chengdu 成都  have also used the 
service of PR firms to improve their image.
206
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Finally, because of the overall bad image of Chinese products (“cheap,” 
“low quality,” or even harmful to people’s health) China has also launched 
various initiatives to create a more positive “made in China” brand. In 2009, after 
a series of product scandals,
207
 the Ministry of Commerce tasked a Chinese-
foreign joint venture advertising company with producing a 30 second ad with the 
theme “Made in China, Made with the World,” and paid to have it shown, among 
others, on CNN.
208
 
Thus, the Party-state is increasingly relying on both state-owned and 
private companies to get its own message out while at the same time trying to 
improve the image of Chinese companies and Chinese products to help improve 
the country’s overall image. 
 
“Civilizing” the Chinese People 
In 2011, a seminar discussed not only raising the quality of Chinese 
products, but also raising the quality of Chinese people in order to improve the 
image of both.
209
 The obsession with the “quality” (suzhi 素质) of the Chinese 
people is a left-over from some of the earliest nation-building campaigns in the 
early 20
th
 century (cf. Chapter 2). The CPC has the ambitious –though still 
relatively abstract– plans to include every single Chinese citizen in its external 
propaganda project. Most importantly, the CPC wants to harness social forces 
because many messages are much more effective when stated by non-
governmental actors. Long Xinmin 龙新民, former deputy secretary of Beijing 
remarked that if every person could become an “external propagandist” (duiwai 
xuanchuan yuan 对外宣传员) and would take the initiative (zhudong 主动) to 
engage in waixuan, this could achieve things that official propaganda could never 
achieve. Therefore, it was important to raise the awareness in Chinese people that 
“in front of foreigners, they represent China.”210  
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Much of this work is done in a format familiar from the Mao period: 
campaigns teaching “civilized behavior.” The most well-known “civilizing” 
campaign in the last few years was preparing the residents of Beijing for the 2008 
Olympics, which included encouraging people to learn English and teaching them 
to queue at the bus stop.
211
  
While this approach seems like an odd relic from China’s Maoist past, the 
project has some prominent supporters. For instance, Wang Jisi 王缉思, dean of 
the School of International Studies at Peking University and a well-known 
commentator on Sino-U.S. relations both in China and in the U.S., suggested that 
rather than trying to crank up its voice, China should concentrate on raising the 
“quality” (suzhi) of the Chinese people so that circumstances in China would be 
improved and leave a good impression on foreigners. He had recently been to 
Japan, and the orderliness and safe environment had impressed him. If China 
could progress to this level, its image would automatically be improved.
212
  
 
Mobilizing Public Opinion 
In 2008, when pro-Tibetan independence groups organized events to 
disrupt the Olympic torch relay, Chinese exchange students and other Chinese 
living abroad organized pro-China rallies. The question whether or not these 
protests were facilitated by the Chinese government has been an issue of 
contention. Whereas Western media reports at the time often insinuated that 
Chinese embassies were behind the protests, Sautman and Li argue, based on 
interviews with organizers, that the protests constituted a genuine initiative from 
below without any help from the Chinese government.
213
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that both views are correct. China has used the management of nationalist protests 
at home as a bargaining technique in international relations and a form of 
alternative to “voter pressure,” which governments of democratic countries can 
use to explain why they need to take a tough stance on a particular issue.
214
 In the 
case of the Olympics, protests did not take place in China, but abroad, and there 
was no immediate diplomatic issue at stake. Instead, popular protests served as a 
way of buttressing the stance of the Chinese government on issues of principle in 
general. In the run-up to the Olympics, they became one of several voices 
“singing the same tune.” This does not mean that Chinese students participating in 
the events were not convinced of the cause. Rather, it means that the Party-state 
tapped into existing sentiments that buttressed its own cause. 
In the previous years, Chinese scholars have devoted much energy to 
researching the role of “opinion leaders” in society.215 There are several reasons 
why the Party-state has an interest in understanding the role of opinion leaders, 
including how to suppress protests when necessary, but such knowledge can also 
be used to fan nationalist protests. In addition, Chinese embassies stay connected 
with Chinese students studying abroad. Through employing opinion leaders and 
providing some infrastructure, it is certainly possible to create or encourage 
popular movements in which the overwhelming majority of participants are 
“unsuspecting” members of the public that simply agree with the cause that is 
being promoted. As is the case with many popular movements, different degrees 
of involvement of parties with special interests makes the distinction between 
“genuine” and “orchestrated” grassroots movements moot. When it comes to 
attacking Western bias against China, the organizers of such movements have a 
large base of young people and Chinese exchange students abroad that are willing 
to join in or might even take the initiative themselves. Thus, few of the 
participants in a rally will have been invited to join by a government contact 
directly.  
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Foreign Experts and Old Friends 
Foreigners enjoy more credibility on certain issues, particularly when 
“national interests” or sensitivities are involved. Foreigners have served important 
roles since the earliest days of the CPC as advisors to the Party, as channels to 
spread China’s message abroad, and as a symbol of Chinese internationalism.216 
Both foreign experts and “friends of China” continue to have a function in 
external propaganda work. All foreigners legally working in Chinese units or 
state-owned companies are formally understood as “foreign experts” (waiguo 
zhuanjia 外国专家) that have come to China to help the country develop. Foreign 
experts are handled through State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs 
(SAFEA) and its local equivalents and work in all kinds of positions (cf. chapter 
4.3). 
The idea to give foreigners more independence in China’s external 
propaganda project has been circulating in external propaganda circles since at 
least the 1990s. For instance, an article in the journal Big External 
Communication (Duiwai da chuanbo 对外大传播 ) from 1994 addresses the 
question whether foreigners should really only be limited to proof-reading or 
whether it might be more useful to involve them in editing choices as well. As the 
world grew closer together, Chinese media would ultimately have to adapt to 
international standards, and in this regard, foreign experts could be of great 
help.
217
 Such suggestions, however, were only realized more than a decade later. 
Until recently, foreigners at the China Daily were only employed as polishers and, 
with a few exceptions, got work contracts for a very limited period of time.
218
 
With the plans to expand China’s global media, foreign advisors were 
hired. The tasks done by these advisors can vary, including training of Chinese 
personnel, giving strategic advice, and liaising with foreigners. Foreign experts 
                                                          
216
 Cf. Anne-Marie, Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the 
People’s Republic (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
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 Li Haibo黎海波, “Shilun ‘Sunzi bingfa’ yu duiwai chuanbo (yi)” 试论《孙子兵法》与对外
传播(一) [Discussion on Sunzi's The Art of War amd external communication (one)], Duiwai 
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 Interview, Alfred Roman, Hong Kong, November 2010. Also see articles on some of the blogs 
of foreigners working for the China Daily, e.g. “So you want to work for China Daily?” 
Personal blog of a former ‘foreign expert’ working at the China Daily. October 4, 2005, 
http://leakingstatesecrets.blogspot.de/2005/10/so-you-want-to-work-for-china-daily.html, 
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are also consulted for which story or which angle would be interesting for 
Westerners. While they are usually familiar with the boundaries of reporting, 
some of them like to push boundaries and therefore suggest ideas that are not 
approved by the leadership.
219
 China Central Television (CCTV) has employed 
several advisors at different stages of its expansion, including John Jirik, who 
wrote his PhD dissertation on the reform attempt, and Jim Laurie, who opened the 
first foreign television bureau in Beijing in 1981.
220
 Before launching an English 
version, the Global Times hired Richard Burger, author of the famous blog Peking 
Duck.
221
 Burger reported in an interview with Danwei.org that he spent most of 
his time copy-editing, but also wrote some columns himself. In addition, he was 
responsible for finding foreigners willing to write occasional columns for the 
Global Times.
222
 The China Daily, too, now employs a number of foreign editors, 
and the China Daily online edition regularly features comments and editorials 
from foreign staff and guest writers. China has also increasingly hired foreign 
anchors. In 2004, CCTV-9 hired Edwin Maher, who previously worked at the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation.  
China has faced two main problems with hiring foreigners. First, until 
recently, because Chinese media lacked competitive salaries, they could not 
attract actual journalists and often employed foreigners studying temporarily in 
China. Experience as a journalist was not needed.
223
 Second, after China invested 
more money to be able to pay competitive salaries to actual journalists, it faced 
new problems as Western journalists working for Chinese media run the risk of 
being maligned as government spokespeople and of selling out on their 
journalistic ethos. Thus, while they bolster the credibility of Chinese media, their 
own credibility is diminished. An article on Edwin Maher addressed the issue: 
“Critics say Maher isn’t a reporter at all, but a shameless government yes-man 
who gives all Western journalists a bad name. Maher answers bluntly: He says he 
                                                          
219
 Interview, Beijing, April 2011. Also cf. “Richard Burger on Being a Foreign Editor at the 
Global Times,” Danwei.org. May 8, 2009. 
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simply doesn’t care.”224 Maher also got a platform on Chinese media to address 
the criticism, arguing that while CCTV contained elements of propaganda, 
propaganda was really only a form of PR.
225
 Although accusations will likely 
diminish the more Western journalists start to work for Chinese media, this poses 
an initial hurdle, as people do not only have to be qualified, but also willing to 
face additional scrutiny.  
 
In addition to employing large numbers of foreign experts, China also 
continues to rely on a selected number of “old friends.” The “foreign friend” ranks 
higher than the “foreign expert.” Friendship, as Brady explains, does not denote a 
close relationship, but is political and strategic in nature.
226
 Using foreign friends 
to present and promote China abroad was one of the first external propaganda 
tactics adopted by the CPC aside from drawing on larger networks and was 
evaluated as a very successful strategy in the post-Mao period that China must 
seek to replicate.
227
 
There are two types of people that have been labeled friends of China in 
the past: influential foreigners who are seen as helping China realize its interests 
such as George Bush Sr. and Richard Nixon and foreigners working for the Party 
or the government such as Anna Louise Strong, Edgar Snow, or Felix Greene.
228
 
For the latter category, China created the friendship awards (youyijiang 友谊奖) 
in 1991, the “highest national level award given by the Chinese government to 
foreign experts that have come to China to work.” 229  Each year, about 50 
foreigners receive the award.
230
 Given the sheer number, it goes without saying 
that very few of them have standing or influence comparable to that of Edgar 
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Snow. Nevertheless, there are some of comparable status in terms of their access 
to leaders and either symbolic or actual political importance, usually referred to as 
“old friends.” 
Currently, perhaps the most important old friend of China with an active 
role in external propaganda is Robert Lawrence Kuhn (Luobote Laolunsi Ku’en 
罗伯特 ·劳伦斯 ·库恩 ). An investment banker and a relatively respected 
intellectual in the West who funds and hosts his own TV show on Public 
Broadcasting Service (PBS),
231
 Kuhn exemplifies the type of foreign friend China 
wants and needs in these new times. He first came to China as an advisor to the 
government in early 1989 and has had access to China’s leaders that is very 
unusual for foreigners.  
Kuhn has been likened to Edgar Snow in the Chinese media and as a 
“good friend that China’s leaders can rely on,”232 and this is most likely how the 
top leadership views him as well: He has written several books about China and 
its leaders. In 2004, he published a hagiography of Jiang Zemin, The Man Who 
Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin.
233
 In 2010, he published 
How China's Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China’s Reforms and What This 
Means for the Future,
234
 for which he received “advice and counsel” from, among 
others, Liu Yunshan, Wang Chen, Cai Wu, and Zhao Qizheng.
235
 Kuhn sees being 
called an old friend of China as a compliment and wants to help the country by 
“[telling] the true story of China to the world.”236 His goal in writing the book, as 
he explained himself, was to “make China's leaders more transparent” and “their 
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ideas and attitudes more accessible.” 237  He also funds and chairs the Kuhn 
Foundation, which is dedicated to “facilitating communications between China 
and the world” 238  and to “[promoting] good relations between America and 
China.”239  
Kuhn is quite aware of the fact that he can be accused of being a 
propagandist for the CPC and tries to pre-empt such accusations by addressing 
them, mostly explicitly, occasionally implicitly. The year that he first came to 
China, 1989, is associated first and foremost with Tiananmen and thus has the 
potential to diminish his credibility. Since most accounts of his career in China 
only list the year, not the month of his first encounter with China, he clarified that 
he visited the country in early 1989 and at first decided not to return after the 
Tiananmen crackdown, but was convinced to come back in 1990 in order to 
“support those, particularly in the science communities, who sought reform and 
opening-up.”240 A Xinhua article reported that when asked whether he tried to be 
balanced about China, he replied “‘No. I do not try to be balanced about China. I 
try to tell the truth about China.’”241 This upfront reply characterizes how he has 
dealt with much of both actual and hypothetical criticism. In his books, he 
repeatedly stressed that he was not censored in English and that while he opposed 
the censorship the Chinese versions of his books were subjected to, he insisted 
that his words not be rephrased and thus felt that his book still provided Chinese 
readers with an alternative to the “Party line.”242 This idea of accepting limitations 
for the greater good of bringing openness to Chinese society in the long run is 
relatively widely accepted, and Kuhn replies to his implied skeptics in a way that 
is very open and is likely to convince quite a few people who are not very 
opinionated about China.  
Kuhn has advised Chinese leaders on the country’s media and international 
communications policy and has also tried to present China’s media reforms as 
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progressive. In his profile of Liu Yunshan, after the former head of the CPD 
ascended to the PBSC, he explained that while China continued to regulate the 
media, Liu had “effected modernization and popularization of media 
communications” and had “enabled increased openness in China’s international 
communications.”243 In the last few years, he has written repeatedly for Chinese 
media and spoken about China’s leaders in venues such as the National 
Committee on U.S.-China Relations.
244
 In 2012, Kuhn acted as a commentator on 
the leadership transition and was featured both in China’s external propaganda 
media and the “Western mainstream press.”245 
In sum, aside from official departments within the Party and the State, 
China increasingly draws on popular or semi-official voices, including Chinese 
companies, educational institutions, NGOs, Chinese youth, and foreign experts 
and friends. 
 
 
8.5 Conclusions 
The analysis above has shown that after several decades of intense and 
continued reform, the CPC still struggles to find an ideal coordinating mechanism 
for external propaganda work that is efficient without jeopardizing or 
counteracting the work of other sectors that are still considered strategically more 
important. The current institutional structure, most of which can be traced back to 
the initial institutional set-up of the Mao period, poses a number of problems: 
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First, external propaganda involves a large number of units of equal rank 
that need to coordinate their work. There is a fairly elaborate division of work that 
dates back to the earliest days of the PRC, as different organs are responsible for 
foreign propaganda according to region of the audience and according to topic. 
The division of work (which in practice is probably not quite as clear as it appears 
on paper) has the advantage that it theoretically saves some resources by not 
having several units work on the same tasks and the disadvantage that it requires a 
high degree of coordination between units belonging to different systems. In 
practice, as complaints from scholars and cadres show, the division of work has 
historically resulted in wasted resources and lack of communication. The CPC has 
tried to remedy the problem of coordination, first, by creating the LSG, and 
second, by encouraging different units and departments to sign contracts and 
framework agreements. The LSG provides a platform to solve these issues and 
find a consensus at the highest level, whereas contracts facilitate interaction at 
lower levels. However, the actual effectiveness of both at reducing conflicts and 
improving cooperation is unclear. 
Second, external propaganda is located between two distinct sectors which 
both consider external propaganda when deliberating policies, but definitely not as 
their highest priority. This problem is replicated at lower levels, for instance in 
media units that produce both content for domestic and for foreign target 
audiences. 
Third, one major organizational difficulty is again the existence of the 
domestic propaganda apparatus, at the national level as much as at the provincial 
level and below. The creation of a leading small group for external propaganda 
work had strengthened the sector, but the upgrade came at time when external 
propaganda was simultaneously tied more closely to overall propaganda work, 
both conceptually and institutionally. The existing infrastructure of domestic 
propaganda work on the one hand makes it possible to set up structures quickly 
and on the other hand very difficult to ensure that these are not just superficial 
measures involved in ineffective activities that borrow too much from the 
domestic propaganda apparatus’s way of operating. The Center has the possibility 
to request certain measures to be adopted, but it has few options to measure 
success qualitatively. Thus, as more and more locales get involved, it becomes 
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increasingly difficult for the Center to ensure that the content produced by 
provinces and municipalities meets certain qualitative standards.  
Fourth, in terms of integrating players outside of the government, the 
Party-state is interested in outsourcing certain tasks and assigning different roles 
to different players, but continues to be reluctant to relinquish control. Not looking 
well-organized has the advantage of raising China’s credibility. However, in a 
situation where different bureaucracies and individuals pursue different goals, lack 
of coordination results in conflicting messages that are not necessarily intended by 
the Center. China has many conflicting identities: It appears as a developing 
country, as a socialist country, as a rising power, as an already established power, 
etc. It wants foreigners to believe that China is peaceful, yet at the same time 
needs to maintain a credible threat of force towards Taiwan. Here, the principle of 
“round outside, square within” (cf. chapter 7.6) comes to mind again: While the 
CPC wants to let different actors to sing the same tune and look uncoordinated, it 
also wants to stay in charge and be able to control the message that is sent. Given 
the CPC’s historical insistence on organizational monopoly, the experiments it has 
conducted should be noted. As I will demonstrate below, such experiments even 
exist in the sensitive area of media ownership, but as of now, they remain very 
cautious and an exception rather than the rule. 
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9 Raising China’s International Communication Capabilities 
In January 2009, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that 
China planned to invest 45 billion Yuan into the expansion of its global media in 
an effort to create a “Chinese CNN.” 1  As demonstrated in chapter 7.7, the 
financial commitment resulted in a massive expansion of Chinese media, the 
creation of new regional editions of the China Daily, of television channels in 
Russian and Arabic, of a second English language TV network under Xinhua 新
华, etc. However, China does not only want a global media presence, but actual 
international influence.  Even with large-scale investments, Chinese media will 
not be able to establish anything even closely resembling hegemony in the media 
market, if such a thing exists. For the next few decades, China is well aware that it 
will remain one of many voices and therefore needs to be competitive not only in 
quantitative, but also in qualitative terms. One key problem, if not the most 
important problem, China’s external propaganda apparatus – especially its mass 
media targeting foreigners – face today is the issue of credibility. The argument 
has been made that, today, the credibility of a medium may be the most important 
factor determining whether or not persuasion of the audience succeeds.
2
 The 
importance attached to credibility means that media as well as political entities are 
constantly in the process of building and protecting this valued asset in different 
contexts and with their different target audiences. Media credibility is a complex 
topic in which a range of largely subjective factors come together, including the 
image of a medium, the image of parties associated with or funding the medium, 
the medium’s past and present behavior, but also what is considered proper 
journalistic behavior in a certain society at a certain time.  
As Shanthi Kalathil has aptly pointed out, “the information rich 
environment” of the current times “has the potential to greatly amplify discrete 
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soft power effort,”3 but at the same time also subjects any actor trying to influence 
the public to a greater degree of scrutiny, something with which China, as 
opposed to many democracies, has comparatively little experience.
4
 China’s 
media face substantial problems: First, there is the issue of stake in general, in 
particular the credibility of governments, political parties or other stakeholders. 
Pointing out affiliation with a government, a party, or any form of interest group 
is one popular means to undermine the credibility of a particular argument or of a 
medium as a whole.
5
 Second, there is the problem of the connotation of 
communism and socialism left over from the Cold War in Western mainstream 
society. This means that what has been presented as the most important asset of 
the Chinese media in the official domestic discourse for most of the 1990s – the 
principle of its party nature, dangxing yuanze 党性原则 – is one of its greatest 
liabilities abroad.
6
 The fact that Chinese media are party-state media shows up in 
most non-Chinese discussions of China’s current global media expansion.7 Third, 
there is the issue of actual media practice that influences how a particular medium 
is perceived in the eyes of the public and that can also provide ammunition to 
opponents who wish to call the medium on the issue of stake or otherwise smear 
its reputation. Fourth, China is a large and rising country in the international 
spotlight. Its media are more likely to be subjected to scrutiny than the state-media 
of smaller countries. 
                                                          
3
 Shanthi Kalathil, “China’s Soft Power in the Information Age: Think Again,” ISD Working 
Papers in New Diplomacy, May 2011, 3.  
4
 Ibid., 1-2.  
5
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The Communist Party of China (CPC) is quite aware of the problems it 
faces. In the 21
st
 century, for example, Xinhua still used its China Features (cf. 
chapter 3.2) service to release certain in-depth reports because those will be 
accepted more easily by foreign media.
8
 The ongoing media expansion that 
followed the announcement has been focused on both hard aspects and on soft 
aspects or, as one of the four deputy directors of the Office of External 
Propaganda (OEP)/State Council Information Office (SCIO), Wang Guoqing 王
国庆, remarked in a twist on the common “grasp with two hands” slogan (cf. 
chapter 6.1): China needed to grasp hardware (yingjian 硬件 ) and software 
(ruanjian 软件) with both hands in order to be able to succeed.9 This means that 
the CPC has realized that while expanding the infrastructure and reach of its 
media is important, in order to become truly influential, media need to improve 
the quality of their content and boost their credibility.  
This chapter will analyze institutional problems China’s new global media 
face within the overall Chinese bureaucracy as well as measures attempting to 
overcome those. Aside from the attempts to establish strong Chinese media 
players, I will also look at the strategies China has employed to deal with its main 
competitor: “Western mainstream media.” Thus, I will explain why, on the one 
hand, particularly quantitatively, China has been quite successful in its external 
propaganda media reform and why, on the other hand, serious obstacles remain 
that will be difficult to solve in the future, absent any more drastic institutional 
reforms, such as a weakening of the Central Propaganda Department’s (CPD) 
powers and a more substantial retreat of the Party-state from the media sector. 
 
In this field, Party-owned media that work according to very different 
organizational and journalistic principles face significant problems. Concern about 
credibility and effectiveness manifests itself in the heightened attention paid to the 
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question how to assess the effectiveness of China’s mass media based external 
propaganda. To understand why this is and what the main issues are, I will first 
give a brief introduction to the media landscape in China at the Central level and 
thus provide an understanding of the system that China’s global media players are 
a part of. In a second step, I will then introduce the most important waixuan media 
as well as their institutional affiliation within the system and analyze how the 
media are presented or branded to the outside world. In order to understand the 
concrete problems faced by waixuan media, I will analyze daily mechanisms of 
enforcing control. Finally, I will present and assess conflicting media values and 
examine how these play out in three areas that Chinese media have traditionally 
had difficulties with: Sudden events reporting, criticism of the Party and the 
government, and the language used, particularly in crisis situations. 
 
9.1 The Media’s Place in the Chinese Bureaucracy 
Three structural transformations of the Chinese media sector are important 
to understand how media are organized and run today: commercialization, 
conglomerization and capitalization.
10
 These transformations are relatively well-
studied with regard to their influence on the domestic media landscape.
11
 
Although the main impetus for these transformations was maintaining control 
over the domestic media, and external propaganda media and media groups at the 
central level by and large still depend on government subsidies, they have been 
affected by these trends to varying degrees.  
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(Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1998); Roya Akhavan-Majid, “Mass Media 
Reform in China: Toward a New Analytical Framework,” Gazette: The International Journal 
for Communications Studies 66, no. 6 (2004): 553-565; Doris Fischer, “Censorship and 
Marketization: Institutional Change within China’s Media,” Regime Legitimacy in 
Contemporary China: Institutional Change and Stability, ed. Thomas Heberer and Gunter 
Schubert (London: Routledge, 2008), 175-196; Zhengrong Hu, “The Post-WTO Restructuring 
of the Chinese Media Industries and the Consequences of Capitalization,” The Public 10, no. 4 
(2003): 19-36; Chengju Huang, “Trace the Stones in Crossing the River: Media Structural 
Changes in Post-WTO China,” The International Communication Gazette 69, no. 5 (2007): 
413-430. 
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Commercialization (Meiti qiyehua 媒体企业化) 
During the first half of the 1980s, the establishment of local media outlets 
was actively encouraged by the top leadership. After 1983, media outlets were 
placed under the supervision of governments at the central, provincial, 
municipal/regional, and county levels and delegated ownership and management 
rights to the local state. The large number of media outlets and subsequent 
competition led to an increase in investigative journalism as papers vied for 
readers’ attention. 12  Following the crackdown at Tiananmen, the Chinese 
government searched for ways to reassert control over the media in the early 
1990s. Initially, the government responded with a reinforcement of the licensing 
system
13
 and with large-scale closures of media outlets.
14
 In 1992, after Deng 
Xiaoping’s 邓小平 Southern Tour, the State Press and Publication (SPPA), the 
predecessor of the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), 
issued a document that required all major newspapers, except central Party 
publications, to become financially self-supporting by 1994, beginning the 
process of marketization of the media.
15
 Around the same time, media were 
furthermore tied into the bureaucratic system through their formal affiliation with 
two units (“supervising unit” and “sponsoring unit”) above them in the vertical 
hierarchy,
16
 meant to prevent the establishment of general interest papers 
(zonghexing baozhi 综合性报纸) that could rival Party papers.17  
                                                          
12
 Ashley Esarey, “Cornering the Market: State Strategies for Controlling China’s Commercial 
Media,” in Discontented Miracle: Growth, Conflict, and Institutional Adaptations in China, ed. 
Dali L. Yang  (World Scientific Publishing Company, 2007), 3-6. 
13
 Cf. Yuezhi Zhao, “From Commercialization to Conglomeration: The Transformation of the 
Chinese Press within the Orbit of the Party State,” Journal of Communication 50, no. 2 (June 
2000): 6.  
14
 Cf. Esarey, “Cornering the Market: State Strategies for Controlling China’s Commercial Media,” 
14.  
15
 Cf. Zhao, “From Commercialization to Conglomeration,” 6.  
16
 In 1993, the State Press and Publication (SPPA), the direct predecessor of today’s General 
Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) promulgated the “Interim Provisions on the 
Responsibilities of Sponsoring Units and Supervising Units of Publishing Units” specifying the 
responsibilities and the relation between a publishing unit (chuban danwei 出版单位) and its 
supervising unit (zhuguan danwei 主管单位) as well as its sponsoring unit (zhuban danwei 主
办单位), A publishing unit in China is defined as any unit publishing newspapers, magazines, 
books, or audiovisual material that is properly registered with GAPP in accordance with the 
relevant provisions, both of which need to be able to give binding orders to the publishing unit. 
The supervising unit and sponsoring unit are responsible to guarantee proper editing, 
publication, printing and distribution of the publication. The sponsoring unit and publishing 
unit should be located in the same city (or the same administrative region). If a publishing unit 
has more than one sponsoring unit, it needs to be specified which of the sponsoring units is 
ultimately responsible. The head of the publishing unit needs to be employed (zai zhi renyuan
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Media remained fully owned by the government, but began to be managed 
like commercial enterprises (shiye danwei qiye guanli 事业单位企业管理).18 
Aside from the fact that this fit into the overall alignment towards a more market-
driven economy, it was also considered necessary because subsidised Party media 
often damaged the Party’s reputation by selling low-quality news and propaganda 
through forced subscriptions.
19
 The commercialization of media, however, only 
created new problems for the Party. Though theoretically the state retained control 
over media activities through the licensing system, illegal private ownership of 
media emerged through secret business cooperation and the contracting out of 
licenses.
20
 In addition, media managed like enterprises decreased advertising 
revenues for important Party media.
21
 
 
Conglomerization (Meiti jitihua 媒体集体化) 
The solution adopted by the Party-state to reassert control on the one hand 
and cut costs on the other was concentration of media ownership, which Herman 
and Chomsky define as a key feature of the current propaganda model of the 
Western media: conglomerization.
22
 Brady has argued that besides serving as a 
criticism of Western “press freedom,” Chomsky and Herman’s analysis of the 
propaganda model has also served as a blueprint for the reform of the Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                               
在职人员) at the sponsoring unit. The Supervising unit (zhuguan danwei) is the unit that made 
the application on behalf of the publishing unit at the time it was founded. It needs to be the 
supervising department (shangji zhuguan bumen) of the sponsoring unit. For publishing units 
at the central level, the supervising unit should have vice-ministerial rank or higher. The 
responsibilities of the supervising unit include: double-checking that the sponsoring unit does 
its work properly, and approving important (zhongda 重大) plans and publications. Sponsoring 
and supervising unit can be the same institutions; in this case the given unit fulfills both the 
sponsoring and the supervising unit’s responsibilities. See “Guanyu chuban danwei de zhuban 
danwei he zhuguan danwei zhize de zanxing guiding” 关于出版单位的主办单位和主管单位
职责的暂行规定  [Interim Provisions about the Responsibilities of Sponsoring Units and 
Supervising Units of Publishing Units], promulgated on June 29, 1993 by SPPA, available on 
People’s Daily Online, http://www.people.com.cn/electric/flfg/d2/930629.html, accessed 
January 16, 2010.  
17
 Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom 
Line (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 127. 
18
 See Xiaoling Zhang, The Transformation of Political Communication in China: From 
Propaganda to Hegemony (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011), 42. 
19
 Cf. Chengju Huang, “Trace the Stones in Crossing the River: Media Structural Changes in Post-
WTO China,” The International Communication Gazette, vol. 69, no. 5 (2007): 419. 
20
 Cf. Zhao, “From Commercialization to Conglomeration,” 6-7; Huang, “Trace the Stones in 
Crossing the River: Media Structural Changes in Post-WTO China,” 419. 
21
 Zhang, The Transformation of Political Communication in China, 43-44.  
22
 Brady, Anne-Marie, Mar eting Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Wor  in the People’s 
Republic of China (Lanham, MD: Rownman & Littlefield, 2008), 114. 
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media and propaganda apparatus in the 1990s,
23
 that is, for how to cut costs 
through concentration of media in a few conglomerates without having to 
relinquish control. In 1996, the Guangzhou Daily Group (Guangzhou ribao baoye 
jituan 广州日报报业集团) was approved as China’s first press group and served 
as a pilot project that was carefully studied by top politicians before the decision 
was made to create further conglomerates.
24
 Lee notes that this was a “peculiar 
reversal of policy” as the Communist Party had previously denounced press 
conglomerization in the West as a means for the capitalist class to control public 
opinion.
25
 In fact, this reversal from initial denunciation to embracing a measure is 
a typical pattern in Chinese media reform that can also be observed in other areas, 
such as media localization (bentuhua 本土化).26  
Shortly after conglomerization was officially launched on a trial basis, it 
was boosted through a number of focusing events. First, after the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997, the overall growth of advertising revenue had dropped below 20%, 
and CCTV’s advertising revenue decreased for the first time since 1990.27 These 
statistics served as an indicator to policy makers that the media industry had 
reached a bottleneck and that restructuring was necessary to solve the problem.
28
 
Furthermore, as indicated above, with the impending World Trade Organization 
(WTO) accession, the government feared that China’s domestic media would be 
                                                          
23
 Ibid., 69.  
24
 Yuezhi Zhao, “The State, the Market, and Media Control in China,” in Who Owns the Media? 
Global Trends and Local Resistances, eds. Pradip Thomas, Zahorom Nain, and Peter Golding 
(London: Zed Books, 2004), 193. 
25
 Chin-chuan Lee, “Chinese Communication: Prisms, Trajectories, and Modes of Understanding,” 
in Power, Money, and Media: Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural 
China, ed. Lee  (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2000), 12. 
26
 Today, as will be seen below, this strategy is pursued by most Chinese external propaganda 
media, whereas in 2002, China’s main concern was still with preventing foreign media from 
pursuing “localization” in China, for instance by hiring Chinese anchors. “Zhao Qizheng 
zhuren shuo, waixuan gongzuo de zhongdian shi zai guoji yulun zhong biaoda Zhongguo de 
shengyin” 赵启正主任说，外宣工作的重点是在国际舆论中表达中国的声音  [Director 
Zhao says, the focus of propaganda work is to express the voice of China in the international 
public opinion], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao对外宣传参考 [External propaganda reference], no. 
9 (2002): 3. 
27
 Cf. Ruoyun Bai, “Media Commercialization, Entertainment, and the Party State: The Political 
Economy of Contemporary Chinese Television Entertainment Culture,” Global Media Journal, 
vol. 4, no. 6 (Spring 2005), available online at 
http://lass.purduecal.edu/cca/gmj/sp05/graduatesp05/gmj-sp05gradinv-bai.htm, accessed 
February 5, 2013.  
28
 Cf. ibid.  
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placed at the mercy of powerful global media conglomerates.
29
 The formation of 
conglomerates further opened the possibility for profitable papers to cross-
subsidize unprofitable but important party papers,
30
 an arrangement that is, for 
instance, used by the People’s Daily Group that runs more than twenty papers and 
periodicals.
 31
  
External propaganda media are not excluded from the trend towards 
conglomerization: The China Daily is part of the China Daily Group (Zhongguo 
ribao baoye jituan 中国日报报业集团, also known as the Zhongguo ribao she 中
国日报社),32 the People’s Daily Overseas edition and the Global Times are part 
of the People’s Daily Group (Renmin ribao baoye jituan 人民日报报业集团, the 
external “commercial face”, more commonly known as the Renmin ribao she 人
民日报社 ), 33  and CCTV and CRI are part of the China Radio, Film and 
Television Group (Zhongguo guangbo dianying dianshi jituan 中国广播电影电
视集团, the commercial face of the State Administration for Radio Film and 
Television, SARFT) established in 2001.
34
 
In the reform process, China systematically studied media conglomerates 
in other parts of the world. For instance, one article stated that there are three 
types of entities, government-owned, public, and commercial. Of the three, the 
latter two are clearly strongest and the most influential with regard to controlling 
public opinion (kongzhi yulun daoxiang 控制舆论导向 ), market penetration 
(shichang zhanyoulü 市场占有率), and operating funds (zijin yunying 资金运营). 
                                                          
29
 Cf. ibid. Also see Li Xingwen 黎兴文, “‘Ru shi’ jiang gei waixuan gongzuo dailai de jiyu he 
tiaozhan”“入世”将给外宣工作带来的机遇与挑战  [Chances and challenges brought to 
external propaganda work by entering the WTO], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 7 (2001): 32. 
30
 Cf. Bai, “Media Commercialization, Entertainment, and the Party State.” 
31
 Cf. “Baoshe jianjie” 报 社 简 介  [Brief introduction of the paper] 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/50142/104580/index.html, accessed February 12, 2013. These 
papers do not make the People’s Daily profitable or even self-sufficient, but they help alleviate 
some of the financial burden of the People’s Daily itself. 
32
 See “About China Daily,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cd/introduction.html, accessed 
February 12, 2013. 
33
 “Baoshe jianjie.”  
34
 Cf. “State Radio, Film and Television Conglomerate Established” December 7, 2001. 
http://english.people.com.cn/200112/06/eng20011206_86070.shtml, accessed June 30, 2012. 
Also see Jiang Fei and Huang Kuo, “Transnational Media Corporations and National Culture 
as a Security Concern in China,” in Security and Everyday Life, ed. Vida Bajc (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 225.  
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They were, therefore, the “mainstream” (zhuliu 主流) of world media groups.35 
However, despite such observations, conglomerization did not equal privatization 
of the media. According to a policy document from 2002, all media 
conglomerates belong to the Propaganda Departments at the respective levels in 
the bureaucracy and are therefore Party owned.
36
 
Media also continue to be governed by the rules of the Chinese 
bureaucratic system. Each medium has its own administrative rank that 
determines its position vis-à-vis other units. In addition, their access to 
information, the strictness with which they are controlled, and the scope of its 
distribution are determined by the administrative level of the Party Committee 
they belong to, i.e. national, provincial, prefectural, etc.
37
 For instance, the 
People’s Daily Group and Xinhua have ministerial rank, while CCTV, and the 
China Daily Group have vice-ministerial rank; however, all of them are national 
media, i.e. media owned by the Central Committee and financed through the 
central budget. Allocations of budgets are usually done through the propaganda 
departments (which simultaneously have a leading relationship over the media 
unit) of the party committee at the respective level.
38
 
 
                                                          
35
 “Guowai meiti jituan fazhan de zhuyao tedian he qushi (yi)” 国外媒体集团发展的主要特点和
趋势（一）[The main characteristics and trends of the development of media conglomerates 
abroad], Neibu tongxin内部通信 [Internal communication] , no. 9 (2001): 16.  
36 Zhao, “The State, the Market, and Media Control in China,” 196. I have not been able to get a 
hold of this internal document (which should be abbreviated as 中央发 [2002] 17号文件 in 
Chinese) and am therefore not sure what the exact formulation is. However, the idea that CPD 
should have the final say over media groups seems in line with China’s overall media policy 
and is confirmed through studies based on interviews, such as Lee, Chin-chuan, Zhou He, and 
Yu Huang, “‘Chinese Party Publicity Inc.’ Conglomerated: The Case of the Shenzhen Press 
Group,” Media, Culture & Society 28, no. 4 (2006): 581-602. 
37  Cf. Zhongguo renquan yanjiu zhongxin 中国人权研究中心  [Human rights in China], 
Zhongguo zhengfu ruhe kongzhi meiti 中国政府如何控制媒体 [Parallel English title: Media 
control in China] (2004) http://ir2008.org/PDF/initiatives/Internet/Media-Control_Chinese.pdf, 
accessed December 17, 2012, 30-33. Also see Zhongdang Pan:,“Improvising Reform Activities: 
The Changing Reality of Journalistic Practice in China,” in Power, Money, and Media: 
Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China, ed. Chin-chuan Lee 
(Evanston: North Western University Press, 2000), 77 for the importance attached to the 
administrative level of a media unit.  
38 Cf. Lee, He, and Huang, “Chinese Party Publicity Inc.” In other words, media are part of the 
Party bureuacracy, not the State bureaucracy. This is also corroborated by the fact that heads of 
media units mentioned that before conglomerization, they dealt directly with their respective 
propaganda departments, while after conglomerization, they have to go through their mother 
unit (Lee, He and Huang, “Chinese Party Publicity Inc”). This again reconfirms that media 
units answer to propaganda departments, both in terms of professional matters as well as in 
terms of budgets.  
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Capitalization (Meiti chanyehua 媒体产业化) 
As demonstrated above (Chapter 6.6), the credibility problem of Chinese 
media abroad has been used by policy entrepreneurs to push for increased 
capitalization and even privatization of the media. While commercialization and 
conglomerization were adopted, the CPC has so far largely resisted pressure for 
privatization of the media. Instead, it began a process of strictly controlled 
capitalization. 
In 2002, the Central Government laid the groundwork for subsequent 
regulations that officially allowed non-public investment in the media sector by 
separating editorial departments (caibian zhineng bumen 采编职能部门) and 
operating departments (guanli zhineng bumen 管理职能部门).39 Editorial work 
units were to remain completely Party-controlled, while operational units could be 
transformed into commercial enterprises. They were first opened to non-media 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) capital and two years later, in 2004, to direct 
domestic and indirect foreign non-public investment
40
 through the formation of 
joint ventures in which foreign capital could not exceed 49% of the shares.
41
  
External propaganda media have clearly begun separating editorial 
departments from market operations, allowing the latter to operate as companies, 
including abroad, that can cooperate with foreign media more easily.
42
 More 
recently, there have also been first experiments with listing some of these 
companies on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE).
43
 But this does not affect 
editorial departments at all. Thus, although non-public capital was allowed in the 
21
st
 century, including in limited experiments with media primarily targeting 
foreigners, the Party continues to own the controlling share of each medium. The 
idea that the Party must own the media has been one of the core tenets of the CPC. 
In addition, the experience of the Soviet Union (S.U.) has long served as a 
                                                          
39
 Chengju Huang, “Trace the Stones in Crossing the River,” 423. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid., 424. Before August 2005, a number of informal arrangements allowed on an ad hoc basis 
existed, but after the release of a “clarifying” document, the rules have been more strictly 
enforced. 
42
 Cf. Huang Jingwei 黄静玮 Xu Xiaodan 徐小丹, “Chuangxin duiwai chuanbo fangshi fangfa” 创
新对外传播方式方法  [Innovative ways and means of external communication], Duiwai 
chuanbo, no. 1 (2012): 14. Also see Hou Yingzhong and Guo Guanghua, Duiwai baodao celüe 
yu jiqiao, 63. 
43
 The operating company behind Xinhua’s new TV network, CNC World, was listed in February 
2012. Cf. “Xinhua affiliate begins trading in Hong Kong,” website of the BBC, February 8, 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16939808, accessed January 18, 2013. 
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powerful veto argument against any attempts to genuinely privatize the media. 
Between 2006 and 2010, a number of articles were published reaffirming the need 
to remain careful not to relinquish too much control and make the same mistakes 
as the S.U.
44
 More recently (2011-2013), this orthodoxy has come under attack on 
unofficial platforms, such as blogs,
45
 but also by media scholars.
46
  
 
Towards Privatization (Meiti siyouhua 媒体私有化)? 
There is a concrete reason for the renewed debate over whether or not 
media privatization directly contributed to the S.U.’s demise: In October 2007, 
Liu Binjie柳斌杰, the director of GAPP at the time, announced that he supported 
“comprehensive media listing” (meiti zhengti shangshi 媒体整体上市), i.e. no 
longer separating editorial and operating departments, instead allowing private 
capital in both. The first test cases followed suit soon after.
47
 The CPC has long 
shown an interest in how others like the United States (U.S.) government exert 
                                                          
44
 Articles publically available include Tang Xiude 唐修哲, “Yulun shikong – Sulian jieti de 
cuihuaji” 舆论失控——苏联解体的催化剂 [Loss of control over public opinion – A catalyst 
for the disintegration of the Soviet Union], Xiandai chuanbo 现 代 传 播  [Modern 
communication], no. 1 (2006): 107-109; Wang Zhenyi 王贞一, “Lun xinwen de ‘gongkaixing’ 
– Sulian jieti de yulun fubi” 论新闻的“公开性”——苏联解体的舆论伏笔 [On the ‘openness’ 
of the press – Public opinion paved the way for the disintegration of the Soviet Union], Xinwen 
tiandi (lunwenban) 新闻天地(论文版) [News universe (thesis edition)], no. 5 (2008): 69-70; 
Zhao Qiang 赵强, “Yulun shikong: Sulian jieti de cuihuaji” 舆论失控：苏联解体的催化剂 
[Loss of control over public opinion: A catalyst for the disintegration of the Soviet Union], 
Qiushi online, November 1, 2010, originally published in Qiushi, no. 21, 2010, 
http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2010/201021/201010/t20101030_54269.htm, accessed February 
5, 2013. Also see Li Shenming 李慎明 et al, “Sugong wangdang lishi jingyan jiaoxun” 苏共亡
党历史经验教训 [Lessons learned from the history of the fall of the Soviet Communist Party], 
http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class14/200804/36170.html, accessed June 3, 2011. 
45
 “Long de chuanren” 龍的传人 [Descendants of the dragon], “Sulian zhi suo yi bengkui, he 
kaifang yulun meiyou zhijie de guanxi” 苏联之所以崩溃，和放开舆论没有直接的关系 
[There is no direct relation between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberalization of 
public opinion], blog entry. January 1, 2013, http://blog.udn.com/tigerdemi/7189544, accessed 
February 5, 2013. 
46
 Pan Xianghui 潘祥辉, “Lun Sulian jieti zhong de chuanbo shiling yinsu - Jian bo Sulian jieti de 
yulun shikong shuo” 论苏联解体中的传播失灵因素——兼驳苏联解体的“舆论失控说” [On 
the factor of failure of communication in the disintegration of the Soviet Union - With a 
simulaneous refutation of the theory that the Soviet Union collapsed because of loss of control 
over public opinion], Ai sixiang, http://www.aisixiang.com/data/56699.html, accessed 
February 5, 2013.  
47
 Cf. “Comprehensive Media Listing” 媒体整体上市 [Meiti zhengti shangshi] in China Media 
Project Media Dictionary, http://cmp.hku.hk/2007/12/13/793/, accessed December 29, 2012. 
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control over the media without directly owning them,
48
 and the interest in at least 
experimenting with privatization seems genuine. However, the policy is still in the 
test phase. In 2011, after news leaked that 13 more media conglomerates were 
preparing to be listed comprehensively, an article in the media theory section of 
People’s Daily Online cautioned against proceeding too fast while the policy and 
possible adverse effects were not yet clear. Since then, it looks as if the policy is 
indeed moving towards the next stage, that of the line (xian 线). In February 2012, 
GAPP issued an “Opinion” on speeding up the transformation of publishing 
media groups, encouraging comprehensive listing for publishing groups.
49
 
Needless to say, however, the expansion of the policy is limited to the publishing 
sector and does not include news media groups.
50
 
 Thus, commercialization and conglomerization have not changed Party 
control and Party ownership of the media, and comprehensive listing is still in a 
test phase. More importantly, even if reforms progressed faster, the ownership of 
central level core Party news media would be least likely to be affected.
51
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 E.g. Li Zhi 李智, Guoji zhengzhi chuanbo: Kongzhi yu xiaoguo 国际政治传播：控制与效果 
[Parallel English title: International Political Communication: Control and Effects] (Beijing: 
Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2007), 63-109. 
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 《关于加快出版传媒集团改革发展的指导意见》Cf. Cao Hong 曹虹, “Xinwen chuban 
zongshu: zhichi chuban chuanmei jituan zhengti shangshi” 新闻出版总署：支持出版传媒集
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zaobao, http://finance.ifeng.com/ipo/xgyw/20120227/5665811.shtml, accessed January 18, 
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involved in news operations, only publishing.  
50
 Even for publishing work, this can still be considered a significant step. Publishing work is seen 
as an “important social and cultural activity” that is vital for the Party’s ability to correctly 
guide public opinion, for the moral and scientific education of the population and to strengthen 
the unity of the Chinese people. Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju 中共中央宣传
部干部局  [Cadre Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department of the CPC Central 
Committee], ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo 新时期宣传思想工作 [Propaganda and 
thought work in the new period] (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 2006), 69. Historically, control 
over printing and publishing facilities proved a very effective means to control the content that 
could reach people. Much of the policy to strictly control all publishing activities was probably 
already transmitted to China on the basis of the experience of the CPSU in its first months in 
power in 1917 when printing facilities were scarce and control over them was a vital means to 
get support. Cf. Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass 
Mobilization, 1917-1929 (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 41-42. 
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 An article on the topic from 2010 explained that a prerequisite before comprehensive listing was 
to check the “nature” (xingzhi 性质) of the medium; for Party papers and Party journals, there 
was currently no need for public listing. Zeng Fanbin 曾凡斌 and Zhang Rong 张荣, “Meiti de 
zhengti shangshi – Yi chuban chuanmei wei li” 媒体的整体上市探析——以出版传媒为例 
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[Parallel English title: Editorial Friend], no. 7(2010): 36. 
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Although external propaganda media are often presented as particularly 
open or as precursors for other media in China,
52
 they are controlled more strictly. 
First, they have traditionally been more “political” than most (though not all) 
domestic media. As a leading cadre from Shandong said in 1994, “the policy 
nature [zhengcexing 政策性 ] of external propaganda is stronger [than for 
domestic propaganda]; all external propaganda needs to be subordinate to and 
serve China’s overall foreign policy.”53 Second, although China clearly plans to 
increase the number, currently, there are only very few media primarily targeting 
foreigners, and they are concentrated at the Center. This makes them generally 
easier to control and to keep in check. Thus, while the needs of external 
propaganda may convince the CPC to implement certain reforms, external 
propaganda media are unlikely to implement drastic reforms for which they have 
no backing from the Party Center. 
 
China’s Foreign Language Media: Reality versus Self-Presentation 
As explained above, at the 2003 external propaganda conference, Li Bing 
李 冰  told participants that especially when Chinese news organizations 
cooperated with foreign news organizations they should “appear with their 
commercial face” (tebie shi yu waiguo hezuo yi shangye mianmao chuxian 特别
是与外国合作以商业面貌出现).54 In order to analyze what strategies China is 
actually pursuing in order to brand its media and possibly reduce the stigma 
attached to its Party-owned media, I will introduce the main waixuan media and 
contrast their place within the bureaucracy with their changing self-representation. 
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 E.g. Zhongshi Guo and Yu Huang, “Hybridized Discourse: Social Openness and Functions of 
English Media in Post-Mao China,” World Englishes 21, no. 2 (July 2002): 217-230; Tan 
Hongkai, “China Daily,” in China Ink: The Changing Face of Chinese Journalism, eds. Judy 
Polumbaum and Xiong Lei (Lanham et al., Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 55. 
53
 “Dong Fengji tongzhi zai shengwei duiwai xuanchuan lianxihui di yi ci huiyi shang de jiang hua” 
董凤基同志在省委对外宣传联系会第一次会议上的讲话 [Comrade Dong Fengji’s speech at 
the first meeting of the Joint Council for external propaganda of the provincial party 
committee], March 24, 1994, in Shandongsheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian ziliao 
huibian 山东省对外宣传工作文件资料汇编, vol. 1, 77.  
54
 Benkan teyue jizhe 本刊特约记者, “Tixian shidaixing, bawo guilüxing, fuyu chuangzaoxing: Ji 
2003 nian quanguo waixuan gongzuo huiyi.” 体现时代性 把握规律性 富于创造性—— 记
2003年全国外宣工作会议 [Embody the characteristics of the times, grasp the rules, be rich in 
innovation – Notes from the nationwide work meeting for external propaganda in 2003], 
Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 2 (2003): 3.  
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China Central Television (CCTV), China’s national television station, 
which has several channels involved in external propaganda, is a vice-ministerial 
unit under direct control of the SARFT. To the outside world, it is often presented 
as part of the China Media Group (Zhongguo guangbo dianying dianshi jituan 中
国广播电影电视集团), which functions as the “commercial face” of SARFT.55 
CCTV, in turn, fully owns China International Television Corporation (Zhongguo 
guoji dianshi zong gongsi 中国国际电视总公司 ), founded in 1984 and 
reorganized in 1997, a SOE which controls imports and exports of TV programs 
and is the only company licensed to sell the rights to CCTV’s productions 
abroad.
56
 Its most important foreign language channel is CCTV-News, formerly 
CCTV-International or CCTV-9. In 2004, CCTV as a whole was presented as “the 
national television station of the People’s Republic of China.”57 Currently, CCTV-
News is presented online as “the English language news channel of China Central 
Television (CCTV), the nation’s largest national broadcasting network.”58 Thus, 
the self-presentation over the last few years has been somewhat ambiguous, 
neither acknowledging the fact that CCTV is owned by the Party-state, nor trying 
very hard to conceal the fact that it has government ties.  
China Radio International (CRI), which broadcasts in 61 different 
languages, is a unit of vice-ministerial rank also under direct control of the 
SARFT. In 2003, its website introduced the radio service as aimed at “promoting 
understanding and friendship between the people of China and people throughout 
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 In a typical arrangement of “one organization with two nameplates” (yi ge jigou, liang kuai paizi 
一个机构，两块牌子) or “one set of people, two nameplates” (yi tao banzi, liang kuai paizi 一
套班子，两块牌子), an arrangement that is also replicated at lower levels. Cf. Zhang Jianhua 
章剑华, “Qiangzhan xianji bawo zhudong – Jiangsu guangdian shishi jituanhua gaige de chubu 
shijian” 抢占先机 把握主动  ——江苏广电实施集团化改革的初步实践 [Seize the 
opportunity, grasp the initiative – First practical (experience) of Jiangsu Radio and Television 
implementing comglomerization], Xinwen zhanxian 新闻战线 [News front], no. 7 (2002), 
available on People’s Daily Online, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper79/6821/664705.html, 
accessed March 3, 2013. 
56
 Cf. “Gongsi jieshao” 公司介绍  [Introduction to the company], Website of the China 
International Television Corporation, http://www.citvc.com/04/03/index.shtml, accessed 
August 13, 2012.  
57
 “About Us, CCTV (China Central Television),” May 8, 2003, archived version from February 2, 
2013, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20031204051409/http://www.cctv.com/english/20030805/101215.s
html, accessed February 5, 2013. 
58
 “CCTV News, Your Link to Asia,” April 26, 2010, 
http://english.cntv.cn/20100426/104481.shtml, accessed February 5, 2013.  
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the world”59 and as “one of the most influential international broadcasting stations 
in the world,”60 without mentioning any affiliation to the Party-state. By 2009, the 
self-introduction had added a note that CRI was “owned and operated by the 
state.” 61  Today, it continues to be introduced as “a state-run radio station 
broadcasting to a global audience.”62  
Xinhua News Agency, the national news agency, has ministerial rank and is 
officially under the State Council, although it has a Party Group that controls it. In 
2010, Xinhua launched its own television channel, China Xinhua News Network 
Corporation (CNC) World.
63
 Xinhua’s website, Xinhuanet, shows the most 
important changes in self-representation. Before 2003, the only link to the 
government was the remark that Xinhua was the “state news agency” of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).64 In 2003, in a counter-intuitive move, the 
“About us” section was changed as part of a major makeover to include a section 
called “Concept” that remained on the website between 2003 and June 2006. 
Aside from being written in awkward English that sticks closely to the original 
Chinese text, the “Concept” section also linked Xinhua to the CPC and 
acknowledged the existence of a leading party group within the news agency.
65
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 “CRI Online,” archived version from February 5, 2013, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030201133514/http://www.cri.com.cn/, accessed February 5, 
2013. 
60
 “Who Are We? The English Service of China Radio International,” archived version from 
February 1, 2003, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030210093719/http://crioracle.cri.com.cn/english/aboutus/index.
htm, accessed February 5, 2013.  
61 “Who We Are?”, archived version from March 4, 2009, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20090222161111/http://english.cri.cn/about_us/who-we-are.htm, 
accessed February 5, 2013. 
62
 “About China Radio International,” September 20, 2012, 
http://english.cri.cn/11114/2012/09/20/1261s723239.htm, accessed February 5, 2013. The 
same applies for the self-introduction in German. “Radio China International,” 
http://german.cri.cn/info/cri.htm, accessed February 5, 2013. 
63
 “Xinhua launches CNC World English channel,” Xinhuanet, July 1, 2010, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-07/01/c_13378575.htm, accessed June 27, 
2012.  
64
 “Brief Introduction to Xinhua News Agency,” archived version from May 10, 2000,  
      http://web.archive.org/web/20000511224506/www.xinhua.org/english/index.htm.  
65
 “Xinhuanet..com [sic!] consistent principle is to persist in giving top priority to national interests, 
unswervingly uphold correct guidance to public opinion and safeguard the authenticity, 
authoritativeness and objectivity of news reporting. ‘Making Xinhuanet.com more influential 
and bigger as soon as possible’ is the ardent expectation of the Party Central Committee on 
Xinhuanet.com. Never resting on success and keeping growing are the requirements posed by 
Leading Party Group of the Xinhua News Agency. Keeping pace with the times and seeking 
the outstanding are the consensus of all Xinhuanet.com employees. […] Xinhuanet.com will 
continue to develop vigorously, boldly make innovations and make steady progress. It will bear 
in mind its duties and tasks, and make every possible effort to fulfill the historical mission of 
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After June 2006, the self-introduction was changed into a simpler format that 
focused only on the website, introducing Xinhuanet’s achievements. This self-
introduction is still online and updated periodically. Xinhua News Agency itself, 
in stark contrast to the Chinese version of Xinhuanet,
66
 is not introduced at all. 
Today, the status of Xinhua as the state news agency is not denied for obvious 
reasons; however, attempts are made to show Xinhua’s official website from its 
“commercial face” by explaining that since 2010, Xinhuanet has been 
transforming itself into a corporation.
67
 CNC World’s self-presentation online is 
ambiguous: On the one hand, it even introduces the institutional arrangement of 
“one organization with two nameplates” (yi ge jigou liang kuai paizi 一个机构两
块牌子 ): “The CNC is based in Xinhua headquarters in Beijing. CNC and 
Xinhua’s TV Department are the same institution under different names.”68 On 
the other hand, Xinhua New Agency itself is not introduced on the TV channel’s 
website.  
China News Service (CNS), unlike Xinhua, is not under the direct 
authority of the State Council. No information about its place within the 
bureaucracy seems to be available from official sources, but a number of 
unofficial websites state that it is under the authority of the State Council 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO).
69
 China News Service now also has an 
English language website that introduces the news agency as “a state-level news 
agency sponsored and established by Chinese journalists and renowned overseas 
Chinese experts on October 1, 1952.”70 The English version does not replicate the 
                                                                                                                                                               
‘publicizing China and reporting the world’ and scale new heights in the network field.” 
(“Concept,” Xinhuanet, archived version from May 26, 2006, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060430021318/www.xinhuanet.com/english/aboutus_e4.htm). 
66
 See “Guanyu Xinhuashe” 关于新华社 [About Xinhua News Agency], http://203.192.6.89/xhs/, 
accessed March 3, 2013. 
67
 “Starting from 2010, Xinhuanet began transforming itself from a governmental cultural 
institution to an enterprise, operating in the entity of the Xinhua Network Corporation Limited. 
In May 2011, the Xinhuanet Corporation LTD was officially established.” (“Brief Introduction 
to Xinhuanet,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/special/2011-11/28/c_131274495.htm, 
accessed June 28, 2012).  
68
 “An Introduction to CNC: CNC’s Corporate Governance,” http://www.cncworld.tv/about/, 
accessed February 5, 2013.  
69
 Cf. “Zhongxinshe zhuguan bumen shi shenme danwei” 中新社  主管部门是什么单位?, 
http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/150709461.html?fr=qrl&cid=84&index=1, accessed March 3, 
2013. “Guanyu Zhongxinshe you ge wenti qingjiao dajia” 关于中新社有个问题请教大家”, 
http://home.donews.com/donews/forum/7/2003-08/12/374953.html, accessed March 3, 2013.  
70
 “About us,” http://www.ecns.cn/aboutus.shtml, accessed January 13, 2013. 
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Chinese version, as the self-introduction highlights, but provides “firsthand data 
and insight into life in China.”71  
China Daily Agency is a service unit of vice-ministerial rank (equivalent 
in rank to the Guangming Daily). In English, it is now officially known as the 
China Daily Media Group. It owns twelve different English language print 
publications plus one national level key news website (guojia zhongdian xinwen 
wangzhan 国家重点新闻网站, namely the China Daily Online).72 There are some 
uncertainties which unit the China Daily currently belongs to, and naturally, no 
such information has been published by official sources in recent years. In its 
initial stages, the China Daily belonged to the People’s Daily Agency. Between 
1988 and February 1994, it was “hosted”73 by the CPD.74 As the China Daily is a 
media group, and Document 17 states that all media groups belong to the 
respective propaganda departments at their administrative level,
75
 the China Daily 
Group should theoretically be fully owned by the CPD. However, two (admittedly 
unreliable) sources state that the China Daily is under the authority of OEP/SCIO. 
The first writes that the China Daily Group is directly under the authority of SCIO 
(zhishu guowuyuan waixuanban 直属国务院外宣办) 76 and the second that the 
China Daily is supervised (zhuban 主办) by the China Daily Group and that 
                                                          
71
 Ibid. 
72
 According to Brady, the China Daily Agency is largely able to finance itself through one of its 
subsidiaries, 21
st
 Century, which is aimed at Chinese learners of English. Brady, Marketing 
Dictatorship, 168.  
73
 Daiwei guanli代为管理 (often shortened to daiguan 代管 in official documents), refers to a 
highly restricted form of leadership of one unit over another. A unit managed thus is called 
affiliated institution (guakao jigou 挂靠机构). Affiliated units are located on the premises of 
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but have their own seal and a fairly large amount of freedom regarding personnel, 
administration, and finances. As opposed to directly subordinate units (zhishu jigou 直属机构), 
they may also directly send documents and receive documents from the State Council or the 
Central Committee, without having to go through the unit that manages them. Cf. Yu Keping 
俞可平, Dangdai geguo zhengzhi tizhi – Zhongguo 当代各国政治体制—中国 [Current 
political systems of various countries: China] (Lanzhou: Lanzhou daxue chubanshe, 1998), 93. 
The arrangement of daiwei guanli is mostly used for smaller units in order to save office space 
and other resources (Cf. “Ge lei jigou jianjie” 各类机构简介 [Introduction of various (types of) 
structures], http://www.xjem.gov.cn/bw/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=10967, accessed Aug 18, 
2010).  
74
Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui, Zhongguo gongchandang 
zuzhishi ziliao, vol. 7, 231.  
75
 Cf. Ruoyun Bai, “Media Commercialization, Entertainment, and the Party State.” 
76
 Which in itself is not quite correct, it is either called Guowuyuan xinwenban 国务院新闻办 or 
Zhongyang waixuanban 中央外宣办. http://wenwen.soso.com/z/q188994546.htm.  
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OEP/SCIO is its sponsoring unit (zhuguan danwei 主管单位).77 Since the China 
Daily is a foreign propaganda media, it is not completely unlikely that OEP/SCIO 
is actually ultimately responsible for it.  
Online, the paper is introduced as “China’s national English-language 
newspaper.”78 The first “About us” section from May 2000 indirectly linked the 
web platform of the paper, China Daily Online, to the government by stating that 
the site was “designated by the Chinese government as one of the country’s five 
key media websites.”79 By 2012, the connection to party or state had been entirely 
eliminated. The website of the China Daily introduces the China Daily Group 
with 12 different print media in its “About us” section.80 The China Daily is 
introduced as the “leading English-language news organization in China.” Party or 
state ownership is not mentioned.  
The People’s Daily Agency, presented as the People’s Daily Group, is a 
service unit of ministerial rank directly under the authority of the Central 
Committee. One of its publications is the People’s Daily Overseas Edition, which 
has vice-ministerial rank.
81
 On its online platform, Renminwang, the People’s 
Daily is tied to the party (as well as to the state).
82
 Previous introductions 
presented the People’s Daily itself as “a newspaper leading the others in China” 
that “reflects the views of the Chinese people, expounds on justice and lambasts 
various forms of malpractice.”83 Currently, the People’s Daily is, in the first place 
introduced as “one of the world’s top ten newspapers,” but praise by Hu Jintao 胡
锦涛 of the People’s Daily Online as “advocating the Party’s belief, guiding 
public opinion and warmly serving netizens in the years since inception” 84  is 
added in the same paragraph. The People’s Daily and the online platform of the 
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 http://www.bjlccm.com/photonei.asp?id=280.  
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 “About us,” http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2011-04/13/content_12319449.htm, accessed February 
6, 2013. 
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 Chinadaily.com.cn. Archived version from January 24, 2002.  
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2012.  
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 Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui, Zhongguo gongchandang 
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83
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People’s Daily Group are therefore mainly presented as “authoritative” because of 
their party/state ties. Despite the conglomerization and presentation of the 
People’s Daily Agency as the People’s Daily Group, the fame of the paper as the 
mouthpiece of the CPC would prevent any other strategy. The need to appeal to 
foreign audiences is offset by the need to pledge loyalty to the Party. 
This does not, however, apply to one of the subsidiaries of the People's 
Daily, the Global Times. Published since 2009, it is the English edition of the 
Huanqiu shibao 环球时报, a unit directly under the People’s Daily Agency. The 
English and Chinese editions are very different; however: Compared to the highly 
nationalist Chinese paper, the English version sounds very restrained, although by 
and large, it is still more nationalistic than the China Daily. The Global Times 
English online edition was launched in April 2009, providing fewer different self-
introductions to compare. Nonetheless, the self-presentation has changed 
drastically. In 2009 and 2010, it was presented as a “new reliable channel for 
Chinese people and the rest of the world to understand one another, […] 
expressing Chinese people’s real feelings, sharing their opinions and standpoints 
on significant international issues and promoting their understanding of the global 
views on China.”85 While the paper was marketed as “the people’s voice” from 
the very beginning, today, the Global Times has a much more “trendy,” buzz-
word rich introduction which stresses the following themes:  
1. GT is a key to understanding China, which “changes every day.” 
2. GT is read by the Chinese and international elite and future elite. 
3. GT is different from traditional Chinese media. This is not explicitly spelled out, but 
hinted at by stating that GT provides “in-depth coverage of controversial stories, from 
child AIDS victims to urban renewal, forced demolition and the fight against 
corruption.” 
4. GT is “essential reading for every China-watcher.” 
5. Foreign media consider the GT a “trustworthy source.” 
 
It is needless to say that no connection to the party-state is mentioned in the 
self-introduction, although the link is has been mentioned in official Xinhua news 
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 “About us,” archived version from January 13, 2010, 
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releases.
86
 The introduction also fails to mention that Global Times is part of the 
People’s Daily Group, as association with the official party mouthpiece would 
have a similar effect as linking it to the party-state.
87
  
The weekly Beijing Review and monthly China Today are both 
subordinate units (jushu danwei 局属单位 ) of the Foreign Language Office 
(FLO)/China International Publishing Group (CIPG), which is, in turn, under 
direct leadership of OEP/SCIO. Thus, while Beijing Review and China Today 
used to be presented very differently to the outside world (one as an official and 
the other as a “popular” magazine), they are under the same leadership. The 
difference is no longer stressed as much today; the Beijing Review is dubbed “the 
only national newsmagazine in English.” Both are presented as subsidiaries of the 
CIPG, which appears with its “commercial face.” 
In August 2008, the first issue of the new English edition of the Chinese 
journal China Newsweek (Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan 中国新闻周刊), called 
NewsChina Magazine, was published. Like the Global Times, NewsChina 
Magazine is presented as a fashionable modern journal explaining a vibrant 
country on the move to foreigners.
88
 The self-introduction explains “This brand-
new magazine will show you a China in transformation. We are not used to 
lecturing or moralizing. We like to present news in an honest and open way, 
crafted as if we were telling a story.”89 This is, of course, nothing but a relatively 
good “translation” of the instructions that have been given regularly to external 
propaganda working workers since the 1980s. Nonetheless, like the Global Times, 
NewsChina is also branded as entirely independent and a journal presenting a 
rising and vibrant country without shirking controversial issues. 
 
With regard to their presentation and their closeness to the CPC and the 
Chinese government, different media have pursued different strategies, or rather, 
taken on different roles. The results of the analysis show a trend to distinguish 
between two clear and two ambiguous branding strategies: First, a number of 
media are branded as authoritative, credible and reliable because, not in spite of, 
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their connection to the party-state. Examples include Xinhua, the People’s Daily, 
CNS, and CRI. In these cases, the fact that China has state media is presented as a 
normal practice that is done by many other countries. Second, another batch of 
media is branded as commercial, independent, modern, and audacious. Examples 
are the Global Times and China Newsweek. In these cases, the Party-state 
connection is de-emphasized or veiled without having to lie. When media, such as 
the China Daily Group, appear with their “commercial face,” this is no outright lie, 
either. The China Daily Group exists legally; it simply has no say over editorial 
choices, but is only in charge of commercial aspects of operations. Third, there are 
media which are currently still affiliated with their sponsoring unit, but which are 
not branded as authoritative and might be disassociated in the future. These are 
CNTV, Xinhua’s TV channel CNC World, and the China Today. Fourth, there are 
media that are presented as “national”: “China’s national English language 
newspaper” (the China Daily), the “largest national broadcasting network” 
(CCTV), and “the only national newsmagazine in English” (the Beijing Review). 
The word “national” implies an official nature, yet at the same time, all of them 
are presented as part of commercial media groups to the outside world. Media in 
this category, too, might either be disassociated later or branded as authoritative 
because of their state connections.   
Summing up, not all media are presented with their “commercial face” or 
branded as entirely independent. Instead, the CPC seems to encourage different 
media that will be able to take on different roles and present different points of 
view, thus creating an impression of plurality. In this division, newly launched 
media are branded as independent and controversial. This is possible because they 
started afresh and thus do not have a history of sticking closely to the Party line. 
The world does not know them yet, which makes it possible to assign them any 
role. More established media, on the other hand, have less leeway in branding 
themselves, as they have acted as Party or state media for decades. In some cases, 
the Party-state ties are emphasized to present the medium as authoritative; in other 
cases, different branding options are open, as media are neither strongly 
associated with nor disassociated from the Party and the Chinese government.  
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9.2 Daily practices 
Below, the most basic means to maintain control over media will be 
introduced, divided into those before, during, and after news production. 
Importantly, I am highlighting the mechanism through which the Party-state tries 
to control media, not the entire news production process. People (both foreigners 
and Chinese) that I interviewed stressed that most of the news production process 
is very similar to that in media anywhere in the world, except perhaps until 
recently a little less stressfull.
90
 In addition, agency within the given framework is 
encouraged in the overall Chinese bureaucracy, in which lower units usually have 
a significant degree of leeway in interpreting “the spirit” (jingshen 精神) of 
instructions from a higher level and tailoring relatively vague policy directions 
usually summed up in a slogan to local or sectoral needs.  
However, I argue that in external propaganda, journalistic agency is 
limited to non-sensitive stories in non-crisis situations, when such agency is 
encouraged, as well as to trying to lobby the Center to change its rules. As 
opposed to some commercial media, which rely on sensational stories for 
financial gain or provincial media, which may enjoy a certain degree of protection 
through provincial governments, external propaganda have little incentive to 
circumvent the CPD’s orders. The close proximity of external propaganda media 
to the Center combined with financial subsidies means that there is very little 
reason to push the boundaries, except in cases where such experiments have been 
approved by or at least not explicitly prohibited by the Center.  
 
Before Production 
The news production process in China is both carefully planned and tightly 
controlled.  
First, there is licensing, which theoretically affects all but the most high 
ranking media, the People’s Daily and Xinhua, which have the same 
administrative rank as the licensing organization.
91
 Aside from needing to obtain a 
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 Jim Laurie, interview, Hong Kong, January 14, 2011, Alfred Roman, interview, Hong Kong, 
November 2010, Chinese journalist, interview, Beijing, April 2011. 
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 Licensing is handled by the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP). GAPP 
was established as an institution of vice-ministerial rank under the name of State Press and 
Publication Administration (SPPA) Guojia xinwen chuban shu 新闻出版署 in January 1987 on 
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license to run a medium in the first place, there are also different types of media 
that are handled differently from the outset. One of the most basic distinctions in 
Chinese media is between political content and apolitical content, such as cultural 
or economic issues. Some media are not even authorized to begin with to produce 
content that falls into the category “politics.” One example is the magazine China 
Today for most of its history.
92
  
Second, coverage of large-scale, important events is usually planned and 
prepared several years in advance, with action plans what should be done at what 
point in time. For example, one major topic at the nationwide external propaganda 
conference in late 1986 was preparing the coverage of the 40
th
 anniversary of the 
founding of the PRC in October 1989
93
 –coverage that was ultimately 
overshadowed by the image crisis following the crackdown on Tiananmen Square. 
Likewise, OEP/SCIO began organizing its coverage of the Hong Kong handover 
in 1995.
94
 In addition, propaganda and external propaganda departments make 
annual plans what to focus on at particular points in time of the year.
95
 
                                                                                                                                                               
vice-ministerial SPPA, a larger number of print media were outside of its control, including the 
Guangming Daily and the China Daily (cf. Zhao Yuezhi, Media, Market and Democracy, 23). 
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Finally, there are very detailed instructions as to what media can and 
cannot report. Today, some of this is governed by official regulations. However, 
as is well-known, these are only the tip of the iceberg of what media need to pay 
attention to. In addition to openly available regulations, there are additional 
internal regulations handed down through the Party bureaucracy, as well as 
concrete written and oral instructions. For daily news production, propaganda 
departments at all levels produce briefings on which topics and terminology to 
avoid and to highlight. The principle of “relying mainly on positive propaganda” 
(yi zhengmian xuanchuan wei zhu 以正面宣传为主 ) already suggests that 
circulars do not only include topics to be avoided, but also give orders on which 
topics to report and to focus on. One Chinese author lists the different ways of 
giving instructions to the media through non-public channels: Internal regulations 
from CPD and other departments, written notifications, notifications and oral 
instructions by phone (dianhua tongzhi, koutou “da zhaohu” 电话通知, 口头“ 打
招呼”) and through briefings ( ai “tongqi” hui 开“通气”会 or chuifenghui 吹风
会 ). 96  Obviously, propaganda departments do not speak with each journalist 
individually, but have contacts in each unit whom they give instructions and who 
then hand them down further within the media unit. Thus, most individual 
journalists are aware of the basic framework, but do not get in contact with the 
system directly. Instruction can include all possible aspects imaginable, though 
not necessarily at the same time: what to pay attention to, whether to report more 
or less on a certain topic, whether to report the positive or negative side of a story 
or both, when to make sure to strictly adhere to certain slogans, which articles to 
consult for reference, and which departments to consult before reporting on a 
particular topic.
97
 In addition, the CPD addresses long term trends and widespread 
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problems in its journal Internal Communications (Neibu tongxin 内部通信 ), 
published since 1991.
98
  
 
During Production 
In case of uncertainties, cadres are supposed to ask for directions (qingshi 
请示) from the relevant units. In the past, important and sensitive issues did not 
only need approval from CPD, but also from relevant departments whose policy 
sector was reported on.
99
 In the case of sudden events, this has become 
increasingly impractical, so new institutions have been put into place to allow 
Chinese media to report faster. China has been forced to react to sudden events 
because other news outlets will report, and the likelihood that China can hide 
anything even within its own territory has been constantly decreasing. The general 
rule since 1998 has been to allow reports unless explicitly proscribed, report as 
neutrally as possible and add opinion and direction (quxiang 趋向) only after the 
relevant departments have given instructions and guidance.
100
 
To make sure nothing undesired gets published or released, since the 
1990s, media – including waixuan media– have employed “reading groups” (yi du 
xiaozu 一读小组) as part of the editorial process that are present in shifts day and 
night.
101
 These reading groups consist of cadres, who are usually older (as older 
people have a better feeling for sensitive and potentially sensitive language and 
content), who check news on behalf of the CPD (or lower level propaganda 
departments in the case of local media). A similar “censor” system exists for 
CCTV and presumably for radio and local television channels as well.
102
 As Jim 
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Laurie, advisor to the new English language channel CCTV-News, put it: “It is 
very similar to the final editing process in other countries, only that they look for 
different things.” 103  Although the official position of these “political editors” 
within the system is not clear, they are directly integrated in the overall editorial 
department,
104
 and their decisions de facto overrule those of the editors.
105
  
 
After Production 
The process of checking news does not stop with publication or release. 
Instead, since the 1990s, China has made use of the “news reading” (xinwen 
yueping 新闻阅评) system, which is considered an important mechanism (jizhi 机
制) for macro-managing (hongguan guanli 宏观管理) the media.106 The news 
reading system was instituted at the central level in 1994 when the CPD 
established its own News Reading Small Group (Xinwen yueping xiaozu 新闻阅
评小组),107 following earlier experiments at lower levels. Bandurski and Lin as 
well as Brady have given some accounts of the institutional arrangement of news 
reading work.
108
 The existence of these groups is also confirmed through notices 
that media often publish online when they receive praise through the news reading 
system.
109
 The institutional arrangement might be different in each propaganda 
department; nonetheless, it is instructive to look at some case studies on which 
detailed information is available. An article in Internal Communications (Neibu 
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tongxin 内部通信 ) describes the “news reading group” arrangement at the 
Propaganda Department of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee and gives 
some insight into how the system functions in concrete terms: 
News reading work was started in Beijing as early as in August 1991,
110
 
when the Municipal Party Committee’s Propaganda Department organized a 
group of 12 senior cadres with experience in news work to become part of a 
“News Reading Assessment/Consultation Group” (Xinwen yueping yi zu 新闻阅
评议组).111 The Propaganda Department’s News Office (xinwen chu 新闻处) 
would then, at irregular intervals publish a briefing (jianbao 简报) called Xinwen 
yueping qingbao 新闻阅评情报 on the basis of suggestions made by the twelve 
senior cadres.
112
  
In 1996, the operating structure and regulations of news reading work were 
adjusted, and the News Reading Work Leading Small Group was formed. It was 
put under the leadership of the director of the News Office, who also became the 
LSG’s head (you… fenguan 由…分管).113 The distribution range of the briefing 
compiled on the basis of news reading cadres was enlarged. Initially, it had only 
been distributed to “important leaders” of the municipality and within the Beijing 
propaganda department. After the change, it included the people responsible for 
the main media units affiliated with Beijing municipality. In addition, it was 
determined that all major media units belonging to Beijing Municipality would 
fall under the scope of news reading, including newspapers, radio stations, and 
television stations. Each news reading cadre was assigned to a whole medium (all 
pages of a newspaper, including advertising, all programs from beginning to end, 
around the clock).
114
 Responsibilities, organizational arrangements, expenditures 
(jingfei 经费), and more were laid down as formal rules.115 Beijing’s news reading 
system works according to the principle of “carefully pick out problems, precisely 
point out successes, and kindly make suggestions, with a focus on ‘picking out 
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problems’” (xi tiao maobing, jing shuo chengji, shan ti jianyi, yi ‘tiao maobing’ 
wei zhu 细挑毛病、精说成绩、善提建议”，以“挑毛病”为主). This has meant 
that between 1991 and 2001, when the article was written, more than 70 percent 
of “Opinions” (yijian) issued within the system were about flaws.116  
Reports from locales testify to the fact that the news reading system is also 
used in external propaganda work, even below the provincial level.
117
 For locales, 
the target publications are usually in Chinese. For foreign language media at the 
central or provincial level, there is the additional difficulty of finding senior 
cadres who are familiar with the correct ideological line, knowledge of the 
language, and a sense for what adaptations are permissible in order to 
accommodate foreigners’ reading habits. Nonetheless, media such as the China 
Daily are definitely included in the overall system. For instance, the China Daily 
was praised for its Xinjiang and Tibet related coverage in the CPD’s journal News 
Reading (Xinwen yueping 新闻阅评).118  
Depending on the mistake that senior readers find, media units might 
either only get a warning or be subjected to a number of penalties. Under the trend 
to “rule the country by law” (yi fa zhi guo 依法治国) the basic regulations about 
media infractions and penalties are available openly in written form. These 
regulations are relatively abstract and still contain a large number of catch-all 
definitions to retain flexibility, accommodate both “lax” and “tight” times as well 
as to be open to all kinds of changes in the political line and to local interpretation. 
Thus, without concrete written and oral instructions from propaganda departments, 
they say very little about what media can and cannot report at a particular point in 
time. Nonetheless, a look at the official regulations is instructional to get a first 
idea of the official framework before looking at how these rules are implemented 
in practice. There are seven different categories of mistakes that a medium can 
commit:
119
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1. Negating the guiding position of Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng 
Xiaoping Theory and in so doing causing bad effects on society (否定马列
主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论的指导地位，造成恶劣的社会影响). 
2. Contradicting the party’s line, principles, or policies and thus making a grave 
political mistake (违背党的路线、方针、政策，出现严重的政治错误).  
3. Divulging state secrets and thus endangering national security or harming 
national interests (泄露国家秘密，危害国家安全，损害国家利益). 
4. Going against policies on ethnic minorities and religion and thus 
endangering ethnic unity and impacting social stability (违反民族、宗教政
策，危害民族团结，影响社会稳定). 
5. Preaching murder and violence, disseminating pornography, superstition and 
pseudo-science and thus committing a mistake in ideological direction (宣扬
凶杀、暴力、色情、迷信和伪科学，思想导向错误). 
6. Spreading rumors, creating false news and thus disturbing the overall work 
(gongzuo daju) (传播谣言，编发假新闻，干扰工作大局). 
7. Any other grave mistake as defined by the relevant propaganda departments 
and press and publication administrative departments (党委宣传部门和新闻
出版行政管理部门认定的其他严重错误).120 
 
According to the document, when a warning is issued, the supervising unit 
(zhuguan danwei 主管单位) and the sponsoring unit (zhuban danwei 主办单位) 
need to conduct an investigation into the issue (documented in writing) and 
discipline the people responsible. Warnings will also be made available to other 
units through CPD’s journal News Reading or, for cases that are both severe and 
instructional, in Internal Communications. If a medium receives three warnings 
within a year, it will be suspended, and the editor-in-chief or director of the 
medium needs to be fired. If a medium that has been suspended before commits 
another mistake, GAPP will take away its serial number (kanhao 刊号).121  
Examples from Internal Communications illustrate how easily one can 
commit a mistake, and what the costs to those involved are. For instance, on 
August 3, 2000, the Chengdu Evening News (Chengdu wanbao 成都晚报 ) 
                                                                                                                                                               
Youth Daily receives a warning for a report violating regulations], Neibu Tongxin, no. 23 
(2001): 18. The mistake mentioned here falls into category no. 7 (党委宣传部门和新闻出版
行政管理部门认定的其他严重错误). The document is Xinchulian [2000] no. 19. The full text 
is available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_61303.htm, accessed August 
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published an article called “Qi Qi and Hu Bing ‘pick the best for themselves.’”122 
The article included a photo of the two models living in Hong Kong. Qi Qi wore a 
T-shirt which said, in English: “It still hurts after 1989.” According to the report 
conducted by the propaganda department of Sichuan Provincial Party Committee, 
the photographer did not check the photos before uploading them onto the paper’s 
computer. Neither the editor in charge, nor the Publications Department, nor the 
Editorial Board’s night shift noticed the problem, so the photo was published on 
page eight of the paper the next day. The mistake was then noticed through the 
news reading system and categorized as a “grave political error” (yanzhong 
zhengzhi cuowu 严重政治错误) by Internal Communications,123 the most serious 
category of mistakes. Subsequently, the Chengdu Evening News received one 
warning and all those involved had to write self-criticisms. More importantly, 
however, the person in charge of the editorial board also received a serious 
warning (yanzhong jinggao chufen 严重警告处分) and had to pay a fine of 1000 
RMB. The heads of the photography department and publishing department both 
received a warning (jinggao chufen 警告处分) and each had to pay a fine of 600 
RMB. In addition, all people who were considered directly responsible, such as 
the photographer, also received a serious warning and had to pay a fine of 800 
RMB each. Finally, the photographer and the editor responsible for page eight 
were both “reassigned a new job” (lingxing anpai gongzuo 另行安排工作).124  
In another example, the Morning News (Xinwen chenbao 新闻晨报), a 
subsidiary of the Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao 解放日报 ), committed a 
“serious political mistake” (zhongda zhengzhi cuowu 重大政治错误) by referring 
to Taiwan as the “country which exports the most electronic products in the world” 
(quanqiu zui da dianzi chanpin chukou guo 全球最大电子产品出口国) on page 
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21 of the paper.
125
According to the investigation that followed suit conducted by 
the Liberation Daily, the subsidiary had copied the news from a third party and 
did not notice the “incorrect” formulation. The person in charge of editing page 21 
“lacked a sense of responsibility” (quefa gongzuo zerenxin 缺乏工作责任心) and 
did not inspect the page diligently. Likewise, the responsible person at the 
editorial department did not exert strict control (baguan bu yan 把关不严). The 
Liberation Daily concluded that the political consciousness and the sense of 
responsibility at the paper were simply not very strong. All that were considered 
responsible for this serious political mistake would receive an individual criticism, 
be transferred, receive a warning, and would not receive their monthly 
bonus/salary (koufa dangyue jiangjin 扣发当月奖金 ). 126  A foreign expert I 
interviewed indicated that Chinese editors’ and journalists’ primary concern is to 
make it through the day without making a mistake that could cost them a 
significant portion of their salary or even their job.
127
  
Importantly, although people like Li Xiguang 李希光 have argued that 
China needs to change its ways of handling the media and become more 
flexible,
128
 China’s external propaganda media are part of this system and work 
largely by the same rules when it comes to sensitive issues and mistakes. The fact 
that the boundaries between external and domestic propaganda are no longer 
considered very pronounced reinforces the need to apply all rules to China’s 
foreign language media as well. Having to pay close attention to possible mistakes 
both costs a lot of manpower and energy and also provides a strong counter-
incentive towards experimenting or testing the borders in instances that are not 
explicitly approved.  
In interviews, it is common to encounter complaints that the penalty 
system is detrimental to creativity and innovation in China’s English language 
media, as editors’ primary goal is to avoid political mistakes and avoid being 
penalized. A “foreign expert” working for the China Daily in 2005 indicated that 
this was also true for China’s most important English language daily during the 
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time that he stayed there.
129
 In a work environment dominated by fear of making 
mistakes, there is little room for the innovation and creativity that is regularly 
demanded of waixuan workers.  
In 2010, when the China Daily accidentally quoted a Tiananmen activist 
(not one of the most famous and most easily recognizable) in one of its articles, 
the paper’s editor-in-chief, Zhu Ling朱灵, was called into the CPD, and funds 
intended for the creation of a China Daily office in London were frozen 
temporarily,
130
 presumably in addition to other fines levied on individuals. Of 
course, the expansion into Europe was not blocked permanently, but nonetheless, 
the system of warnings as well as fines which both units as a whole and 
individuals may be subjected to cannot but have a chilling effect.  
As the speed with which news need to be delivered in order to be 
competitive has increased, this pressure has grown, too, as mistakes need to be 
detected and decisions made within much less time. This is one instance in which 
the system external propaganda media are a part of is in direct contradiction to the 
calls made in public. This does not mean that the calls for more innovation and 
creativity in expanding China’s foreign language media are not serious, but this 
example clearly shows prioritization. The fact that mistakes are penalized, but 
there is no clear system to measure and reward means that innovation is slowed 
down because new ideas can only be tested in close coordination with the 
authorities. 
A number of people have argued for treating external propaganda media 
according to different rules and by default allowing them more leeway in their 
reporting, language, and choice of topics. These proposals will be addressed again 
below. By and large, however, external propaganda continues to function by much 
of the same rules as media intended for domestic consumption.
131
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9.3 Media Values and Their Applicability to External Propaganda 
Work 
I suggest that the new term used by the CPC in 2009, “international 
communication capabilities,” was no coincidence, but reflected the efforts that 
people familiar with the Western understanding of the media and journalism had 
started in the 1980s and resumed in the 21
st
 century to get the Party to change its 
understanding of what external propaganda was and what reforms it required in 
order to be successful. The link between “correct terminology” and “correct 
understanding” is still very pronounced in the CPC,132 and academics and external 
propaganda experts had long justified their choice of terminology by arguing that 
using a specific term was important in order to change (or retain) specific 
practices.
133
 The debate over correct terminology ongoing since the 1980s reached 
new heights in the 21st century. To many, a change in terminology is needed to 
reflect an actual change in practice or to help cadres to correctly understand the 
work that they have to do. In both cases, the focus is on getting cadres and 
journalists to pay more attention to professional journalistic standards.  
Generally, continued use of the term xuanchuan has been justified by 
saying that it reminds cadres and journalists of their responsibilities to defend the 
interests of the Party and of the state and to let them know that they are not simply 
doing reporting, but using reporting to serve a mission, namely to improve 
China’s image and guide international public opinion. For instance, one author 
argued in 2005 that only using the word “communication” (chuanbo 传播) “easily 
weakens media’s social responsibility and their national mission and almost 
makes it appear that communicating towards the target countries can transcend the 
state’s and the nation’s interests and even reaches the realm of global unity 
(quanqiu datong 全球大同).”134 Instead, the author argues to use chuanbo and 
                                                          
132
 See for instance Lu Di 陆地, “Ruhe cong duiwai xuanchuan zouxiang guoji chuanbo” 如何从
对 外 宣 传 走 向 国 际 传 播  [How to go from external propaganda to international 
communication], Hangzhou shifan xueyuan xuebao 杭州师范学院学报 [Journal of Hangzhou 
Teachers College], no. 2 (2005). 
133
 See for instance Lu Di, “Ruhe cong duiwai xuanchuan zouxiang guoji chuanbo.”  
134
 “容易冲淡媒体承担的社会责任和国家使命感，似乎面向目标国家的传播可以超越国家、
民族的利益，而达到全球大同的境界.” Zhang Kun 张昆. “Zhongshi guojia xingxiang de 
duiwai xuanchuan yu chuanbo” 重视国家形象的对外宣传与传播 [External propaganda and 
external communication that pays attention to the national image], Jin Chuanmei, no. 9 (2005): 
8.  
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xuanchuan together, so as to highlight both the need to adhere to certain 
professional ethics and the need to defend China’s interests. Despite the new 
terminology introduced in late 2008, the routines and values of the propaganda 
and thought work sector pose a greater problem for the external propaganda sector. 
Chinese observers, especially those who have significant experience in external 
propaganda work, are often keenly aware of these issues. One professor I spoke to 
expressed his frustration that the authorities simply did not understand 
“international communication” and that in order to be effective, Chinese media 
needed more independence and less interference from the government.
135
 
In this section, I will introduce the values stressed in Chinese journalism 
before discussing the changes with regard to several issues that have been a 
problem for Chinese media for a long time: negative news, harsh language, and 
ideological content. Some of these values, such as the Party principle and the 
principle of truthfulness, go back to before the PRC was founded. Others, such as 
trying to adapt to foreigners (zhenduixing 针对性) were subject to debate during 
the Mao period. Timeliness (shixiaoxing 时效性 ), by contrast, only became 
relevant in the post-Mao period. The values according to which Chinese media 
function are well-known and will only be briefly summed up here as an 
introduction to the basic dilemmas media continue to face. 
 
The Party Principle (dangxing yuanze 党性原则) 
The most important and oldest principle highlighted in any speech or text 
on the Chinese media is the “Party Principle” (dangxing yuanze 党性原则). The 
Party Principle, in its contemporary interpretation, officially encompasses three 
different but related points: First, media have to embrace the Party’s ideology, 
second, media have to propagate the Party’s line, principles, and policies, and, 
third, media have to accept the Party’s leadership.136  Throughout most of the 
1980s and 1990s, the “party nature” of Chinese media was formally presented as 
an asset, even in external propaganda work.
137
 Neither in the 1980s nor in the 
                                                          
135
 Interview, “communication studies professor II”, Beijing, April 2011.  
136
 The party principle has been explained quite often. See Zhao Yuezhi, Media, Market and 
Democracy, 19.  
137
 For instance, at a conference in March of 1986, Mu Qing stated that Xinhua’s greatest specialty 
and greatest advantage (youdian 优点) was that it had a proletarian and Marxist-Leninist stance. 
Cf. Mu Qing 穆青 , “Zhenfen jingshen jianchi gaige jin yi bu tuijin jianshe shijiexing 
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1990s this necessarily represented the views of all, or even the majority, of news 
workers – particularly of those people engaged in external propaganda, who knew 
which problems the “party nature” caused. However, the principle could not be 
attacked openly or directly.
138
  
Although external propaganda is not necessarily supposed to directly 
propagate the Party, but to communicate more subtly, the “Party Principle” 
continues to apply to all external propaganda media.
139
 This means that in crisis or 
“high politics” mode external propaganda media continue to be forced to present 
positions and use language that most external propaganda cadres know will 
alienate foreigners. Moreover, since 1989, strengthening party leadership over 
external propaganda work has always been presented as the most important task 
for any external propaganda reform and cannot be disputed in public discourse.
140
 
Thus, while Chinese academics argue for the inclusion of private initiatives and 
the Party itself realizes that the affiliation of Chinese media with the Party-state 
diminishes their legitimacy, formally independent initiatives are slow to emerge, 
and truly independent media are out of the question.  
 
Truthfulness (zhenshixing 真实性) 
From Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 to Hu Jintao, party secretaries have argued that 
the party principle and the truth criterion are two sides of the same coin. The 
“truth” criterion is extremely flexible and can be turned against those arguing for 
                                                                                                                                                               
tongxunshe de shiye” 振奋精神 坚持改革 进一步推进建设世界性通讯社的事业 [Uplift the 
spirit, adhere to the reforms, further promote the cause of building a global news agency], 
speech given March 4, 1986, in Guoji xinwen caixie jingyan huicui 国际新闻采写经验荟萃
[Collection of experience in writing international news], ed. Xinhuashe xinwen yanjiusuo新华
社新闻硏究 [Reasearch center of Xinhua News Agency] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1991), 6. 
138
 Instead, external propaganda veterans, such as Shen Suru, chose to ignore it, which was 
possible by emphasizing that one’s work was concerned with the “professional” (yewu 业务) 
aspects of external propaganda only, not with the political dimension. 
139
 See for example Duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo lunwenji 对外宣传工作论文集 [Collected studies 
on external propaganda work], ed. Zhongyang duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi yanjiushi 中央对
外宣传办公室研究室 [Research Office of the Central Office of External Propaganda](Beijing: 
Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 1998), 208. 
140
 E.g. Huang Zecun 黄泽存 , Xin shiqi duiwai xuanchuan lungao 新时期对外宣传论稿 
[Preliminary discussions of external propaganda in the new period] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo 
chubanshe, 2002), 263: “首先，必须加强党对外宣传的领导。外宣工作是一项利用各种传
播手段直接作用于外国受众的思想和政治工作，其直接任务是树立中国在国际上的良好
形象，争取世界人心和国际社会的支持 ，保证改革开放的顺利实施，推动我国现代化建
设事业的发展。这些任务的艰巨性要求从一开始就应加强党的领导， 在党制定的方针、
原则下开展对外宣传工作。”  
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only or overwhelmingly good news as much as against those arguing for the 
inclusion of more or certain types of negative news. Ultimately, the “truth” 
principle leads back to the need for guidance by the party. This is so because 
before reporting, the essence of an event needs to be determined, something which, 
officially, only the CPC is capable of (cf. chapter 4.1). Once that has been done, 
the CPC can determine whether reporting the event will reflect the essence or will 
create a false impression.
141
 Thus, the interpretation of the principle of 
truthfulness is entirely dependent on the political climate at a particular point in 
time. 
 
Timeliness (shixiaoxing 时效性) 
The idea that those who report first are able to determine how an event will 
be covered everywhere else has today been accepted as one of the “objective laws” 
(guilü 规律) of how media function. The Party-state fully recognizes that Chinese 
media are too slow and has worked hard to enable them to break news faster. 
Despite some celebrated successes
142
 and a massive overall improvement, Chinese 
media often continue to lag behind their Western counterparts. 
 
Conformity to audiences’ tastes (zhenduixing 针对性) 
 The language that had been traditionally used in China’s foreign language 
media for much of the Mao period, as well as its rhetorical style, conflicted with 
the conception of the press and good reporting as taught in Western journalism 
classes, which were introduced in China on a massive scale in the 1980s. This 
mismatch between media content and readers’ expectations was especially stark 
when texts were directly translated from Chinese originals with minimal 
adaptations, a common strategy that continued into the 1990s. Issues of language 
and style impact the image and credibility of Chinese media in several direct and 
indirect ways: first, unfamiliar language and style makes Chinese media stand out 
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 Cf. Gu Mingsheng 贾明生, “Lun shishi qiu shi de yuanze” 论实事求是的原则 [On the 
principle of seeking truth from facts], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 9, (1990):12.  
142
 Cf. Kang Xingping 康兴平 , “Yilake zhanzheng baodao dui Xinhuashe jianshe shijiexing 
tongxunshe de qishi” 伊拉克战争报道对新华社建设世界性通讯社的启示 [Implications of 
reporting of the Iraq War for Xinhua building (i.e. becoming) a world news agency], in 
Chuanmei yunxing moshi biange - 2003 nian Xinhuashe xinwen xueshu nianlunhui lunwen 
xuan 传媒运行模式变革 2003 年新华社新闻学术年会论文选 (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe 
2004), 60-62.  
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from other news sources in a negative sense in the eyes of most foreigners, second, 
direct translations from Chinese make foreign language texts resemble texts from 
the former Soviet bloc, whose media have been largely discredited in the eyes of 
the Western public, and, third, “crisis mode” retorts written in foreign languages 
often appear ridiculous to the foreign target audience. Today, avoiding such 
problems is high on the agenda, but in cases of conflict, particularly when an issue 
is considered “political,” the Party principle trumps every other principle.  
Problems with conflicting values are acknowledged and have been 
recognized for a long time. Thus, the issue is not that the Party does not 
understand the legitimacy issues its media values cause. There are two layers of 
problems, however. First, owing to the need to find consensus solutions and the 
dialectical thinking of the CPC, the Party usually tries to balance two conflicting 
values and weigh them against one another. The current overall approach, as I will 
demonstrate, is to give external propaganda media as much leeway as possible to 
enable them to raise their own credibility, and to include some strategic well-
orchestrated initiatives but to remain vigilant in the background and step in 
whenever the principles of the Party or the national interest are challenged 
meaningfully. Second, the principle of “round outside, square within” encourages 
reforms to be superficial and makes substantial structural reforms very difficult. In 
order to probe to what extent the need to create globally competitive media 
players has enabled Chinese media to reform their practices substantially and 
where the limits are, I will examine four case studies below, each of which 
addresses an area in which Chinese media have faced difficulties in the past: the 
reporting of sudden events, criticism of the Party and the central government, 
awkward or harsh language, and the question to what extent China should stress 
its socialist identity. 
  
Negative News I: Sudden events 
One major issue that Chinese media have been increasingly confronted 
with in the post-Mao period is sudden events reporting. Here, China faces two 
main problems: First, events may be categorized as sensitive and not be reported 
at all, and second, China’s media do not report fast enough for a number of 
reasons such as problems in coordination. While the latter is a problem of 
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professionalism (yewu 业务) and can be solved by investing money and retraining 
journalists, the first is a political issue (zhengzhi wenti 政治问题) and thus much 
more delicate.  
To briefly resume, for sudden events, the types of news allowed to be 
covered have largely been expanding over the last decades. Towards the late 
1990s and into the 21
st
 century, reporting sudden events was increasingly 
portrayed as an issue of confidence and as an important means to stop hostile 
forces from attacking China and spreading rumors, 1998 being the first year of 
reforms. The most important explanation for why China needed to increase and 
speed up its reporting of sudden events that was already formulated five years 
prior to the SARS debacle was that “hostile forces” used them to smear China’s 
image (cf. chapter 6.3). By not reporting sudden events, Chinese media allowed 
hostile forces to dominate the presentation of events instead of “proactively 
guiding international public opinion” (jiji zhudong de yindao guoji yulun 积极主
动地引导国际舆论). Hence, the issue was primarily framed as being part of the 
fight against hostile forces and the new agenda to positively guide public opinion 
at home and abroad. To be able to report on time, an article in Internal 
Communications (Neibu tongxin 内部通信) explained in 2000, it was necessary to 
break with the regular customs of reporting news (dapo changgui 打破常规) and 
to deal with sudden events in a special way (tebie chuli 特别处理).143 
Articles on the topic in External Propaganda Reference (Duiwai 
xuanchuan cankao 对外宣传参考) give a good insight into the categorization of 
news and how they were to be handled in the late 1990s. Xinhua was to draw a 
strict line between natural disasters, such as earthquakes, landslides, floods, and 
droughts, which should be handled freely or liberally (congkuan 从宽 ) and 
politically sensitive events, which needed to be handled strictly (congyan 从
严).144 As, theoretically, any issue could (and still can) be redefined as political in 
retrospective, this division still favors those who err on the safe side whenever 
                                                          
143“Guanyu zhongda shijian tufa shijian xuanchuan baodao de ruogan jingyan” 关于重大事件突
发事件宣传报道的若干经验 [A Number of experience about media coverage of major events 
and sudden events], Neibu tongxin, no. 6 (2000): 10-12. 
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Yan Wenbin 严文斌. “Shijiexing tongxunshe yu tufa shijian duiwai baodao” 世界性通讯社与
突发事件对外报道  [A world news agency and reporting sudden events abroad], Duiwai 
xuanchuan cankao, no. 11 (1998): 13. 
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possible. A year before the SARS crisis, this policy was still basically affirmed: 
For most natural disasters and minor incidents, media should decide on their own 
whether and how to report. For major events either in China or abroad involving 
China that fell into the category of political, “careful research” (shenzhong yanjiu 
慎重研究) had to be conducted before making a decision, although everybody 
was urged to try to speed up the clearance process even in the case of sensitive 
events.
 145
 
For faster reporting in the case of predictable events, there have been some 
experiments with new structures. In early 2003, Xinhua leaders raised the point 
that Xinhua needed to dare to engage in a “news war” (xinwenzhan 新闻战) with 
big Western media during the Iraq War and to compete with them over English 
news from the frontline of the war.
146
 Before the war broke out, Xinhua’s 
International Department (Guojibu 国际部 ) created the Iraq War Reporting 
Emergency Response Small Group (Yilake zhanzheng baodao yingji xiaozu 伊拉
克战争报道应急小组), made arrangements to allow some journalists to dispatch 
news directly in English and laid down principles that had to be followed in the 
case of news that needed to be sent out quickly.
147
 The reporting of the first shot 
in the Iraq War in 2003, in which Xinhua beat even CNN by 10 seconds, was 
celebrated as a great success at Xinhua and as evidence that in the case of 
“foreseeable sudden events” and with the right preparations it was possible for 
Xinhua to beat Western news agencies in terms of timeliness.
148
 
The year 2003 is also seen as a watershed changing the policy of reporting 
in the case of “unpredictable” and sensitive sudden events 149  because of the 
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 对于突发事件可以区别对待，一般来说，对于天灾人祸，应由各媒体根据一惯做法和经
验自行决定是否报道和如何报道，加强自检自律，由公众进行监督。对国内和国际涉我
重大政治性突发事件，由于它的政策性和敏感性，需要慎重研究决定，但应尽量减少决
策的中间环节，缩短时间，避免贻误时机，造成被动。对突发事件的报道分秒必争，限
制了我们自己的报道，等于把舆论引导的主动权让给了他人。Yang Zhengquan 杨正泉, 
“Jiji caiqu cuoshi baodao hao tufa shijian” 积极采取措施报道好突发事件 [Taking measures 
actively to report well about sudden events], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao no. 5 (2002): 5.  
146
 Kang Xingping, “Yilake zhanzheng,” 61. The success is even listed on Xinhua’s English online 
introduction (Cf. “Brief Introduction to Xinhuanet,” 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/special/2011-11/28/c_131274495.htm, accessed 
October 23, 2012). However, this was a “predictable sudden event,” and Xinhua had prepared 
for it for several months (Kang, “Yilake zhanzheng,” 61). 
147
 Ibid., 60-61. 
148
 See ibid., 60-62.  
149
 See for example an article by Zhao Qizheng, which mentions that Hu Jintao stressed the need to 
report news on time so as to be able to guide public opinion during a conference on how to 
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severe criticism China had received for having suppressed news about the SARS 
outbreak in late 2002. After the SARS debacle, China had to reconsider the types 
of news to be tightly controlled. An article from 2005 explained that Xinhua had 
changed its policy. All other countries’ media had their eyes on important sudden 
events owing to their news value, and due to China’s different political and 
ideological system, the country was under even more intense scrutiny. Therefore, 
Xinhua had introduced a new slogan summing up its new policy for reporting 
(potentially all) sudden events: “Swaying people by reporting first, focusing on 
what we want to say, guiding public opinion and thus decreasing any negative 
impact” (xian sheng duo ren, yi wo wei zhu, yindao yulun, jianshao fumian 
yingxiang 先声夺人，以我为主，引导舆论，减少负面影响).150  Thus, by 
reporting first, China would ideally be able to set the agenda for follow-up 
reporting done by other media. The failure to spin coverage of the Lhasa unrest in 
2008 served as another argument in favor of faster and more open coverage even 
for political and sensitive sudden events instead of trying to suppress or censor 
news. Although quite different, the Wenchuan 汶川 earthquake of May 2008 has 
been celebrated as a success in implementing the lessons learned from the SARS 
and Tibet incidents.
151
 
Generally speaking, media are encouraged to “try to report” (zhengqu 
baodao 争取报道) and to report on time. Initially, Xinhua was also encouraged to 
report more openly towards foreigners: “Domestically, we must control strictly 
according to the requirements; externally, we should be basically open and strive 
                                                                                                                                                               
prevent SARS. Zhao Qizheng 赵启正, “Xinwen fabu you liyu yingxiang he yindao guoji yulun” 
新闻发布有利于影响和引导国际舆论  [Press conference help to influence and guide 
international public opinion], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 12 (2005): 5. 
150突发事件，由于有较高的新闻价值共同取向，一向是各国媒体和世人关注的热点。又由
于政治制度、意识形态等的差别，各国媒体对在中国发生的突发事件更加关注，且态度
复杂。 因此，“先声夺人，以我为主，引导舆论，减少负面影响”成为新华社报道突发事
件的重要策略。 Li Jianmin 李建民, “Xiansheng duoren, yi wo wei zhu – cong tufa shijian 
baodao kan guonei fenshe jizhe de ‘shijiexing tongxunshe’ yishi” 先声夺人 以我为主——从
突发事件报道看国内分社记者的“世界性通讯社”意识 [Swaying people by reporting first, 
focusing on what we want to say - looking at the “global news agency”-consciousness of 
domestic branch reporters from the (angle of) reporting of sudden events], Duiwai xuanchuan 
cankao, no. 11 (2005): 12. 
151
 E.g. Huang Hai 黄海, “‘Huai xiaoxi’ yu ‘hao xingxiang’” “坏消息”与“好形象” [(The link 
between) “bad news” and a “good image”], Duiwai chuanbo, no. 8 (2011): 31-32; Hou 
Yingzhong and Guo Guanghua, Duiwai baodao celüe yu jiqiao 对外报道策略与技巧 
[Strategies and techniques for external reporting] (Beijing: Zhongguo chuanmei daxue 
chubanshe, 2008). 
553 
 
to release more [news]” (duinei baodao yange an yaoqiu kongzhi, duiwai jiben 
fangkai, zhengqu duofa 对内报道严格按要求控制，对外基本放开，争取多
发).152 However, by 2007, while the idea that as much as possible should be 
reported remained, external propaganda work was asked to take domestic 
repercussions into consideration. While the need to report fast potentially applies 
to all events, until today, if domestic repercussions are feared, an incident will not 
be reported, regardless of whether this hurts the credibility of Chinese media in 
the eyes of foreigners. Thus, there are a number of incidents that are still not 
reported or reported very late. This is particularly the case when there are “mass 
incidents” (quntixing shijian 群体性事件), i.e. popular protest, and the CPC fears 
that reporting the event will help spread the protests to other regions. In these 
cases, reports continue to be limited to very few official Xinhua releases, and even 
Xinhua takes several days or even weeks until it reacts. 
When the U.S.-based website Boxun 博讯  called for a “Jasmine 
Revolution” in China in early 2011, Chinese media of course largely remained 
silent. There were only two Xinhua releases indirectly addressing the issue: One 
statement from Zhao Qizheng 赵启正 (released on February 26, 2011) that there 
would be no “Jasmine Revolution” in China153 and a report that delegates from the 
ongoing Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) had asked 
foreign media to stop focusing on news not reflecting “the general trend of 
China's development,”154 released on March 5, 2011.  
Similarly, when Chen Guangcheng 陈光诚 escaped to the U.S. embassy in 
April 2012, Xinhua did not report on the issue until May 2, when it issued a 79 
word statement that the Chinese government “[urged the] US to stop misleading 
the public” about the case.155  
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 Zhou Zongmin 周宗敏, “Yong ‘shijie yuyan’ tong haiwai shouzhong ‘zhijie duihua’ – yu 
guonei fenshe jizhe Yingwen baodao peixunban xueyuan zuotan” 用‘世界语言’同海外受众
‘直接对华’——与国内分社记者英文报道培训班学员座谈 [Using the ‘world language’ for 
‘direct dialogue’ with overseas audiences - seminar with the participants of the english 
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(2004): 18. 
153
 “Senior political advisor: idea of possible ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in China unrealistic,” Xinhua 
General News Service, February 24, 2011, accessed via Lexis Nexis. 
154
 “Foreign Media to Report China Objectively,” Xinhua General News Service, March 5, 2011, 
accessed via Lexis Nexis. 
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 “China urges US to stop misleading the public after harboring Chen Guangcheng,” Xinhua 
General News Service, May 2, 2012, accessed through Lexis Nexis.  
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There is an absolute taboo in the Chinese media to report on leadership 
politics, such as different factions.
156
 Thus, the coverage on Wang Lijun’s 王立军 
defection to the U.S. consulate and Bo Xilai’s 薄熙来 fall in China’s foreign 
language media was initially limited to a small number of short official Xinhua 
statements and statements from spokespeople.
157
 After the initial silence, 
commentaries painting the case as a good example that no-one is above the law in 
China
158
 and criticizing foreign media for spreading rumors about political 
struggles did appear,
159
 but these came very late and not before the CPC had made 
a decision on Bo.  
In conclusion, because of a combination of adverse affects and an overall 
trend and willingness to report, China’s external propaganda media have adapted 
significantly to the new media environment, in which it is often impossible to 
keep sudden events, including protests, from being discovered. China is aware 
that if its media remain silent on major sudden events, they will face difficulties 
gaining credibility and a loyal target audience. Nonetheless, whenever the Party 
considers domestic stability at stake or when news touch on other areas 
considered taboo (such as the top leadership), no reports are issued.  
 
Negative News II: Strategic Criticism versus a “Chinese Model of Journalism” 
Another key area in which the CPC’s traditional conception of the media 
clashes with the ideals (though not necessarily the practice) of Western journalism 
is the question whether media should support those in power or challenge them. 
More broadly speaking, it is also a question whether media should focus on the 
positive or on the negative. The issue of finding the right balance between the 
“positive” and the “negative” as well as between “criticism” and “praise” in 
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April 19, 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/705623/Bos-downfall-result-of-
inflated-sense-of-influence.aspx, accessed February 14, 2013. 
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May 1, 2012, accessed via Lexis Nexis; “China Voice: Why do rumors repeatedly arise in Bo 
Xilai incident?” Xinhua General News Service, April 29, 2012, accessed via Lexis Nexis. 
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Chinese media coverage has been hotly debated throughout the entire post-Mao 
period. China is caught between two options: Either it can adapt to the 
expectations of its foreign target audience and include more negative news to raise 
its own credibility or it can try to defend a “Chinese model of journalism” that 
focuses on the positive. So how has China dealt with this question in the past and 
what options does it currently pursue? 
Starting in the post-Mao period, the need to include more negative news, 
either to substantially improve Chinese journalism or to improve its image for 
strategic reasons has been discussed under a large variety of slogans. The first and 
most influential was that external propaganda needed to “seek truth from facts” 
(shishi qiushi 实事求是), which could be used both to argue for more positive and 
for more negative news.
160
 In addition to the flexible “seek truth from facts” 
discourse, lack of negative news was also discussed under the slogan “reporting 
only happy and no bad news” (bao xi bu bao you 报喜不报忧).161 Another slogan 
that implies including negative news simply for strategic purposes is “a little bit of 
(strategic) criticism can go a long way” (xiao ma da bangmang 小骂大帮忙), 
which refers to the practice of criticizing one’s own government (or any other 
interest group behind a certain medium) in order to create the impression of being 
an “independent medium”162 and is considered a common strategy of the Western 
(previously: the capitalist) mainstream press. The purely strategic inclusion of 
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This was already mentioned in the early 1970s: Zhang Xiangshan tongzhi tan guanyu zuohao 
jiedai, lüyou gongzuo zhong de xuanchuan wenti” 张香山同志谈关于做好 接待、旅游工作
中的宣传问题 [Comrade Zhang Xiangshan talks about the issue of properly doing propaganda 
as part of hosting (foreigners) and tourism work], in Xuanchuan dongtai xuanbian, 1979 宣传
动态选编, 1979 [Selections from Propaganda trends, 1979] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue 
chubanshe, 1981), 235-236. 
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 In the 1980s, bao xi bu bao you 报喜不报忧 was used in two important contexts: First, to 
describe the problem of internal underreporting of problems at the local level to superiorsand, 
second, to criticize the inclination of public Chinese media to focus on the positive. 
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 Cf. Sun Xupei 孙旭培, “Tan duiwai baodao de xin guannian he xin yishu” 谈对外报道的新观
念和新艺术 [On new ideas and new art (i.e. qualitative skills) of external reporting], Huaibei 
meitan shifanxueyuan xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 淮北煤炭师范学院学报（哲学社会
科学版）  [Journal of Huaibei Coal Industry Teacher’s College  (Humanities and social 
sciences edition) 25, no. 3 (2004):  35. The formulation was first used by CPC members to 
describe the Dagongbao 大公报 in the 1930s and continues to be strongly associated with the 
paper. E.g. Liu Jianming刘建明 et al., eds., Xuanchuan yulunxue da cidian 宣传舆论学大辞
典 [Dictionary on the study of propaganda and public opinion] (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 
1992), 114. 
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negative news is also presented under the term “objectivity” (keguanxing 客观性) 
or “balance” (pingheng 平衡, both today usually in quotation marks).163 
While during large parts of the 1980s, objective and balanced news were 
discussed as an actual ideal to strive for, since 1987/1989, “objectivity” and 
“balance” have been presented almost exclusively as farces upheld by Western 
media: In order to gain the trust of the target audience and be able to exert 
influence subtly, they will include different points of view and not directly tell the 
reader or listener what the correct stance on a certain issue is. As early as 1981, an 
article in External Reporting Reference suggested that Chinese external 
propaganda organs learn from Western media in this regard and “include negative 
opinions that do not conflict with the basic interests of the ruling group.” 164 
First in 1987 and then after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, with the 
change from “regular mode” to “crisis mode” in virtually all debates, those 
advocating for the inclusion of more negative news, both in domestic and in 
external propaganda media, suffered a setback. They were accused of wanting to 
introduce a 50/50 quota between positive and negative news in order to achieve 
true “balance” and to be even more critical of China than foreigners were.165 Since 
at least 1990, external propaganda leaders have been pointing out explicitly that 
“relying mainly on positive propaganda” (zhengmian xuanchuan wei zhu 正面宣
传为主)166 did not equal “reporting only happy and no bad news”.167 Nonetheless, 
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 See for example Hu Yajuan胡雅娟, “Xifang jizhe wudao guoji shouzhong xiezuo shouduan 
qianxi” 西方记者误导国际受众写作手法浅析  [Analysis of writing techniques used by 
Western reporters to mislead the international audience], Duiwai chuanbo, no. 6 (2012): 34.  
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 “Guangbo shiyeju Xide zhuanjia Nuote tan duiwai xuanchuan” 广播事业局西德专家诺特谈
对外宣传 [West German expert ‘Nuote’ from the Broadcasting Bureau speaks about external 
propaganda], Duiwai baodao cankao, no. 1 (1981): 15.  
165
 “Duiwai xuanchuan cankao huiyi shang Zeng Jianhui tongzhi de jiang hua” 《对外宣传参考》  
会议上曾建徽同志的讲话 [Zeng Jianhui’s speech at the meeting of External Propaganda 
Reference], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao no. 9 (1990): 6. Zeng Jianhui: “平暴以前，有相当一
个时期，有的同志认为，所谓宣传要全面，人家才相信，好坏各打 50 板，把问题的一
面讲得很严重，比如腐败问题，有的将得比外国人讲的还厉害。” 
166
 In the 1990s, while the slogan “relying mainly on positive propaganda” (zhengmian xuanchuan 
wei zhu 正面宣传为主) was primarily used as the opposite of refuting hostile forces’ lies when 
applied to external propaganda work, it could also refer to the balance between reports 
promoting China’s achievements and those presenting more negative news. (E.g. “Duiwai 
xuanchuan cankao huiyi shang Zeng Jianhui tongzhi de jiang hua,” 6.) Nonetheless, the two 
uses of zhengmian xuanchuan wei zhu (the first in opposition to negative news and the second 
in opposition to refuting hostile forces) in external propaganda continue to be mixed up. 
167
 Speech by Zeng Jianhui, Rong bing, jia qiao, tu wei, vol. 127. 
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this was not an invitation for substantial criticism or even large numbers of critical 
news for strategic purposes. 
At the 2003 external propaganda conference, Li Bing stressed again that 
talking about problems in the media first and foremost meant that China had 
confidence.
168
 While China needed to adhere to its own outlook on the press 
(xinwenguan 新闻观), it could not entirely neglect the Western conception of the 
press.
169
 Since 2003, the strategy to “rely mainly on the positive” has been openly 
attacked by authors writing on external propaganda, linking the issue directly to 
the credibility and consequently the influence of Chinese media among foreigners 
and arguing for the inclusion of a larger ratio of negative news in order to increase 
the credibility of Chinese media.
170
 Sun Xupei 孙旭培, like Hu Yaobang in 1985, 
even spelled out a ratio: News targeted at foreigners should be 20-30% 
negative.
171
 The careful wording of early criticism
172
 showed that attacking 
“positive propaganda” or “positive reporting” ran the risk of being portrayed as an 
attack on the socialist conception of the press as first systematically spelled out in 
the late 1980s and the 1990s.  
Today, arguments against “positive guidance” are less careful. One author 
explained that while positive reports could be justified in China, they were 
unsuitable for external reporting and one of the reasons why China had still not 
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 Cf. Benkan teyue jizhe, “Tixian shidaixing, bawo guilüxing, fuyu chuangzaoxing,” 3. 
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 Cf. ibid. 
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 E.g. Guo Ke 郭可, “Shilun woguo duiwai chuanbo zhong guoji shouzhong xinli yanjiu” 试论
我国对外传播中国际受众心理研究 [Discussing research of the psychology of the audience 
in China’s external communication], July 3, 2003, http://tech.sina.com.cn/other/2003-10-
13/1647243344.shtml, accessed July 9, 2012 Also see Tang Jiamei 唐佳梅. “Cong ‘duiwai 
xuanchuan’ dao ‘gongong waijiao’” 从‘对外宣传’到‘公共外交’ [From ‘external propaganda’ 
to ‘public diplomacy’], Guangdong waiyu waimao daxue xuebao 广东外语外贸大学学报 
[Journal of Guangdong University of Foreign languages and foreign commerce] 19, no. 6 
(2008): 31; Li Xia 李 霞, “Duo jiaodu he xijie – duiwai baodao de kexindu” 多角度和细节—
—对外报道的可信度 [Multiple angles and details – the credibility of external reporting], 
Zhongguo jizhe 中国记者 [China journalist], no. 1 (2008); Zhu Jianting 朱建婷, “Duiwai 
xuanchuan: tigao guojia wenhua ruanshili de zhongyao lujing xuanze” 对外宣传：提高国家
文化软实力的重要路径选择 [External propaganda: Choosing an important path to raise the 
country’s cultural soft power], Jiangxi Xingzheng xueyuan xuebao 江西行政学院学报 
[Journal of Jiangxi Administrative College] 10, no. 2 (2008): 29; Xu Ge 许革, “Guanyu duiwai 
xuanchuan yu shi jujin de ji dian sikao” 关于对外宣传与时俱进的几点思考 [A few thoughts 
on external propaganda going with the times], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 4 (2003): 6.  
171
 Sun Xupei, “Tan duiwai baodao de xin guannian he xin yishu,” 35. 
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 E.g. “这不是说在对外传播中我们不能坚持以正面报道为主的方针，但这必须以我们对外
传播是否有效果为前提，要看我们对国际受众心理状态的了解和把握程度。” Guo Ke, 
Dangdai duiwai chuanbo. 
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succeeded in entering Western mainstream society.
173
 For external communication, 
the policy slogan of “positive propaganda” should be replaced with the slogan 
“striving for a positive effect of propaganda” (zhengqu zhengmian xuanchuan 
xiaoguo 争取正面宣传效果).174 
 
There are, again, different types of criticism that can be included in the 
news. First, there are social problems in Chinese society. Since the beginning of 
the 21st century, these types of report have been welcome. With the “China threat 
theory” and later as part of the response to it –the “peaceful development” 
discourse– Chinese external propaganda workers were discouraged from 
exaggerating China’s achievements175 and encouraged to report more on its social 
and economic –though not its political– problems. The consensus was that the 
West exaggerated China’s actual economic power on purpose so as to be able to 
paint China as a much larger threat than the former S.U.
176
 Similarly, reporting 
some of China’s economic problems was also encouraged to bolster the country’s 
status as a developing country surrounding the WTO accession.
177
 One author 
wrote in 2001 that reporting only the positive and not the negative (bao xi bu bao 
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 Liu Shinan 刘式南, “Wenhua tizhi gaige de zhongyao neirong – shixian Zhonghua wenhua 
youxiao chuanbo” 文化体制改革的重要内容——实现中华文化的有效传播  [Important 
content of the reform of the cultural system - realizing effective communication of Chinese 
culture], Duiwai chuanbo, no. 5 (2012): 7-8. 
174
 Huang Hai, “‘Huai xiaoxi’ yu ‘hao xingxiang,’” 31. For a discussion of how to understand 
positive propaganda when targeting foreigners also see Hou and Guo, Duiwai baodao celüe yu 
jiqiao, 131-138. 
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 This referred to economic and military achievements. While the principle of “relying mainly on 
the positive” still applied, one should be careful about not scaring other countries with too 
many success stories and fuelling the “China Threat Theory”. Zhang Zhenhua 张振华 , 
“Guanyu duiwai xuanchuan ruogan wenti de sikao” 关于对外宣传若干问题的思考 
[Thoughts on a number of problems in external propaganda], in Duiwai xuanchuan lunwenji 对
外宣传论文集 [Collected studies on external propaganda], ed. Zhongyang duiwai xuanchuan 
bangongshi yanjiushi 中央对外宣传办公室研究室 [Research Office of the Central Office of 
External Propaganda] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 1998), 96f-97). Also see Zhai 
Shuyao 翟树耀, “Duiwai xuanchuan yao jianchi ‘tao guang yang hui’, ‘you suo zuowei’” 对外
宣传要坚持“韬光养晦，有所作为” [External propaganda should ‘keep a low profile’ and 
‘make contributions’], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 11 (2005): 19.  
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Sha Qiguang 沙奇光, “Dui Xifang meiti sanbu ‘Zhongguo weixielun’ de pingxi (xia)” 对西方
媒体散布“中国威胁论”的评析（下） [A critical analysis of Western media’s spreading of 
the ‘China threat theory’ (part three of three)], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 6 (2001): 8. 
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 Yu Jincui, “Chengguan not best choice to enforce civilized behavior,” Global Times Online, 
August 17, 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/727453/Chengguan-not-best-
choice-to-enforce-civilized-behavior.aspx, accessed August 17, 2012. 
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you) was counter-productive to branding China as a developing country.
178
 One 
article highlighted the need for Chinese journalists not to boast about China’s 
powers (shili 实力 ), neither in China’s own media nor through foreigners 
stationed in China. China had to be particularly careful with regard to military 
affairs and defense construction.
179
 If external propaganda was not done well in 
this field, it could lead to Western countries taking up measures to curtail China 
and could cause other developing countries which are at about the same 
development level as China to worry about its increasing competitiveness.
180
  
Thus, obviously, including negative news in support of the peaceful rise 
narrative is not a carte blanche to criticize at will, but has to support goal of 
shaping China’s image and creating an environment that is favorable to the 
realization of China’s strategic aims. Therefore, critical reports have to support the 
Center’s master narrative or at least not contradict it. Today, the problems that are 
generally safe to report on or that can be supported through reports are very well 
defined and have been incorporated into the “peaceful development” narrative: 
China is still a developing country, China has a large population, which makes 
development and growth more difficult, and China is unevenly developed.
181
 This 
excludes certain types of reports that might otherwise be included more regularly 
for strategic purposes. 
 
With regard to criticism of the Party and the government, several authors 
have suggested to criticize the authorities on secondary issues to gain the readers’ 
or viewers’ trust and goodwill, but to affirm the Center’s position on anything that 
mattered (xiao ma da bangmang).
182
 However, since 1953, media have been 
prohibited from criticizing party committees at the same level, meaning the 
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传播战略 [China’s great power status and (its) international communication strategy] (Beijing: 
Changzheng chubanshe, 2001), 74-75. 
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道路和亚洲的未来 [A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia], November 
3, 2003, in China’s Peaceful Rise. Speeches of  heng Bijian 1997-2005 (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 14-15.  
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 E.g. Wu Zheng吴征, Zhongguo de daguo diwei yu guoji chuanbo zhanlue 中国的大国地位与
国际传播战略 [China’s great power status and (its) international communication strategy] 
(Beijing: Changzheng chubanshe, 2001), 101-102; Sun Xupei, “Tan duiwai baodao de xin 
guannian he xin yishu,” 35. 
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jurisdiction within which they operate, a rule that is enforced until today.
183
 Thus, 
central level media are authorized to criticize provincial party committees and 
governments, but not the Party Center or the national government. This means, of 
course, that the center officially cannot be subjected to criticism by any open 
Chinese mass medium. When the entity being protested is local or private and the 
Center approves of the protest, by contrast, reporting it is encouraged and has 
become relatively common.
184
 Particularly since the affirmation of the decision to 
create global media players in late 2008, there have been a number of articles on 
more delicate topics that appear to be part of the implementation of strategic 
criticism. One article on China.org.cn, entitled “Shanghai hukou reform just for 
show,”185 points out the inadequacies in the 2009 Shanghai hukou 户口 reform.186  
More recent articles touch on even more sensitive topics. For instance, 
Metro Beijing and Global Times Online published an article on the discrimination 
against a Uyghur woman by Beijing authorities in an unresolved case of a denied 
passport. The article also explained that the woman had been harassed by 
authorities in the past over posts made on Renren, China’s equivalent of 
Facebook.
187
 The Global Times also reported on the phenomenon of paid online 
commentators, better known as the “Fifty Cent Party.”188  
Generally speaking, media that are not directly linked to the Party-state in 
their presentation to the outside world are more daring and outspoken. While the 
Global Times carries harsh attacks on foreign governments and China’s critics, it 
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 See Zhao Yuezhi, Media, Market, and Democracy in China, 20. Also see Lang Jingsong 朗劲
松, Zhongguo xinwen zhengce tixi yanjiu 中国新闻政策体系研究 [Research on China’s news 
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departments of party committees own media within the same administrative jurisdiction makes 
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Shirk, Changing Media, Changing China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 21-22. 
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 E.g. Wang Zhenhua, “Refusal of water sparks outrage,” China Daily Online, US edition, July 9, 
2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-07/09/content_15559576.htm, accessed July 9, 
2012.  
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 Fan Junmei, “Shanghai hukou reform just for show,” March 19, 2009. China.org.cn 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/features/content_17468979.htm, accessed July 9, 2012. 
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 The Shanghai municipal government announced in February 2009 that it would allow migrants 
to obtain a local hukou 户口 under a number of conditions, including having had a Residence 
Permit for at least seven years. “Shanghai hukou reform just for show.” A hukou is a local 
registration that is supposed to prevent the fluctuation of the population.   
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 Xie Wenting, “Double Standards,” website of the Global Times, December 24, 2012, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/752002.shtml, accessed January 15, 2013. 
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 Zhang Lei, “Invisible Footprints of Online Commentators,” website of the Global Times, 
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has also served as a platform to test new policies and break taboos. For instance, 
in 2009, its first year, the Global Times openly referred to the “June 4 Tiananmen 
Incident” on the twentieth anniversary of the crackdown, even addressing the 
taboo around the event in Chinese society and describing the reserved reactions 
the Global Times received when asking officials and scholars to comment.
189
 
While such references are common in internal (neibu 内部) pieces, even at the 
lowest levels and public material without wide circulation,
190
 they would not 
usually appear in public mass media such as newspapers. According to one report 
in the Christian Science Monitor, the article was approved by the authorities at the 
last minute.
191
 
In addition to allowing more criticism or breaking taboos for strategic 
purpose, China has also become more assertive in presenting its own style of 
journalism as an alternative to Western media, particularly when covering the 
developing world. China is again arguing that its positive approach to news 
provides a remedy to Western misrepresentations of these regions. This line of 
argumentation is familiar from the UNESCO debate on the New World Media 
Order held in the 1970s and -80s. When the China Daily launched its Africa 
edition in December 2012, it emphasized its plans to focus on the positive in a 
region which it considered misrepresented by Western media.
192
 To what extent 
this approach resonates with audiences in the developing world is for future 
research to explore.  
Articles in the China Daily critical of local party committees or 
governments are, time and again, seen as signs that China’s media are becoming 
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2013.   
190
 See for example Zhao Qizheng 赵启正, “Nuli jianshe youliyu woguo de guoji yulun huanjing” 
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more open or that civil society is becoming stronger.
193
 The discussions on 
including more negative or critical news for strategic purposes instead strongly 
suggest that the inclusion of such articles is a strategic change to raise the 
credibility of China’s foreign language media more than anything else. However, 
two points should be made. First, journalists and officials engaged in external 
propaganda have argued for these changes for several decades, yet, such reports 
have only been included since circa 2008 or 2009 after external propaganda 
gained new urgency. Second, these changes in China’s foreign language media 
might have a spill-over effect into domestic media under the policy to “coordinate 
the domestic and the international.”  
 
To conclude: Reports on certain social and economic problems are 
welcome not only to change the image of Chinese media as reporting only good 
news, but also in order to support China’s peaceful rise narrative. More 
importantly, Chinese media increasingly integrate strategic criticism of local 
authorities in order to gain some credibility. Criticism of the Central Party 
Committee, the central government, and the political system per se remains 
largely taboo. Thus, the calls for including more negative or critical news in order 
to raise the credibility of China’s media and be able to influence foreigners better 
has been realized in several different ways, with some more daring and potentially 
consequential than others. However, the question remains whether this is enough. 
David Bandurski sums up the main problem in a comment on the Tiananmen 
reference in the Global Times: “They are only breaking taboos in terms of the 
repressive media policies in China [...] If you look at their coverage in the context 
of global coverage, which is the whole point of projecting soft power, it is 
irrelevant.”194  
 
Reducing Awkward and Polemical Language 
 One long term criticism of China’s media targeted at foreigners –since the 
founding of the PRC or even before– has been that their language and style are not 
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 E.g. David Cohen, “The Curious Case of Zhan Haite,” The Diplomat online, December 19, 
2012, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/the-curious-case-of-zhan-haite/, accessed December 
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well-suited to the “reading habits” of foreigners. Much has been done in this field. 
Particularly after the upgrade in 2004 and the decision to raise China's 
“international communication capabilities” in late 2008, there were very visible 
changes. At the same time, Chinese media continue to face criticism for awkward 
language in general as well as, more specifically, what I call “rhetorical 
overdrive”: The use of very harsh language whenever refuting what is perceived 
as an attack on China’s core interests.  In this chapter, I will explain how the idea 
that China needs to work harder to adapt to foreigners became increasingly 
important in the post-Mao period and what obstacles remain.  
 In the 1980s, journalists were systematically taught how to write articles 
for Western audiences, including the pyramid scheme, “speaking through facts” 
(yong shishi shuohua 用事实说话) and illustrating larger truths through reports 
on a specific topic (“making the large visible through the small,” yi xiao jian da 
以小见大), to give a few examples. Despite the re-orientation towards a “Chinese 
style of journalism” in the 1990s, these basic principles of journalism and of 
trying to adapt to foreigners’ reading habits remained valid. Both in the 1980s and 
1990s, the main problems were not lack of awareness, but lack of qualified 
personnel and lack of political will to fundamentally change existing journalistic 
practices.   
 In 2003, Li Bing addressed the need to adapt to foreigners’ reading habits 
and their conception of the role of the press to a certain degree, a point repeated 
by Li Changchun 李长春  in 2004 in a statement published in the People’s 
Daily.
195
 The fact that in 2003 and 2004 such a basic position –which was 
considered common knowledge among external propaganda workers in the 1980s, 
though not always realized in practice– still had to be justified carefully in the 21st 
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作会议 [Embody the characteristics of the times, grasp the rules, be rich in innovation – Notes 
from the nationwide work meeting for external propaganda in 2003], Duiwai xuanchuan 
cankao, no. 2 (2003): 2-3. For the People’s Daily article, see “Li Changchun zai zhongyang 
duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang qiangdiao yong ‘san ge daibiao’ zhongyao sixiang 
tongling duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo jin yi bu kaichuang duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo xin 
jumian” 李长春在中央对外宣传工作会议上强调 用“三个代表”重要思想统领对外宣传工
作  进一步开创对外宣传工作新局面  [Li Changchun stresses at the central external 
propaganda work conference that external propaganda needs to be directed by the important 
thought of the ‘three represents’ in order to continue to create a new situation in external 
propaganda work], Renmin ribao, April 22, 2004, 1.  
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century illustrates the problems external propaganda has faced in trying to 
institute changes to journalistic practices. The points Li Bing made were not new, 
but the fact that he stated them in a speech available to the public marked an 
important turn that accompanied the strategic upgrade of external propaganda in 
2004. Until today, speeches and articles from high-ranking cadres continue to 
highlight that China needs to adhere to the “three closenesses,” find common 
ground between what China wants to say and what foreigners need to know and 
increase targetedness, effectiveness, affinity, and persuasiveness (zhenduixing, 
shixiaoxing he qinheli, shuofuli 针对性、实效性和亲和力、说服力) of external 
propaganda.
196
 
 Nonetheless, China’s English language media continue to produce 
occasional articles that are seen as awkward or absurd. Often these are translations 
from local media or from ordinary citizens not actually employed as journalists.
197
 
For the 90
th
 anniversary of the CPC, the China Daily online version published an 
article which sought to explain why the CPC had been so successful in China and 
had been embraced by the Chinese population: 
 
“Why is CPC so special? How can CPC win the support of the people? There are 
many reasons, since it is relying on the basic theories of Marxism, Leninism and Mao 
Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping theories, Three represents and scientific 
development concept, which are the summaries of experiences and wisdom of the 
CPC and the whole Chinese people.”
198
  
 
 Aside from grammatical issues and awkward wordings, the article simply 
lists slogans one after the other without making any effort to explain what they 
mean. Obviously, the author does not try to speak through facts, either. In sum, 
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 “Wang Chen: Yi gaige chuangxin jingshen kaichuang dang de duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo xin 
jumian” 王晨：以改革创新精神开创党的对外宣传工作新局面 [Wang Chen: Create a new 
situation for the Party’s external propaganda work through the spirit of reform and innovation], 
Website of OEP/SCIO, July 5, 2011, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/zygy/wangchen/jh/201107/t949561_2.htm, accessed June 29, 
2012 
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 One example is “A Happy Ending to Farmers’ Anus Woes,” February 27, 2011, Global Times 
online, http://life.globaltimes.cn/2011-02/628018.html, accessed March 1, 2011. The article, 
which was translated from Wuhan Morning News and suitably filed under the category “Odd 
enough,” is no longer available online.  
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 Chen Xuefei, “CPC’s 90th Birthday Celebration and Reflection,” website of the China Daily, 
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the article does everything that Chinese journalists have been taught to avoid for 
decades. The main reason for this is most likely that Chinese media are under 
pressure to produce a lot of content and needs to broaden its base of contributors. 
Thus, as long as people write as individual Chinese citizens and the medium can 
disassociate itself from the content –which the China Daily Online does explicitly 
in this case
199
 - such articles are considered acceptable. Nonetheless, as the 
number of people involved in external propaganda or “international 
communication” increases through the involvement of ordinary people and 
through the creation of foreign language media at the provincial level, quality 
control becomes a serious issue again. 
There is another issue, namely the need to propagate China’s socialist 
identity and the “superiority of the socialist system” that potentially lends itself to 
vocabulary that seems out of place in the 21
st
 century. In July 2011, Wang Chen 
王晨 mentioned that one of the successes in handling sudden events and reporting 
“hot topics” over the last few years had been demonstrating (zhanxian 展现) the 
superiority of the socialist system to the world.
200
 However, use of the word 
“demonstrate” seems to indicate that the strategy to directly spell out the 
superiority of the socialist system has been replaced by a softer “speaking through 
facts” approach in foreign languages. In 2011, a small number of articles 
published by Chinese media in English both before and after Wang’s comment 
did, in fact, directly stress the “superiority of the socialist system.” One article, 
called “Miraculous earthquake recovery proves superiority of socialist system,” 
reported on reconstruction in Sichuan after the Wenquan earthquake.
201
 The 
socialist system, the article argued, was superior because it could “help a country 
concentrate efforts and resources on major tasks” and “innovation-based self-
improvement in the process of addressing tough issues” that the CPC credits itself 
with. The rhetoric of the title and much of the content is reminiscent of articles 
published in the Peking Review in the Mao period and seems out of place in the 
21
st
 century. The relatively small number suggests that this was a test case rather 
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 “The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the China Daily website.” Chen 
Xuefei, “CPC's 90th Birthday Celebration and Reflection.” 
200“Wang Chen: Yi gaige chuangxin jingshen kaichuang dang de duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo xin 
jumian.” 
201
 “Miraculous earthquake recovery proves superiority of socialist system,” People’s Daily Online, 
May 13, 2011. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7379684.html, accessed 
October 31, 2011. 
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than an established new policy.
202
 No similar articles were published in 2012, 
though a Xinhua release from 2012 cited a Brazilian senator pointing out that 
China’s successes demonstrated the superiority of the Socialist system.203 
 
Especially with regard to high politics or crisis mode condemnations and 
refutations, there has been another obstacle standing in the way of more moderate 
language, namely the need to “adhere to principles” (jiang yuanze 讲原则 ). 
According to Central Circular [1990] no. 21, retorts should be issued sparingly in 
order to avoid giving China’s enemies a platform and achieving the opposite of 
one’s intention (cf. chapter 6.2). However, as soon as China’s core interests were 
touched, any issue was automatically upgraded to “political”, and Chinese 
external propaganda then needed to “adhere to principle” and issue a response. 
The identification of high politics issues is clearly not limited to China, but the 
“high tune” (diaozi gao 调子高) style of the responses triggered is quite distinct 
and is an obstacle to being taken seriously. Like during the Republican period, 
there remains an assumption that China is right, and thus spreading correct 
information should ideally suffice to convince foreigners.  
 
The obvious problem, as already indicated above, is that Chinese media 
are least likely to produce content that foreigners will be convinced by in those 
areas that China cares about most. While arguing against such “high tone” 
condemnations is a sensitive issue to address and most Chinese analysts prefer not 
to criticize “the need to adhere to principles” when writing articles in public, 
media are aware of this and arguments have been made to reduce this type of 
                                                          
202
 See for instance “Miraculous earthquake recovery proves superiority of socialist system.” 
“‘Pairing-up’ support program for Tibet reflects superiority of socialist system: Vice President,” 
Xinhuanet, July 20, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
07/20/c_13998175.htm, accessed October 31, 2011. Liu Qibao, “A Great Miracle in Disaster 
Relief Created by the Socialist System,” Qiushi vol. 3, no. 3, July 1, 2011, website of 
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Congjun, “Toward a New Media World Order,” June 1, 2011. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704816604576335563624853594.html, 
accessed March 28, 2012.The reactions to the article, which were, without doubt, monitored, 
were overwhelmingly negative and no attempts were made by the Chinese side to add positive 
comments.  
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 “Interview: China’s communist party shows great leadership: Brazilian senator,” Xinhua 
General News Service, October 22, 2012, accessed through Lexis Nexis. 
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“overreaction.” Here, both Western media and China’s “enemies” have served as 
reference models. 
For example, in April 2001, Xinhua General Editors’ Office held a “report 
coordinating session” (baodao xietiao hui 报道协调会) to give orders (jinxing 
bushu 进行部署) how to cover the 50th anniversary of the “peaceful liberation of 
Tibet.” The session studied the Dalai Lama’s and the Western point of view 
meticulously, browsed the Tibetan Government in Exile’s website, TibetNet,204 
read “representative works” (jingdian zhushu 经典著述) from foreign scholars on 
Tibet, and read reports from foreign media on Tibet. In addition, Xinhua heard 
suggestions from (Chinese) Tibet scholars. One Tibet expert criticized the initial 
rough draft of various articles, stating that the criticisms of the Dalai Lama in 
some of the topics sounded just like wild cursing (manma 谩骂), whereas it would 
be much more effective to use facts.
205
  
Another article published in External Propaganda Reference in early 2004 
explained that the Voice of America (VOA) was a good example to teach Chinese 
cadres how to conduct external propaganda. For instance, normally, VOA used 
objective reporting to gain the trust of listeners and viewers, but in key times, they 
were directed by ideology.
206
 However, this argument was not used to justify 
rhetorical overdrive in cases where China’s core interests were touched. Instead, 
the article suggested China should learn from the Dalai Lama. As opposed to 
China, which often launched grand attacks (xiang da pipan wenzhang像大批判
文章), the Dalai Lama succeeded in making his political talks look apolitical by 
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http://tibet.net. A snapshot of the website from 2001 can be found here: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010221230948/http://www.tibet.net/index2.html, archived 
version from February 20, 2001, accessed February 7, 2013. At the time, the website was 
available in English, Chinese, Tibetan, and Hindi. 
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 Duoqiong 多穷, Qiu Lihua 裘立华, and Han Song 韩松, “Xin shiji yu Dalai de shouci da 
guimo yulun jiaofeng - Xizang heping jiefang wushi zhounian duiwai baodao suiji”新世纪与
达赖的首次大规模舆论交锋——西藏和平解放五十周年对外报道随记 [First large-scale 
public opinion clash of the new century with the Dalai - Random notes on external reports of 
the fiftieth anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 8 
(2001): 16. 
206
 Liu Yaming 刘雅鸣 and Li Pei 李珮, “Quanqiu chuanbo shidai woguo duiwai xuanchuan xin 
chulu (er) – Di yi shijian fachu shengyin waixuan bixu xian fa zhi ren” 全球传播时代我国对
外宣传新出路（二）——第一次发出声音外宣必须先发制人 [A new way out for China’s 
external propaganda in the era of global communication (two) – Starting with the first sound 
external propaganda needs to gain the upper hand by releasing news first], Duiwai xuanchuan 
cankao, no, 12 (2003): 19.  
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nurturing his image as a man of peace and avoiding certain terminology.
207
 The 
article acknowledged that while Western media’s distorted reports on China 
accounted for part of the country’s failure to sway public opinion on questions 
such as Tibet and Taiwan, the strategies and techniques China chose to get its 
point across also contributed to the problem.
208
 The year 2004 also saw another 
wave of teaching journalists to “speak through facts.”209  
An article from 2004 explains to journalists working for domestic Xinhua 
branches how to properly react to attacks against China (tit for tat, zhen feng xiang 
dui 针锋相对). One is to plan a series of objective reports. Another possibility is 
to reply to foreigners’ concerns or hostile forces’ attacks in a positive manner by 
providing information. Indirect answers can also work under certain 
circumstances. In some cases, it makes sense to preemptively deal with a potential 
attack, but it is important to avoid drawing attention to the issue. Finally, not 
reacting at all can also be a proactive way of dealing with an attack.
210
  
However, restraint in China’s media coverage continues to be a matter of 
political climate and importance of the topic to China. For instance, the report on 
the external propaganda conference in 2010 again stressed the need to engage in 
the struggle over international public opinion again, something which had not 
been mentioned in a People’s Daily report on external propaganda conferences 
since 2003. The topic most likely featured prominently because of the difficulties 
Chinese media had faced in spinning sensitive events in China’s favor in both 
2008 and 2009, which also increased the number of times “anti-China forces” 
(2008) and “hostile forces” (2009) mentioned in Xinhua news releases (see chart 
9.1). Today, despite the fact that external propaganda cadres have been aware of 
the issue, rhetorical overdrive when covering sensitive stories
211
 continues to be a 
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 Liu and Li, “Quanqiu chuanbo shidai woguo duiwai xuanchuan duiwai xuanchuan xin chulu 
(san),” 19.  
208
 Ibid.  
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 E.g. Zhai Shuyao 翟树耀, “Duiwai xinwen xiezuo yao yong shishi shuohua” 对外新闻写作要
用事实说话 [Foreign news writing should speak through facts], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 
10 (2004): 28. 
210
 Zhou Zongmin, “Yong ‘shijie yuyan’ tong haiwai shouzhong ‘zhijie duihua,’” 16. 
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 Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, human rights, and anything else touching China’s “core interests” that 
requires external propaganda to “adhere to principle.” 
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problem for China’s foreign language media. Xinhua news releases still speak of 
“overseas splittists,”212 “anti-China forces,”213 “wolf in monk’s robes,”214 etc.  
 
Graph 9.I: China’s Crisis Communication 
The first peak in red is from the year 2008; the second, yellow peak is from 2009.
215
 
 
The failure to influence international public opinion in 2008 prompted 
more outspoken criticism. An article on OEP/SCIO’s website argued for a 
relaxation of control over content and form. Previously, China had paid too much 
attention to enforcing unity of formulations in cases of reports whose political 
nature was particularly strong (zhengzhixing teqiang de gaojian 政治性特强的稿
件 ). This could be easily achieved because all media simply had to follow 
Xinhua’s reports. In addition, the relevant departments and ministries had also 
determined the timing, order, page number, etc. of these articles in various media. 
The article did not attack the need to unify slogans, but argued that aside from that 
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2011. 
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–presumably meaning aside from a number of formal refutations released by 
Xinhua and possibly reprinted by other media, which were sacrosanct and thus 
could not be attacked at the time– China should relax all other controls.216 Here, 
the article instead endorsed a statement made by Chen Lidan 陈力丹, a renowned 
journalism professor at the CASS and at China People’s University on his blog, 
reacting (supportively) to Hu Jintao’s speech at the People’s Daily in June 2008: 
The propaganda organs of the CPC and “some leaders” (mouxie lingdaoren 某些
领导人) did not want to accept that one could also propagate the stance of the 
Party through other, more popular means than “a series of fixed-expression 
editorials” (taohua lianpian de shelun 套话连篇的社论). In this area, Chen 
argued, Party leaders’ and propaganda departments’ understanding of the 
functions of the media would have to adapt to the changed social environment.
217
  
The article on the OEP/SCIO website argued that for a specific type of 
political events (teding de zhengzhi shijian 特定的政治事件), particularly sudden 
events, the authorities needed to relax control over form and content of the 
message and allow the media to be creative. In addition, the number of articles 
and programs that had to be reprinted and rebroadcast should be gradually 
reduced and replaced by a policy of allowing the media to come up with their own 
content. “Specific type of political events” implied that not all political events 
needed to be handled like this. Rather, the article suggested a test case for events 
which involved nationalist sentiments and therefore guaranteed the loyalty of 
media and Chinese citizens. Here, the article implicitly used the CPC’s official 
evaluation of Western media as an argument for fewer controls. After all, “no 
matter how harsh ‘independent’ or ‘oppositional’ voices in one countries’ media 
sounded, they would never oppose their own country or their own people.”218 It 
                                                          
216
 “Jingwai meiti she Hua jiemu hulianwang chuanbo de duice yu sikao” 境外媒体涉华节目互联
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worked abroad, and the recent events had demonstrated that it would also work in 
China.  
In fact, it appears that the Chinese Party-state has tried to replace official 
Xinhua statements on sensitive areas as much as possible with astro-turfing and 
unofficial statements by “experts” or “ordinary Chinese.” “Speaking through 
experts” is a well-recognized propaganda tactic.219 In domestic propaganda work, 
“relying on social forces” (yikao shehui liliang 依靠社会力量) by asking famous 
people or experts to give their opinion on a particular topic had been explicitly 
encouraged since at least 1994.
220
 These articles are characterized by the 
separation of news and opinion. First there are “neutral” reports in China’s official 
media summing up articles written by “experts,” which only paraphrase what the 
“experts” said without taking a stance. Likewise, the official media will report on 
“open letters” from Chinese citizens. Second, there are editorials. As a general 
rule, articles become more radical the less an author can be associated with a Party 
medium or the Party-state itself. The Global Times, which, after all, presents itself 
as independent, usually carries the most radical editorials of all official waixuan 
media, although the China Daily has also begun publishing more provocative 
editorials. The important point, however, is that these are editorials, not news 
articles, and that they are unequivocally presented as the opinion of a particular 
individual. There continue to be exceptions to this separation of news and opinion, 
for example in the form of Xinhua releases written like an opinion piece, but left 
unsigned,
221
 but these types of articles have decreased. 
The problem of language continues to be openly addressed. For instance, 
in late 2011, a very short article on how China should improve its media coverage 
in crisis situations highlighted: 
 
“At the current stage, China’s news communication workers do not pay nearly 
enough attention to language. This is an area where we urgently have to learn from 
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Construction (London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996), 114. 
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引导人是新闻工作的根本任务  [Guiding people with correct opinion is the fundamental 
responsibility of press work], Neibu tongxin, no. 11 (1994): 4.  
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accessed November 12, 2012.  
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Western media: We need to replace forcible preaching with persuasive and 
suggestive language.”
222
  
 
 Of course, such commentaries are not new, but since Chinese media have 
instituted more systematic systems for reader feedback, the position to avoid 
lecturing and express China’s position more subtly has likely gained in support. 
Having better feedback systems also allows Chinese media to experiment 
with different strategies and abandoning those that prove to be counterproductive. 
Using public opinion or the “will of the people” (minyi 民意) was experimentally 
used as a way to buttress the governments’ position. There are some indications 
that Taiwan served as a model in this regard. China was very annoyed by Chen 
Shui-bian’s 陈水扁  tactic to use public opinion polls to argue for Taiwan 
independence. Consequently, one article in Internal Reference Readings (Neibu 
canyue 内部参阅) suggested that the PRC should do the same (dalu fangmian ye 
yinggai dachu “minyi pai” 大陆方面也应该打出“民意牌”).223 This was seen as 
a good way to oppose Taiwan independence without risking the ire of the 
international community. The opinion of 1.3 billion Mainland Chinese should 
outweigh that of 23 million Taiwanese. This could be done in stages, first by 
publicizing the results of opinion polls on Taiwan in general and, if the “splittists” 
did not stop, the PRC could also publish polls on how many Chinese supported 
military action (according to online polls, the author stated, about 60% of the 
people did at the time).
224
 
Poll results have, in fact, been used to support the position of the 
government and exert pressure on its opponents. The Global Times specifically 
has a poling center to generate results that can be used. For instance, in a 
confrontation between the Chinese government and Facebook in the aftermath of 
riots in Xinjiang over Facebook groups supporting Xinjiang independence, an 
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article on People’s Daily Online declared that: “81.7 percent of netizens voted to 
support punishing facebook for conniving ‘Xinjiang independence’ forces” 225 
based on a poll conducted by the Global Times. According to the same article, 90 
percent of netizens thought that Facebook should immediately ban the group.
226
  
Another article, also on the Xinjiang protests, declared that “90 percent of 
netizens support anti-riot law.”227 An article in the English web-edition of the 
Global Times announced that 87.63 percent of respondents had declared they 
would “never go to Starbucks even if it [were] free” after Starbucks stopped 
listing Taiwan as a province of China in June 2009.
228
 All these and most other 
examples
229
 were from the year 2009, indicating a type of test run for this policy 
in the year that China also invested massively into the expansion of its media. In 
2010, another article published on China Daily Online stated that 60 percent of 
netizens supported China’s White Paper on Internet Policy.230  While polls on 
other issues continue to be frequently cited in English language articles until today, 
including on problems in Chinese society,
231
 they are no longer used to buttress 
the PRC’s policy on sensitive issues, indicating that the test run was not evaluated 
as successful and the idea was abandoned, at least in the crude form the test cases 
had taken.  
 
 In conclusion, until today, a basic distinction needs to be drawn between 
“regular mode” coverage and “crisis mode” coverage. In the case of the latter, 
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despite some resistance against this practice, the Party media are often obliged to 
adhere to very specific terminology prescribed by Xinhua and the People’s Daily. 
In the first case, regular coverage, change has been sweeping. Nevertheless, more 
recently, as media try to involve larger sections of society so as to “speak through 
the voices of the people” and produce larger volumes of material, a number of 
articles are again published without being proof-read by native speakers. Thus, 
whereas in crisis mode, the problems are political in nature, issues that occur in 
regular mode coverage are problems of “professional” principles of journalism as 
well as language skills authors. Finally, whereas de-emphasizing China’s socialist 
character was contemplated as a strategy and temporarily even openly advocated 
in more or less direct terms, currently, attempts are made to reinsert the socialist 
dimension back into China’s image abroad as well as into its external propaganda 
messages amidst debates on ideological security, building socialist culture and 
establishing a “discourse system with Chinese characteristics.”  
 
9.4 Dealing with Western Mainstream Media 
In building up China’s “international communication capabilities,” 
Western mainstream media are both competition and a resource to draw on, or, as 
one Chinese author remarked in 2004: “Western media are our opponents, but at 
the same time, they can also become our partners.”232 There are four different 
strategies: First, China tries to improve its handling of foreign journalists and 
foreign media in order to improve their China coverage. Second, China buys 
advertizing space or even full media. Third, China has tried to form alliances with 
others against “Western mainstream media.” Fourth, the country has tried to paint 
a credibility crisis of Western media and allowed first (possibly) privately owned 
media that are supposed to enjoy more credibility and can work outside of the 
restrictions of the overall Chinese media system.  
 
Dealing with Foreign Media and Journalists 
The CPC has complained to foreign media about their coverage since the 
1990s. Zhao Qizheng recounted a conversation with CNN founder Ted Turner, 
whom he met several times, in which he told him he did not like CNN because it 
                                                          
232
 Sun Xupei, “Tan duiwai baodao de xin guannian he xin yishu,” 35. 
575 
 
still included the Tiananmen tank scene in the opening credits of the hourly news. 
Afterwards, the tank scene was cut out from the opening credits, and Zhao found 
out that Turner had reprimanded the head of CNN International and told him that 
if he wanted to do business in China, he would have to pay attention to such 
details.
233
 Mike Chinoy, the CNN Beijing Bureau chief between 1987 and 1995, 
recalled that Chinese did complain about the use of the shot to Ted Turner as well 
as to a number of other people, including himself.
234
 Complaints were made in 
private, never in public and were usually directly to the point though without 
making any overt threats.
235
 However, Ted Turner did not order the shot to be 
removed, and its use was gradually reduced rather than stopped over night. This 
happened around 1993 or 1994, partially in response to Chinese complaints, but 
also because Chinoy felt it no longer reflected realities in China. Thus, after a 
certain point in time, CNN continued to use the shot when a program was about 
the crackdown but no longer in general promotional videos.
236
 
Since the 1990s, China has become more assertive in the case of serious 
political infractions it dislikes. The “Jasmine Revolution” in 2011 –a series of 
protests supposed to be modeled on the ongoing Arab revolutions– led to conflict 
between Chinese authorities and foreign journalists. On one day that authorities 
expected protests, the main high-end shopping street Wangfujing was sealed off 
for “cleaning.” A number of journalists (who had gathered to see if anything 
would happen) reported being attacked or treated roughly.
237
 On February 21, 
2011, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China made an announcement on its 
website that in order “to ensure continued operation” of the Club, it was 
“currently not posting incident reports or statements on our website,” although it 
would continue to collect information (on the Jasmine protests) that would be 
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available to members upon inquiry.
238
 Thus, the Club had clearly been warned by 
the authorities and had decided to take the threats seriously.  
The most effective tool to control foreign journalists individually and 
foreign media collectively is the issuing of visas. In May 2012, China expelled 
Al-Jazeera correspondent Melissa Chan, which resulted in the network’s closing 
of its China bureau after applications for a new correspondent were also 
rejected.
239
 In late December 2012, Chris Buckley of the New York Times 
followed suit after the NYT had run an investigative piece on the fortune of the 
family of Premier Wen.
240
 A spokesperson later denied that Buckley had been 
expelled, claiming that his visa application had simply been filed incorrectly.
241
 
Compared to the relatively timid reactions to the Tiananmen video on CNN, this 
is clearly an escalation. However, in this area, the threat is more useful than 
actually realizing it: If everyone were expelled, China would obviously harm itself 
and its image.  
Threatening journalists with revoking their visas or credentials is a 
potentially very effective means of control, but also a risky one that can backfire 
easily. Both Western governments and the Chinese Party-state use this method 
and both of them need to carefully weigh costs against benefits before making 
threats that are not subtle enough to maintain deniability. For Western 
governments being caught trying to muzzle the press can result in a scandal, first 
and foremost because such attempts conflict with their professed stance on the 
role of the media. In the case of China, there is no such great discrepancy between 
what is said and what is done (the Chinese government does not make public 
statements on media freedom), and the Chinese government is arguably held to a 
much lower standard.  Nonetheless, the scrutiny China finds itself under 
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combined with the lack of control over the most important TMC (transnational 
media corporations) that have the power to amplify such scandals still have a 
potentially devastating effect on any progress China makes in other areas. 
 
Gaining Allies: Shaping Journalistic Norms through Cooperation? 
In his tasks for external communication in the coming five to ten years, 
Qinghua professor Shi Anbin argued that China’s focus on elites and opinion 
leaders in North America and Western Europe during the previous years was 
misguided. Because of the difference in values and ideology, the results had not 
turned out as China had hoped: Not only had China’s message not reached the 
ordinary people in the West, but the country had also alienated old friends in the 
developing world. Shi’s solution was to reconsider the legacy of China’s external 
propaganda apparatus in the Mao period, and to shift the focus of external 
communication to developing and undeveloped countries as well as to grassroots 
movements in the West, global social movements, and non-governmental 
organizations.
242
 What Shi suggests is not so much an entirely new strategy, but a 
reassessment of priorities. Over the past few years, China has tried to gain allies in 
the developing world through a number of initiatives: 
First, it cooperates with media and provides or sells mass communication-
related equipment and services.
243
 China has established partnerships with Kenyan 
media (where China itself maintains a strong media presence with its local 
branches of CCTV and CRI). In 2006, the two countries signed an agreement on 
closer cooperation between SARFT and Kenya’s Ministry of Information and 
Communications.
244
 In February 2006, CRI opened its first overseas FM radio 
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station in Nairobi, Kenya. In November of the same year, the second FM radio 
station followed suit in Vientiane, Laos.
245
 China has supported state media in 
Kenya and Zambia, provided Zimbabwe with jamming devices, and has won bids 
for or has provided money for the transformation of the telecommunications 
sector in several countries.
246
 A small body of literature on this Sino-African 
media cooperation has emerged over the last few years, largely centered on the 
question whether this might lead to the transplantation of the Chinese media 
model into different African contexts.
247
 Most authors conclude that there is no 
evidence thus far that this is happening. However, China’s primary goal at this 
point in time does not appear to be to transplant its model of the media, but rather, 
to gain allies for its cause and platforms for distributing its own message. 
Second, China has provided scholarships primarily for students from 
developing countries. In his speech on the role of the press in 1985, Hu Yaobang 
stressed the need to train people from the Third World. China could do so by 
letting them study in China, but also by letting them work in Chinese news units 
and thus learn through practice.
248
 
Third, it offers training seminars for government officials and 
professionals from Africa, and South America. These seminars are intended to 
transfer expertise, as both journalists and government officials receive training in 
China on media-related matters. The first Seminar for Government Officials from 
Africa about News (Di yi qi Feizhou guojia zhengfu guanyuan yanxiu ban 第一期
非洲国家政府官员研修班) organized by OEP/SCIO took place in Beijing in 
August 2004.
249
 This was the first time that China cooperated with African 
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governments to organize a seminar. The purpose behind the seminar, according to 
OEP/SCIO, was to foster exchange with China’s news circles, to showcase 
China’s achievements of the Reform and Opening period, and to “increase 
understanding and promote friendship and cooperation between China and 
Africa.”250 Since then, China has offered one per year. In 2012, it offered several 
different seminars: one for English-speaking and one for French-speaking African 
countries and another seminar for Latin American countries.
251
 
 
Buying Media; Buying Media Space 
Particularly while Chinese media still face severe credibility issues, using 
foreign media as vehicles to distribute China’s point of view is important. The 
strategy of buying up foreign media is mentioned in several articles, although 
generally speaking, information is sparse due to the sensitive nature of the issue. 
In an article in External Communication (Duiwai chuanbo 对外传播), author Wu 
Zuolai 吴祚来 cautions against rash actions and lists the buying of foreign media 
(shougou haiwai meiti 收购海外媒体) as one action among others that might 
backfire and damage China’s reputation more than improve it.252 He argues for 
more strategic thought to be put into the subject matter before randomly 
increasing budgets and expanding external propaganda quantitatively. Wu notes 
that the American government, for instance, did not buy up foreign media to 
increase U.S. influence worldwide, but rather exported its cultural products 
ranging from Coca Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken to Hollywood and Michael 
Jackson, even if sometimes forcefully by declaring war on another country. This 
is not so much important for the point Wu makes here,
253
 but for the casual 
mentioning of the strategy which attests that buying up foreign media is part of 
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the standard repertoire considered to increase China’s “soft power” in many 
circles, especially those favoring a quantitative approach to influence expansion.  
Information on private Chinese citizens or companies buying up foreign 
media is more widely available on the Internet. Examples include Ye Maoxi 叶茂
西, a businessman from Wenzhou 温州 and owner of the Xijing Group (Xijing 
jituan 西京集团),254 who bought up a British satellite TV station called Propeller 
in July 2009
255
 after it went bankrupt in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Ye 
Maoxi heard about the financial trouble of Propeller while on a diplomatic trip to 
England together with Premier Wen Jiabao 温家宝.256 A report on China.org on 
the acquisition used the opportunity to praise China’s new “going out” policy: 
While it was common for business people to visit other countries together with 
important politicians, in the past only heads of SOEs had the opportunity in China. 
Now, with the new priorities, private entrepreneurs could also accompany Chinese 
politicians on state visits.
257
 The process of acquisition took about half a year until 
completed. This TV station, formerly subsidized by the British government, is 
now a “platform to broadcast Chinese culture.”258 Ye Maoxi declared the aim of 
buying up the station to be “promoting Wenzhou, promoting Chinese culture, and 
creating opportunities for the Chinese to expand overseas markets.”  
Propeller TV has websites in English and Chinese (simplified and 
traditional), which, as of date (January 2013) are still very incomplete. According 
to the online schedule, the station broadcasts daily from 9 a.m. to 1 a.m., with a 
slightly different program on the weekends than during the week. The channel is 
broadcast on Sky and includes programs on Chinese culture (“A Shining 
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Civilization,” “The Living Customs in China,” “Kung Fu Tutorial”) and language 
lessons (“Communicate in Chinese”).259 Propeller has also signed a contract with 
Guangdong’s new international channel GDTV World.260 
For now, however, a much more common strategy is advertising in 
established mainstream media, either by buying advertising space or through 
regular supplements. Buying up space intended for advertisement in Western 
media and using it for political messages was first introduced as an illegitimate 
practice conducted by Taiwan. An article published in External Reporting 
Reference (Duiwai baodao cankao 对外报道参考) in January 1982 reported on 
how the Guomindang (国民党, GMD) had bought the second page of Spanish 
paper ABC (which, according to the article, was usually reserved for ads) and used 
it to print an article in commemoration of the 1911 revolution, with a photo of 
Chiang Ching-kuo (蒋经国) in the centre of the page. The article was published 
on October 8, 1981, in preparation for the 80
th
 anniversary of the revolution. The 
article noted that it was common practice for states to distribute propaganda 
material about its country, but that the GMD had bought advertisement space for 
its own articles only showed the world how desperate its diplomatic situation 
was.
261
  
Since then, the PRC has changed its opinion on buying up ad space for 
political messages. One phenomenon that emerged after the 2008 financial crisis 
was paid supplements to well-established newspapers. Since 2010, the 
Washington Post and the International Herald Tribune have included a paid 
supplement produced by the China Daily, called ChinaWatch.
262
 The supplement 
is eight pages long and usually has one or two themes per issue, such as 
investment and economic development,
263
 healthcare,
264
 minorities,
265
 sports,
266
 or 
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culture and heritage tourism.
267
 The supplement largely avoids direct political 
commentary and focuses on topics that are not considered political. Articles 
include numerous references to China’s problems, but also some direct (and 
clearly strategic) criticism. For instance, one article cites a cadre from the State 
Information Center, a government think tank, questioning the sustainability of 
large-scale investments: “If the new leaders continue to make investments on a 
large scale, we’ll see the country get into the trouble that European countries are 
in today.”268 
The edition from June 30, 2011, published a day before the 90
th
 
anniversary of the CPC provided an exception to the rule and focused entirely on 
the Party. However, this was done very subtly and in accordance with the advice 
given in one article cautioning external propaganda media to avoid theoretical 
articles and instead “tell stories” (jiang gushi 讲故事), focus on aspects that 
foreigners were interested in, and to use the words of foreigners rather than 
assessing or praising the achievements of the Party directly.
269
First, the issue did 
not mention the fact that the Party had a birthday to celebrate anywhere on the 
front page. The fact only came up on page 3 in an interview with CPC advisor 
Robert Kuhn (cf. chapter 8.4) on the CPC’s accomplishments.270 Second, it tried 
to adhere as much as possible to the principles of “showing the big through the 
small” (yi xiao jian da 以小见大) and “speaking through facts” (yong shishi shuo 
hua 用事实说话).271 The front-page article, for instance, focused on the Central 
Party School. While not the most exciting topic, it provided an opportunity to give 
a basic introduction to China’s current and previous policy and to make larger 
political points about freedom of speech in China in a relatively unobtrusive 
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manner and by speaking through the people interviewed for the article.
272
 Third, 
the issue provided a large number of different angles on the topic. Two articles 
addressed the popularity of the Party among Chinese people: one on university 
students
273
 and the other on Party Committees in joint venture firms.
274
 There 
were articles on Long March tourism,
275
 a reality TV show reliving the Long 
March,
276
 a heritage tourism site,
277
 on a sculptor making wax figures of famous 
historical CPC personalities,
278
 on the life and works of anthropologist and foreign 
friend Isabel Crook,
279
 and on a talent show featuring foreigners singing “red 
songs,” i.e. revolutionary songs praising the Party from the 1940s and the Mao 
period.
280
 
Thus, particularly since 2009, China has paid for supplements in 
“mainstream” media, and Chinese businesspeople cooperating with the central or 
provincial government have even bought full media. The purpose behind all of 
these initiatives is to bring China’s message to “Western mainstream society” 
while China’s own media do not have enough credibility to significantly influence 
public opinion in the West themselves.  
 
From Tit-for-Tat to Experimenting with Popular Media 
Although China’s main strategy for increasing its international voice is 
building its own “first-rate international media” by expanding them and trying to 
raise the quality of journalism, it has also begun to use opportunities to counter 
and discredit Western media. The country has long complained about Western 
media’s bias. Depending on whether statements are made in “crisis mode” (with a 
high tone, gao diaozi 高调子) or in “regular mode,” different arguments are used. 
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Those in regular mode are based on the premise that foreigners and foreign media 
basically have no ill will, whereas those in crisis mode are usually centered on the 
idea that a significant number of Westerners and Western media want to harm 
China. Since the 1989 crackdown, the CPC has insisted that Western media hide 
behind the cloak of “objectivity” while secretly trying to Westernize and split 
China.
281
 Exposing these plots became an important policy,
282
 and ill motives 
were frequently highlighted in retorts countering attacks on China’s human rights 
situation or any other form of criticism touching on China’s core interests over the 
1990s.  
Since the 21
st
 century, China has changed its strategy, primarily focusing 
on lack of accuracy and only later bringing the Western intentions vis-à-vis China 
in as a motive for the distortions. Chinese commentators as well as China’s 
foreign language media have tried to turn mistakes in reporting the protests in 
Tibet into a “credibility crisis.” For instance, one Xinhua commentator cautioned 
Western media to “watch out for your credibility crisis.” 283  Likewise, when 
Xinhua criticized Western media for its coverage on Bo Xilai, it highlighted that 
they had obtained information from Falungong’s 法轮功 Epoch Times website: 
“In fact, those reports made by some foreign media have been circulated long ago 
on some websites sponsored by the evil cult that the people despise. Isn’t it a 
startling anecdote in international press history that rumors from cult-run websites 
appear in traditional media?”284 
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Similar to what was already done in the 1920s and 1930s, China’s media 
argue that biased or incorrect reporting and depiction of China in Western media 
first, harms mutual understanding, and second, hurts the image of Western media 
in China. In a rebuttal aimed against a Washington Post editorial on the Xinjiang 
Conflict in July 2009, the Global Times wrote: 
 
“An editorial represents a paper’s point of view. If an editorial of a newspaper is biased 
and questionable, it will do no good for the full understanding between people in China 
and the United States. As well, it will do no good to boost the newspaper’s good image 
among Chinese people.”285 
 
An Op-ed published by the president of Xinhua News Agency, Li Congjun 
李从军 , on the website of the Wall Street Journal, proposed to establish “a 
mechanism to coordinate the global communications industry, something like a 
‘media UN,’”286 alluding to the UNESCO initiative of the 1970s and 1980s. The 
reactions to the article, which were, without doubt, monitored by the Chinese side 
to test the waters, were overwhelmingly negative. In this case, clearly, the CPC 
itself had very little credibility in the eyes of Western readers. However, in 
attacking Western media, the Party-state has also relied heavily (and arguably 
more successfully) on “popular voices” (minjian shengyin 民间声音 ) by 
mobilizing young Chinese, particularly those studying abroad, a strategy first 
employed in 2008, the year of the Olympics.  
One outcome of the 2008 crisis is April Media (Siyue meiti 四月媒体), 
presented as a private media initiative and operating in Chinese, English, Russian, 
and Korean. In external propaganda, April Media, called “The 4th Media” in 
English, is a test case for the new policies to “let different actors with different 
roles sing the same tune” and to allow patriotic media to operate relatively 
independently. It uses a number of strategies that have been used for over half a 
century (though not all of them in China), including delegating “radical” positions 
that might have negative repercussions if voiced in party-owned media to “private” 
and “independent” media, and letting foreigners speak on behalf of China in order 
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to raise the credibility of the position argued, inspired by the strategy to assign 
different roles to official government media and “independent” (but government 
subsidized) media. 
The founder and CEO of April Media was Rao Jin 饶谨 (1984 - ), a 
Qinghua graduate who set up the well-known website anti-cnn.com, the 
predecessor of April Media, which went online on March 20, 2008 in the direct 
aftermath of the Lhasa incident less than a week earlier. The Anti-CNN forum 
was launched eight days later on March 28. It did not take long for official 
Chinese media to declare their support for the website.
287
 “April Youth Club” was 
launched one day before the Olympics Opening Ceremony, on August 7, 2008, 
combining various features of the Web 2.0 such as the option to befriend other 
users. April Youth Club was mainly an extension of the Anti-CNN forum in order 
to make it more interesting and attract more users. The name April Media is based 
on the month, April 2008, in which the movement to “expose” Western media’s 
lies gained traction.
288
  
The official status of April Media is unclear. Founder Rao Jin has 
presented it as a popular or people-owned medium independent of the Party-
state.
289
 There are, in fact, experiments with media that are fully privately owned, 
but the policy is in a very early testing stage and is strictly limited to publishing, 
thus far excluding news production (cf. chapter 9.2). At the same time, articles in 
2008 and 2009 did argue in favor of relaxing controls in cases of events that 
would evoke nationalism. On the one hand, April Media claims to be people-run 
and independent, and the English-language website certainly does deviate from 
the standards that are applied to regular Party-state media. On the other hand, 
Chinese law does not allow independent media.  
On its English language website, April Media introduces itself as “The 4th 
Media,” with the tagline “Just Another Voice” added in a smaller font, which, as 
the self-introduction reveals, stands for “just another voice in the progressive 
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global media landscape.” 290  The self-introduction presents April Media, “the 
mother of the 4
th
 Media,”291  as “an independent media organization based in 
Beijing, China.” 292  Until recently (July 2012), the introduction included one 
sentence most likely directly translated from Chinese that is intended to express 
that April Media is aware of its “social responsibility” towards the Chinese state, 
but that remains cryptic in its English translation: “By thinking about national 
tradition, security, and demonstrating anxiety to occurrences within and outside 
our national boundaries, April Media strikingly demonstrates its responsibility and 
consciousness.” This sentence, which had been eliminated by November 2012,293 
indicates that April Media has reason to want to declare its loyalty.  
In March 2012, the founder of April Media, Rao Jin, published an article 
in External Communication that further explained April Media’s “responsibility.” 
He stressed that “popular media” such as the Fourth Media could only exist as 
long as the people running them had a thorough understanding of China’s national 
circumstances (guoqing 国情 ) and put the national interest above everything 
else.
294
 Thus, people that were sufficiently nationalist like the founders of anti-
CNN may, indeed, have gotten permission to run their own media as long as they 
stuck to defending the national interest. Because they are not directly linked with 
the Party-state, they can support positions that China’s official media could not 
support for diplomatic or other reasons.  
April Media might indeed be a a test case for a “patriotic popular medium” 
operating in a legal gray zone under the close supervision of people OEP/SCIO 
trusts: The editors of the English version are linked to Qinghua University and to 
the head of the Research Center for International Communication and OEP/SCIO 
advisor Li Xiguang, who has been an outspoken supporter of April Media. 
According to Li, “A few youths had completely annihilated CNN’s credibility of 
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thirty years over night by setting up a single website.”295 Not CNN but Anti-CNN 
represented the media of the future.
296
  
The editor-in-chief of the Fourth Media’s English-language website is 
Kiyul Chung 郑己烈 , a Korean-American visiting professor at Qinghua 
University with a PhD in political science from Philadelphia University. Japanese-
American Yoichi Shimatzu 岛津洋一, a former editor of the Japan Times Weekly 
and now based in Hong Kong as a freelance journalist, is listed as editor-at-large. 
In 2003, after being invited by Li Xiguang
297
 he also stayed as a researcher at 
Qinghua’s Research Center for International Communication and gave classes at 
Qinghua University on how to do reporting in English.
298
  
There are two main differences between China’s official English-language 
Party-state media and the Fourth Media: First, Fourth Media is not constrained by 
CPD language policies and second, it the website carries much harsher attacks on 
the U.S. than any official media would ever be allowed to do, including the 
Global Times, which is branded as independent. In the earliest days of the PRC, 
the CPC granted some media branded as “popular” more leeway and subjected 
them to less strict control. However, for the largest part, not being subjected to 
certain controls of the system came at the cost of not being able to comment on 
current political matters directly.
299
 The Fourth Media, by contrast, is not 
restrained at all in its attacks. 
The focus of the main English-language website is clearly on attacking the 
U.S. government and, to a lesser degree (in terms of quantity of articles), the 
Israeli government. It is largely sympathetic to social movements such as Occupy 
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Wall Street, as well as to politicians outside of the Democratic and Republican 
parties. In terms of editorial focus, it is thus similar to both Al-Jazeera and, more 
so, Russia Today. As opposed to regular Chinese media, the Fourth Media mainly 
carries editorials and investigative pieces from other news sources, including 
Russia Today, Al-Jazeera, and the Occupy Movement. In addition, it reprints 
articles from renowned individuals such as Noam Chomsky without naming the 
source where these articles were first published, creating the impression they were 
written specifically for the Fourth Media (which is usually not the case). Thus, the 
Fourth Media English-language website can best be understood as an aggregator 
of and platform for voices attacking U.S. policies which produces some original 
articles but primarily collects content from a broad variety of “alternative” media 
sources to reproduce them on the site. However, it also pays attention to issues the 
Chinese Party-state cares about at a particular point in time, for instance, in April 
2011, the website ran a series of articles attacking and discrediting Ai Weiwei 艾
未未 (in a rude way that would be impossible even for China’s official media).300  
Thus, it seems that the Fourth Media could well be a test case of a medium 
not directly owned by the CPC. However, if so, it is clearly an exception that is 
unlikely to have broader implications. The “patriotic surge” of 2008 helped to 
justify the existence of April Media, but at best, this means that the CPC now 
allows private media run by individuals with personal connections to OEP/SCIO. 
Organization outside of the party-state continues to be a very sensitive topic. In 
the media sector, the official evaluation of what went wrong in the Soviet Union 
has been a very powerful obstacle standing in the way of granting social forces a 
larger degree of autonomy in China’s public diplomacy.  
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9.5 Conclusions 
Measures to create globally competitive and influential media have been 
implemented and become visible in the expansion of China’s designated key 
media. Although the media expansion has been stunning (cf. chapter 7.7), China’s 
global media continue to be burdened by certain restrictions that come along with 
being part of the Chinese media system. There have been several layers of 
problems in reforming news coverage. First, at the most basic level, there is the 
issue of old habits and of having to train and retrain staff so that they have 
sufficient journalistic as well as language skills. This is also a matter of investing 
money both into the education of new journalists and into attracting qualified 
personnel to work for Chinese media. In this area, the PRC has had problems for a 
long time. Currently, since 2009, it has done reasonably well in this area 
compared to earlier periods, although money invested is not always used 
efficiently and the authorities’ support for media expansions and educational 
projects has not been absolutely consistent. Nonetheless, there has been 
substantial progress in areas which previously severely damaged the credibility 
and reputation of China’s media. Second, media values pushed by the Party 
contradict each other. People involved in external propaganda or international 
communication have succeeded in including values such as timeliness or adapting 
content and style to the target audience in the overall package of things considered 
important, but in crisis situations when “high politics” issues are at stake, the 
“Party principle” trumps all other values. Third, arguments for certain reforms, 
such as the inclusion of more negative news, can be countered by demands for a 
“Chinese” style of journalism that focuses on the positive rather than the negative.  
The continued emphasis on a correct ideological stance, combined with 
continued Party-ownership is one of the most important problems of the entire 
sector: A lot of the money invested is wasted on inefficient programs and on 
media that cannot become sufficiently influential because the Party suffocates the 
media. Proponents of external propaganda have pursued two strategies: First, they 
push for allowing more categories of news to be covered or to be controlled less 
strictly. Second, a number of people have argued for privatization of the media 
and delegating large parts of China's external propaganda or international 
communication to media groups not owned by the Party. Given the current 
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emphasis on feedback mechanisms and the quite established argument that some 
things will be more effective when expressed in the “spirit” of the Center rather 
than word by word, the trend of reducing the number of instances were concrete 
formulations are controlled strictly is likely to continue. Privatization of the media, 
on the other hand, while controlled experiments will likely continue, is unlikely to 
have a significant effect on external propaganda work in the near future.  
While some inroads have been made in order to enable more people to 
participate in China’s external propaganda, the CPC is more interested in the 
impression of plurality and the impression of being supported by the people and 
has adopted various measures to create this impression: It let its media play 
different roles, allowing some to be more open and break more taboos in order to 
brand themselves as more open and independent. In these cases, the more 
deniability the Party has and the more it can distance itself from a particular 
position, the harsher the criticism. Although the inclusion of some investigative 
reporting or other forms of critical news is primarily strategic, it does have the 
effect of slowly shifting what is permissible in Chinese journalism. However, this 
also means that any measure to be newly introduced needs to be checked for its 
potential effect on the domestic media sphere. Under the principle of coordinating 
the internal and the external, the possibility of keeping certain changes limited to 
China’s foreign language media is limited.  
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10 Conclusion 
This research has been driven by two sets of questions: First, how has 
Chinese external propaganda changed and what factors have played a role, and 
second, to what extent are current options limited by previous choices. In response, 
I have provided a political history of external propaganda in China and analyzed 
its development in order to explain the difficulties China’s external propaganda 
apparatus continues to face as well as what strategies people pushing for reforms 
have used to overcome historical, ideological, and bureaucratic baggage. As such, 
it has probed how and to what extent China has been able to adapt its external 
propaganda apparatus, initially set up on the basis of the Soviet propaganda model 
that depended on the ability of the Party to regulate the flow of information into 
and out of China, to the current global media environment marked by porous 
national borders and fast-paced flows of information across the globe.  
In order to tie together the findings of the previous chapters and 
systematically answer the questions raised in the introduction, I will briefly 
summarize the development of external propaganda over the last century before 
dissecting the different factors that have influenced how and to what extent 
external propaganda has changed. I will then address the different levels of path 
dependence of Chinese external propaganda, first by discussing in what ways and 
to what extent previous choices have limited and influenced the range of options 
available to China at a later point in time and, second, by explaining how external 
propaganda reformers have tried and in many cases succeeded to overcome 
institutional hurdles of various kinds.  
 
10.1 Chinese External Propaganda: Reform and Inertia 
Chinese external propaganda has been part of a larger set of beliefs, 
institutions, and practices that are spread across national, ideological, and other 
borders. The idea that a country or a party needs to promote itself and its goals 
before the international public was translated into different institutions and 
policies in China under varying circumstances and continued to develop under the 
influence of a large number of domestic and international factors. The concept of 
propaganda was first systematically introduced in China in the early 20
th
 century 
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as part of the overall reorganization of world order. At the time, propaganda had 
become part of several movements, institutions, disciplines, and ways of 
organizing the world, all of which tried to come to terms with the question how to 
deal with a new influential force of the 20
th
 century, namely the public or the 
“masses.” While ideas about the press that resembled later conceptualizations of 
propaganda already circulated earlier, the widespread discussion of propaganda 
began after the end of the First World War, when China translated massive 
amounts of texts from Western languages as part of the May Fourth Movement in 
an effort to extract from the European tradition anything that might save the 
Chinese nation. During this time, both the GMD and the CPC absorbed ideas 
about propaganda from the S.U. and from the West. Thus, several different 
concepts of domestic and international propaganda were appropriated around the 
same time and interacted with one another. 
The concept of propaganda as it developed in the West and the S.U. shared 
some common roots in its assumptions about the relationship between “the masses” 
or the overwhelming majority of society and elites, but later relied on rather 
different institutions and techniques. Particularly the difference in attitude towards 
domestic propaganda in the two blocs resulted in two different sets of methods 
how to control and/or manipulate the media. More importantly, the underlying 
organizational structures to manage the media at home developed differently. The 
Soviet system of media management adopted in China relied on a powerful 
propaganda department at the top, whereas Western governments and other 
interest groups developed mechanisms such as press conferences, creating media 
events, access journalism or working with individual journalists to plant certain 
messages.  
The GMD, which had also adopted the Soviet domestic propaganda 
apparatus, faced similar problems as the CPC did later when it first tried to 
organize propaganda targeted at foreigners through its domestic propaganda 
structures. The environment the GMD worked in was vastly different from that 
the CPC managed to establish after the founding of the PRC. Large parts of China 
were not under its control, and it had no influence on the content of the majority 
of media at the editorial level. Thus, the GMD had to work in an environment that 
was full of competitors and in which it was nearly impossible to shut individual 
papers down. While it tried to exert control through censorship of messages sent 
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out of China and through restricting journalists, which often backfired, the GMD 
also made use of “positive” or “proactive” measures, such as cooperating with and 
subsidizing private initiatives. The problems with the GMD’s own international 
propaganda apparatus were partially resolved in 1937 by putting a Missouri-
trained journalist in charge and shielding him from interference by separating 
international propaganda from the domestic propaganda apparatus.  
The CPC came of age in this media environment and was familiar with soft 
incentives. Many individual CPC members and people that continued to work in 
external propaganda after the founding of the PRC were familiar with the Western 
model of journalism. However, after the CPC had established control, it no longer 
had to deal with many of the problems the GMD had faced earlier. The CPC did 
not have to cope with foreigners that were not sympathetic to its cause, as those 
were simply not allowed into the country or expelled. Censorship regimes such as 
the GMD’s preventing individual messages from leaving the country were soon 
no longer necessary; restrictions both on foreigners and on the media in general 
took effect at a much higher level.  
The media landscape in China changed completely after the founding of the 
PRC. Some foreign-owned papers were closed down immediately, whereas others 
were shut down by their foreign editors later. Controlling most of China’s 
territory, the CPC had the opportunity to set up a propaganda apparatus of a much 
more pervasive kind with Soviet help than anything the GMD could have hoped 
to accomplish before 1949. This propaganda apparatus was built so that it could 
reach the entire population, and the effectiveness of the methods and techniques 
used was to a large extent contingent on the ability to prevent flows of 
information and block out alternative sources of information.  
The new propaganda and media system required widespread re-education of 
journalists, which also affected China’s external propaganda media. External 
propaganda in China before 1949 had been more closely connected with Anglo-
American rather than with Soviet concepts and practices, but after the founding of 
the PRC, this legacy was absorbed into the Party-state bureaucracy with its 
Soviet-inspired set-up and was institutionalized within the domestic propaganda 
apparatus. People who had been engaged in external propaganda work before 
1949 had to completely change the way they approached their work and became 
part of a system in which not only was there (in theory) only one correct way of 
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interpreting everything in the world, but also only one correct way of expressing 
reality.  
 None of the choices in the media environment were made primarily for 
external propaganda. Instead, in 1949, a full development package was chosen, 
and external propaganda, whose routines and values acquired during the wars did 
not fit this package very well, had to be adapted accordingly, though not entirely 
without resistance. The question what external propaganda should be was one 
aspect of a larger power struggle between the “Left,” pushing for revolution and 
transnational ties outside the state-based framework and the “moderates” pushing 
for economic reform and state-to-state diplomacy. The clash happened at two 
different levels. First, there was the question what goals external propaganda 
should serve. On the one hand, it had a diplomatic mission operating in a world 
ordered according to nation-states; on the other hand, it had a revolutionary 
mission in a class-based world order. As such, the struggle over external 
propaganda was a manifestation of the struggle over the general line of the Party. 
Second, how external propaganda was supposed to be organized and conducted 
was also disputed. To what extent was it legitimate to distinguish between foreign 
and Chinese audiences without negating the Marxist understanding of propaganda 
as an activity to be proud of? Thus, particularly this second conflict can also be 
understood as a continued clash between different understandings of propaganda 
technique and of what constitutes good and persuasive journalism.  
In addition, in its earliest days, the PRC set up organizations for cultural 
exchange and CPC-controlled “people-to-people” diplomacy. In these structures, 
however, China depended on the network of the Socialist bloc, which was lost 
after the Sino-Soviet split, forcing China to rebuild its own networks. The country 
enjoyed quite a bit of success in building networks outside of the state-based 
framework, and as opposed to PRC historiography, the high tide of the Cultural 
Revolution was a time when China was not only highly engaged in external 
propaganda work, but also enjoyed a great deal of popularity among leftists, 
Maoist groups, and protest movements around the world. The problem, however, 
was that after China refocused on improving its relations with the U.S. to balance 
against the S.U. and embarked on the project of reform and opening, these people 
were no longer the contacts that China was interested in.  
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The relatively closed off environment of the Mao period meant that when 
the CPC decided to open itself up more, it had absolutely no experience at 
managing foreign media and journalists through softer approaches outside of a 
tightly controlled environment. Although controls on foreigners in China were not 
loosened over night, starting in the 1970s, the CPC, nonetheless, found itself in a 
catch-up game of learning the rules of the new media environment. At the time, a 
new form of journalism not only for external propaganda but for all of China’s 
media apparatus was a welcome change in the eyes of many. External propaganda 
continued to develop despite varying political climates. The 1980s were a time 
when choices for China were relatively open again. Hu Yaobang pushed for 
political reforms, including in the media sector. Between 1978 and 1987, China 
gradually moved in the direction of weakening the domestic propaganda apparatus 
and strengthening its external propaganda instead. Though the official standard 
function in the eyes of the CPC was to support the realization of China’s three 
grand tasks, from the humanist perspective, external propaganda was presented as 
a bridge to connect China to the world. 
The trend of boosting external propaganda rather than focusing on 
domestic propaganda was stopped and reversed in two steps: First, the Campaign 
against Bourgeois Liberalization resulted in the strengthening of domestic 
propaganda work, particularly at the institutional level through the creation of a 
new LSG, and second, the Tiananmen crackdown enshrined the need for domestic 
propaganda as a matter of regime security. The fact that external propaganda 
structures were established on the basis of and thus within domestic propaganda 
structures made the sector highly dependent on the domestic propaganda 
apparatus. Without the key events in 1987 and 1989 which elevated domestic 
propaganda, both Chinese politics as a whole and its propaganda apparatus in 
particular could have taken a very different path.  
The time after 1989 was dominated by a contradiction: On the one hand, 
external propaganda had clearly regained in importance. A new small group was 
formed in order to deal with the negative fallout of the Tiananmen crackdown and 
facilitate China’s diplomatic reintegration into the world. Most of the institutions 
that are still involved in external propaganda today were set up in their most basic 
form in the 1990s. On the other hand, however, there were two problems. First, 
with the events of 1989, domestic propaganda was redefined as vital for the 
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survival of the CPC, thus cementing and expanding domestic propaganda’s 
institutional upgrade of 1987. After its role had been called into question by some 
during the 1980s, domestic propaganda regained a firm and fortified place in the 
overall ideological universe, occupying a role both in the CPC’s regime security 
considerations and in China’s development plans. Propaganda targeted at 
foreigners was not nearly as important as domestic propaganda at the time. 
External propaganda, as it quickly transpired, would not become an independent 
field, but remained a subfield of domestic propaganda. Second, the events of 1989 
set a precedent for tit-for-tat struggle against hostile forces in matters of principle. 
While the CPC was well aware that its hysterical reactions often drew attention to 
“hostile forces” and quite a few people in the external propaganda sector also 
knew that such responses, far from elevating China’s standing in the eyes of 
foreigners, actually diminished it, the value that China needed to be principled 
(jiang yuanze 讲原则) often trumped other considerations.  
Many of the established propaganda practices were not suitable for 
targeting foreigners. External propaganda cadres and journalists pushing for 
reform did not necessarily oppose China’s need to defend its interests, but many 
knew that the form and the rhetoric of rebuttals was anything but helpful. 
Likewise, in the 1990s, the need to report certain events that Chinese media had 
previously ignored or reported very late was mainly fuelled by concerns over 
China’s image abroad. This posed another challenge to China’s media system that 
had emphasized tightly controlled use of correct terminology and politically 
correct content over timely release of news. In cases where the reasons for slow 
releases were technical or bureaucratic in nature, China had a chance to catch up. 
However, when the reasons were political, the problems were more difficult to 
solve. 
In the late 1990s, as China began to plan its rise and return to great power 
status more concretely, external propaganda increased in importance and was 
given a place in China’s long-standing dream of great power status again. This 
coincided with the United States’ renewed debate on “public diplomacy” and “soft 
power” after 9/11, which further fuelled the discussions in China and provided 
Chinese analysts with new arguments why external propaganda mattered not only 
to China’s development and diplomacy, but was essentially a matter of national 
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security. In 2003, external propaganda was upgraded in importance by linking it 
to the country’s security and stability and by making China’s external propaganda 
capacities part of its “comprehensive powers.” The inclusion of propaganda 
powers in China’s comprehensive powers and China’s ability to defend itself was 
not mere rhetoric, but was tied to the CPC’s evaluation of the international 
situation. As the world grew ever closer together, reactive and defensive measures 
such as censorship and the blocking of media flows would become increasingly 
useless. Instead, the CPC decided to embark on the ambitious plan to shift the 
international power balance in the field of “power over opinion.”  
It would be wrong to say that only the upgrade of 2003/2004 had 
significant consequences. Many of the current policies are variations of earlier 
reform attempts that failed or were too feeble due to lack of political commitment 
or unexpected turns of events. Each major call for strengthening and improving 
external propaganda work, usually accompanied by the release of a new policy 
document, brought with it tremendous changes. In 1979/1980, Hu Yaobang’s 
speech and the first “Opinion” written by the newly created EPSG resulted in new 
structures to reinforce external propaganda as well as a complete retraining of 
journalists how to write for foreign audiences. The 1986 “Opinion” sought to 
incorporate all provinces and institute a variety of new measures centered on 
cultural exchange and pushing Chinese as a foreign language, though the reforms 
were disrupted by the events of 1987 and 1989. The “comeback” of external 
propaganda after the events of Tiananmen resulted primarily in new institutions 
for the Chinese government to propagate its stance that were more compatible 
with Western norms of how governments should interact with the media and the 
public, namely the (nominal) creation of an “Information Office,” a spokesperson 
system for ministries other than the MFA, the release of white books, etc. After 
the new macro policy program (silu 思路) was introduced in 1996, China began to 
tackle sudden events reporting. The upgrade of 2003/2004 resulted in the 
inclusion of many new actors into China’s “big external propaganda” project and 
an impressive expansion of China’s media and cultural activities that have been 
noted worldwide, although new developments such as the crises of 2008 were 
arguably needed as additional incentives for the CPC to decide to invest even 
larger sums of money into the global expansion of its media. 
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 However, instead of losing in importance, domestic propaganda and 
thought work actually came to be seen as even more significant under the Hu-Wen 
leadership. The position of domestic propaganda in the overall ideological 
universe was further cemented by weaving older Chinese Marxist tenets and 
findings of modernization theory predicting potential crises during the stage of 
development China was about to enter. A PBSC member, rather than, previously, 
a Politburo member, was put in charge of propaganda and thought work. The 
upgraded external propaganda sector was not given any independence, but was 
unequivocally placed under the leadership of domestic propaganda and thought 
work, thus reversing any possible trends towards more independence that may 
have been on the horizon during the previous years under Zhao Qizheng’s 
directorship of OEP/SCIO. This step was further enshrined with the principle of 
“coordinating the domestic and the international” in order to deal with the 
increasingly globalizing world. Thus, despite what have arguably been 
tremendous developments in the field of external propaganda, Chinese observers 
are not satisfied with the results. 
Basically, China currently attempts to take advantage of two basic models 
of media control at the same time. On the one hand, it tries to establish the 
Western model of media management by strengthening the spokesperson system, 
providing amenities and services to journalists and making first attempts at access 
journalism that go beyond merely threatening journalists with revoking their visas. 
On the other hand, it maintains the S.U. inspired model of media control through 
Party ownership of the media and a powerful propaganda apparatus pre- and 
proscribing what should and what should not be covered. The approach to mix 
elements of the Soviet-derived system of media control with Western techniques 
of spin might work for the domestic media to a certain extent, but it does not work 
for China’s foreign language media. Neither does it work for large media 
conglomerates that are supposed to operate both within China and internationally. 
When there is a conflict between the two approaches to handling the media, the 
traditional model of control wins, and it is needless to say that this often destroys 
much of the goodwill that may have been built previously. 
Nevertheless, after the upgrade in importance of external propaganda, a 
number of former taboos have been broken. China has clearly reduced the number 
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of scenarios that need to be “handled strictly” (congyan 从严) and in which it 
needs to “adhere to principle” (jiang yuanze), thereby reducing sources of conflict. 
Although the role of foreigners continues to be restricted at China’s main media, 
they were allowed to do more than language polishing. Media have instituted 
mechanisms to be able to deal with sensitive sudden events better without 
completely relinquishing control. The CPC has even begun to experiment with 
patriotic private or popular media, delegating some control to social forces outside 
of the Party-state, something which it has been very reluctant to do. Although the 
exact status of media such as anti-CNN is unclear, these “officially unofficial” 
media can carry harsher attacks, as the Party-state can distance itself from these 
media. The arrangement is similar in many ways to U.S. media such as Radio 
Free Europe (RFE), which could carry much harsher and provocative broadcasts 
because the U.S. government could credibly distance itself from RFE. A similar, 
though less extreme tactic is pursued for media such as the Global Times that are 
marketed as cutting-edge and provocative and that try to obscure their link to the 
Party-state as much as possible without having to lie. 
Several Chinese observers have pointed out that if China wants to create 
credible media players, these will have to be privately owned, both because 
foreigners do not trust state or Party owned media and because such private 
initiatives would be more free from certain constraints within the Chinese media 
system. Until now, however, the strategy has been to let the established players 
“appear with the commercial face” rather than actually creating private media. 
The CPC is clearly willing to outsource, but it is unwilling to relinquish control. 
While small possibly private or semi-private media initiatives have been launched, 
China is currently planning to rely primarily on its established external 
propaganda media and use them as the basis for media groups with a global reach.  
Since the CPC pledged to bring about the “great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation” and placed a renewed emphasis on culture in the 1990s and the 
21
st
 century, the idea that the world needs to develop an appreciation for the 
greatness of the Chinese civilization, one of the earliest justifications for 
propaganda targeted at foreigners, has re-emerged. In the cultural realm, China’s 
external propaganda faces fewer restrictions. While culture also falls into the 
sphere of propaganda and thought work, there is no system of control for China’s 
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current cultural activities abroad comparable to that for the media. While culture 
and history both have highly political dimensions, cultural activities do not face 
the same dilemmas as the media, in that they do not have to respond quickly to 
sudden events or make sure to cover a certain event. Thus, in this area, China has 
relegated a relatively large degree of control. In the case of Confucius Institutes, 
China’s policy has been to form joint ventures with foreign education institutions, 
giving the foreign partner quite a bit of control. Moreover, although the Confucius 
Institutes’ headquarter is a central level unit, in concrete initiatives, the Chinese 
partner in these joint ventures is usually a Chinese university. While assessing the 
success of Confucius Institutes and similar cooperative enterprises goes beyond 
the scope of this thesis, in the largely “low politics” arena of culture, the CPC has 
been willing to relinquish control. However, relaxation of control in this area is 
unlikely to spread to sectors such as the media anytime soon. 
 
10.2 Domestic and International Factors in China’s External 
Propaganda Policy 
The most recent as well as each previous change in China’s external 
propaganda policy was driven by a complex set of domestic and external factors 
that were context-specific and therefore do not lend themselves easily to 
generalization. However, a few important factors should nonetheless be explained, 
divided into external and domestic.  
First, the CPC’s general line, officially based on its evaluation of the 
biggest problems the Party needs to tackle at home and abroad, has unsurprisingly 
influenced the aims of external propaganda as well as the most important target 
audiences. When line and goals change, so will external propaganda’s purpose 
and the way in which it is conducted. After the CPC identified Japan as its main 
enemy in 1936, the focus of international propaganda shifted from linking the 
Chinese revolution to the world revolution towards getting the West’s help in the 
fight against Japan. Conversely, when the direction or a particular policy is 
disputed, this is likely to show in China’s external propaganda policy and output. 
During the Mao period, the goal, target audience, content and tone of external 
propaganda kept changing following political struggles within the Center over the 
course China should take. Since the beginning of the reform and opening period, 
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the main function of external propaganda has been to serve the realization of the 
three main tasks of the CPC, economic development, reunification, and world 
peace (i.e. China’s rise). With regard to the latter two, divisions within the Center 
translate into difficulties to decide which of China’s many roles to stress: is China 
a developing country or a major power; a peaceful and cooperative giant in the 
existing international system or a or a serious counterbalance against the U.S.? In 
addition, the CPC’s external line and China’s foreign policy have influenced the 
target audience. For example, as China began to attach importance to improving 
diplomatic relations in its immediate vicinity, external propaganda targeted at 
neighboring countries was reinforced.  
Second, principles and policies devised for the overall situation (quanju 全
局) and meant to be adapted to each policy sector and each locale significantly 
shape the external propaganda debate. For instance, when Jiang Zemin introduced 
the “Three Represents,” the external propaganda sector came up with ideas how 
the new principle could be translated into concrete policies. Principles and 
policies originally devised for other policy sectors, most importantly propaganda 
and thought work and foreign affairs work, are also frequently re-interpreted and 
adapted to the external propaganda sector. Thus, the overall agenda of the CPC at 
a particular point in time provides the basic framework within which external 
propaganda can develop. 
Third, in almost each new development, foreign models and the 
transnational development of what the concept of propaganda targeting foreign 
publics meant and what scope of activities it should encompass had an impact on 
the Chinese debate. These are developments that take place outside of the PRC 
and in which neither the CPC nor the Chinese government are directly involved, 
although some changes might be reacting to developments within the PRC. Such 
developments enter the Chinese discourse and pool of policy options through the 
channels of absorbing foreign knowledge outline in Chapter 4. The in-flow of 
ideas from abroad is partially acknowledged and marked as such (e.g. in the case 
of the concept of soft power) and partially unacknowledged. 
Many different countries have served as models for specific aspects, for 
example Japan (culture), Israel (handling journalists, integrating academics), 
Egypt (image of ancient civilization), France (cultural diplomacy), etc. China has 
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also learned from its opponents such as the Dalai Lama. Intergovernmental 
initiatives and cooperation projects have likewise impacted Chinese external 
propaganda debates and practices. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the UNESCO 
debates about a “new world information and communication order” provided 
arguments why Xinhua would have to be turned into a world news agency.  
The most important country that China has watched and studied since the 
post-Mao period, however, is clearly the United States, first, because since the 
1990s China has seen itself as a major target of U.S. propaganda and wants to stay 
informed of what it has to expect and second, because the U.S. as the only 
superpower is an important model for China. In the 1980s, when an image-
conscious Ronald Reagan was in the White House, China first began to speak 
about its own international image. Likewise, as Charles Wick prepared to launch 
Worldnet, China, too, began to focus on how it could use television to spread its 
message. In the 1990s, China kept an eye on the changes in the USIA. The “shift 
East” of U.S. propaganda was used as a general argument why China needed to 
reinforce its external propaganda, but concrete transformations, such as the 
consolidation of radio and television, were also picked up and used as suggestions 
for China’s reforms. In the 21st century, the renewed emphasis on soft power and 
public diplomacy in the U.S. introduced a range of new arguments about the 
relationship between external propaganda and national security into the Chinese 
debate that contributed to the upgrade of the external propaganda sector.  
Debates abroad thus function as a constant supplier of new ideas. Through 
the established practices of intelligence work at all levels, ideas voiced or 
implemented in one national context quickly spread to other countries. The same 
is true for academic debates. The steady inflow of all kinds of new ideas and 
practices and the fact that in many areas China still tries to catch up means that 
Chinese discussions often become a form of “echo chamber” for larger global 
debates. For each development in China, it therefore makes sense to first look 
which global debate or development it responds or corresponds to. However, the 
examples throughout the dissertation have shown that the Chinese debate did not 
merely react passively to the influx of new ideas from abroad, but that the latter 
were mostly used quite consciously to push for changes within the Chinese system. 
The appropriation of different concepts and practices from abroad is often driven 
by specific Chinese needs, and when ideas and practices are transplanted, they can 
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assume very different meanings and purposes. As such, foreign models first and 
foremost constitute resources that can be used by different actors in the policy 
process to argue for (or against) certain reforms. 
Despite the use of different models, the constant inflow of new ideas as 
well as changes in the structural base of world relations, some institutions have 
been very persistent. These are patterns of action or valuation that often precede 
the founding of the PRC or go back even further. The most important cultural or 
historical legacy going back to 19th century is the understanding of China as a 
victim of bullying by imperialist powers that is now finally able to resume its 
rightful place in the world. This master narrative has survived various changes in 
how the world is structured, with the bullies appearing in the form of the racist 
imperialists, the capitalist imperialists, the cultural imperialists, and the national 
hegemonists. In the debate whether external propaganda is the solution to many of 
China’s problems or whether it is completely useless, the key is how the West is 
framed: Can it be convinced or is it irredeemably imperialist/reactionary/hostile? 
If it is the first, China needs to be patient with foreigners, who simply lack 
knowledge. If ill-will on the part of foreigners must be assumed, on the other hand, 
propaganda is useless. Here, the argument that the majority of the people are good 
has helped those in favor of more external propaganda throughout the 20th 
century as much as today. 
In sum, while foreign models have played an important role, many twists 
in the debate can only be understood if analyzed as part of a larger Chinese 
domestic campaigns, which were, of course, often the result of interaction with an 
outside world. In addition, historical patterns of framing the world and discussing 
propaganda targeted at foreigners continue to be relevant in current debates. 
 
10.3 Historical and Structural Constraints 
 Alarmism about the deficits of one country’s propaganda is part and parcel 
of any attempt to get more money from the central government, both in China and 
elsewhere. However, it is still reasonable to argue that Chinese external 
propaganda is, in fact, lagging behind in many areas. Various constraints have 
prevented China from taking certain paths or have pushed it towards one option 
and away from another. Most issues can be traced back in some way to having 
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adopted the S.U. model of propaganda that works in a relatively closed 
environment, but does poorly in an environment in which borders are eroded. 
Problems China has to deal with in trying to reform the system can be identified at 
three different levels. First, at the most basic level, there is the issue of introducing 
new practices and having to re-train external propaganda workers. Second, there is 
the problem of bureaucratic resistance when trying to implement reforms. Finally, 
there is the organizational structure and place of external propaganda in the 
overall bureaucracy. Existing constraints can additionally be divided into two 
basic types: Those cases where the CPC fully supports a reform and that can -
theoretically- be resolved through retraining personnel and institutional 
restructuring and those cases in which different policies and values are in conflict. 
While solving the first type requires commitment (both the political will and 
ability to invest money and energy) and thus should not be underestimated, the 
latter category has been more problematic in China and will likely remain difficult 
to solve in the future as well.  
 The first legacy of the institutional set-up of the Mao period is that 
external propaganda is not a powerful sector in its own right. Instead of setting up 
a relatively independent, strong external propaganda agency comparable to the 
USIA, China opted for a complex division of work between different departments 
largely from the propaganda sector and the foreign affairs sector according to their 
areas of expertise. Although the distribution of responsibilities has changed, the 
fragmentation of the sector has persisted until today.  
 Second, China now has a domestic propaganda apparatus that has a vital 
role in maintaining CPC control, but does not mix well with the practices required 
in the global media environment. Although the establishment of the domestic 
propaganda apparatus set China off on a path that was difficult to reverse, the fate 
of China’s external propaganda as dependent on and thus constrained by domestic 
propaganda was neither sealed when the CPC consolidated its propaganda 
apparatus in 1942 nor when it invited Soviet advisors after the founding of the 
PRC to establish a pervasive nationwide propaganda apparatus. Rather, these were 
the first steps of a multi-stage process that could have turned out differently at 
several junctures, such as in the 1980s, when domestic propaganda came under 
attack. The current situation China finds itself in is the result of a series of 
reactions to different events that strengthened the domestic propaganda apparatus 
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and gave propaganda work a firm place in the overall ideological universe of the 
CPC. 
After a decade of relative weakening of the domestic propaganda system 
and the relative strengthening of the external propaganda apparatus, domestic 
propaganda returned with full force. Owing to the institutional reforms of the 
1980s, which had used existing domestic propaganda structures to strengthen 
China’s external propaganda work, the overwhelming majority of new external 
propaganda structures depended on and had to take orders from domestic 
propaganda departments and units, at the central level as much as within most 
individual media units. Despite a possible trend towards more independence in the 
late 1990s and early 21st century, with the creation of the External Propaganda 
Work Leading Small Group in 2004 and the explicit order in 2007 to “coordinate 
the domestic and the international,” external propaganda is now almost 
irreversibly a part of the overall propaganda system. The CPC’s belief in the 
inevitable trend of globalization contributed significantly to the upgrade of 
external propaganda, but it also blocks the possibility of delinking the external 
propaganda apparatus from its more powerful domestic counterpart. While 
external propaganda media are encouraged to adapt their style and content at the 
micro-level to the tastes of foreign audiences, any substantial exceptions from the 
existing media rules for external propaganda media are ruled out. Thus, any 
reforms will have to apply to the domestic propaganda apparatus as well. That 
means in the eyes of the CPC the benefits of any proposed reform have to 
outweigh the costs not only for China’s international communication, but also 
from a domestic perspective.  
Many of the shortcomings of “external propaganda” that Chinese analysts 
frequently complain about, such as a reporting style that is not suited to foreign 
tastes or late reports especially in crisis situations, are arguably a direct result of 
the institutional arrangement at the decision and policy-making level, where the 
interests of external propaganda institutions are secondary to domestic concerns. 
Media are not like cultural projects, which can either focus on “low politics” or 
approach “high politics” issues indirectly. Instead, they are frequently required to 
directly engage in the global conversation on topics considered “high politics” by 
the CPC. In the dialectic contradiction between “focusing on ourselves” (yi wo 
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wei zhu 以我为主) and “being on target” (you di fang shi 有的放矢), the latter by 
and large takes precedence in regular mode, whereas the first prevails once a crisis 
is declared or China’s core interests are touched.  
One main problem, which explains why some points on the agenda kept 
showing up for several decades without being solved, has been the fact that there 
have been few incentives for taking risks or implementing certain changes, but a 
lot to lose instead. In an environment in which the political climate keeps shifting 
and in which orders given are ambiguous –demands for creativity and innovation 
on the one hand, and for “propaganda discipline” (xuanchuan jilü 宣传纪律) on 
the other– people are likely to err on the safe side. As opposed to domestic media, 
which need to make money, China’s big media targeting foreigners are not 
expected to pay for themselves. Thus, the potential for independent innovation is 
very low, and even in Party-sanctioned reforms, people are careful.  
 Two layers about the Chinese media system need to be distinguished that 
could, to a degree, be maintained or abandoned independently from one another, 
Party-ownership of the media and extra-legal control over media content and 
concrete formulations using day-to-day instructions through various well-
established channels. In both areas, since the late 1980s, when the Party principle 
was strongly reaffirmed, there have been reforms: With regard to Party-ownership, 
some operating departments have been listed, even at the highest level. Regarding 
extra-legal controls, external propaganda media are supposed to get as much 
leeway as possible. Except for the careful testing of selected private media, 
however, there have been no substantial or qualitative changes that would off-set 
even small parts of the Party principle. So what stands in the way of substantial 
reforms, both regarding Party-ownership of the media, and concrete practices of 
control?  
 First, and most importantly, domestic propaganda work has a very firm 
place in the political imaginary of the CPC. It is no coincidence that the CPD’s 
powers were upgraded at the same moment that China embarked on further 
economic reforms in 1992. Instead, the two were tied together: For as long as 
China pursued the policies of reform and opening, it would have to continue 
strengthening its propaganda apparatus in order to mitigate any negative 
consequences of increasingly divergent interests within society and to counteract 
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any hostile ideology that could sneak in through the open door. The CPC’s belief 
that chaos would ensue if it failed to correctly guide public opinion was further 
enforced by the absorption of modernization theory. Thus, in the new century, 
with the entry into the WTO and a very “risky” period of development ahead, 
domestic propaganda, again, became more, not less important.  
 Second, existing bureaucracies as well as groups and individuals within 
these bureaucracies are likely to resist change, both because they do not want to 
cede power and because changes in existing routines are costly. In the case of 
external propaganda, at the highest level, there is the fact that the CPD as a 
bureaucracy will resist any weakening of its power. Although less consequential, 
the same is true for units at lower levels.  
 Third, while the current system of media control with the CPD at the top, 
despite its many adaptations, is a huge burden for Chinese media going global, in 
the domestic realm it arguably works well enough that there is not enough of an 
incentive for the CPC to fundamentally change it. Instead the Party continues to 
try to optimize it. Since external propaganda has been tied to domestic propaganda, 
and domestic propaganda continues to be seen as more important, swift and 
substantial reforms in the near future for China’s most important media are 
unlikely.  
From a more practical perspective, there is the difficulty and cost associated 
with having to retrain people. Both after the founding of the PRC and again 
beginning in the 1980s, the CPC tried to retrain its external propaganda workers. 
While in the first case, some continued to argue for distinguishing material 
targeted at foreigners from domestic propaganda, the level of skill required to 
produce correct translations according to a single correct standard is relatively low. 
Through a system of additional checks, adherence to the new standards could be 
ensured relatively easily. Teaching journalists to write more vividly and 
independently in a foreign language, by contrast, has been a much more difficult 
enterprise. Throughout the post-Mao period, more rhetorical commitment usually 
led to more external propaganda initiatives, but not necessarily or immediately to 
qualitative improvement of media output, in the sense of moving away, for 
example, from the extreme attention paid to correct formulations and correct 
ideological stance, regardless of how such texts would be received by foreigners. 
On the contrary, the expansion of the apparatus and inclusion of more people and 
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organizations as well as the desire to crank up China’s voice sometimes even led 
to temporary set-backs because new organizations became involved that had little 
experience with external propaganda work and not necessarily enough qualified 
personnel. A recent example is the trend among provinces and municipalities, 
presumably following orders from the Center, to set up websites in English which 
often contain basic “mistakes” such as translating xuanchuanbu 宣传部  as 
propaganda department not publicity department. 
 One of the most important problems is the fact that China has opted for a 
“quick fix.” For the nation-wide establishment of external propaganda structures 
at the provincial level and below, existing domestic propaganda departments have 
arguably been of help to achieve swift results that could be pointed out in the 
typical “success reports” delivered by locales to their superiors. It is far easier to 
add a bureau to an existing department and transfer a number of people than to 
establish a new department from scratch. However, the problems with this 
approach are evident: The simple existence of an external propaganda department 
and personnel does not mean that cadres have the necessary qualifications. More 
importantly, retraining is difficult because cadres already have an established way 
of doing things. Finally, external propaganda bureaus, departments, and small 
groups are established under the authority of domestic propaganda structures, 
replicating the problems China also faces at the highest level. Thus, during the 
1980s as much as today, domestic propaganda structures have offered a 
treacherous illusion of being able to set up external propaganda at lower levels 
fast without offering any actual way of quality control. Particularly in a sector 
such as external propaganda in which quality matters at least as much as quantity, 
if not more, the problems this causes are evident. While cities such as Shanghai 
have the expertise, experience and likely even the motivation to create media that 
are well-received by foreigners, possibly better than the Center itself, the same 
cannot be said of provinces such as Shanxi or Gansu.  
 A related problem has presented itself with the creation of global media 
players, which have been seen as key to China’s overall external propaganda 
project. The reforms and expansions largely take place on the basis of existing 
media units, many of which have historically focused on domestic audiences. In 
the past, such existing infrastructures have proven difficult to work with in several 
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instances. Media newly created at an opportune moment, by contrast, had a much 
better chance to establish different work and reporting styles, despite being less 
powerful. The China Daily, founded in 1981 as a paper with unprecedented 
independence in the PRC, had been writing pieces quite removed from the 
Chinese journalistic style of the Mao period and produced English language 
articles of a much higher quality than Xinhua’s External Department, which was 
tied down both by its previous experience and by its place in the overall news 
agency. Likewise, trying to establish a 24 hour news channel on the basis of 
existing structures at CCTV (including existing routines, existing hierarchies, etc.) 
has been problematic.  
 
 Of course, not all problems in China’s external propaganda are caused or 
exacerbated exclusively by the domestic propaganda apparatus. The two different 
modes of communication in crisis mode and in regular mode are also upheld in 
texts clearly not scripted (though most likely often approved) by the CPD. In fact, 
long term advisors of OEP/SCIO such as Li Xiguang are outspoken proponents of 
lambasting anyone challenging any of China’s core interests; they might be 
opposed to the awkward language used in some rebuttals, but they are not 
opposed to rebuttals per se, even very harsh ones. This is not an issue primarily 
caused by the CPD, but a part of Chinese political communication that, just like 
the distinction between malicious ringleaders and unwitting followers, is anchored 
more deeply in the CPC’s way of thinking and acting and even has some pre-
modern roots. 
Moreover, with regard to harsh critiques in cases where China’s interests 
are touched, there are different opinions tied to the larger debate about how 
assertive China should be in front of the international public. It is mainly an 
outcome of the various different roles that China tries to play simultaneously: 
China the developing country versus China the big power and peaceful China 
versus a China that needs to show the world it can and will defend its interests. 
However, the act of balance is arguably also further complicated by the two 
different modes of communication, a relatively restrained style stressing harmony 
versus the highly polemical often martial style that is used once issues are 
considered political. 
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Despite disagreements within the external propaganda sector, over the last 
few decades several individuals and groups of people have tried to change 
existing practices and arrangements. A number of different groups have an 
interest in changing the way external propaganda is run for different reasons: 
External propaganda departments and units have an interest in raising their own 
standing within the overall system by increasing the importance of external 
propaganda. Though most journalists do not get into contact with the CPD 
directly, many presumably have an interest in being disturbed by existing 
regulations as little as possible and not having to fear negative consequences for 
minute slips and mistakes. People who want to improve China’s image and 
increase its influence over international public opinion who also have an 
understanding of how international journalism should operate in order to be 
effective have ideational motives. These people come from all walks of life. They 
might be cadres in higher or lower leadership positions, media scholars, 
journalists, or Chinese exchange students studying abroad. Businesspeople in the 
media industry generally have an interest in continued commercialization and 
privatization of the media. They point out the problems China’s Party-owned 
media face internationally in order to further their own agenda.  
External propaganda cadres’ pushing for incremental reforms should not 
be confused with what is understood in studies of the Chinese media as “pushing 
the boundaries.” In China’s domestic media environment, journalists at the 
majority of media, which are no longer subsidized and thus need to be self-
sufficient, have incentives to try to report as much as possible and test the waters 
in order to attract more readers and thus make more profits. China’s external 
propaganda media –at least at the central level– are in a completely different 
situation. They receive large subsidies, and although several people have argued 
that eventually they will have to be self-sufficient in order to be competitive on 
the global media market thus far none of them have to worry about the bottom line. 
What they do have, particularly at the lower levels, is first-hand knowledge that 
China’s domestic media model and Chinese journalistic norms and conventions of 
style do not work at the international level. At higher levels, aside from this 
knowledge, cadres are also motivated by making their own department more 
relevant to the CPC’s interests and thus potentially more powerful.  
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Under the existing constraints, proponents of external propaganda reforms 
away from the strict constraints imposed by the CPC’s elaborate system of media 
control have made use of a number of strategies, most of which are also known to 
be used in other sectors of the Chinese bureaucracy.  
The first, successfully used in the early 21st century, was linking external 
propaganda to national security and regime security. Once this interpretation had 
gained the acceptance of the Party Center and external propaganda had been 
officially reframed as a security issue, much more drastic and sweeping reforms 
became possible. 
The second strategy has been to ask for incremental reforms rather than 
sweeping changes. Thus, people keep lobbying for more reforms and for gradually 
shifting the balance between two dialectic policies. This chipping away at 
orthodoxies is a common strategy in Chinese politics and arguably more likely to 
succeed than asking for massive changes challenging the ideological foundations 
of propaganda work as a whole. However, whatever is gained can be quickly lost 
during the next conservative backlash. 
Third, reformers couch the changes they advocate in the language of the 
Center. Departments and locales generally have a degree of leeway for making 
policies as long as they stay in the overall framework of the Center, usually 
provided in the form of speeches and new slogans. The results are usually very 
concrete policies that can be very removed from the original context provided by 
the Center. Within the confines of a slogan and the precedent what the slogan 
means at a higher level external propaganda policy makers do have some degree 
of freedom of interpreting the slogan and room for setting their own agenda (as 
long as this agenda can be connected to the slogan).The resulting policies are not 
usually seen as a problem by the Center; the flexibility is intentional. It does not 
mean that departments have endless possibilities, but in non-sensitive areas, they 
are relatively free to associate the problems they see as most pressing with the 
slogans devised at the Center, and even in sensitive areas, a new slogan can 
provide an opportunity to push in a particular direction.  
Fourth, people pushing for a particular reform may also state that a 
particular measure is an “objective law” (keguan guilü 客观规律) that needs to be 
observed in order to succeed. Here, proponents of reform may point to studies of 
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various foreign models that have identified certain regularities. One author stated 
that external propaganda could only succeed if radio and television units joined 
forces. Likewise, several qualitative changes in writing style have been justified 
by pointing to the “objective laws of journalism.” Thus, building “external 
propaganda theory” is also a potential strategy to push for certain measures that 
might otherwise be rejected for ideological reasons. The building of mechanisms 
to harvest and evaluate feedback from readers also plays to the advantage of those 
arguing for more sweeping changes. Under the overall value of the “scientific 
development outlook” (kexue fazhan guan 科学发展观 ) combined with the 
overall urgency attached to extending China’s influence over global public 
opinion, being able to “prove scientifically” that a certain strategy is 
counterproductive is of immense value.  
Fifth, successful events and experiments can be used to argue for the 
expansion of a particular policy or strategy. Events whose coverage or 
presentation to the world is evaluated as successful, such as the Hong Kong 
handover or the Wenchuan earthquake, often continue to be used as illustration 
that success is possible for years. This has to be understood as an argument 
against the common complaint that external propaganda is pointless because the 
West distorts China on purpose. More importantly, the (external) propaganda 
conducts controlled experiments. If an experiment goes well, supporters can point 
to the positive results to argue for a policy change. Anti-CNN very much seems 
like such a controlled experiment. The group was touted on Chinese mainstream 
media, and after the fact, it was used to argue that Chinese netizens were patriotic 
enough that they could be trusted, at least on questions involving nationalist issues.  
 
10.4 Summary 
To conclude, the shift from selective appropriations from the S.U. to 
selective appropriations from Western countries has proven difficult for China and 
continues to cause problems. The most disruptive factor for China’s external 
propaganda, an issue that most countries China currently selectively borrows from 
do not have to deal with, is the existence of a more powerful domestic propaganda 
apparatus, which was accorded an even more important and powerful position in 
the early 1990s than during earlier decades. Through the use of different strategies, 
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tremendous changes in China’s external propaganda have been effectuated. Even 
in “high politics” areas, despite significant institutional and ideological obstacles, 
China has been able to adapt its external propaganda apparatus relatively well to 
an environment tilted largely to its disadvantage, but the process has been slow, 
and has been partially counteracted by new policies introduced in the 21
st
 century 
that react to the difficulties in containing information and that mandate domestic 
and external propaganda coordinate its activities more closely. The Party’s 
concept of propaganda and the media continues to put a cap on what can be done, 
and this is unlikely to change. This means that while reforms might be remarkable 
within the Chinese context they are not strong enough to have an effect 
internationally. Thus, in the absence of any drastic changes, Chinese external 
propaganda is heading towards a dead end. Whether or not this matters for China 
depends on whether or not there is any truth to the belief in propaganda as a 
magical weapon. 
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11 List of Abbreviations 
 
Acronym Name Chinese/Russian 
(transcription) 
Chinese/ Russian 
ABC American 
Broadcasting 
Company 
[Meiguo guangbo 
gongsi] 
[美国广播公司] 
AFP Agence France-
Presse 
[Faguo xinwenshe (Fa 
xinshe)] 
[法国新闻社 (法新
社)] 
AP Associated Press [Meiguo lianhe 
tongxunshe (Mei 
lianshe)] 
[美国联合通讯社
(美联社)] 
BBC British Broadcasting 
Corporation 
[Yingguo guangbo 
gongsi] 
[英国广播公司] 
BFSU Beijing Foreign 
Studies University 
Beijing waiguoyu 
daxue 
北京外国语大学 
CAJ China Academic 
Journals 
Zhongguo xueshu 
qikan 
中国学术期刊 
CASS Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences 
Zhongguo shehui 
kexue yuan 
中国社会科学院 
CC Central Committee Zhongyang 
weiyuanhui 
中央委员会 
CPPCC Chinese People’s 
Political 
Consultative 
Conference 
Zhongguo renmin 
zhengzhi xieshang 
huiyi 
中国人民政治协商
会议 
CCTV China Central 
Television 
Zhongyang dianshitai 中央电视台 
CFA Committee for Free 
Asia 
[Ziyou yazhou 
weiyuanhui]  
[自由亚洲委员会] 
CIPG China International 
Publishing Group 
Zhongguo guoji 
chuban jituan 
中国国际出版集团 
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CNC China Xinhua News 
Network 
Corporation 
Zhongguo Xinhua 
xinwen dianshi wang 
中国新华新闻电视
网 
CNKI China National 
Knowledge 
Infrastructure  
Guojia zhishi jichu 
sheshi 
国家知识基础设施 
CNN Cable News 
Network 
[Youxian dianshi 
xinwenwang] 
[有线电视新闻网] 
CPC Communist Party of 
China 
Zhongguo 
gongchandang 
中国共产党 
CPD Central Propaganda 
Department 
Zhongxuanbu 中宣部 
CPI Committee on Public 
Information 
[Gonggong xinxi 
weiyuanhui] 
[公共信息委员会] 
CPIFA Chinese People’s 
Institute of Foreign 
Affairs 
Zhongguo renmin 
waijiao xuehui 
中国人民外交学会 
CPSU Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union 
Kommunisticheskaya 
partiya Sovetskogo 
Soyuza 
Коммунистическая 
партия Советского 
Союза 
  [Sulian 
gongchandang] 
[苏联共产党] 
CRI China Radio 
International 
Zhongguo guoji 
guangbo diantai 
中国国际广播电台 
CWPC Chinese Workers 
and Peasant’s 
Correspondence 
Zhongguo gongnong 
tongxunshe 
中国工农通讯社 
EPSG External Propaganda 
Small Group 
Duiwai xuanchuan 
xiaozu 
对外宣传小组 
EPWLSG External Propaganda 
Work Leading Small 
Group 
Duiwai xuanchuan 
gongzuo lingdao 
xiaozu 
对外宣传工作领导
小组 
FALSG Foreign Affairs 
Leading Small 
Group 
Waishi lingdao xiaozu 外事领导小组 
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FAO Foreign Affairs 
Office 
Waishi bangongshi 外事办公室 
FASG Foreign Affairs 
Small Group 
Waishi lingdao xiaozu 外事领导小组 
FDI Foreign Direct 
Investment 
[Waiguo zhijie touzi] [外国直接投资] 
FLO Foreign Languages 
Office 
Waiwenju (Zhongguo 
waiwen chuban faxing 
shiye ju) 
中国外文局 (中国
外文出版发行事业
局) 
FLP Foreign Language 
Press 
Waiwen chubanshe  外文出版社 
GAPP General 
Administration of 
Press and 
Publication 
Xinwen chuban 
zongshu 
新闻出版总署 
GATT General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 
[Guanmao zong 
xieding] 
[关贸总协定] 
GDP Gross Domestic 
Product 
[Guonei shengchan 
zongzhi] 
[国内生产总值] 
GDTV 
World 
Guangdong 
Television World 
Guangdong dianshitai 
guoji pindao 
广东电视台国际频
道 
GMD Kuomintang/ 
Chinese Nationalist 
Party 
Guomindang 国民党 
GNP Gross National 
Product 
[Guomin shengchan 
zongzhi] 
[国民生产总值] 
GPrA General Press 
Administration 
Zhongguo xinwen 
zongshu 
中国新闻总署 
GPuA General Publication 
Administration 
Zhongguo chuban 
zongshu 
中国出版总署 
HKSE Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange 
[Xianggang jiaoyisuo] [香港交易所] 
ICA International 
Communication 
[Guoji jiaoliushu] [国际交流署] 
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Agency 
ICS International 
Channel Shanghai 
Shanghai waiyu 
pindao 
上海外语频道 
IDCPC International 
Department of  
Central Committee 
of CPC 
Zhonggong zhongyang 
duiwai lianluo bu 
中共中央对外联络
部 
ILD International Liaison 
Department 
Duiwai lianluo bu 对外联络部 
IPA Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis 
[Xuanchuan fenxi 
xuehui] 
[宣传分析学会] 
IPI Core 
Group 
International Public 
Information Core 
Group 
[Guoji gonggong xinxi 
xiaozu] 
[国际公共信息小
组] 
IPTV Internet Protocol 
Television 
[Wangluo xieding 
dianshi] 
[网络协定电视] 
IR International 
Relations 
[Guoji guanxi ] [国际关系] 
LSG Leading Small 
Group 
lingdao xiaozu 领导小组 
MCST Modern Chinese 
Scientific 
Terminologies 
[Jin xiandai Hanyu 
xueshu yongyu yanjiu] 
[近现代汉语学术
用语研究] 
MFA Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Waijiaobu  外交部 
MFN Most Favoured 
Nation 
[Zui hui guo daiyu] [最惠国待遇] 
MFT Ministry of Foreign 
Trade 
Duiwai jingji maoyi 
bu 
对外经济贸易部 
MoC Ministry of Culture Wenhuabu 文化部 
MOFCOM Ministry of 
Commerce 
Shangwubu 商务部 
NAM Non-Aligned 
Movement 
[Bu jiemeng yundong] [不结盟运动] 
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NATO North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization 
[Bei Daxiyang 
gongyue zuzhi] 
[北大西洋公约组
织] 
 
NED National Endowment 
for Democracy 
[Meiguo guojia 
minzhu jijinhui] 
[美国国家民主基
金会] 
NGO Non-Governmental 
Organization 
[Fei zhengfu zuzhi] [非政府组织] 
NPC National People’s 
Congress 
Quanguo renmin 
daibiao dahui (Renda) 
全国人民代表大会 
(人大) 
NSDD National Security 
Decision Directive 
[Guojia anquan juece 
zhiling] 
[国家安全决策指
令] 
NWICO New World 
Information and 
Communication 
Order 
[Guoji xinwen 
chuanbo xin zhixu] 
[国际新闻传播新
秩序] 
NWIO New World 
Information Order 
[Guoji xinwen xin 
zhixu] 
[国际新闻新秩序] 
OCAO (State Council) 
Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office 
(Guowuyuan) Qiaowu 
bangongshi 
(国务院)侨务办公
室 
OEP Office of External 
Propaganda 
Zhonggong zhongyang 
duiwai xuanchuan 
bangongshi 
中共对外宣传办公
室 
OGC Office of Global 
Communications 
[Quanqiu jiaoliu 
bangongshi] 
[全球交流办公室] 
OWI Office of War 
Information 
[Zhanshi xinwen 
bangongshi] 
[战时新闻办公室] 
PBSC Politburo Standing 
Committee 
Zhonggong zhongyang 
zhengzhi ju 
changweihui 
中共中央政治局常
委会 
PDD Presidential Decision 
Directive 
[Zongtong jueding 
zhiling] 
[总统决定指令] 
PLA People’s Liberation 
Army 
Renmin jiefangjun 人民解放军 
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PR Public Relations [Gonggong guanxi] [公共关系] 
PRC People’s Republic of 
China 
Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo 
中华人民共和国 
PTWLSG Propaganda and 
Thought Work 
Leading Small 
Group 
Xuanchuan, sixiang 
gongzuo lingdao 
xiaozu 
宣传、 思想工作
领导小组 
RFA Radio Free Asia Ziyou Yazhou diantai 自由亚洲电台 
RFE Radio Free Europe Ziyou Ouzhou diantai 自由欧洲电台 
ROC Republic of China Zhonghua minguo 中华民国 
S.U. Soviet Union Soyuz Sovetskikh 
Sotsialisticheskikh 
Respublik 
Союз Советских 
Социалистических 
Республик (СССР) 
  [Sulian] [苏联] 
SAFEA State Administration 
of Foreign Expert 
Affairs 
Guojia waiguo 
zhuanjia ju 
国家外国专家局 
SARFT State Administration 
for Radio, Film, and 
Television 
Guojia guangbo 
dianying dianshi 
zongju 
国家广播电影电视
总局 
SCIO State Council 
Information Office 
Guowuyuan xinwen 
bangongshi 
国务院新闻办公室 
SCMP South China 
Morning Post 
[Nanhua zaobao] [南华早报] 
SIIO State Internet 
Information Office 
Guojia hulianwang 
xinxi bangongshi 
国家互联网信息办
公室 
SOE State-Owned 
Enterprises 
Guoyou qiye 国有企业 
SPG Special Planning 
Group 
[Tebie jihua xiaozu] [特别计划小组] 
SPPA State Press and 
Publication 
Guojia xinwen chuban 
shu 
国家新闻出版署 
TASS Telegraph Agency of Telegrafnoye Телеграфное 
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the S.U. agentstvo Sovetskovo 
Soyuza 
агентство 
Советского Союза 
(ТАСС) 
  [Tasi she] [塔斯社] 
TMC Transnational Media 
Corporations 
[Kuaguo chuanmei 
gongsi] 
[跨国传媒公司] 
U.S. United States [Meilijian hezhongguo 
(Meiguo)] 
[美利坚合众国 (美
国)] 
UN United Nations [Lianheguo] [联合国] 
UNESCO United Nations 
Educational, 
Scientific and 
Cultural 
Organization 
[Lianheguo jiaoyu, 
kexue yu wenhua 
zuzhi] 
[联合国教育、科
学与文化组织] 
UPI United Press 
International 
[Hezhong guoji she] [合众国际社] 
USIA United States 
Information Agency 
[Meiguo xinwen shu] [美国新闻署] 
USIS United States 
Information Service 
[Meiguo xinwen chu] [美国新闻处] 
VOA Voice of America [Meiguo zhi sheng] [美国之声] 
VOKS All-Union Society 
for Cultural 
Relations with 
Foreign Countries 
Vsesoyuznoye 
obshchestvo  ulʹturnoy 
svyazi s zagranitsey 
Всесоюзное 
общество 
культурной связи с 
заграницей 
(ВОКС) 
  [Sulian duiwai 
wenhua guanxi xiehui] 
[苏联对外文化关
系协会] 
WTO World Trade 
Organization 
[Shijie maoyi zuzhi 
(Shimao)] 
[世界贸易组织(世
贸)] 
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12.1.1.7 Newspaper Articles 
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2007, 1. 
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1925, 196. 
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qiangdiao yi kexue lilun wuzhuang ren yi zhengque yulun yindao ren yi 
gaoshang jingshen suzao ren yi youxiiu zuopin guwu ren: Li Ruihuan Zhu 
Rongji Liu Huaqing Hu Jintao Li Lanqing Li Tieying Wei Jianxing Wen 
Jiabao Ren Jianxin chuxi, Ding Guan’gen zhuchi huiyi” 江泽民总书记在全
国宣传思想工作会议上发表重要讲话强调以科学理论武装人以正确舆
论引导人以高尚精神塑造人以优秀作品鼓舞人李瑞环朱镕基刘华清胡
锦涛李岚清李铁映尉健行温家宝任建新出席  丁关根主持会议 
[General Secretary Jiang Zemin delivered an important speech at the 
National propaganda and ideological work meeting and stressed to arm 
people with scientific theories, guide people with correct opinion, shape 
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ribao, May 17, 1962, 5. 
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wending wujia, zhengqu nongye hao shoucheng, huanjie zong gonggei zong 
xuqiu maodun Guowuyuan jueding zuzhi qicao san nian Zhili zhengdun 
jihua mingque san nian hou mubiao” 李鹏总理在国务院全体会议上说 年
内经济工作重点仍是三件事 继续稳定物价，争取农业好收成，缓解总
供给总需求矛盾 国务院决定组织起草三年治理整顿计划明确三年后目
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标 [Premier Li Peng said in the plenary meeting of the State Council that the 
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zhe zhong wuli zuofa you sun Zhong Yin youyi; Nihelu dui Xinhuashe de 
baodao zuo wu genju de gongji” 对新华社关于印度情况的真实报道深为
不满 印度政府迫使新华社记者离印 我大使馆照会指出这种无理作法有
损中印友谊 尼赫鲁对新华社的报道作无根据的攻击 [Deeply dissatisfied 
with Xinhua’s true reports about the situation in India, the Indian 
government forced Xinhua’s journalists to leave the country. The Chinese 
embassy pointed out in a verbal note that this unreasonable action harms 
Sino-Indian friendship. Nehru’s attack on Xinhua’s reports has no basis]. 
Renmin ribao, August 3, 1960, 3. 
Fu Ying 傅莹. “Zhongshi gonggong waijiao” 重视公共外交 [Attach importance 
to public diplomacy]. Renmin ribao, July 27, 2009, 14. 
“Ge di ganbu qunzhong renzhen xuexi linghui shiliu da baogao jingshen biaoshi 
jinjin zhuazhu zhongyao zhanlue jiyuqi quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui” 
各地干部群众认真学习领会十六大报告精神表示紧紧抓住重要战略机
遇期全面建设小康社会 [Cadres and masses everywhere diligently study 
and understand the spirit of in the report of the sixteenth Party Congress and 
state that (China must) firmly seize the period of important strategic 
opportunities to build a moderately well-off society]. Renmin ribao, 
November 12, 2002, 1. 
 “‘Guangming ribao’ fabiao Zheng Bijian Guo Zhenyuan wenzhang ping shijie 
fanwei de gaige tiaozheng chaoliu”《光明日报》发表郑必坚郭震远文章 
评世界范围的改革调整潮流 [The Guangmin daily publishes an article by 
Zheng Bijian and Guo Zhenhua assessing the worldwide trend of reform and 
adjustment]. Renmin ribao, August 14, 1988, 3.  
Gu Ping 古平. “Lun guoji jushi de ji ge tedian” 论国际局势的几个特点 [On a 
few characteristics of the international situation]. Renmin ribao, April 3, 
2002, 3.  
Guo Jiping 国纪平. “Gongtong weihu shijie heping wending” 共同维护世界和
平稳定  [Jointly safeguard world peace and stability]. Renmin Ribao, 
December 6, 2007, 3. 
Hu Jintao 胡锦涛. “Tuidong gongtong fazhan, gongjian hexie Yazhou – zai Bo’ao 
yazhou luntan 2011 nian nianhui kaibushi shang de yanjiang” 推动共同发
展 共建和谐亚洲——在博鳌亚洲论坛二〇一一年年会开幕式上的演
讲  [Promoting common development and building a harmonious Asia - 
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Speech at the opening ceremony of the annual meeting of the Boao Forum 
for Asia 2011]. Renmin ribao, April 16, 2011, 1. 
“Hu Qili zai quanguo xuanchuan buzhang huiyi shang shuo jin yi bu jiefang 
sixiang zhudong kaituo gongzuo ba shisan da baogao de xuexi yinxiang 
shenru” 胡启立在全国宣传部长会议上说 进一步解放思想主动开拓工作 
把十三大报告的学习引向深入 [Hu Qili states at the nationwide meeting 
for propaganda department heads that (everbody needs to) further liberate 
thinking, proactively pioneer work and deepen the study of the report of the 
Thirteenth Party Congress]. Renmin ribao, January 26, 1988, 1.  
Jie Xi 解犀 and Shi Lu 施路. “Pingbao  ‘beiwanglu’ – Jian da ‘jieyan budui bu 
rushing shiufou hui fasheng fan geming baoluan’ deng yiwen” 平暴“备忘
录 ”——兼答 “戒严部队不入城是否会发生反革命暴乱 ”等疑问 
[“Memorandum” of quelling the riots – Plus answers to questions such as 
“If the martial law troops had not entered the city, could anti-revolutionary 
riots have happened”]. Renmin ribao, July 26, 1989, 1.  
Liao Hongbin廖宏斌. “Xingxiang bu hao guai baozhuang” 形象不好怪包装 [If 
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“Li Changchun zai zhongyang duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang qiangdiao 
yong ‘san ge daibiao’ zhongyao sixiang tongling duiwai xuanchuan 
gongzuo jin yi bu kaichuang duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo xin jumian” 李长
春在中央对外宣传工作会议上强调 用“三个代表”重要思想统领对外宣
传工作 进一步开创对外宣传工作新局面 [Li Changchun stresses at the 
central external propaganda work conference that external propaganda needs 
to be directed by the important thought of the ‘three represents’ in order to 
continue to create a new situation in external propaganda work]. Renmin 
ribao, April 22, 2004, 1.  
Li Changjiu李长久. “Zengqiang zonghe guoli, weihu shijie heping” 增强综合国
力 维护世界和平 [Enhance the nation’s comprehensive powers to protect 
world peace]. Renmin ribao, June 30, 1999, 6.  
Li Xiaobing 李小兵 . “Lengzhan hou de wenming zhanlue: Hengtingdun de 
‘wenming chongtu lun’ pingjie”冷战之后的文明战略——亨廷顿的“文明
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